



1499/4
11 P
Naval Party 8901
Royal Marines
Poole, Dorset
BH15 4NQ
Poole 77311 Ext. 304

Distribution below

18 April 1982

REPORT BY MAJOR M J NORMAN ROYAL MARINES
INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ON FRIDAY 2 APRIL 1982

1. I have the honour to submit my report on the invasion of the Falkland Islands by the armed forces of Argentina on 2 April 1982. The Royal Marines force of 69 consisted of both the 1981/82 detachment under the command of Major G R H Noott Royal Marines and the 1982/83 detachment under my command. Operational command had transferred to the new detachment at 0900 hrs Thursday 1 April 21 hours before the invasion. I submit this report as the military commander of the garrison when it was overrun by the enemy.

PREAMBLE

2. With hindsight it can be said that the first information received in the Falkland Islands that heralded the subsequent turn of events, was passed by the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) Base Commander at Grytviken to HMS ENDURANCE for His Excellency the Governor on the evening of Friday 19 March 1982. The signal stated that Argentine personnel had landed at the old whaling station of Leith on South Georgia. The message also alluded to shots being fired, men in military-type uniforms and the raising of the Argentine flag. As a result, it was decided that HMS ENDURANCE should re-embark her flight and Royal Marine Detachment, the latter being reinforced by 9 ranks of NP 8901, and the ship should sail to the area of South Georgia on Sunday 21 March 1982. 11 ranks of HMS ENDURANCE's survey party remained ashore (1). Also landed ashore were Lord and Lady Buxton, the Controller of IN and father of Cindy Buxton who is filming wild life on South Georgia, and an Uruguayan Naval Officer.

3. On Tuesday 23 March 1982, NP 8901 were requested by the Civil Administration to assume responsibility for the overnight security of the Lade (2) F28 aircraft because the police force were unable to cope with the task. This request resulted from minor incidents over the weekend in which anti-Argentine slogans had defaced the offices of Lade in Stanley. NP 8901 accepted this task.

4. In view of the rising tension OC NP 8901 decided, as a precautionary measure, to deploy a small force of section strength to Stanley Airport before first light, in order to report and disrupt any possible dawn air-landed assault on the islands. This force was withdrawn daily at 0730 hours and was first instituted on the morning of Saturday 27 March 1982.

5. The new NP 8901 Detachment arrived at Port Stanley in the Royal Research Ship (RRS) JOHN BISCOE on the evening of Monday 29 March 1982 and disembarked to Moody Brook Camp that evening, the old Detachment had by this time moved into private accommodation ashore.

Notes:

1. Nominal Lists are at Annex A.
2. Lade is a command of the Argentinian Airforce which flies commercial aircraft on non-economic commercial routes.

6. On Tuesday and Wednesday the handover of the detachments continued according to plan. On the afternoon of Wednesday 31 March, the new Detachment Section Commanders and NCOs were taken out and briefed on the operational plan on the ground. It had been planned that command would change at 1830 hours on Wednesday 31 March 1982. However, as a result of information passed to the Governor and the fact that some of the administrative parts of the handover (ie Audit of the Detachment Fund) were not completed by that time, it was agreed between Major Noott and Major Norman that command would not change until the following morning, when Major Norman would assume operational command and would subsequently on completion of the administrative handover, assume full command. The latter intention was overtaken by events.

7. Information was received by HEGFI on Wednesday 31 March 1982 that an Argentinian submarine had been instructed to carry out a surfaced recce of a suitable landing beach for an amphibious landing close to Stanley. The following precautionary actions were taken:

a. By Day

- (1) OP was placed in Pembroke Lighthouse.
- (2) OP was placed on Sapper Hill.
- (3) A reaction section was held at immediate notice at Moody Brook.

b. By Night

- (1) OP was placed in Pembroke Lighthouse.
- (2) A reaction section was positioned at the Airport Terminal building.

