

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CHRON FILE

UNCLASSIFIED  
WITH ~~TOP SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

ACTION

April 19, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: CHRISTOPHER SHOEMAKER *CS*  
ALLAN MYER *AM* *AM*

SUBJECT: NSC Minutes

Attached are the minutes from the NSC meeting on April 16 which dealt with NSSD 1-82, Part I, II, and III A-C.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve these minutes.

Approve *CS* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_  
*for*

Attachment

Tab I NSC Minutes

UNCLASSIFIED  
WITH ~~TOP SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

*NSC 8/26/85*

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II

90011

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

DATE, TIME January 5, 1982, 4:00 p.m.,  
AND PLACE: The Cabinet Room

SUBJECT: Poland

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

The Vice President

State

Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
Under Secretary Walter J. Stoessel

Treasury

Secretary Donald T. Regan

OSD

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger  
Deputy Secretary Frank C. Carlucci

Agriculture

Secretary John H. Block

Commerce

Secretary Malcolm H. Baldrige

OMB

Mr. David A. Stockman

CIA

Mr. William J. Casey

USUN

Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

JCS

General David C. Jones

White House

Mr. Edwin Meese III  
Mr. James A. Baker III  
Judge William P. Clark  
Admiral James W. Nance  
Ms. Janet Colson

NSC

Dr. Norman A. Bailey  
Dr. Geoffrey Kemp  
Dr. Allen J. Lenz  
Dr. Richard E. Pipes

Minutes

Clark. Mr. President, we have two agenda items today for which we have allocated one hour. First, an update on Poland and our actions concerning Poland and the USSR. Second, United Nations actions on the Golan Heights. These items will not necessarily require decisions today.

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Review January 5, 1988

DECLASSIFIED

NLS M05-016 #19135

BY WOT NARA, DATE 12/21/05

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

DATE, TIME            April 16, 1982; 11:00 A.M.-12:05 P.M.  
AND PLACE:            Cabinet Room

SUBJECT:              NSSD 1-82

PARTICIPANTS:

The President  
The Vice President

State

Acting Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger  
Richard Burt, Director, Politico-Military Affairs  
OSD  
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

CIA

Mr. William J. Casey

OMB

Mr. William Schneider, Associate Director for National  
Security and International Affairs

USUN

Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

JCS

General David C. Jones  
Lieutenant General Paul F. Gorman

White House

Mr. Edwin Meese III  
Mr. James A. Baker III  
Judge William P. Clark  
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
Admiral John M. Poindexter  
Mr. Richard Darman

NSC

Mr. Thomas C. Reed  
Colonel Allan Myer  
Colonel Michael O. Wheeler  
Major Christopher Shoemaker


DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By M75 NARA, Date 8/26/99

~~TOP SECRET~~

Review 4/19/2002  
Cl'd & Ext. by W.P.Clark  
Reason for Ext.: NSC 1.13(e)

# FORCE REQUIREMENTS



\* BASED ON THREAT AND STRATEGY

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Minutes

Judge Clark: Today we meet to consider the first five parts of NSSD 1-82. The President signed the document on February 5, and this is the first occasion we have had to roundtable parts of it. The President has asked Tom Reed to chair the effort, and the President has read and commented on the papers as they have been produced. There will be one more meeting of the NSC to consider the final four parts of the study. The importance of this study is indeed great; it will guide not only budget decisions but also national security for the balance of the century.

We have general agreement on the first four sections; the one issue we have is in the fifth section. I suggest that we focus our attention on that section. I now ask Tom Reed to discuss the first four sections and the issue we face in the fifth.

Mr. Reed: This effort is this Administration's successor to PD-18 and PD-62. As you will see, there are substantial differences between our document and those of our predecessors. I will now run through, very briefly, the first four parts and summarize the principal findings. Part I outlines our basic national objectives and the global environment in which our objectives must be met. The threats we face and the nature of our objectives are such that we are at a time of greatest danger to our national security since World War II. It is highly likely that, over the course of this decade, fundamental changes in East-West relations will occur. In general, our objectives, as outlined in Part I, are more assertive and less passive than the approach of our predecessors. For example, we call for active measures to counter Soviet expansionism, to encourage the liberalizing tendencies in the Soviet bloc, and to force the Soviet Union to bear the brunt of its economic mismanagement. The bottom line is we are helping encourage the dissolution of the Soviet Empire.

