

~~SECRET~~
PERSONAL
PERSONAL

Para 6

Folio No.
22

2038/1 ←
CDS

copy to: Pso

BRIEFING FOR HEAD BDS WASHINGTON

1. At FLAG A is his signal asking for information and this brief follows his Para 2 in general terms. As we discussed, your aim is to get, as much as we can from the Americans. In general, Cdre Healsip and I believe you should express confidence in the capability of our balanced force to achieve the political aim.
 2. Turning now to Para 2 of his signal, I suggest you leave sub-para a - Outline Task Organisation of Fleet and Landing Force-to ACDS(Pol) in a more detailed brief.
 3. Anodyne assessments of Argentinian sea, air and ground forces are at FLAGS B to D. You have asked that General Boam sees DCDS(I) and I believe he should deal with communications, EW and logistic capabilities.
 4. Air superiority (Sub-para c) is clearly very sensitive, and I suggest you answer this in general terms only. It is clear that the Argentinian's have certain problems:
 - a. Limited aircraft range and limited capability in poor weather.
 - b. Location and identification of targets at sea; their training appears to have been more concerned with attacking targets on land. 6. UK Task Force has strong all-weather air defence capability. 4. UK Harriers armed with Sidewinder, and have on-board radar capability optimised for maritime environment.
 5. UK logistic capability is perhaps better than one might think. Ascension Island is the key, and we are obviously most grateful for US co-operation. RFA support should be adequate, any way in the shorter term. There is considerable reserve of ships and aircraft which may be chartered.
- CLOSED FOR 40 YEARS UNDER
FOI SECTION 27
7. Help from US is already forthcoming in logistic (Ascension) and Int and Elint fields, and we would be even more grateful if SR 71 sorties could be allocated. In addition, we would like the President to play down his even-handed approach and have been encouraged by some recent DIPTELS on this subject.

7 Apr 82

PS
PSO/CDS

PERSONAL
~~SECRET~~

SECRET
PERSONAL
PERSONAL

2038/1/1

See

✓ CDS

(A) + Juv

→ (B) + K

→ file 26

BRIEFING FOR HEAD BDS WASHINGTON

1. At FLAG A is his signal asking for information and this brief follows his Para 2 in general terms. As we discussed, your aim is to get as much as we can from the Americans. In general, Cdre Healsip and I believe you should express confidence in the capability of our balanced force to achieve the political aim.
2. Turning now to Para 2 of his signal, I suggest you leave sub-para A - Outline Task Organisation of Fleet and Landing Force to ACDS(Pol) in a more detailed brief.
3. Anodyne assessments of Argentinian sea, air and ground forces are at FLAGS B to D. You have asked that General Boam sees DCDS(I) and I believe he should deal with communications, EW and logistic capabilities.
4. Air superiority (Sub-para C) is clearly very sensitive, and I suggest you answer this in general terms only. It is clear that the Argentinian's have certain problems:
 - a. Limited aircraft range and limited capability in poor weather.
 - b. Location and identification of targets at sea; their training appears to have been more concerned with attacking targets on land. UK Task Force has strong all-weather air defence capability. UK Harriers armed with Sidewinder, and have on-board radar capability optimised for maritime environment.
5. UK logistic capability is perhaps better than one might think. Ascension Island is the key, and we are obviously most grateful for US co-operation. RFA support should be adequate, any way in the shorter term. There is considerable reserve of ships and aircraft which may be chartered.
6. We aim to avoid being too close and reliant on Chile. However, there is some early promise of co-operation but sensitive and difficult issues are not yet resolved.
7. Help from US is already forthcoming in logistic (Ascension) and Int and Elint fields, and we would be even more grateful if SR 71 sorties could be allocated. In addition, we would like the President to play down his even-handed approach and have been encouraged by some recent DIPTeLs on this subject.

7 Apr 82

J.S.
PSO/CDS

PERSONAL
SECRET

A/S AT 071600 A APR 82

SECRET

BRAZIL

KEY

- C - CARRIER
- CC - CRUISER
- D - DESTROYER
- F - FRIGATE
- S - SUBMARINE
- L - LANDING SHIP
- N - NAVAL AUXILIARY
- M - MERCHANT SHIP
- P - ICE BREAKER

Q1

CHILE

IN PORT

- 1 X C
- 1 X CC
- 5 X D
- 2 X D?
- 1 X F!

ARGENTINA

URUGUAY

BUENOS AIRES

MONTEVIDEO

IN PORT
3 X S

MAR DEL PLATA

RESPODA

Bahia Blanca

PUERTO BELGRANO

D

1135 NM

779 NM

600 NM

F

320 NM

M

S

N

F

PORT STANLEY


Comodoro
Brazzaville

PUERTO Deseado

TRELEW

RIO GRANDE

① MAIN NAVAL AIRFIELDS



SECRET

FC 0003

SECRET

LOOSE MINUTE

D Ops Staff 7/10/2

Navy Ops
Army Ops
Air Ops
DIC

Copy to:

COSSEC
SCDS(A)
DS 11

BRIEFING FOR AMERICANS ON OUR MILITARY CAPABILITY TO RECOVER FALKLAND ISLANDS.