8. On the morning of Thursday 1 April 1982, Major Norman assumed operational command at 0900 hours. He was briefed by Major Noott on the operational plan on the ground. A reconnaissance by these two officers was in progress on the afternoon of that day, following further intelligence, when they were recalled by radio and requested to report immediately to HEGFI. On meeting the Governor they were informed that he had been advised that an invasion of the islands was highly likely to take place the following morning, Friday 2 April 1982. Major Norman was ordered to "make his dispositions accordingly".

9. A recall of the old Detachment living ashore was instituted immediately and subsequently all ranks were briefed on the situation and given initial orders, including a priority of work. On completion of this, preparation of positions, the issue of weapons and ammunition and the destruction of crypto and classified material began in earnest. Final orders were given by Major Norman to all ranks at 2300 hours that evening and the deployment to positions followed. During the course of the evening ex-Cpl J Fairfield RM and Mr Bill Curtiss arrived at Moody Brook and volunteered their services, which were accepted. Mr Curtiss subsequently immobilised the VOR directional aircraft beacon belonging to Lade to the East of Stanley.

10. By 0200 hours Moody Brook had been vacated and all defence positions had been occupied. Initially communications were not good. However, after the false report of an Aircraft Carrier off Surf Bay, initiated by the Master of MV FORREST, communications improved considerably. At 1800 hrs a signal of NP 8901 proposed deployment for battle was signalled to CINCFLEET and a BZ was received in reply at 0400 hrs. At this juncture it became completely apparent that it was only a matter of hours before some form of assault could be expected and that there would be no military assistance from elsewhere.

PLAN

11. The plan was based on an appreciation which concluded four enemy options:
 - a. Amphibious landing of infantry over a beach.
 - b. Helicopter assault onto the airfield.
 - c. Naval task force steaming into Port Stanley.
 - d. Helicopter landings in the area of Port Harriet.

A combination of a. and b. was considered to be the most likely course of action.

12. The defensive force was organised with an Operations Room, Tactical Headquarters, Detachment Headquarters, Government House Section, Six Sections of Royal Marines, one Section of Royal Navy and an Administration Section.

13. The general plan was to hit the invading enemy force as hard as possible, cause maximum casualties and make him deploy. Inevitably it would be necessary to withdraw before being overrun, through the next section. The overall aim was to delay the invading force and so gain time for potential negotiation.

14. There are within 5 miles of Stanley two beaches which are suitable for an amphibious landing. They are shown as Orange and Purple on the map at Annex B. Both are Kelp and Rock free and have good exits. Orange had a very gentle gradient which would have meant a long wade for infantry. Purple beach was the better beach. As we had insufficient forces to defend both, it was decided to defend Purple Beach(2).

15. Our dispositions which are shown at Annex B, were as follows:

- a. 5 Section was positioned at the southern edge of the airfield, which had been obstructed with airport transport. Its task was to disrupt and delay any helicopter landings on the airfield (2).
- b. A GPMG team was positioned in the dunes overlooking Purple Beach and double dannert barbed wire was laid the length of this beach. Its task was to disrupt the initial landings and then to withdraw by motorcycle across the airfield. In the event of a helicopter assault it was to withdraw through point A where a canoe had been pre-positioned (2).
- c. 1 Section was at Hookers Point. Its task was to delay enemy forces crossing the Isthmus from the airfield.
- d. 2 Section plus Troop Headquarters was at the old airstrip. Its task was to delay the enemy advance towards Stanley.
- e. 3 Section was by the VOR directional Beacons with a similar task.
- f. The final Tp Position was at Look Out Rocks and was the Intermediate Position for 1, 2 and 3 Section and Troop Headquarters.
- g. 4 Section was positioned on the Western side of the narrows. Its task was to engage enemy landing craft or shipping attempting to steam through the narrows. This Section had a Gemini so that it could be recalled when required.

Notes:

2. This task would have better suited a Section of 81mm Mortars. This weapon had been requested by previous OCs NP 8901 on more than one occasion over the past years.

h. 6 Section was positioned at Murray Heights. Its task was to cover the ground to the South of Stanley and to give early warning if the enemy elected for enemy option d.

i. An OP was placed on Sapper Hill.

j. MV FORREST was positioned in Port William. Its task was to keep a Radar Watch.

k. The main headquarters with both F and B echelons were at Government House. Their task was to defend Government House and to re-supply Sections as required.