Part II is a bridge between the military component and the other components of our national strategy. We cannot rely on military force alone to achieve our objectives. If we are to succeed, we must integrate all components.

Part III-A summarizes the threats that we face to our national security. Soviet imperialism remains the major threat. Some feel that the Soviets have now concluded that they have a window of opportunity and may press their advantage into a confrontation. We do not accept that view; this section concludes that it is unlikely the Soviets will challenge us directly in the near future.

Part III-B outlines the role of the Allies. Allies are indispensable; we cannot go it alone. But we need more help from the Allies than in the past, and this makes us more vulnerable to Allied behavior. This is the reality, however, and we must deal with it.

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS MO6-D15 #1A

By LST, NARA, Date 10/16/06

Part III-C. This section establishes our regional military objectives. Importantly, it begins by stating that we must plan for global war; the 2½ or 1½ war strategy of the past is no longer sufficient. The Soviet Union is a global military power and our strategy must deal with that reality. We must, at the same time, set priorities among regions so that we are not forced into a decision on whether to escalate or to sacrifice vital interests. The global priorities laid out in the paper are those that we have had for several decades: North America, NATO, Southwest Asia, the Pacific, Latin America, and Africa, in that order.

The issue in this section deals with Southwest Asia. It asks basically what should we try to do in Southwest Asia by the end of the decade. There are two basic options: either we should plan to retaliate on a worldwide basis if the Soviets attack in Southwest Asia; or we should plan to defend in the Gulf.

Before we address this issue, I invite your comments on the other sections.

Mr. Meese: What about the covert-political components of national strategy?

Mr. Reed: The interagency review group concluded that those were really strategies of implementation rather than components of national security.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick: Under what general component do covert and political actions fit?

Mr. Reed: They fit under a number of components; partially under diplomatic, military, and economic. But we did not believe it would be correct to treat it separately in this paper. Again, we consider that issues such as arms control and covert action should be treated as implementing measures. The purpose of Part II was to show the other legs of our national strategy and not to discuss implementing tactics. However, this paper does discuss one aspect of this topic; specifically, unconventional warfare in Eastern Europe.

Mr. Meese: I agree that these subjects are tactics of implementation, but I think we can solve the problem by calling the economic component in Part II "economic/political."

Mr. Casey: Covert action is primarily directed against specific insurgent threats. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NATIONS which control key choke points are under severe threat, and we need to devote more covert action and security assistance to help them out.

E. O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 1.4c, d

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Mr. Reed: We will discuss security assistance in more detail in ten days at the next NSC meeting on this topic. However, I would argue that it is an enormously cost-effective instrument.

Secretary Weinberger: Security assistance is the cheapest and best way of defending the United States. We must convince Congress of this.

Mr. Reed: This is a clear example of how Congress is impeding efficient expenditure of defense dollars. We must get rid of the tangle of restrictions.

Judge Clark: We will focus on security assistance in ten days.

Mr. Eagleburger: Al Haig shares completely the view that security assistance is crucial. We must take a firm stand in dealing with this on the Hill.

Secretary Weinberger: We must take action to increase the number of friends we have around the world. They need to know that we are all in this thing together. We need to increase their cooperation with our efforts even in areas outside their immediate regions.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick: We need a political dimension to our national objectives. The best way to defend our interests is to support friendly governments. It is a conceptual mistake not to think about the political dimension in national objectives.

Mr. Meese: There are other items which do not fit wholly under the diplomatic component; an item such as South American land reform is an example. It is important, therefore, to add the political component to the economic component in Part II.

Judge Clark: It appears to me that we have general agreement on Parts I, II, III-A, and III-B. I suggest that we now move to the issue in Section III-C: what do we do about Southwest Asia?

Mr. Reed: I suggest that we go around the table and discuss two questions. First, are the wartime priorities, which we have accepted for two decades, still our policy; and, second, what do we want to try to build for Southwest Asia? Do we want to build the capability to defend in Southwest Asia, or do we recognize the difficulties there and counter-attack in other parts of the world? Would we give up oil for pineapples or bananas?

