

02 23 03

4813

GR 750

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 022302Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 378 OF 2 APRIL 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO.

MIPT: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. I HAVE BEEN THINKING HARD ABOUT OUR TACTICS. FIRST, I BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE WRONG FOR A BRITISH MINISTER TO DROP EVERYTHING AND RUSH OUT HERE SIMPLY BECAUSE THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER IS ARRIVING. THIS STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS IS LIKELY TO BE MESSY AND WE ARE BY NO MEANS CERTAIN TO EMERGE SUCCESSFUL. HENCE, IT IS BETTER FOR ME TO BEAR THE BRUNT. THE TIME MAY COME WHEN MINISTERIAL ATTENDANCE WILL BE DESIRABLE. IF AND WHEN IT DOES, I WILL TELEGRAPH IMMEDIATELY. AT THE MOMENT, I AM CONVINCED THAT THE REVERSE IS THE CASE.

2. SYMPATHY FOR US IS BEGINING TO EBB AND I CANNOT GUARANTEE THAT WE WILL GET 9 VOTES FOR OUR RESOLUTION. THE RUSSIANS ARE PUTTING IT ABOUT THAT THERE HAS BEEN A FAIT ACCOMPLI AND THAT THERE IS THEREFORE NO NEED TO HURRY. THERE IS TALK OF THE BRITISH LOOKING FOR A FACE-SAVING RESOLUTION. THE LONGER THE DELAY BEFORE THE VOTE, THE MORE THIS ROT WILL SET IN AND WE WILL COME UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE UNACCEPTABLY TO WATER OUR RESOLUTION DOWN AT ARGENTINE REQUEST, CHANNELLED THROUGH EG PANAMA, SPAIN AND THE SOVIET UNION - EVEN MRS KIRKPATRICK.

3. HENCE, I AM CONVINCED THAT WE MUST GET THROUGH THIS ROUND TOMORROW (3 APRIL) WHATEVER THE RESULT AND THAT WE MUST REFUSE TO ACCEPT ANY SOFTENING AMENDMENTS (EXCEPT PERHAPS THE ELIMINATION OF OPERATIVE PARA 1 IF, BY SATURDAY MORNING, IT IS TOTALLY UNREALISTIC. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE POSSIBLE OUTCOMES IN DESCENDING ORDER OF DESIRABILITY:-

- (1) NINE VOTES OR MORE WITH NO VETO, IE ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION.
- (2) NINE VOTES OR MORE WITH A SOVIET VETO.
- (3) FAILURE TO ACHIEVE NINE VOTES.
- (4) IF THERE IS OBJECTION TO VOTING ON THE RESOLUTION, LOSS OF A PROCEDURAL NOTION BY US IN FAVOUR OF A VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION.

IN EFFECT THERE IS LITTLE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN (3) AND (4) ABOVE. GIVEN THE STATE OF OPINION IN BRITAIN, IT IS MY JUDGEMENT THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO FAIL FOR ANY OF THE THREE REASONS STATED ABOVE THAN TO ACQUIESCE IN A HEAVILY WATERED DOWN DRAFT TO BE VOTED ON, SAY, IN TWO OR THREE DAYS TIME. THE ONLY OTHER OPTION WOULD BE TO WITHDRAW THE DRAFT ALTOGETHER IF ^A NUMBER OF FRIENDLY COUNTRIES URGED US TO DO SO BECAUSE THEY THEMSELVES COULD NOT SUPPORT IT.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. IF WE FAIL, FOR ANY OF THE ABOVE REASONS, TO GET THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED, I WOULD PROPOSE TO MAKE A STATEMENT THANKING THOSE WHO HAD SUPPORTED US, EXPRESSING DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE COUNCIL'S INABILITY TO TAKE ACTION IN SUCH A SERIOUS CRISIS, STATING THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM NOW SAW NO MORE USEFUL ACTION WHICH COULD BE TAKEN IN THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE TIME BEING, AND QUOTING THE APPROPRIATE SENTENCE FROM THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE LORD PRIVY SEAL IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 2 APRIL (YOUR TELNO 624 TO WASHINGTON), NAMELY "WE ARE TAKING APPROPRIATE MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC MEASURES TO SUSTAIN OUR RIGHTS UNDER DIPLOMATIC LAW AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE UN CHARTER".

5. ALTHOUGH TIME IS SHORT, I SUGGEST THAT URGENT LOBBYING SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN MADRID, DUBLIN, GEORGETOWN, AMMAN (WITH SPECIAL THANKS TO KING HUSSEIN FOR NUSEIBEH'S HELP TO ME IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL YESTERDAY), TOKYO AND KINSHASA. I JUDGE THAT OTUNNU (UGANDA) ACTS OFF HIS OWN BAT. IT MIGHT ALSO BE WORTH ASKING THE FRENCH TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS IN LOME. THESE REPRESENTATIONS WILL HAVE TO BE MADE IMMEDIATELY IN ORDER TO BE IN TIME.

6. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS ON ALL THE ABOVE PROPOSITIONS. ONCE WE HAVE GOT THROUGH THIS ROUND, I WILL SEND FURTHER ADVICE ON HOW WE SHOULD HANDLE MATTERS IN THE UN, IF AT ALL, THEREAFTER. I AM BEGINNING TO THINK THAT WE MAY BE WISE TO AVOID THE UN AFTER THE PRESENT ROUND; OTHERWISE THE ARGENTINES WILL GET US EMBEDDED IN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTE WHERE THEY HAVE THE VOTES AND WE HAVE NOT.

PARSONS

[COPIES SENT TO EMERGENCY STAFF]

FCO
S AM D
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
FALKLAND ISLANDS

-2-

CONFIDENTIAL