

FC 033

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Reference CAS. 90818

SECCOS

FALKLAND ISLANDS - MILITARY APPRECIATION

I attach CAS's proposed amendments to the Falkland Islands Military Appreciation in response to COS(Misc)90/742/1 dated 6 April 1982.

(D.J. BONNER)
PS/CAS

7th April 1982

Att

CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF

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FALKLAND ISLANDS - MILITARY APPRECIATION: FURTHER AMENDMENTS

1. Page 1. Para 2a Military Pros (2)
Remove "extremely" in line 1.
2. Page 3. Para 3a Military Pros (1)
Reword sub para to read:
"SSNs would be effective against Argentine warships and relatively invulnerable to counter-attack; their effectiveness would be considerably enhanced if MPA support were available."
3. Page 4. Para 4 line 4

CLOSED FOR 40 YEARS UNDER
FOI SECTION 27
4. Page 5. Para 4b Military Pros (1) line 3
Remove "air LOCs".
5. Page 5. After Para 4b
Add new sub para:
"c. Offensive Air Support from the Task Group
Military Pros
(1) Air attacks could be made against the air LOC and key land targets on the Falkland Islands with the Task Group operating outside the effective range of land-based air cover.
(2) Argentine morale would suffer.
(3) Such operations could be conducted independently of land invasion.
Political Pros
(1) The risk to the civilian population would be lower than in a land assault.
(2) Attacking Argentines on UK territory would be politically defensible.
Political Cons
(1) There would be a small risk of civilian casualties, although this could be minimised by careful selection of targets.

PSO/COS

CAS AMENDMENT TO MILITARY APPRECIATION PAPER

(dictated to COSSEC)

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10. Following a successful reoccupation of the Falklands, we might have to defend them again against a bitter and hostile Argentine. An initial estimate of our required force level is 2 x frigates or destroyers, an infantry battalion equivalent, Rapier anti-air defences, 4 - 6 Harrier aircraft (sea or GR3), 6 - 8 support helicopters and supporting elements. These would virtually double the Falkland Islands population. The runway and facilities at Port Stanley airfield would need to be upgraded. All this of course would depend on the state in which the Argentinian Navy and Air Force had been left. If largely intact, the force levels needed could be much greater.

11. The preferred course of action must be a matter for continual review. The following factors are critical to the achievement of the aim:

- a. The neutralisation of the Argentine Navy and the establishment of a favourable air situation.
- b. Early, accurate intelligence of the disposition, strength and intentions of Argentine forces, in the Falkland Islands, at sea and on the mainland.