Mr. Eagleburger: Al Haig's position is strong support for Option Two as presented in the paper. Southwest Asia is our second most important region for strategic and natural resource reasons. It is necessary to posture our forces to defend in the area. The State Department worries that, if we adopted the first option, we will lose credibility in the region, and our

Allies will be less inclined to help. We will be telling them that we are willing to give up this area of vital interest. We need to build a force of seven divisions that could be used in Southwest Asia. Even that force may not be sufficient to stand up against a determined Soviet attack. However, it will provide a much more credible deterrent and reassurance for our regional friends and our European Allies.

Secretary Weinberger: Nobody disagrees with the importance of the oil fields; we need to hold them for our national security. We also do not disagree on the requirements for seven divisions, but we need to understand what we are dealing with. The assumption in Option Two is that we could limit the conflict to the region. In fact, the Soviets themselves might be delighted to do just that. The Soviets could mount 40 divisions in just a few days, and they would enjoy shorter lines of communications. On the other hand, we could project two divisions in 14 days and would then have to worry about resupply and reinforcement.

If we want to have the capability to defend the oil fields in the region, we will need to do three things. First, we will have to increase enormously our defense resources in order to expand greatly our air- and sealift assets. Second, we will have to expand our force structure. At this point, we have 16 divisions, and resources may force us to deactivate one. Third, we will have to have a far more friendly atmosphere in the region. We cannot defend the Persian Gulf unless we have the full cooperation of regional states, particularly Saudi Arabia. Yet, Saudi Arabia is totally unwilling to associate itself with our military efforts. Jordan is making overtures to the Soviet Union, and Israel remains politically isolated. We do not have the bases we require.

[REDACTED]

We have a lot to do before we will be able to defend the oil fields. Considering the way Option B is phrased, we simply cannot do it.

The option DOD would prefer is to work in other theaters to hold the oil fields. It is not a question of giving up the oil fields; the question is how best to defend them. The threat of escalation is the key. We also need to work with NATO to overcome their great reluctance to help us in Southwest Asia. This is somewhat ironic since the loss of Persian Gulf oil would hurt Europe far more than us. The UK is the only country that is thinking about defense outside the NATO area. Option B would require budget and force structure increases, and far more friends in the region than we now have. We would need bases well in advance of a contingency.



ALTERNATIVE WORDING

To enhance deterrence by sufficiently improving our global capability to deploy and sustain military forces so as to ensure that should the Soviet Union attack in SWA, it would be confronted with the prospect of a major <sup>w/v.s.</sup> conflict in theater and the ~~^ priority ^ reasonable~~ threat of escalation.

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General Jones: I agree with State; we need to work as hard as we can to get seven divisions to Southwest Asia. In a recent war game, in which we made the most optimistic assumptions, we found that we could hold in Iran for a while, but would eventually lose. We need a credible capability for Southwest Asia, but also need the threat of escalation. [General Jones then distributed suggested language for Section C.]

Secretary Weinberger: We cannot give up the oil fields. We need to have the Soviets face the prospects of major conflict with the United States in the region and the threat of escalation. The realities dictate that we cannot defend in-place.

The President: I have always been of the view that the Soviets, if they think they are ready to engage us, will not need an excuse, but at the same time they will not engage us if they feel threatened. What we need is presence so that they know if they come in, they will have to confront the US. Can't we use our presence in Europe to that effect?

Secretary Weinberger: That's the underlying theme of the new language that has just been circulated. We need a presence in the region, plus we need a threat of escalation.

The President: You look at Russian history. Protecting the homeland has always been of paramount importance. If they know that we might respond to them by hitting them anywhere in the world, that's a strong deterrent.

Mr. Reed: If the Soviets know they will face a war with the US in Southwest Asia and that we will be prepared to escalate if necessary, that will be an effective deterrent. I support the JCS proposal.

Mr. Eagleburger: State can live with the language if seven divisions remains our objective. We also need to carefully avoid implying that we will draw forces from the central front in Europe for use in Southwest Asia. That could cause big problems with the Allies.

Secretary Weinberger: That's true, but there's a limit to how far you can stretch sixteen divisions.

Judge Clark: We should insert in the JCS language "...conflicts with the US...".

Secretary Weinberger: Our big problem in NATO is to get our Allies to see beyond Europe.

