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INFO PRIORITY ROME, THE HAGUE

FRAME GERMANY  
FRAME EXTERNAL

FROM UKREP BRUSSELS

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL, 18 JUNE:  
GENSCHER-SHEVARDNADZE EXCHANGES

SUMMARY

1. GENSCHER OPTIMISTIC IN REPORT ON TALKS WITH SHEVARDNADZE WHICH REVEALED SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS OF AGREEMENT. MAJOR SOVIET CONCERN APPARENTLY TO AVOID ISOLATION. GENSCHER FIRM ON NEED FOR WESTERN HELP TO SOVIET UNION. FURTHER BRIEFING TO NATO TOMORROW.

DETAIL

2. IN THE MARGINS OF TODAY'S COUNCIL, GENSCHER REPORTED TO A MINISTERS-ONLY SESSION ON HIS MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE IN MUNSTER. HE WOULD BE BRIEFING NATO OVER LUNCH TOMORROW, AND PLANNED ANOTHER MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE BEFORE THE JULY TWO-PLUS-FOUR MINISTERIAL IN PARIS. GENSCHER CONCLUDED THAT THERE WERE STILL SOME THORNY PROBLEMS TO RESOLVE BUT HE WAS BASICALLY OPTIMISTIC. HIS MAIN IMPRESSION WAS OF SOVIET ANXIETY NOT TO BE ISOLATED FROM THE REST OF THE WORLD. HE ALSO TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO URGE THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE WESTERN HELP TO THE SOVIET UNION.

3. GENSCHER SAID THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD ASKED ABOUT THE SPEED OF UNIFICATION WHICH GIVEN THE VOKLSKAMMER RESOLUTION HE HAD CONFIRMED WOULD BE LIKELY TO HAPPEN IN 1990. SHEVARDNADZE DESCRIBED ARTICLE 23 AS A PURELY GERMAN MATTER, NOT A SOVIET AFFAIR. GENSCHER DESCRIBED THIS IN TURN AS A RADICAL SHIFT IN THE SOVIET POSITION - EARLIER THEY HAD DESCRIBED IT AS A FORM OF ANNEXATION.

4. GENSCHER HAD TOLD SHEVARDNADZE THAT THERE WERE FOUR CRUCIAL FACTORS WHICH APPLIED TO FUTURE GERMAN MEMBERSHIP OF NATO: THE CSCE ELEMENT, RELATIONS BETWEEN ALLIANCES, CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT, AND

THE BORDER QUESTION. SHEVARDNADZE HAD TAKEN NOTE THAT TWO PARLIAMENTARY RESOLUTIONS WOULD BE TABLED TOMORROW ON THE LAST POINT.

5. ON CSCE GENSCHER HAD EXPLAINED THE REASONS FOR HOLDING THE SUMMIT IN NOVEMBER, WITH WHICH SHEVARDNADZE HAD AGREED. HE HAD ALSO AGREED WITH GENSCHER'S ARGUMENT THAT THE EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION SHOULD NOT LAG BEHIND THE INTERNAL (IE THERE SHOULD BE NO DE-COUPPING). GENSCHER HAD ALSO REHEARSED HIS OWN IDEAS ON THE NEED FOR INSTITUTIONS IN CSCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY, FREE ELECTIONS AND RIGHTS OF MINORITIES.

6. GENSCHER HAD GIVEN AN INITIAL REACTION TO THE SHEVARDNADZE LETTER ON CSCE, ARGUING THAT THE POINT AT ISSUE WAS RELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES, NOT ALLIANCES, THAT EVERYONE HAD THE RIGHT TO JOIN AN ALLIANCE IF IT EXISTED, THAT GERMANY HAD RENOUNCED ALL TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AND RECOGNISED EXISTING BORDERS, AND HAD RENOUNCED THE USE OF FORCE (THOUGH NOT THE FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS). THERE SHOULD BE, HE HAD CONTINUED, NO DIFFERENTIATION IN THE DEGREE OF SECURITY BETWEEN DIFFERENT ZONES, AND CONTACTS BETWEEN THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY AND WARSAW PACT PARLIAMENTARIANS.

7. SHEVARDNADZE HAD ASKED ABOUT FUTURE GERMAN FORCE LEVELS, TO WHICH GENSCHER HAD RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS A MATTER FOR THE VIENNA TALKS. SHEVARDNADZE HAD INSISTED THAT THE SUBJECT BE DISCUSSED IN THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR CONTEXT, BUT GENSCHER DID NOT BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE A GREAT PROBLEM.

8. SHEVARDNADZE HAD SAID THAT GMU WAS ALREADY CAUSING PROBLEMS FOR SOVIET TROOPS IN THE GDR. (GENSCHER NOTED THAT HE HAD NOT REALISED SO MANY SOVIET WIVES THERE HAD JOBS, THAT ONLY THE OFFICERS HAD A CONVERTIBLE ELEMENT IN THEIR PAY, AND THAT THE STANDARD OF LIVING AMONG SOVIET FORCES WAS ALREADY DROPPING FAST).

9. SHEVARDNADZE HAD TRIED TO DRAW A PARALLEL BETWEEN SOVIET TROOPS IN THE GDR AND ALLIED FORCES IN THE FRG. GENSCHER HAD REFUTED THIS, IN THE FACE OF SHEVARDNADZE'S PLEA FOR NO DISCRIMINATION. THERE WAS CLEARLY NO SYMMETRY BETWEEN THE TWO ALLIANCES.

10. GENSCHER HAD ALSO ARGUED THAT THE ISSUE OF QUADRI-PARTITE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (QPR) MUST BE SETTLED BEFORE THE CSCE SUMMIT. THERE COULD BE NO TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AFTER UNIFICATION. SHEVARDNADZE HAD SAID THERE WAS AS YET NO FINAL SOVIET VIEW ON THIS.

11. FINALLY, SHEVARDNADZE HAD ASKED FOR REASSURANCE ON ASPECTS OF SOVIET-GERMAN RELATIONS. GENSCHER HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT ARTICLE 5 AND 6 OF THE NATO TREATY APPLIED TO THE ENTIRETY OF GERMAN TERRITORY.

12. THERE WERE NO COMMENTS OF SUBSTANCE FROM OTHER EC MINISTERS.

13. IN PRIVATE, YOU WARNED GENSCHER THAT THERE WAS ALREADY A GOOD DEAL OF INTEREST AND EXCITEMENT ABOUT MASSIVE WESTERN ASSISTANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION. HE REPORTED THAT KOHL HAD WRITTEN TO COLLEAGUES TODAY, NOTING THE SEVERE FINANCIAL FLIGHT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE NEED TO CONSIDER ASSISTANCE TO IT. GENSCHER SEEMED UNFAZED BY THE ARGUMENT THAT THE WEST SHOULD NOT POUR MONEY DOWN THE SOVIET DRAIN, ESPECIALLY WHEN THEY WERE NOT MEMBERS OF THE IMF AND NO CONDITIONALITY APPLIED TO THEM. HE APPEARED READY TO COUNTENANCE SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, PROVIDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION ACCEPTED GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO.

14. ALTHOUGH GENSCHER HD BEEN ADVERTISED EARLIER IN THE COUNCIL AS WISHING TO RAISE EC/US INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS, HE DID NOT IN THE EVENT MENTION THE SUBJECT AT ALL.,

CAMPBELL

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