16. Major Norman was at Look Out Rocks and in overall command of ground forces. Major Noott was at Government House advising the Governor. It was planned that as the Sections withdrew through their intermediate position Major Norman would move to Government House and Major Noott would take Nos 5 and 6 Sections out into Campus(Camp) to continue a military resistance to the enemy occupation of the islands.

17. The Governor decided that there was to be no fighting in Stanley. Therefore 1, 2 and 3 Sections and Troop Headquarters having engaged the enemy at Look Out Rocks, were to withdraw to their final positions at Government House. 7 (RN) Section was used at 020400 hrs to arrest and guard all Argentine nationals in Stanley. This Party was led by the Chief Secretary.

18. It was our intention to improve our defences using explosives and home made primitive claymore mines on both the airfield and beaches. In the event this was not possible through lack of time.

THE ASSAULT

19. The enemy elected for a Coup de Main type operation using a Commando/SAS Unit of a company plus strength. The landing plan with timings is shown on the map at Annex B. First light was at 0630 hrs.

20. The Assault in chronological order is shown below:

Serial (a)	Time (b)	Event (c)
1	020230	MV FORREST reports a large radar contact 5 miles off Mengeary Point moving slowly towards Port William. Possible frigate showing no lights
2	020315	Master of MV FORREST (alongside) reports aircraft carrier in Surf Bay - false
3	0400	FORREST to sea
4	0430	Possible helicopter activity in Port Harriet - unconfirmed
5	0515	FORREST reports contacts: 2 at Mengeary Head 1 five miles East Mengeary Head, all heading West

(a)	(b)	(c)
6	0540	FORREST recalled en route at York Point, reports further contact at Charles Point
7	0545	Lighthouse crew report ship movement possible aircraft carrier
8	0555	Lighthouse report craft showing single light moving towards York Point. Possible landing craft
9	0605	Explosions and firing at Moody Brook. (Moody Brook had been vacated at 0035 hrs)
10	0605	Major Norman reappraises threat which now indicated an enemy to the South and a possible direct threat to the Governor and Seat of Government. He orders 5 and 1 Sections to re-deploy to the high ground South of Government House (GH) and to the Monument West of GH covering approaches from Moody Brook. Major Norman returns to GH
11	0615	GH under attack from South (before 5 and 1 Sections arrive).
12	0620	Enemy make a determined assault on GH which is repulsed. They withdraw leaving 3 badly wounded in grounds. Assault supported by automatic fire, stun grenade and possible light mortar. 3 enemy gained access to Maids' Quarters but were undetected at this time
13	0635	OP on Sapper Hill reports tracked vehicles (Amtracs) moving off Orange Beach, over Airfield towards Stanley. (Initially 3 but within a very short period - between radio transmissions - a build up to 18)
14	0645	OP on Sapper Hill reports Helicopters landing at Airport
15	0650- 0930	Enemy revert to sniping tactics from high ground dominating GH. Major Norman arranged all round defence and attempted to push out GH defence boundaries. Defence improved but the enemy's fire is too accurate to regain the best ground. Enemy appears to be content to await arrival of their main force advancing from the airport
16	0715	Enemy Amtracs engaged by 2 Section from Look Out Rocks. Knocked out lead vehicle. Remainder stopped and disembarked troops outside anti-tank range. No troops disembarked from lead vehicle

