

## UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR~~SECRET~~Remarks of EVR At National Security Council Meeting  
at Los Angeles, August 17, 1981, on Strategic Weapons  
Systems, (somewhat edited),

First, let me say that like the previous speakers I agree with all of Cap's recommendations except for those with regard to the land based ICBM systems, and in my case, the number of B-1s being proposed. I think there should be more. The area of agreement is now wide, and the area of disagreement narrow and clearly defined. I commend Cap on his presentation. I also welcome Davy Jones' comment that these decisions be fully integrated with our arms control policy, and Al Haig's concurrence in that view. I strongly favor viewing arms control policy as an integral part of our foreign and defense policy as a whole.

I start with the problem of the window of opportunity, as Cap did. And I underscore his statement that that famous window is not a future problem but a present problem. We are suffering from its consequences now in the Caribbean, the Persian Gulf, and other parts of the world. In my judgment a perception of its importance is the root of the uneasiness in Europe and in this country as well. With regard to what Davy Jones said about the relative emphasis on conventional and strategic forces in our planning, I should say simply that the two problems are inseparable. Without a clear second strike capability, it is impossible for us to use our conventional forces with confidence anywhere in the world.

As a matter of arms control policy narrowly considered, it is vital that the window be closed as quickly and firmly as possible. I am not satisfied to wait for a solution until the late 1980s or the early 1990s. Perhaps it is selfish of me, but it would not be much fun to get into the amphitheater with the lions unless that decisive step is taken, and taken soon. And if I do have to face the lions without strong

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armaments behind me, I wouldn't like to bet on the outcome. As Al Haig said, the Soviets don't give something for nothing. They are neither pacifists nor philanthropists, as they often boast. Unless the window of opportunity is closed, we cannot hope to bargain with the Soviet Union about strategic arms at all. Nor, equally, can we expect to keep our allies or our own public behind us, either.

Mind you, I am not suggesting that we wait to negotiate until we are rearmed. That is a rational position. Mitterand has recently spoken favorably of it. But we can't go so far, and the President has decided otherwise. As we have been forced to realize, the mystic faith in arms control agreements as guaranties of peace is simply too strong among our people and the people of Europe to be ignored. But I do want firm commitments to rearm before we sit down at the table next November and March -- Presidential decisions, votes, appropriations; just as soon as possible on the whole of our rearmament program for the next five or six years, and especially on a plausible program for protecting the present and prospective vulnerability of our land-based ICBMs and thus being able to continue deterring the Soviet ICBMs.

Much more is at stake than my comfort in the START negotiations.

There simply is no substitute for our land-based ICBMs at the present time as a check on theirs. It is doubtful whether the bombers we have now and are likely to have for some years can reach and thus deter the Soviet ICBM force, given Soviet air defenses, even with a great many ALCMs. And submarine based missiles are not yet accurate enough for the mission.

Mind you, I am for all three legs of the TRIAD, not because three is a magic number, but on grounds

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of prudence before the dynamics of science, as Dr. Townes pointed out. The bombers have all sorts of uses. In the nuclear equation, they have the advantage of giving the President time by allowing a deployment which would involve neither pushing a button or doing nothing. And submarines, thus far, are hard to find.

But, unless we have an invulnerable second strike capability with which to deter the Soviet ICBM force, and have it as soon as possible, our alliances will melt away. They are showing signs of melting now. Who is going to believe in our nuclear guarantee if we cannot credibly deter the huge and menacing Soviet ICBM force or their SS-20s? If we capitulate before the arithmetic of the nuclear equation -- if, that is, we give up the land-based leg of the TRIAD because it will cost us too much to close the gap Carter created, our action will be perceived as a posture of public surrender to Soviet nuclear blackmail -- exactly the result the Soviets have sought and expect from their intimidating ICBM build up. The effects of such a perception of American retreat are incalculable -- and all bad. It has been said that all land-based ICBMs are now obsolete because they are too vulnerable. If we follow the course Cap recommends, that will be true of ours but not of theirs.

There has been irritation with the Allies over some of the TNF issues and about our MX decision as well. We must understand that if we give up on land-based ICBMs it will be enormously difficult, perhaps impossible, to carry through with theatre nuclear modernization in Europe. Rightly or wrongly, our enemies in Europe and their fellow travellers will focus on what Senators Laxalt and Garn and the Mormon Church have said about MX, and say, "Why should we have land-based missiles if the Americans are phasing out?" At the same time, only an American presence on land in Europe fortifies the alliance against the nightmare fear of decoupling -- that in a crunch the United States would not protect Europe with nuclear power. If we go for a common missile, we should be extremely conscious of that point. No fear can encourage European neutralism more than that one.

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The care and feeding of alliance relations requires the leader to understand, sympathize, and emphathize with the concerns of his allies, and to find solutions for them. At the same time, we should never give others a veto over the vital decisions. Otherwise the alliances may disintegrate. That is how we must treat these problems. We don't have alliances for reasons of sentiment or philanthropy, after all. We have security treaties with the NATO allies, Japan, and a number of other nations, and security understandings with others, because we must at all costs keep them out of Soviet hands. If Europe were lost, Japan and China would draw the necessary conclusions, and we should be isolated, impotent, and alone in a hostile world.

For the time being then -- until submarine based missiles are more accurate and more numerous -- I see no escape from the proposition that we should continue with land-based missiles, very much as we should continue with B-1 until Stealth is ready.

One further point about the policy Cap has proposed: by neglecting our existing ICBM force and therefore making it more and more vulnerable, the pressures of the nuclear equation would make doctrines of launch-on-warning more plausible and more popular. Such a development would be most destabilizing, especially as the Soviets reach the point of unmistakable first-strike capacity.

I have said nothing so far about basing modes for our land-based ICBMs. I am against choosing a mode only because it might be compatible with the provisions of SALT II. I expect the influence of the Treaty provisions to diminish slowly after January 1, 1982. And I have no choice from an arms control point of view among the various modes being discussed, although I have always preferred the simple vertical shelters to the elaborate grids and racetracks which became popular later.

In 1978 and 1979, I was one of those who advocated a quick fix for the window of vulnerability -- to reopen the Minuteman III production line, modernize somewhat, and deploy enough of the missiles to deter the Soviets

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in a simple shell-game mode. Dr. Townes commented on Minuteman III modernization, and said it would be simple and cheap to do, but required a policy decision by others as to whether we wanted a first strike capability. But what he calls a "first strike" capability has always been part of our second strike capability doctrine with regard to extended deterrence -- that is, that we had to have the capacity to make such a strike against the Soviet Union in order to deter, control, or manage a Soviet attack in Europe, in Japan, or in certain vital areas of the Middle East, for example.

If we proceed now, rapidly, with Minuteman III, improving its deployment if its present deployment is wrong, using some sensible form of MPS, we could substitute MX for Minuteman III when MX is available, or enlarge the force if that should be necessary then.

Let me close with a comment on ABM. I plead with all of you not to talk about "abrogating" the ABM Treaty. Our signature to the ABM Treaty rested on the explicit premise that we should also have an effective strategic arms limitation treaty. Otherwise, we said, "the supreme interests" of the United States would be affected. Congress later joined the President in affirming that proposition. It would therefore be natural for us to ask for amendments that might allow us to protect our strategic weapons with ABMs. Such a policy would be altogether consistent with our basic strategic arms policy of deterrence, retaliation, and stability. If, under present circumstances, the Soviet Union should reject such a proposal, it would be time enough to talk about abrogating the treaty. Even then, and on that ground, it would not be easy to do. The Treaty has some of the mystical aura of "arms control" as a religion.

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