Mr. Meese: I agree. In fact, NATO has larger interests in Southwest Asia than we do.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Mr. Eagleburger: NATO will be more apt to support our objectives outside of Europe if the Allies see the US is serious about keeping up our forces.

Secretary Weinberger: That's what we are doing.

Mr. Eagleburger: It will also help with our Saudi relationship.

Secretary Weinberger: We desperately need bases in Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Burt: Let me ask a specific question. Does "military forces" mean seven divisions plus support?

Secretary Weinberger: Yes, at a minimum. But those divisions are going to need support. The danger is that they might be committed to Southwest Asia and then cut off.

The President: What about use of our oldest ally in the region, Israel?

Secretary Weinberger: We need to do a lot of work to avoid alienating other states. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] there remains the deep suspicion of Israel throughout the region.

General Jones: Let me make clear the implications for broader strategy of another part of the paper. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Resource implications are enormous. This is a far greater objective than those we are now planning for. [General Jones then passed out a graphic illustration of our budgetary shortfall.] I want to ensure that everybody understands what it is that we are saying.

Mr. Reed: That issue is taken up in Section G, which says that we cannot get there from here, and there is a large gap between resources and plans. There are enormous risks involved.

Secretary Weinberger: The FYDP is not the panacea. We have clear constraints and have a long way to go. Our reach is exceeding our grasp, but the gap will become far greater if we do not fund the FYDP.

General Jones: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] there are enormous problems. Bear in mind that seven divisions we are now allocating for Southwest Asia are seven divisions that will not be available for Europe. [REDACTED]

The President: We will do whatever is necessary to meet our objectives. A vigorous defense build-up will also be a great help at arms control talks. The Soviets do not believe that they can keep up with us.

Mr. Eagleburger: We must also continue to push the Europeans to do more.

The President: If you compare Western Europe to the Soviet Union, you find that our Allies collectively have a greater population and higher GNP. Why should the Russians look ten feet tall and our Allies look like pygmies?

Mr. Schneider: We should not have too conspicuous a gap between objectives and programs. We need to ensure a high level of congruence. Otherwise Congress will become unmanageable.

The President: We have a far more coherent policy than Congress.

Mr. Reed: To summarize, the NSC has accepted the alternative proposed by General Jones. The President has also approved the package.

The NSC adjourned at 12:05.

The decisions reached were:

- (1) Parts I, II, III-A and III-B were approved as written, except that Part II will be amended to include an economic/political component of national strategy.
- (2) Part III-C was accepted and the issue was resolved by accepting JCS language, as amended by the NSC. This language is to be included as peacetime military objectives for Southwest Asia and reads:

To enhance deterrence by sufficiently improving our global capability to deploy and sustain military forces so as to ensure that should the Soviet Union attack in Southwest Asia, it would be confronted with the prospect of a major conflict with the US in-theater\* and the threat of escalation.

\* This language means seven divisions plus support.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 21, 1982

SECRET/SENSITIVE WITH  
TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

**CHRON FILE**

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ALLAN A. MYER *oam*  
CHRIS SHOEMAKER *CS*

SUBJECT: National Security Council Decision (U)

Attached is a memorandum from you to the President (Tab I) presenting the decisions on U.S. National Security Strategy, Parts I, II, and III A-C reached at the April 16 National Security Council meeting for the President's formal approval.

Because the decisions reached at the April 16 meeting will drive the remainder of the study, it is of great importance that the President sign the attached memorandum and NSDD (Tab A) as soon as possible.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve *WPC* Disapprove *J*

Attachments

Tab I Memo from you to the President  
Tab A Proposed NSDD

SECRET/SENSITIVE WITH  
TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997  
By *M77* NARA, Date *8/26/97*

*0930 Fri*  
*Did TCR see?*  
*Yes*  
*But yes, as mentioned.*

*But we've agreed  
OBE as of 4/26.*

*Do one final NSDD  
immediately after  
Tuesday NSC.*

TOP SECRET

101748  
28

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

ACTION

**DECLASSIFIED**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

NLRR M325/1 # 101748

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

BY KML NARA DATE 4/4/13

SUBJECT: Decisions at the April 16, 1982 Meeting of the National Security Council

Issue

What were the decisions at the April 16 meeting of the National Security Council?

