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SOVIET UNION EXTERNAL = GORBACHEV'S REPORT ON THE SUMMIT

SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT GORBACHEV REPORTS WITH SATISFACTION ON HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON. A NEW ERA OF COOPERATION. HARDLINE COMES THROUGH ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND GERMANY/NATO. BRIEF TREATMENT OF VISIT TO OTTAWA AND THE WARSAW PACT SUMMIT

DETAIL

2. GORBACHEV SPOKE TO THE SUPREME SOVIET ABOUT HIS NORTH AMERICAN VISIT AND THE WARSAW PACT ON 12 JUNE. HE SPOKE FOR 80 MINUTES AND THEN ANSWERED WRITTEN QUESTIONS FROM THE FLOOR.

SOVIET/AMERICAN RELATIONS

3. HE SAID HE HAD SET OFF WITH THE HOPE OF ANSWERING FOUR QUESTIONS ON AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION. HOW DID THE AMERICANS ASSESS THE NEW APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS? HOW MUCH WAS THEIR POLICY CALCULATED ON SHORT-TERM BENEFIT? DID THEY UNDERSTAND THAT THE SUPERPOWERS COULD NOT GO ON COMPETING? HAD OUTDATED ATTITUDES BEEN OUTDATED.

4. HE THOUGHT THAT IN THIS REGARD THE SUMMIT HAD BEEN SATISFACTORY. HE WAS SATISFIED THAT PRESIDENT BUSH WAS HOLDING TO BE REASONABLE COURSE DESPITE PRESSURE FROM ALL SIDES. THE TRADE AGREEMENT, WHICH MANY IN THE MEDIA HAD TRIED TO REPRESENT AS HOSTAGE TO THE LAW ON EMIGRATION AND 'OUR RELATIONS WITH THE LITHUANIAN SEPARATISTS,' HAD BEEN SIGNED AND WOULD ULTIMATELY BENEFIT THE SOVIET UNION. HE LISTED THE AGREEMENTS TO SUPPLY AMERICAN COMPUTERS, WHICH HAD EARLIER BEEN FORBIDDEN FRUIT.

5. THERE HAD BEEN VERY LITTLE DISAGREEMENT ON REGIONAL ISSUES. THE ONLY THORNY SUBJECT HAD BEEN CUBA.

ARMS CONTROL.

6. GORBACHEV EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THE AGREEMENTS ON START. HE HIGHLIGHTED THOSE AREAS WHERE THE AMERICAN POSITION HAD SHIFTED TO

ENABLE A COMPROMISE TO BE STRUCK.

7. BUT NOW A START AGREEMENT HAD BEEN STRUCK, IT WAS TIME TO INCLUDE THE FRENCH AND BRITISH DETERRENTS IN THE NEXT GENERATION OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. THERE HAD BEEN A CONSENSUS, AT THE TIME OF HIS CONCESSION OF REYKJAVIK, THAT THESE SYSTEMS WOULD BE ON THE TABLE AFTER THE SUPER-POWERS HAD CUT THEIR ARSENALS BY 50%. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE NO CIRCUMVENTION OF START. THE US WERE INSISTING ON MAINTAINING THEIR PROGRAMME WITH THE UK, BUT THIS MATTER WAS BEING ADDRESSED SERIOUSLY (SERIOZNO ZANIMAETSYA). HE HAD PUT HIS VIEWS FORWARD IN WASHINGTON AND REPEATED THEM TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

8. THE CW AGREEMENT WAS A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH. BUT THE SOVIET UNION WAS FACED WITH THE PROBLEM OF NOT HAVING THE DESTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY. THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE TO SHARE ITS TECHNOLOGY.

GERMANY

9. GORBACHEV REPORTED THE LINE HE HAD TAKEN WITH THE PRESIDENT THAT THE INCLUSION OF GERMANY IN NATO WOULD PROMPT THE RUSSIANS TO REVIEW THEIR POSITION AT BOTH THE CFE AND NST NEGOTIATIONS. THE WARSAW PACT HAD RECOGNISED THE NEED TO REFORM. THEY NOW AWAITED A RESPONSE FROM THE NATO SUMMIT. HE DID NOT EXPECT THE BLOCs TO DISSOLVE OVERNIGHT, AND THERE WOULD BE A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IN WHICH THE FRG AND GDR'S OBLIGATIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE HONOURED. DURING THIS TIME NATO AND SOVIET FORCES WOULD REMAIN IN GERMANY. HE HAD WARNED THAT IF THE SOVIET UNION WAS MADE TO FEEL THAT THE GERMAN QUESTION WAS BEING SOLVED WITHOUT IT, THEN THE POSITIVE CHANGES WOULD BE UNDER THREAT.

10. HE APPRECIATED WESTERN EFFORTS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF SOVIET CONCERNS. THE SOVIET POSITION WAS THAT 'WE COULD AGREE TO GERMAN MEMBERSHIP, IF (THE WEST) WOULD ACCEPT ASSOCIATIVE PARTICIPATION, AT THE SAME TIME THERE SHOULD BE RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN, AND TRANSFORMATION OF, THE ALLIANCES.' NO ONE MODEL HAD YET FOUND FAVOUR. IT WAS A TIME TO EXPLORE OPTIONS. AFTER HIS TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, AND SHEVARDNADZE'S MEETING WITH BAKER IN COPENHAGEN, THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TAKE THIS ON.

