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US/SOVIET RELATIONS: BAKER'S SPEECH TO THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON US/SOVIET RELATIONS

## SUMMARY

1. BAKER OUTLINES FRAMEWORK FOR NEW ERA OF US/SOVIET RELATIONS EMPHASISING QUOTE PATHWAYS OF MUTUAL ADVANTAGE UNQUOTE FOR BOTH NATIONS. LISTS A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC AREAS WHERE COOPERATION COULD BE INTENSIFIED, INCLUDING BILATERAL ACTION AGAINST PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. EXPRESSES SYMPATHY FOR THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE SOVIET UNION, AND URGES AMERICANS TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN, NON-OFFICIAL, CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

## DETAIL

- 2. IN A SPEECH TO THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON US/SOVIET RELATIONS ON 19 OCTOBER, BAKER CALLED FOR CONTINUED EXPANSION OF US/SOVIET COOPERATION. THE COLD WAR EPOCH WAS OVER. IT ENDED IN EUROPE ON 1 OCTOBER WITH THE SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT ON GERMANY. THE GLOBAL COLD WAR ENDED MORE DRAMATICALLY WITH THE PARTNERSHIP FORGED BETWEEN BUSH AND GORBACHEV AT THE HELSINKI SUMMIT.
- THE NEW US/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP BEGAN EIGHTEEN MONTHS AGO WHEN BUSH FIRST ADVOCATED A POLICY OF MOVING BEYOND CONTAINMENT. A YEAR AGO, BAKER URGED A SEARCH FOR POINTS OF MUTUAL ADVANTAGE. NOW THERE WAS A NEED TO QUOTE MARK PATHWAYS OF COOPERATION UNQUOTE FOR ADDRESSING POST-COLD WAR CHALLENGES.
- 4. THE SEARCH FOR POINTS OF MUTUAL ADVANTAGE HAD ACHIEVED IMPORTANT RESULTS. OVER THE PAST YEAR, THE US/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP HAD BEEN BROADENED AND DEEPENED BY COOPERATION ON FIVE TOPICS: FIRST, BY WORKING TO MAKE EUROPE WHOLE AND FREE. THE CHANGES IN EUROPE HAD BEEN POSSIBLE BECAUSE THE US AND OTHERS HAD REACHED OUT TO MOSCOW, FOR EXAMPLE THROUGH THE TWO PLUS FOUR MECHANISM, AND THE ADAPTATION OF NATO WHICH CULMINATED IN THE LONDON SUMMIT DECLARATION. SECOND, THERE HAD BEEN GOOD PROGRESS IN COOPERATING ON REGIONAL CONFLICTS OUTSIDE EUROPE. IRAQ/KUWAIT WAS THE OBVIOUS EXAMPLE. BUT BAKER ALSO MENTIONED CENTRAL AMERICA, NAMIBIA, ANGOLA, THE HORN OF AFRICA, CAMBODIA, AND AFGHANISTAN. THIRD, THERE HAD BEEN NOTICEABLE PROGRESS IN

PAGE 1 UNCLASSIFIED CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AND START. THEY WERE
COOPERATING OVER CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND ON THE CONTROL OF MISSILE
TECHNOLOGY. FOURTH, THE US HAD SUPPORTED SOVIET POLITICAL
REFORM. THERE HAD BEEN PROGRESS IN HUMAN RIGHTS, AND IN HELPING
MOSCOW CONSTRUCT DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW.
FIFTH, THE US HAD LAUNCHED A WIDE RANGE OF ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL
CONTACTS. BAKER SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO EXPAND THESE EFFORTS TO
HELP REPUBLIC LEADERS, AND EVEN CITY LEADERS.

- 5. THE SEARCH FOR POINTS OF MUTUAL ADVANTAGE WOULD CONTINUE IN NEW AND MORE AMBITIOUS WAYS. BAKER SAID THERE WAS A NEED TO BUILD A QUOTE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER UNQUOTE. US/SOVIET RELATIONS WOULD PROBABLY ALWAYS BE UNIQUE, BUT THEY COULD BECOME MORE LIKE THOSE THE US HAD WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS: COOPERATION COULD BECOME THE NORM, AND DISAGREEMENTS COULD BE LIMITED TO SPECIFIC DISPUTES. THE US HOPED TO BUILD QUOTE PATHWAYS OF MUTUAL ADVANTAGE UNQUOTE WHICH WOULD ASSUME THAT CONTINUOUS AND EVEN LASTING COOPERATION MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. THE US WOULD TRY TO PROMOTE COOPERATION IN THREE AREAS: ELIMINATING THE VESTIGES OF THE COLD WAR, ADDRESSING NEW THREATS TO THE POST-COLD WAR ORDER, AND DEALING WITH TRANSNATIONAL PROBLEMS.
- 6. TO HELP ELIMINATE THE VESTIGES OF THE COLD WAR, BAKER PROPOSED, IN CONCERT WITH ALLIES AND THE NEW EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES, TO DEEPEN THE DIALOGUE WITH MOSCOW BY FOCUSING ON WAYS IN WHICH DEMOCRACY, ECONOMIC LIBERTY, RECONCILIATION AND TOLERANCE COULD BE FOSTERED THROUGH THE CSCE. THERE WAS A COMMON INTEREST IN EASING THE ECONOMIC TRANSITION OF THE NEW EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES. ON ARMS CONTROL, HE SAID HE WOULD PROPOSE TO SHEVARDNADZE A JOINT WORKING GROUP ON DETERRENCE, REASSURANCE AND STABILITY TO LEARN MORE ABOUT THE DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY OF SOVIET LEADERS. HE ALSO HOPED FOR A DIALOGUE WITH MOSCOW ON QUOTE DEFENCE CONVERSION UNQUOTE.
- 7. THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION NEEDED MECHANISMS FOR MANAGING NEW THREATS TO THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER. THEY BOTH VIEWED PROLIFERATION AS THE GREATEST SECURITY CHALLENGE OF THE 1990S. THE INCIPIENT NUCLEAR PROGRAMMES OF IRAQ AND NORTH KOREA WERE THE BEST ARGUMENT THAT THE NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORT NEEDED A NEW IMPETUS TO COPE WITH A VERY REAL AND NEW DANGER. THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION COULD HELP LEAD THE WAY TOO ON OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, BUILDING ON THEIR BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO IMPROVE EXISTING MECHANISMS, AND DEVELOP NEW ONES TO RESTRICT THE SUPPLY OF TECHNOLOGY, AND REDUCE THE DEMAND FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. THE EUROPEAN CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES MIGHT ALSO BE USEFUL IN DIFFERENT REGIONS OF THE WORLD. BAKER SAID HE WOULD PROPOSE A US/SOVIET