Reference

A. DIPTTEL from BDS Washington (copy attached)

1. You will see from the attached that CDS will need to be briefed as to his reply to Head BDSW.

2. I would be grateful if you would provide replies for ACDS(Ops) to use in his advice to CDS. Would you reply as follows to the questions posed. (Sub-paragraphs below correspond to those in the signal):

DATE	7/10/2
CDS	
Hd SCDS(A)	
SCDS A 1	
Hd SCDS(A)	
SCDS E 1	
ADCC	
PA/SCDS	
FILE: 207K/7	

a. Navy

b. DIS. I assume that DCDS(I) will wish to advise CDS direct.

c. Navy please coord with Air.

d. Navy, Army and Air. Navy Coord?

e. Navy, please coord with Air.

f. Navy, Army and Air.

Please state in your replies where you are concerned about sensitive material - see paragraph 3 of the signal.

3. I would be grateful for your replies, addressed to Controller DSC, by 1100 hrs 7 April.

4. ACDS(Ops) may well decide to raise Reference A at the DOE on 7 Apr.

A G H HARLEY
Col
Controller DSC
MB 5270 6081 MB

7 Apr 82

SECRET
One Page Only

SECRET

IMMEDIATE 061939Z APR 82

FROM: BDS WASHINGTON

TO : MODUK

SECRET

SIG A2C

WASCOS 03

FROM HEAD BDSW TO CDS

1. HMA IS SEEING HAIG THIS AFTERNOON AND THERE IS A STRONG POSSIBILITY HE MAY BE INVITED TO GIVE A BRIEFING ON OUR MILITARY CAPABILITY TO RECOVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. WHILST APPRECIATING THE SENSITIVE NATURE OF DETAILED PLANNING HMA CONSIDERS IT ESSENTIAL TO CONVINCING US ADMINISTRATION OF OUR RESOLVE AND MILITARY CAPABILITY. THE PRESS GENERALLY HAS BEEN GOOD AND IN MANY INSTANCES AHEAD OF THE ADMINISTRATION, PARTICULARLY OVER THE IMPORTANT ISSUES. SOME MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATION APPEAR TO BE OVER-IMPRESSED BY SOME MISTAKEN OPINION BEING EXPRESSED BY SENIOR RETIRED OFFICERS WHO OFTEN PRESENT A SIMPLISTIC PICTURE. IT IS MOST IMPORTANT TO COUNTER THE LATTER.
2. IN ORDER TO SUPPLEMENT INFORMATION ALREADY GLEANED FROM SITREPS AND INTSUMS REQUEST FOLLOWING WITHIN 24 HOURS:
 - A. OUTLINE TASK ORGANISATION OF THE FLEET AND LANDING FORCE.
 - B. UK ASSESSMENT OF THE ARGENTINIAN SEA, AIR, GROUND, COMMUNICATIONS, EW, AEW AND LOGISTIC CAPABILITIES. UNDERSTAND DIS ASSESSMENT IS EXPECTED SHORTLY.
 - C. HMA IS BOUND TO BE ASKED HOW UK CAN GAIN AIR SUPERIORITY OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN SOURCE OF PRESS SPECULATION. IN PREPARING ANY BRIEFING MATTER FOR HMA OUR OWN ASSESSMENTS OF ARGENTINIAN AIR CAPABILITY IS OFTEN AT ODDS WITH CIA ASSESSMENTS BEING FED IN WHICH APPEAR TO CREDIT THEM WITH GREATER EFFECTIVENESS THAN WE ESTIMATE IS CORRECT.
 - D. HOW WILL UK SUSTAIN LOGISTIC TRAIN DURING ASSAULT OPERATIONS AND AFTER SUCCESSFUL REOCCUPATION OF THE ISLANDS.

SECRET

Page 1 of 2 Pages

- E. IS THERE ANY INTENTION TO USE CHILEAN FACILITIES.
- F. OTHER THAN REQUIREMENTS LISTED IN FCO TEL 684 OF 4 APR 82 AND INTELLIGENCE, ARE THERE ANY OTHER REQUESTS FOR US MILITARY ASSISTANCE BEING CONTEMPLATED.

3. APPRECIATE THIS IS ASKING FOR MUCH SENSITIVE INFORMATION. THEREFORE GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE ON ANYTHING YOU DO NOT WISH US TO TELL AMERICANS.

BT

MEETING OF OFFICIALS - 0800H LOCAL APR 82

Please see attached a note w/ CDS intent to table for discussion of the meeting of officials scheduled for 0800 hours tomorrow morning.

[Faint signature and stamp]
 [Faint text]

7 APR 82
 [Faint text]