


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Information:

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AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS APPRECIATION

Reference:

DP9/82 (Final Draft).

1. A brief which First Sea Lord may wish to use for the Chiefs of Staff discussion of this paper at 1000 14 April, is attached.

M. H. Livesay

M H LIVESAY
Director of Naval Warfare

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BRIEF FOR FIRST SEA LORD
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS APPRECIATION

DP 9/82 (Final Draft)

Introduction

Redacted under FOI exemption section 26(2).

1. This paper was written by C Division over the weekend and is largely based on inputs from the Navy Dept and CGRM. Very little time was allowed for staffing the first draft, on which we had substantial comment. Most of our comments have been incorporated into the Final Draft.

Assessment

2. The line of argument and the conclusions of the appreciation, are generally agreed. However, the conclusions are not strongly expressed and you may feel that the CTG's own appreciation nearer the time may be the more telling assessment; for the present this paper confirms we should proceed.

3. First Sea Lord will be fully alive to the difficulties of the Amphibious operation, in particular the weather and the sea state, and the amount of time that the enemy will have had to consider and to prepare beach defences and fortified positions dominating beachheads, and the routes away from them.

4. However against this you may wish to set the advantages that the amphibious force commander possesses in terms of:

b. Surprise. The enemy will remain uncertain about the line of approach and landing area particularly if the sea approach is by night.

c. Flexibility of deployment. The initial assault can be made by a large number of helicopter borne troops being deployed onto high ground of tactical importance. Beaches may be cleared subsequently. As Col Garrod will explain there are some potential landing beaches in many parts of the islands, though kelp may render some of them unuseable.

5. The difficulties for the enemy must not be underestimated. He is attempting to guard very large islands. First Sea Lord may wish to note, for instance, the size of the Northernisle of West Falkland, is 60 m x 40 m, about the size of West Kent. The distance around the coast from Port Stanley to Darwin is the distance from Portsmouth to Weymouth. This is a Country devoid of roads, a very large version of a mountainous Dartmoor in the middle of a freezing winter. The enemy have been living under canvas, or in cramped accommodation for at least a month amongst a hostile population. The majority are young one year conscripts.

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Achievement of the Political Aim

6. If your discussion encompasses the political aim and the question is raised of engaging the Argentines without endangering the Falkland Islands, our current understanding is that the Argentine Forces are billeted separately, some in large tented camps. Once again with the movement resources that we have it is possible to take the offensive to the Argentinians, and they are unlikely to be able to retaliate by attacking our lines of communication. This is bound to have a fundamental effect on enemy morale, and the plan will be to hasten by every means possible the prospect of surrender.

7. The question of morale is presented in understandably low key in Para 31 of the paper; it may well be a decisive factor, particular those operations in 31a, c and d.


Detailed Points

8. You may wish to make the following points in discussion:

a. Page 2 ~~last~~ line para 2 add "until the arrival of the Task Force in the area".

Ascension (last 5)
b. Para 7. I believe there is an important third assumption "Sea control and adequate air superiority have been achieved ~~over~~ and over the Falkland Islands and can be sustained during operations ashore".

c. Para 10. You may wish to point out that the four day period at Ascension is required to redistribute the landing force within the shipping.

d. Para 23d. 

e. Para 49 line 3 should be amended to read ".....surprise, make a landing that is unlikely to be opposed and attain"

Other Service Views

9. CGS is likely to emphasize the importance of surprise and adequate beach reconnaissance.

10. CAS is likely to suggest that the conclusions are woolly and emphasis as the Landing Force mobility is misplaced.

Line to Take

11. First Sea Lord is recommended to:

a. draw on this brief in discussion with his colleagues.

b. suggest that opportunity for editorial amendment to DP9/82 should be considered.

Redacted under FOI exemption section 27(1)(a).

c. conclude that the operation is feasible though subject to a number of difficulties and constraints.

12. CCRM has cooperated in preparation of this brief which he agrees.

M. H. Livesay

M H LIVESAY
DNW