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SIC EME
MODUK FOR SEC (NATO/UK) (P)

UKDEL TELNO 273: NATO/WARSAW PACT DECLARATION

SUMMARY

1. NAC ADDRESSES NATO/WARSAW PACT DECLARATION. MIXED VIEWS. FRG ARGUES STRONGLY IN FAVOUR, WITH LENGTHY PRESENTATION ON SUBSTANCE. U S CAUTIOUS. FRANCE HOSTILE AND ITALY, BELGIUM AND NETHERLANDS RESERVED. OTHERS SUPPORT THE PRINCIPLE, VOICING AGREEMENT WITH UK ON FORM AND SUBSTANCE.

DETAIL

2. AS AGREED (TUR), THE COUNCIL ADDRESSED THIS QUESTION ON 20 JUNE ON THE BASIS OF SHEVARDNADZE'S RECENT LETTER TO BAKER (FAXED TO THE DEPARTMENT). SEVERAL PERMREPS WERE WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS.

3. VON PLOETZ (FRG) SAID THAT THE FUTURE SHAPE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ALLIANCES WAS IMPORTANT AND RELEVANT TO THE TWO PLUS FOUR PROCESS. SECRETARY BAKER AND OTHERS HAD RAISED THE QUESTION AT TURNBERRY. WE NOW HAD SOVIET IDEAS ON THE SUBJECT, WHICH WERE CLEARLY NOT THE LAST WORD. THE SEQUENCE OF IDEAS PUT FORWARD AT BREST, THEN IN LETTERS TO NATIONS INDIVIDUALLY, THEN IN THE LETTER TO BAKER, SHOWED AN EVOLUTION OF SOVIET THINKING ON SUBSTANCE. THE REACTION OF THE NSWP COUNTRIES MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT: GERMAN EMBASSIES HAD BEEN ASKED TO REPORT. CLEARLY THESE COUNTRIES WANTED CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION WITH NATO (OF THE PCC DECLARATION). SHEVARDNADZE'S IDEAS CONTAINED A NUMBER OF POSITIVE ELEMENTS: SOME WHICH NEEDED AMENDMENT: AND SOME WHICH WERE UNACCEPTABLE. SOME KEY POINTS WERE MISSING. THE IDEA OF A DECLARATION AT 23 MUST NOT DAMAGE THE FUTURE OF CSCE, WHICH REMAINED THE MAIN FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO ALL OF EUROPE. IT WAS THUS WELCOME THAT SHEVARDNADZE ENVISAGED OTHER CSCE STATES JOINING IN. SOME SORT OF DECLARATION COULD BE CONSIDERED: IT SHOULD BE BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCES, NOT BETWEEN THE ALLIANCES AS SUCH.

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4. VON PLOETZ THEN ADDRESSED SHEVARDNADZE'S IDEAS SERIATIM:

- ALLIANCES DID NOT SEE EACH OTHER AS ADVERSARIES, AND THERE SHOULD BE OVERARCHING STRUCTURES: THIS IDEA WAS NOT A PROBLEM IF CORRECTLY FORMULATED.
- BORDERS/NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS: THE FINAL ACT HAD SUITABLE LANGAUGE.
- RENUNCIATION OF FORCE, NO NUCLEAR FIRST USE: THE FIRST POINT WAS COVERED IN THE HELSINKI/STOCKHOLM DOCUMENTS. NOFUN WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE, BUT THE IDEA COULD BE BROADENED TO EXCLUDE FIRST USE OF ANY KIND OF FORCE. PERHAPS A JOINT FORMULA COULD BE DEvised DESCRIBING THE WAR-PREVENTING ROLE OF AN ADEQUATE MIX OF WEAPONS AT MINIMUM LEVEL.
- CONSULATION MECHANISMS, INCLUDING CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE PRINCIPLE OF INSTITUTIONALISED, CONSULTATIONS WAS ACCEPTED BOTH AT 23 AND AT 35. THE EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ON MECHANISMS AT 35.
- COMMITMENT TO ARMS CONTROL: THE CONTINUATION OF CFE WAS ACCEPTABLE, ALTHOUGH THE STATED GOAL NEEDED AMENDMENT.
- REDUCTIONS OF ALL STATIONED FORCES: THIS WOULD NEED CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. THERE SHOULD BE NO PARALLELISM BETWEEN SOVIET AND WESTERN STATIONED FORCES.
- SNF: NATO HAD AN AGREED POSITION BASED ON THE BUSH PROPOSAL.
- ZONAL PROPOSALS: GERMANY DID NOT LIKE THE IDEA OF ZONES WITH SPECIAL STATUS, WHETHER CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR, EXCEPT AS APPROPRIATE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN OVERALL AGREEMENT (AS IN CFE).
- COOPERATION IN VARIOUS FIELDS (PEACE-KEEPING, ETC): THESE IDEAS NEEDED CAREFUL STUDY: SOME WERE UNACCEPTABLE.
- CONVERSION OF EQUIPMENT: THE WEST DID NOT FACE THE SAME PROBLEM AS THE SOVIET UNION.