11. GORBACHEV DEALT BRIEFLY WITH OTTAWA, BUT PRAISED MULRONEY AS A SERIOUS INTERLOCUTOR.

QUESTIONS

12. GORBACHEV WAS ASKED ABOUT THE PEACE DIVIDEND, THE PROSPECTS FOR NAVAL ARMS CONTROL (ON WHICH HE EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF WHY THE AMERICANS WERE HESITANT) AND A NUCLEAR FREE WORLD (ABOUT WHICH HE WAS

OPTIMISTIC). HE WAS ASKED TO COMPENSATE THE RESIDENTS OF SEMIPALABINSK FOR THEIR ENDURANCE OF NUCLEAR TESTING WHICH HAD ENABLED 'DETERRENCE TO KEEP PEACE IN EUROPE FOR FORTY YEARS.' BOTH THE KAZAKHS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE NORTH ASKED FOR NUCLEAR TESTING TO BE STOPPED.

13. ON GERMANY, GORBACHEV CONFIRMED THAT HIS DISCUSSIONS AT CAMP DAVID HAD SHOWN UP THE 'FRENCH OPTION' AS A MYTH. HE SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD WANT TO SEE A SMALLER BUNDESWEHR, AND NO FORWARD DEPLOYMENT.

14. HE ALLOWED HIMSELF TO SMILE AT THE QUESTION IF HE AND PRESIDENT BUSH HAD DISCUSSED A JOB SWAP. HE DID NOT LET PASS THE IRONIC SUB-TEXT WHICH HE TOOK TO BE 'THAT PRESIDENT BUSH WILL HELP YOU.'

RECEPTION

15. GORBACHEV WAS WELCOMED WITH POLITE BUT SHORT APPLAUSE. HIS VOICE WAS TIRED AND STRAINED AT FIRST, BUT HE GREW MORE RELAXED AND PERKED UP WHEN DEALING WITH QUESTIONS. HIS AIDES SHEVARDNADZE, FALIN AND PRIMAKOV ALSO LOOKED TENSE. THE DEPUTIES, WHO HAD LISTENED WITH VARYING DEGREES OF ATTENTION, SUBSEQUENTLY APPROVED HIS REPORT IN A RELATIVELY ANODYNE RESOLUTION

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
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OUR TELNO 1094: GORBACHEV ON THE SUMMIT = NON-CIRCUMVENTION/TRIDENT

1. WE SENT TUR BEFORE THE TEXT OF GORBACHEV'S REMARKS WAS AVAILABLE. HERE IS WHAT HE SAID ABOUT TRIDENT.
2. BEGINS: 'SERIOUS DIFFERENCES WERE AROUSED BY THE QUESTION, WHICH CONTINUES (SIC) TO REMAIN UNRESOLVED, OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF THE TREATY. THE AMERICANS, REFERRING TO THEIR SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH GREAT BRITAIN IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC ARMS, ARE INSISTING ON THEIR UNRESTRICTED RIGHT TO TRANSFER TO HER TECHNOLOGY, AND ANY FORM (OF WEAPON). THIS ALSO PRESEVES A CHANNEL - IN CIRCUMVENTION OF THE TREATY - TO CONTINUE TO IMPROVE AND EVEN INCREASE THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENAL WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF NATO'S OVERALL STRATEGY. THIS QUESTION WILL HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED SERIOUSLY.
3. 'IT IS WORTH REMEMBERING THIS. WHEN IN REYKJAVIK WE DISCUSSED INTERMEDIATE MISSILE REDUCTIONS, AND THE IDEA OF ELABORATING AND SIGNING A TREATY ON 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC ARMS, WE MADE A CONCESSION: FOR A WHILE, AT THAT STAGE, TO LEAVE FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES TO ONE SIDE, BUT THEN BOTH WE AND THE AMERICANS DISCUSSED, AND THERE WERE STATEMENTS FROM THE FRENCH AND BRITISH THAT THEY WOULD INCLUDE THEM IN THE PROCESS OF TALKS ON STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS AFTER THE SOVIET UNION AND UNITED STATES HAD CUT THEIR STRATEGIC WEAPONS BY 50PERCENT. TODAY, WHEN WE HAVE SET DOWN THE BASIC ELEMENTS AND ARE MOVING TO SIGNATURE BY THE END OF THE YEAR IT IS NATURAL FOR THIS QUESTION TO COME UP. I SPOKE ABOUT IT IN WASHINGTON AND TO MRS THATCHER A FEW DAYS AGO.
4. 'IN A WORD, IT IS AN UNACCEPTABLE FORMULA TO US - TO TRANSFER TO THE BRITISH WITHOUT RESTRICTITONS NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE MEANS TO MODERNISE THEM. EARLIER WE WERE TALKING ABOUT REPLACING 'TRIDENT-1' WITH 'TRIDENT-II'. AND NOTHING MORE. AND NOW THEY WANT TO HAVE SUCH A GENERAL FORM (OF WORDS) WHICH WOULD LEAVE A CHANNEL OPEN TO CIRCUMVENT THE US-SOVIET START TREATY. THIS IS IMPERMISSABLE AND UNACCEPTABLE.'

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