

INMEDIATE

TAPE

(28)

B DISTRIBUTION
FINAL SPECIAL*****
EXCLUSIVE FOR
DR (JOHNSON)
CS [REDACTED]
DP [REDACTED]
J (HERMAN)
K (LITTLE) (2)
L [REDACTED]
P [REDACTED]
R [REDACTED]
S [REDACTED]
V [REDACTED]
Z [REDACTED]
BT
W68/050

[REDACTED]

O 061700Z APR 82 ZYH

FM GCHQ LDN

TO GCHQ CHELTENHAM

INFO SUKLO

VDRKX/5BOM

ZEN

T O P S E C R E T UMBRA UK EYES ALPHA SECTION ONE

EXCLUSIVE FOR DR (JOHNSON) CS ([REDACTED]) DP ([REDACTED]) J (HERMAN)

K ([REDACTED]) - 2 COPIES. LI ([REDACTED]) PI ([REDACTED]) R ([REDACTED]) S ([REDACTED])

5)

V [REDACTED] Z [REDACTED] DTI [REDACTED] FROM DIRECTOR.

HIGHLIGHTS OF SPECIAL JIC ON TUESDAY 6 APRIL 1982.

DCDS(I) AND DS(INT) REPRESENTED HQ.

2. JIC(82)(TA)12:

THE COMMITTEE TOOK NOTE AND:

A) ASKED THAT, IN FUTURE DAILY SITREPS OF THIS KIND, PERIODIC MENTION OF SOVIET REACTIONS (EVEN IF NEGATIVE) SHOULD BE INCLUDED:

B) AGREED THAT THESE DAILY SITREPS SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE INTELLIGENCE ALLIES: IF NECESSARY, A NON-RELEASABLE UKEA ANNEX COULD BE PRODUCED.

3. ARGENTINE CAPABILITY: JIC(82)(N)28:

A) PARA 7 (ON ARGENTINE SIGHT CAPABILITY): I CAUSED A SENTENCE TO BE ADDED TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO BREAK BRITISH CYPHERS PROVIDED THAT THESE WERE CORRECTLY USED:

B) PARA 8 (ON A POSSIBLE ARGENTINE ATTACK ON THE TASK FORCE WHILST EN ROUTE): MENTION WAS TO BE MADE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ARGENTINE AIR FORCE CANNERRAS BEING USED IN THIS CONTEXT:

C) PARAS 14 AND 16: DS INT RAISED THE EXPECTATION THAT ONE OF THE ARGENTINIANS' FIRST MOVES WOULD BE TO EXTEND AND IMPROVE THE PORT STANLEY AIRFIELD: THIS WOULD ALTER THE PICTURE WITH

REGARD BOTH TO SUPPLY BY AIR AND TO AIR DEFENCE, AND APPROPRIATE AMENDMENTS WERE MADE:

4. EVENTS LEADING UP TO INVASION: JIC(82)(N)29:

THE MOST NOTEWORTHY CHANGE WAS TO PARAS 7-8, WHERE ASSESSMENT STAFF WERE ASKED TO DISTINGUISH MORE CLEARLY BETWEEN THE NAVAL EXERCISES UNRELATED TO THE INVASION (BEGINNING AS EARLY AS 24 MARCH) AND THE NAVAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE INVASION ITSELF. BUT THE VIEW THAT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE FOR THE DECISION TO INVAD E WAS 28/29 MARCH STOOD (QUITE RIGHTLY) UNALTERED.

5. IN THIS CONTEXT COPIES WERE HANDED ROUND OF A LETTER SENT FROM FCO TO NUMBER 10, DEALING FIRMLY WITH THE ABSURD SUGGESTION THAT THE INVASION COULD HAVE BEEN PREDICTED ON THE BASIS OF ARTICLES IN THE ARGENTINE PRESS AND/OR LETTERS RECEIVED FROM INHABITANTS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. (I SHALL BE SENDING MY COPY TO D1 FOR FURTHER DISTRIBUTION.)

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