PAGE 2 UNCLASSIFIED MINISTERIAL WORKING GROUP TO PROMOTE COOPERATION. 8. THE TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES OF DRUG TRAFFICKING, TERRORISM AND ENVIRONMENT HAD BEEN ADDED TO THE FORMAL US/SOVIET AGENDA IN 1989. BUT, BAKER SAID, HE WANTED TO GIVE MORE EMPHASIS TO THESE. HE PROPOSED EXPLORING THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR ECOLOGICAL RESEARCH OF LAKE BAIKAL. ENERGY EFFICIENCY SHOULD BE A TOPIC FOR DISCUSSION. THEY WANTED TO CONTINUE TO DEVELOP COOPERATION TO COUNTER INIERNATIONAL TERRORISM. 9. ON INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION, BAKER DESCRIBED PERESTROIKA AS A REVOLUTION WHICH, LIKE MOST REVOLUTIONS, HAD A MIX OF PARADOXICAL ELEMENTS. ON THE ONE HAND, THERE WAS GREATER LIBERALISM, AND EVOLUTION OF POWER, WHICH WAS FUNDAMENTALLY GOOD. BUT ON THE OTHER, THERE WAS A DETERIORATION IN SOVIET LIFE. STANDARDS OF LIVING WERE FALLING. FREEDOM HAD OPENED AGE-OLD ETHNIC ANIMOSITIES. THIS QUOTE DARKER SIDE UNQUOTE OF THE SOVIET REVOLUTION HAD TO CONCERN US ALL. WE SHOULD ALL BE UNDERSTANDING OF THE HARDSHIP THAT THE QUOTE GREAT UNQUOTE SOVIET PEOPLE WAS ENDURING. THE HOPE WAS THAT DEVOLUTION AND DECENTRALISATION WOULD PREVAIL OVER DETERIORATION AND DECAY. 10. THE SOVIET FUTURE DEPENDED ULTIMATELY ON THE CHOICES MADE BY THE SOVIET PEOPLE. THESE CHOICES WOULD BE LESS HARD IF THE WEST COULD STAND BY THEM. OUR INFLUENCE MIGHT BE MARGINAL, BUT HELP COULD STILL MAKE A DIFFERENCE. ALTHOUGH, DURING THE COLD WAR US/SOVIET DIALOGUE WAS RESTRICTED TO CONTACTS BETWEEN DIPLOMATS, BAKER HOPED THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, ALONG WITH STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, WOULD NOW JOIN THE ADMINISTRATION IN REACHING OUT TO

COMMENT

MARKET ECONOMICS.

11. ALTHOUGH WE UNDERSTAND FROM CONTACTS IN STATE THAT THE TEXT WAS PREPARED FAIRLY QUICKLY, BAKER OBVIOUSLY INTENDED IT AS A KEYNOTE SPEECH TO DESCRIBE WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN TRYING TO ACHIEVE WITH THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS AND HOW HE HOPES THE RELATIONSHIP WILL DEVELOP. THE POSITIVE REACTION OF THE MEDIA HERE WILL ALSO HAVE PLEASED THE ADMINISTRATION. THE APPEAL TO PRIVATE ORGANISATIONS TO DEVELOP CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WAS A USEFUL STATEMENT OF

HELP THE SOVIET PEOPLE. THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY FOR CONTACT AT ALL LEVELS: AMONG PERSONS, GROUPS, FIRMS, INSTITUTIONS, CITIES AND STATES. TO LEND MOMENTUM TO THIS BAKER ANNOUNCED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED TO INCLUDE THE SOVIET UNION IN THE QUOTE CITIZENS DEMOCRACY CORPS UNQUOTE (A PROGRAMME DESIGNED TO HELP CHANNEL PRIVATE US ASSISTANCE TO SPUR DEMOCRACY IN EASTERN EUROPE). THE ADMINISTRATION HOPED, THROUGH THE PROGRAMME, TO HELP SOVIET LEADERS INCREASE THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF DEMOCRACY AND

PAGE 3 UNCLASSIFIED ADMINISTRATION BACKING FOR SUCH CONTACTS - WHICH ARE HAPPENING ON A LARGE SCALE ALREADY - AT A TIME WHEN THE ADMINISTRATION ITSELF IS STILL HAMPERED BY LEGAL OBSTACLES FROM DOING MORE TO HELP THE SOVIET UNION. 12. FULL COPY OF SPEECH BY BAG TO SOVIET DEPT.

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