(a)	(b)	(c)
17	0730- 0830	Sections fighting way back to GH encountering enemy troops en route. Planned 'thin out' route to the South was effectively blocked. 6 Section attempted to use a Gemini to go North but the Gemini would not start. Master of FORREST reluctant to sail
18	0830	Governor contacted Vice Commodore Hector Gilobert (3). Asked him to come to GH to help contact the Argentine Commander
19	0830	Major Norman advises Governor on military options: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. All Marines with Governor to break out and set up Seat of Government elsewhere. b. Continue as present and to fight until overrun. (We were prepared and willing to do so). c. Negotiate a truce. I advised the Governor that we could hold out against the present enemy indefinitely but once all the Amtracs, which were armed with 30mm canon arrived, together with their supporting troops who had company support weapons, eg 81mm mor, then we would be defeated. I told the Governor that our defence would be determined, unrelenting but would be relatively short-lived
20	0845	Vice Commodore and Chief Secretary Mr Eric Baker move to Town Hall to meet Admiral Carlos Busser
21	0910	Major Noott, Cpl Gill and Mne Dorey capture 3 prisoners from Maids' Quarters
22	0915	4 Section ordered to move out. Unfortunately this Section was part of 1982/83 Detachment and was not originally planned for this task. It did not know the area and was ill equipped. It was, however, the only Section in a favourable position
23	0920	The Enemy Commander, Admiral Busser, arrived to talk to Governor. He advised the Governor of his superior forces, that he had 700-800 men ashore with more to fly in. He expressed a wish not to injure or damage civilian life or property. He did not want to kill the brave Royal Marines who had fought so furiously and well and who could not possibly stop his huge force
24	0925	HEGFI ordered Major Norman to instruct RM to stop firing

Notes:

3. He is the Resident Representative of LADE.

21. Section Commanders' Reports. Individual reports by Section and Detachment Commanders are attached to this report at Annexes C - L.

22. Ammunition Expended. The Naval Parties expended:

a. 7.62mm x 6450 rounds

b. 84mm x 5 rounds

c. M66 x 7 rounds

23. Casualties. The following unconfirmed enemy casualties are estimated:

a. Killed - 5 (2 confirmed)

b. Wounded - 17 (2 confirmed)

c. Prisoners - 3

d. Amtrac - 1

No casualties were sustained by the defending force.

POST ASSAULT

24. The first priority at Government House was to hand over the prisoners, who instructed their comrades on the high ground that the defenders were going to come out to assist the 3 wounded men. This had been considered before but was abandoned when one of the wounded was seen to prepare a grenade for throwing.

25. The Sections were slowly rounded up, searched, disarmed and brought back to a paddock adjacent to Government House. Major Norman and Major Noott supervised the collection of the Sections to avoid any unnecessary incident. This was ordered by the enemy commander.

26. At this stage little humiliation was suffered. The mood changed when the steel helmeted "Common Marines" of No 2 Unit arrived as arrogant victors. In the main the closest they had got to the fighting was to guard the prisoners. There was a very marked difference in standards and age between these two factions. The "Common Marines" looked very much as if they were young conscript soldiers.

27. The British forces remained in the paddock until approximately 1600 hours when they were taken (10 at a time) to Moody Brook where, under close supervision they were given 10 minutes to pack non-service kit. It quickly became obvious that most items of value, eg cameras, radio cassettes and money had been looted.

RETURN TO UK

28. Major Norman and Major Noott insisted that each man should be allowed to pack his kit, including those billeted in Stanley before being flown out. They also insisted that the 3 Marine wives and their families living in Stanley should be allowed to accompany them.


29. At 1930 hours all were given a thorough search and loaded on board a C130 under heavy guard, then flown to Comodoro Rivadavio. The Governor and the families had been flown out on a F28 at the same time. On arrival the group was transferred to a LADE Boeing 707 and told their next destination was Buenos Aires. During the transfer from C130 to Boeing the Detachments were heavily guarded - there must have been over 100 armed troops in the close vicinity of the aircraft and coaches at all times. Once on board the Naval Parties were joined by the Governor, his staff and service families.

30. We had been informed that our destination was Buenos Aires. However at 0300 hrs we landed at Montevideo. The party was then transferred to a hotel and kept in very comfortable house arrest.

MORALE

31. The party was at all times in good humour and morale was high. On arrival at Montevideo the force was tired, unwashed, unshaven, unfed and scruffy. They were undoubtedly exhausted but not dejected. To a man the combined force fought bravely and well; indeed Major Noott and Major Norman were proud to have been associated with these men.

