CONFIDENTIAL SCORESA THE TYPE AS DESTROYERS SHERE IN

C GØ13 Ø8/Ø334 Ø98CØ513

FOR CWG

IMMEDIATE Ø716ØØZ APR 82
FROM COMMCEN FCO LONDON TO MODUK (DUS (P)) DS12 DSC

CONFIDENTIAL

SIC A3A/19F

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY Ø8Ø8ØØZ

FM FCO Ø716ØØZ APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 115 OF 7 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE NATO POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, CANBERRA,

WELLINGTON, MODUK (DUS(P)) DS 12 AND DEFENCE SITUATION CENTRE CONFIDENTIAL WELLINGTON, MODUK (DUS(P), DS 12 AND DEFENCE SITUATION CENTRE)

YOUR TELNOS 165 AND 166: FALKLAND ISLANDS 1. WE APPRECIATE YOUR WISH TO KEEP OUR ALLIES AS FULLY INFORMED AS POSSIBLE. YOU WILL UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT DETAILS OF OUR MILITARY PREPARATIONS SHOULD NOT (NOT) REACH

PAGE 2 RBDWC AØ388 C O N F I D E N T I A L THE ARGENTINES. IF WE WERE TO REVEAL OUR DISPOSITIONS TO OUR ALLIES THERE WOULD BE AN INEVITABLE INCREASE IN THE RISK OF A DAMAGING LEAK WHICH COULD ENABLE THE ARGENTINES TO PREPARE MORE EFFECTIVELY AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF A MILITARY ENGAGEMENT. 2. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINE IN THE NAC: AS ALLIES WILL BE AWARE FROM THE PRESS, WE ARE DESPATCHING A SUBSTANTIAL FORCE TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. WE SHALL BE SEEKING TO USE THE TIME WHICH WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THE FORCE TO MAKE THE JOURNEY TO EXERCISE THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA TO AGREE TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. THE ASSISTANCE OF ALLIES WILL BE ESSENTIAL HERE, AND WE ARE DEEPLY GRATEFUL FOR THE SUPPORT WE HAVE RECEIVED SO FAR. BUT ANY SOLUTION MUST ENTAIL THE DEPARTURE OF ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE ISLANDS. IF DIPLOMATIC MEANS FAIL, F WE ARE PREPARED TO USE FORCE IN EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER THE TERMS OF THE UN CHARTER. B) THE DESPATCH OF UK SHIPS TO THE AREA WILL INEVITABLY MEAN THAT THE VESSELS CONCERNED WILL BE TEMPORARILY UNAVAILABLE FOR THEIR NATO TASKS. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ANTICIPATE HOW LONG THIS PERIOD WILL BE, BUT WE HOPE IT WILL BE RELATIVELY BRIEF.
WE SHALL OF COURSE COMPLY WITH OUR OBLIGATION TO INFORM THE NATO

PAGE 3 RBDWC AØ388 C O N F I D E N T I A L MILITARY AUTHORITIES WHEN THE FORCES IN QUESTION MOVE TO A LOWER STATE OF NATO READINESS. BUT WE HOPE THAT ALLIES WILL UNDERSTAND THE REASONS WHY, GIVEN THE POSSIBILITY OF THE NEED TO USE

MILITARY FORCE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, WE WOULD MUCH PREFER NOT TO SEVERAL DETAILS OF OUR DISPOSITIONS AT THIS STAGE. WE HOPE ALLIES

VILL NOT PRESS US ON THIS POINT.

(C) WE CAN, HOWEVER, INFORM ALLIES THAT THE TASK FORCE INCLUDES THEF

FOLLOWING VESSELS WHICH ARE ASSIGNED TO CINCHAN/SACLANT:

2 CARRIERS: INVINCIBLE AND HERMES, WITH SEA HARRIERS AND HELICOPTERS EMBARKED: 12 ESCORTS: THE TYPE 42 DESTROYERS SHEFFIELD, GLASGOW AND COVENTRY: COVENTRY CLASS DESTROYERS ANTRIM AND GLAMORGAN: TYPE 21 FRIGATES ARROW, ALACRITY AND ANTELOPE: TYPE 22 FRIGATES BRILLIANT AND BROADSWORD: AND TYPE 12 FRIGATES

PLYMOUTH AND YARMOUTH: III) ASSAULT SHIP HMS FEARLESS AND 5 LANDING SHIPS:

IV) FLEET AUXILIARIES: APPLELEAF, TIDESPRING, PEARLEAF,

OLMEDA, FORT AUSTIN, RESOURCE AND STROMNESS:
V) IN ADDITION THE PASSENGER LINER CANBERRA IS TO BE USED AS A TROOP TRANSPORT AND TANKERS AND OTHER SUPPORT SHIPS

PAGE 4 RBDWC AØ388 C O N F I D E N T I A L ARE ALSO BEING CHARTERED OR REQUISITIONED: VI) SUBMARINE FORCES ARE ALSO BEING DEPLOYED, BUT FOR REASONSF IN PARA 1 WE CAN NOT (NOT) GIVE ANY FURTHER DETAILS AT THIS STAGE.
THESE FORCES PROVIDE A BALANCED CAPABILITY SUSTAINABLE FOR A LENGTHY PERIOD IF NECESSARY. BUT WE WOULD NOT AT THIS STAGE WISH TO REVEAL THE MILITARY OPTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

HHH

```
DISTRIBUTION A3A
```

1 Res Clerk 1 S of S

VCDS (P&L)

4 COSSEC ACTION (CXK 1 DSC:) 3 ACDS (Pot) AUS(D Staff) 1 CAS 1 CDS CWT 1 CGS 1 CNS CYL 1 CPR DIC DNOT CWJ 1 DS 11/12 1 DS 17 DS 5 CWJ DS 5 1 DS 6/7 DS 8 1 DSC (AFDO) 1 DSC (NATO) CQ DSC (ROW) DUS(P) CAB 1 GF 1 1 IP 2

0

0

0

HHHH

HH