

LOOSE MINUTE

41-4-1

Secretary of State

Copy to:

- DMO
- DASD
- AUS(GS)
- VQMG

5/21

S/YS

You raised this at the Chiefs meeting.

It may be necessary to reduce readiness - but we will try & avoid it until after Easter

STATES OF READINESS

Monday. Remember this as a


1. You asked about the UK Regular Army's present state of readiness - not including those already committed to Op CORPORATE, (principally 3 PARA).
2. At 0800 hours 6 April 1982 our official state is:
  - a. At 24 hours notice to move (NTM)
    - The leading elements of the SPEARHEAD battalion group - now 1 QO HLDRS.
  - b. At 72 hours NTM
    - Remainder of the SPEARHEAD battalion group.
    - AMF(L) Key Company - 1 PWO (NATO Readiness).
  - c. At 5 days NTM
    - Leading Parachute Battalion Group - now 2 PARA.
  - d. At 7 days NTM
    - Remainder of the UK Field Army (including 5 Inf Bde, UKMF(L) and remainder of AMF(L)).
  - e. There are also a number of units earmarked for specialist operations within UK, such as Op TRUSTEE (London Airport), which are held at shorter notice.
3. Thus Op CORPORATE units have been replaced in the duty roster - and we are at our correct normal readiness.
4. However all units are following events with the closest interest - and thus reaction times could be considerably shorter depending upon the elements of the Brigade required. Logistic outloading considerations are often the limiting factor. Suffice it to say that I am confident that the Field Army is poised to respond with great urgency to any contingency should the occasion demand - and the realities of obtaining movement agencies will probably be the deciding factor in readiness.

contingency if we wish to increase the pressure SW



5. The deployment to the South Atlantic has, of course, had an impact on our logistic stocks. All war stocks specifically earmarked for Priority 2 operations have, with a few exceptions, been outloaded with the Task Force. In addition, the Royal Marine Commandos have taken, with a very few exceptions, their complete stocks for their Priority 1 commitment. It will take some time to re-earmark sufficient stocks to replace those that have gone to the South Atlantic. However I am confident that at present we can meet the contingencies which could possibly arise in other parts of the world without war stocks being a major constraint, with the exception of our full Priority 1 commitment, in which the extent of the shortfall is well known to you.

6 April 1982



CGS



SECRET

MF66



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DMO  
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VQMG

MO 5/21

MA/CGS

STATES OF READINESS

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The Secretary of State was very grateful for CGS's minute of 6th April which he found a useful summary over the position. S of S has commented that it may be necessary later to reduce readiness - but that he will try and avoid it until after Easter Monday. It is a contingency which he has to bear in mind as a way of increasing pressure.

(D B OMAND)  
PS/S of S

7th April 1982

SECRET