I have the honour to be,
Sir
Your obedient Servant



M J Norman

M J NORMAN
Major Royal Marines
Officer Commanding
Naval Party 8901 (1982/83)

Annexes:

- A. Nominal List
- B. Map
- C-L. Section Commanders' Reports

Distribution:

External

Action:

CINCFLEET

Information:

Dept of CGRM
MGRM TRFRM
Editor, Globe and Laurel

Internal

CO RM Poole
OC NP 8901 (6)

FALKLAND ISLANDS - NP 8901 1-2 APRIL 1982
TACTICAL ORGANISATION ON INVASION OF ARGENTINIANS

TAC HQ - OCs ROVER GROUP

		WPN
Maj M J NORMAN	OCRM	
Mne R A FARNWORTH	S3	SLR
Mne M G PATERSON	Dvr (L/Rover)	SLR

DET HQ

CSgt W W MUIR	DSM		
Mne J A TYLER	Dvr (L/Rover)	9mm	SLR
Mne R P TURNER	C3	- Ammo	SLR
Mne A B TIMMS	Dvr	MK - Ammo	SLR

ADMIN SECTION

WO2 W L ASPINALL	DQMS		SLR
Cpl T D PARES	K2		SLR
Cpl P N VAN HEERDEN	VM2		SLR
Mne G DUNCAN	K2		SLR
Mne G P WILLIAMS	K3		SLR
Mne S TIGHE	Storeman		SLR
Mne G C EVANS	Dvr	MK - Personnel	SLR
Mne D F ADEY	Dvr	MK - Ammo & Rations	SLR

OPERATIONS ROOM

Maj G R H NOOTT RM			
Sgt A N SHORT	S1 Ops Operator	9mm	SLR
Cpl P ROUNDING	Carp Ops Log	9mm	SLR
			SLR

RN SECTION AT GOVERNMENT HOUSE

Lt BALL RN	HMS ENDURANCE		SMG
Lt TODHUNTER RN	" "		SLR
CSgt J NOONE		9mm	
GPO (SR) WOODHOUSE	" "		SMG
PO (Wtr) VIND A	" "		SMG
PO (MEM) SMART	" "		SMG
LS (SR) WARD	" "		SMG
LS (SR) LAWSON	" "		SMG
LMEM(R) ALMOND	" "		SMG
AB(SR) McGRATH	" "		SMG
AB(R) McMEEKIN	" "		SMG

MEDICAL COVER

LMA T H C BRADFORD			SLR
LME A G PICKTHALL			SLR

GOVERNMENT HOUSE SECTION

WPN

Cpl M D SELLEN
Mne H W W DOREY Personal Guard to HE
Mne C JONES
Mne P J FAIRCLOUGH
Cpl B M GILL
Mne A McDONALD
Mr J FAIRFIELD Ex Cpl RM NP 8901 80/81

SLR
SLR
SLR
SLR
L42
SLR
SLR

TROOP HQ

Lt C W TROLLOPE RM Tp Cdr
Sgt R G R SHEPHARD Tp Sgt
Mne M GIBBS Arm

9mm & SLR
9mm & SLR
SLR

1 SECTION

Cpl D J ARMOUR
LCpl G CLIFTON
Mne J ALDEN
Mne A C BRINDLEY
Mne R E PARKER
Mne B L ECCLES

SLR
GPMG
GPMG
SLR
SLR
SLR

2 SECTION

Cpl C F BRYAN
LCpl M REYNOLDS GPMG No 2
Mne D J BETTS 84 No 2
Mne S EGAN GPMG No 1
Mne S BROWN 84 No 1
Mne M E COOMBS

SLR
SLR
SLR
SLR
SLR
SLR

3 SECTION

Cpl S C JOHNSON
LCpl S M BLACK
Mne M A BRANCH GPMG No 2
Mne R A N BUTCHER
Mne S DRONFIELD GPMG No 1
Mne M D MACLEOD

SLR
L42
SLR
SLR
SLR

4 SECTION (STILL HELD BY ARGENTINIANS)

Cpl S C YORK
LCpl J N McKAY GPMG No 2
Mne J N URAND
Mne G MOOR
Mne R W F OVERALL 84
Mne M T SMITH GPMG No 1