VON PLOETZ SAID THAT AMONG MISSING ITEMS WAS ANY MENTION OF THE RIGHT OF A STATE TO CHOOSE TO BELONG TO AN ALLIANCE.

5. FULCI (ITALY) SAID THAT NATO SHOULD NOT PROP UP THE WARSAW PACT AGAINST THE WILL OF ITS MEMBERS. MANY OF THE SOVIET POINTS WERE UNACCEPTABLE. CAJAL (SPAIN) SAW SOME POSITIVE ELEMENTS: NATO SHOULD RESPOND IN ITS SUMMIT DECLARATION TO THE EVIDENT DESIRE FOR COOPERATION. THUYSBAERT (BELGIUM) SAID THAT IF THE PACT WAS GOING TO DISAPPEAR, NATO WOULD SUFFER BY ANY ATTACHMENT TO IT. THE SOVIET UNION WAS WITHDRAWING TO WITHIN ITS OWN BORDERS: TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE PACT COULD INHIBIT THIS PROCESS. ANY APPROACH TO A DECLARATION, OR TO BROADER COOPERATION WITH THE EAST, SHOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN CSCE.

6. JACOBVITS (NETHERLANDS) ARGUED FOR A CAUTIOUS APPROACH. IT APPEARED THAT THE TEXT RECEIVED IN THE HAGUE WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT SENT TO BAKER. WERE APPROACHES TO INDIVIDUAL ALLIES ON DIFFERING BASES A TACTICAL DEVICE? WE NEEDED EARLY REACTIONS FROM THE NSWP. THE RUSSIANS WERE TRYING TO GIVE THE PACT A NEW LEASE OF LIFE BY LINKING IT TO NATO. IT WAS PREFERABLE TO CONSULT AT 35 RATHER THAN AT 23.

7. ROBIN (FRANCE) SAID THAT THERE WERE THREE OBJECTIONS TO A PROPOSAL FOR AN AGREEMENT AT 23: IT SUGGESTED THAT THE PACT WAS HERE TO SAY (EVEN IF WE NEGOTIATED WITH ITS INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS): TO TAKE UP THE SOVIET IDEAS WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF RENDERING NATO USELESS, SINCE IT WOULD NO LONGER HAVE A PURPOSE: AND THE IDEA WAS CONTRARY TO THE CSCE PROCESS (WHY BUILD AT 23 WHAT WE WISHED TO ACHIEVE AT 35?) THE ACCEPTABLE PARTS OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL COULD BE ACHIEVED AT 35.

8. SMITH (CANADA) AGREED WITH VON PLOETZ. HE SUPPORTED A DECLARATION AT 23: THIS COULD BE LINKED TO THE CFE AGREEMENT. IT WAS A GOOD IDEA THAT OTHERS COULD SIGN UP IF THEY WISHED. BEFORE THE LONDON SUMMIT THE COUNCIL SHOULD LIST THE ELEMENTS WHICH IT WAS WILLING TO SEE INCLUDED.

9. TAFT (U S) SAID THAT SHEVARDNADZE'S LETTER, DELIVERED ON 14 JUNE, WAS A RESPONSE TO BAKER'S REQUEST FOR AN ELABORATION OF THE IDEAS PUT FORWARD IN COPENHAGEN. BAKER HAD FELT THE IDEA OF A DECLARATION SHOULD NOT (NOT) BE REJECTED OUT OF HAND. WASHINGTON WAS STILL STUDYING SHEVARDNADZE'S TEXT: BUT IT SEEMED A STEP BACK COMPARED WITH EARLIER SOVIET PRESENTATIONS. THE SUBSTANCE OF SHEVARDNADZE'S LETTER WAS DISAPPOINTING. IT AIMED AT THE ABOLITION OF NATO, AND HAD MANY OTHER UNACCEPTABLE FEATURES. THE ACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS ALREADY FEATURED IN EXISTING INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS. THE U S STILL DID NOT REJECT THE IDEA OF A DECLARATION: BUT THE LATEST SOVIET PROPOSAL WAS NOT A BASIS FOR ONE. NATO SHOULD DEAL WITH THE PACT MEMBER STATES, NOT WITH THE PACT AS SUCH.