Facts

On February 5, by signing NSSD 1-82, you directed the drafting of a U.S. National Security Strategy for NSC consideration. An exhaustive interagency review chaired by the NSC staff produced the first five segments of the study, and they were addressed by the NSC on April 16 for consideration and decision. The remaining four segments are now scheduled for NSC consideration on April 27. The NSDD at Tab A is an interim document designed to formalize decisions on the first four parts.

Discussion

At the meeting, the NSC approved the following:

- 1) Parts I, II, III-A and B were approved as written except that Part II will amend the economic component of our national strategy by adding a political component.
- 2) Part III-C (Regional Military Objectives) was approved with the revision provided by General Jones and amended by the NSC. The NSC approved this revision with the understanding that the language meant a seven-division force for Southwest Asia.

Recommendation

OK NO

That you approve NSC decision to approve Parts I, II, III-A-C as stated above, and sign the NSDD at Tab A.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Review April 16, 2002  
Cl'd. & ext'd. by W.P. Clark  
Reason for extension: NSC 1.13(e)

**DECLASSIFIED**  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By [Signature] NARA Date [Signature]

Prepared by:  
Allan A. Myer  
Chris Shoemaker

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

101749 29

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION  
DIRECTIVE NUMBER

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

On February 5, 1982, I directed that a major review of our national security be undertaken. The first five parts of this study were reviewed by the National Security Council on April 16, 1982.

As a result of that review, I direct that the following serve as interim guidance for the study and for the resulting national security strategy.

- 1) Parts I, III-A and III-B of NSSD 1-82 (attached) are approved as written.
- 2) Part II is approved, except that the economic component of our national strategy will be changed to an economic/political component.
- 3) Part III-C is approved with the following language added as a peacetime military objective for Southwest Asia:

"To enhance deterrence by sufficiently improving our global capability to deploy and sustain military forces so as to ensure that, if the Soviet Union attacks in Southwest Asia, it would be confronted with the prospect of a major conflict with the US in-theater and the threat of escalation."

This language is understood to mean that a peacetime military objective for the defense program is a capability to project and sustain a seven-division force in Southwest Asia by the end of the FYDP.

The specific language contained in each of the first five parts of NSSD 1-82 may be modified as necessary to reflect decisions made in the last four parts.

This NSDD will be superseded by a final NSDD to be issued after the completion of the entire study.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Cl'd. & ext'd. by W.P.Clark  
Review April 20, 1988  
Reason for ext.: NSC 1.13(f)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M325/1 #101749

BY KML NARA DATE 4/4/13

101750

National Security Council  
The White House

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Package # 50228

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NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION  
DIRECTIVE NUMBER

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

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"To enhance deterrence by sufficiently improving our global capability to deploy and sustain military forces so as to ensure that, if the Soviet Union attacks in Southwest Asia, it would be confronted with the prospect of a major conflict with the US in-theater and the threat of escalation."

This language is understood to mean that a peacetime military objective for the defense program is a capability to project and sustain a seven-division force in Southwest Asia by the end of the FYDP.

The specific language contained in each of the first five parts of NSSD 1-82 may be modified as necessary to reflect decisions made in the last four parts.

This NSDD will be superseded by a final NSDD to be issued after the completion of the entire study.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Cl'd. & ext'd. by W.P.Clark  
Review April 20, 1988  
Reason for ext.: NSC 1.13(f)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M325/1 # 101750

BY KNL NARA DATE 4/4/13



# THE WHITE HOUSE

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

11:00 AM

Friday, April 16, 1982

COLONEL MICHAEL O. WHEELER

~~Top Secret~~

NSC Meeting  
4/16/82  
NSSD 1-82

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By MLM NARA, Date 8/26/97

~~Top Secret~~

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NSDD 1-82

(Carlucci not here) (Baker out/in/out)

82  
4/16/82

107am

J.C. - introductory remarks - 1st occasion for roundtable all 5 parts - Pres. has read & commented on drafts - another meeting planned - agreement on 1st 4<sup>th</sup> <sup>sectors</sup> still in debate

T.R. - successor to PD 18/52 - 5 papers: ① nat'l objectives & environment ② discusses need for many strategies/wops (econ, pol, mil, etc.) ③ threat ④ role of allies (new reliance - offers Soviets a vulnerability) ⑤ regional military objectives (priorities NAMer, then NATO, then oil SWA, then ~~public~~ allies, then ~~regio~~) - issue re: SWA - come back in a week to discuss decisions

goal: dissolving Soviet empire

Ed Meese - don't see anything in strategies (part 2) on <sup>political</sup> cover - arms control

T.R. - integral part

Kitpatrick - where does it fit?