SLR
SLR
SLR
SLR
SLR

5 SECTION

Cpl N S DUFF		SLR
Cpl D G ERRARD		SLR
Mne B J HOBBS		SLR
Mne S M McCALHAN		SLR
Mne F M SUGDEN		SLR
Mne B M CLAY	L/Rover Dvr	SLR

6 SECTION

Cpl D L CARR		SLR
Cpl N J N WILLIAMS		SLR
Mne R D BLOYE		SLR
Mne T M GEORGE		SLR
Mne M E M BENNETT	GPMG No 1	SLR
Mne M CARR		SLR


BEACH 'OP' - MOTORCYCLES

Mne L MILNE	GPMG	
Mne R P WILCOX		SLR

SAPPERS HILL 'OP' - MOTORCYCLE

Mne M J BERRY		SLR
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8-1



REPORT BY LT C W TROLLOPE RM

Deployed from MB with Sgt Shepherd and Mne Gibbs to 2 Sect position at the Old Airfield.

2 Sect arrived and dispersed to their positions. Preparations for the defence of the position were continued.

Position fully prepared and Sect + Tp HQ stood to.

Explosions were heard from the area of MB. Shortly after this CS5 and 5A moved back through our position.

LCpl Reynolds in C/S 2 L/R went to p/up C/S1 from Hookers Point and return to GH. LCpl Reynolds returned to our location. All this time sporadic small arms fire and explosions could be heard from the area of GH.

At first light we saw two ships to the South. One large probably a cruiser and a frigate. At the same time the sound of APCs could be heard coming from over the top of the ridge from York Bay. Sixteen were counted by the time we vacated that position.

I decided to withdraw as we had no longer to cover the withdrawal of 1 Sect, and also because there was nobody to cover us after any initial contact. The Sect and Tp HQ then withdrew to the area of the pylons on the edge of White City. Six APCs began advancing at speed down the airport road. The first APC was engaged at a range of about 200-250m. The first three 84mm (2) and 66mm (1) missed. Subsequently 1 x 66 fired by Mne Gibbs hit the passenger compartment and 1 x 84mm (Mnes Brown and Betts) hit the front. Both rounds exploded and no fire was received from that vehicle.

The remaining 5 APCs which were about 600-700m away, deployed their troops and opened fire. We engaged them with GPMG, SLR and Sniper Rifle (Sgt Shepherd) for about a minute before Cpl Bryon threw w/p and we withdrew back to the cover of the rear gardens. Incoming fire at that stage was fairly heavy but at the same time mostly inaccurate (not all). We were joined by LMAs Pickthall and Bradford. The Section and Tp HQ withdrew back to the gardens just above the hospital and by this time the first two mediators under a white flag were leaving GH and moving towards the Town Hall. Mne Coombes, the RO maintained comms with ϕ well and passed information accurately.

At this point the Section and Tp HQ still had a considerable quantity of small arms ammunition but had exhausted all its anti-tank supply.

After about $\frac{3}{4}$ of an hour in this position, orders were received to stop firing for good and stay where we were until a representative from each side got to our position to disarm us. At this point I ordered all weapons to be dismantled and destroyed as far as possible. This was carried out.

Before the two representatives arrived we were spotted by their troops, taken prisoner and marched to GH where we joined the others already taken. At all times the members of the Sect and Tp HQ and both LMAs behaved calmly and reacted quickly to all orders. Field craft and fire and movement was of a high standard. All men were prepared to fight on.

REPORT BY CPL D J ARMOUR

i/c 1 SECT

1 Section started to prepare positions under order of OC. Due to lack of time and digging tools shell scrapes were dug and camouflaged out. Section returned for meals and ammo and final brief from OC.

1 Section deployed to positions on Hookers Point approx 0100 hrs 2. 4.82.

Final touches to pos were carried out.

Sect "stood to" on a number of occasions by air from C/S 9 or 0.

At approx 0600 1 Section was withdrawn by Rover to the Pavilion via Stanley.

On reaching Stanley the sect was stopped by Cpl Carr whose sect had been taking fire.