10. BEATTIE (UK) SAID THAT COUNCIL WOULD RECALL THAT THIS ISSUE HAD BEEN RAISED BY GORBACHEV DURING THE PRIME MINISTER'S RECENT VISIT TO THE USSR. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD AGREED THAT THE MATTER SHOULD BE PURSUED FURTHER, BUT HAD GIVEN NO OTHER COMMITMENT. OUR INITIAL VIEW WAS THAT THE IDEA OF A DECLARATION OFFERED POSSIBILITIES. THE PRIMARY AIM WOULD BE TO HELP THE RUSSIANS ACCEPT A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO. BUT ANY SUCH DECLARATION SHOULD NOT PREJUDICE OUR OWN SECURITY INTERESTS, NOR ARTIFICIALLY STRENGTHEN THE WARSAW PACT. AS STRESSED

IN COUNCIL ON 19 JUNE (TUR) FULL ACCOUNT SHOULD BE TAKEN OF THE VIEWS OF THE NSWP, WHO SHOULD BE CONSULTED AT AN EARLY STAGE. ON FORMAT, WE ENDORSED THE GERMAN VIEW THAT ANY DECLARATION SHOULD BE BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBER STATES OF THE ALLIANCES. WE SHOULD AVOID IMPLYING ANY EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN NATO AND THE PACT OR ANY INDICATION THAT WE EXPECTED THE PACT TO CONTINUE IN BEING. ON SUBSTANCE, THE SOVIET PROPOSAL CONTAINED MANY UNACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS, BUT WE COULD AGREE TO OTHERS. (I LISTED THE MAIN ELEMENTS IN PARA 3 OF FCO TELNO 1061 TO WASHINGTON). THE TACTICS OF PRESENTATION OF ANY PROPOSALS WOULD NEED VERY CAREFUL THOUGHT. WE WOULD NEED TO STRESS THAT WE WERE ONLY WILLING TO CONCLUDE A DECLARATION AS PART OF AN OVERALL ARRANGEMENT, INCLUDING FULL GERMAN MEMBERSHIP OF NATO. WE MIGHT WELL WISH TO REFER TO OUR WILLINGNESS IN PRINCIPLE FOR A JOINT DECLARATION IN THE NATO SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE. BUT THE ISSUE WOULD REQUIRE MUCH FURTHER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

11. BIERRING (DENMARK) SUPPORTED THE PRINCIPLE OF A DECLARATION IF IT HELPED THE RUSSIANS ON GERMANY/NATO, AND PROVIDED IT WAS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES AND THE NSWP AGREED. BUT THE ALLIES SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS ON SUBSTANCE. MANY OF THE SOVIET IDEAS WENT TO FAR, SOME WERE UNACCEPTABLE AND OTHER IMPORTANT ELEMENTS WERE MISSING. BUT HE AGREED WITH THE UK THAT A GOOD DEAL COULD BE DISTILLED FROM SOVIET IDEAS. MOST OPERATIONAL MECHANISMS ENVISAGED WERE MORE APPROPRIATE FOR THE CSCE.

12. BREMER (LUXEMBOURG) SAID HIS MINISTER WAS NOT OPPOSED IN PRINCIPLE. BUT THE RELATIONSHIP WITH CSCE WOULD NEED CLARIFICATION. MOST OF WHAT WAS ACCEPTABLE IN SHEVARDNADZE'S PROPOSALS WAS FOR CSCE. NATO SHOULD REACT POSITIVELY, BUT AVOID BUTTRESSING THE PACT. HE WAS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE LONDON SUMMIT SHOULD REACT. IF SO, THIS SHOULD BE IN VERY GENERAL TERMS ONLY.

13. FARIA (PORTUGAL) SAID ANY DECLARATION WOULD NEED TO BE DRAFTED IN THE BROADEST POSSIBLE TERMS. THE ALLIES SHOULD FIRST CONSIDER WHERE THEIR OWN INTERESTS LAY, AND WHAT CONCEPTS THEY COULD SIGN UP TO. ONLY THEN SHOULD SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN VIEWS BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

14. FOSTERVOLL (NORWAY) SAID HIS MINISTER WELCOMED THE IDEA. NATO SHOULD BUILD ON THE USEABLE ELEMENTS IN SHEVARDNADZE'S PROPOSALS. NSWP VIEWS SHOULD BE SOUGHT URGENTLY. THERE SHOULD BE A REFERENCE IN THE NATO SUMMIT DECLARATION: THE ISSUE WAS TOPICAL AND EYE-CATCHING.

15. ZAFIROPOULOS (GREECE) SUPPORTED PREVIOUS SPEAKERS. HIS

AUTHORITIES WELCOMED THE IDEA IF THIS WOULD HELP GERMAN UNIFICATION, BUT WERE CAUTIOUS ON THE OPERATIONAL ASPECTS. THE MATTER SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE NATO SUMMIT DECLARATION.

16. THE SECRETARY GENERAL CONCLUDED THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THIS QUESTION WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN THE CONTEXT OF PREPARATION FOR THE LONDON SUMMIT, BUT DID NOT ATTEMPT TO SUM UP.

17. AT THE PERMREPS LUNCH IT WAS AGREED THAT THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE SHOULD COMPARE AND ANALYSE THE VARIOUS (AND SLIGHTLY DIFFERING) SOVIET TEXTS RECEIVED IN CAPTIALS.

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