T.R. - diplomatic ... across-the-board - other studies underway - principle not to do by mil alone

Meese - can look at them as implementation of basic strategies ... change "econ" to "pol & econ"

Casey - covered action/insurgencies - Soviet threat to major choke points throughout world - assume it will be brought out a week from now

T.R. - absolutely - security assistance best use of \$

Weinberger - no quarrel whatever - best way to defend U.S. - Congress impeding

T.R. - if forced  
[break to xerox]

J.C. - ... move to 3C, SWA

T.R. - go around table - do we defend in SWA or counterattack elsewhere

DECLASSIFIED

NLS M06-015 #1

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BY LOT, NARA, DATE 10/16/06

(2)

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Eagleburger - our view, & Sec Haigs, is that we defend effectively in the area itself - if we adopt a strategy that sends the signal "we'll walk away," make difficult - move on 5-yr plan to produce 7 divisions for there - can't say these are efficient - but deter

Weinberger - don't disagree that we need to hold oil fields - nor 7 divisions - but assumption seems to be that we'll limit to area - 40 Soviet divisions, move within a couple of days, no need to use sealift - could not defend oil fields today - we can project 2 divisions within about 14 days to defend, need - increase resources so we can project 7 divisions (quarter force structure) <sup>(2)</sup> more friendly atmosphere in mid-east - option/language preferred is that we'd have to work in other areas/theater to hold the oil fields - need substantially increased force structure to do this (i.e. 5-yr plan doesn't give force structure)

Jones - no disagreement w/ State - need to get 7 divisions there as quickly as possible - Iran war came - would get overwhelmed over time if only a couple hundred miles for Soviets, <sup>10-12</sup> thousand for us... [hand out wording for Weinberger's point]

Weinberger - I repeat points for ~~escalatory~~ escalatory/global strategy]

~~TOP SECRET~~

Pres: I've always thought that if Soviets ready to take us on, they'll do it — but won't do it if they think there's a threat to them — what if presence in Europe vice US, and we can convince our allies to make it a multiple effort

Weinberger: yes ... consistent w/ my words

Pres: Russia's history ① no threat to Mother Russia ② hit them elsewhere

Weinberger: that's the essence of my proposal

T.R.: Dave's addition a good one — this wording is good

Jones: and doesn't cause problem if quoted in Post

Eagleburger: we could live w/ language so long as 7 Divisions/accrains remains our 5yr aim — if take out of Europe, major pol. problems

Weinberger: but must recognize that only so much can be done w/ 16

J.C.: insert —

Weinberger: need to convince Eur that their interests lie outside Eur.

Eagleburger: need directive to work hard

Weinberger: must have base in SWA

J.C.: Questions?

Burt: does wording mean 7 div?

Weinberger: wording can mean anything at all — question is whether we'll have the resources

Pres: what about Israel?

(4)

Weinberger: NOU... but don't want to turn others  
in region into enemies — education  
problem of tremendous dimensions

Jones: broader issue than SWA — means an  
ability to fight WWII against USSR  
if read literally — resource implications  
are very great [pass chart around]  
— up to many more resources than we're  
funded for today — will be discussed later  
in studies, but didn't want to  
leave misunderstanding as we discuss  
objectives

T.R.: chart out of later part

Weinberger: ~~show~~ how we haven't built max

Jones: may need to revisit objectives if were moving  
from escalatory strategy, high resource  
implications

Weinberger: point AI made ~~in his talk~~ in  
his talk re: no rejection of 1st use

Pres: strength help in arms talks

Weinberger: only way

Gaefberger: need Eur

Pres: Eur GNP > USSR

Schneider: risky to go to Hfl w/ too big  
a gap between objectives and  
resources to deliver

Pres: Z

(5)

~~TOP SECRET~~

J.C. — Tom, summarize

T.R. — alternative wording makes sense —  
propose

~~TOP SECRET~~