The seaward rd was or appeared to be dodgy so we took up positions on the rd.

Cpl Carr withdrew through 1 sect towards Davis St. Both sect received incoming fire.

As I did not know my whereabouts Marine Eccles (who had served NP8901 before)

pointed out Davis St, where we went to. Cpl Carr was about 30m in front when he made a contact - from now on St names unknown -

1 sect move up to Cpl Carr who was engaging a wood at the end of the street. We were informed by Ø to get to Gov House and Cpl Carr was told to move to the Post Office.

1 Sect engaged the wood while Cpl Carr moved off. En fire ceased and 1 Sect pepperpotted down the rd towards the wood (where we knew Gov House to be).

Movement was slow as we had to crawl and monkey run until we reached the hospital.

From there (now daylight) the sec fire and manoeuvred behind the nurses home and across the football pitch until we reached a hedgerow leading to Gov House.

We moved on the blind side of the hedgerow towards the GH. As we had lost comms well before I informed Marine Parker to call out "Royal Marines" as we approached the house. We were eventually heard by Cpl Pares who told us where the en were and where he had took fire. The sect under cover from Cpl Pares then dashed into the house where we were deployed upstairs by Major Noott; from then on we acted under orders from Maj Noott and Maj Norman OC RM until the CSM (CSgt Muir) informed us to unload and told me to take the sect outside to the en as agreed in the negotiations.

REPORT BY CPL C P BRYAN

SEC COMD 2 SEC

The section was deployed to the old airport at approx 0130 hrs (2. 4.82). We occupied the position which had already been pre-prepared the foregone evening. The positions were fully prepared on our arrival, and the section then went on 50% stand to. When the first attack went in on Moody Brook (approx 0605) we changed to 100% stand to. We then heard gunfire and rocket or mortar fire around Govt House area. (0615 hrs). At first light we heard APC's moving to the left of our positions. When The APC's started moving across the Ismass we thought that a tactical withdrawal was needed. We then moved across Rookery Bay by Landrover back to our secondary position around White City. The section occupied positions around this area with scope to cover the airport road.

We then waited until the APC's were within firing range of the 66mm (around 200m) then opened up with the 66mm and 84mm. One APC was hit twice and started moving back for cover while deploying troops, the GPMG continued to lay down fire while smoke and phos grenades enabled us to withdraw through White City. The APC's continued firing while advancing, the section then made their way through STANLEY (via back gardens) to the last back garden over-looking the football pitch. We arrived there just before the first truce was called. After the "carry on firing" was called. We stayed in this position as a move for Govt House would have ended in disaster. (Argentinas troops had occupied the hills overlooking the football and Govt House). Both LMAs were then asked to leave the section and join the hospital (we picked them up at White City).

We stayed in these positions until the 'surrender'. We then destroyed all weapons and documents. The Special Service troops then took us to Govt House where the rest of the Detachment were being held.

REPORT BY CPL JOHNSTON, 3 SECTION CDR

We left Moody Brook, a Section of 6 strong RM plus one civilian technician (Mr Bill Curtiss) who had the task of off-setting the direction beacon for the airport by 20^o, but was unable to so he turned it off, after which he returned home with Major Norman.

We then set up our position at the pre-arranged point, we then had a 50% on watch. During then we were ordered to stand to by ø & 9.

At approx 0615 we were ordered to GH to reinforce their pos. At the same time we had No 2 + 5 and 5A pass our pos. En route we were told to take over the power station. Having no knowledge of the location of the power station and ø could not help us, ø then ordered us to GH by the rear entrance. On Sapper Hill we were pinned down by machine gun fire (2) men. This was from the area of Lookout Rocks some 1800m. We were also brought under fire from the ridge above GH so we were caught in the cross fire. It was then the ø ordered us to make our way SW. On our move up Sapper Hill one mortar round landed close to our pos. Our route we took was the track up Sapper Hill, towards the Darwin Road and headed to Bluff Cove. Because of the reports of the Track we left the road and headed off the rough direction Bluff Cove via Mullet Creek Stream. It was then that the Sec was ordered over the radio to stop. Major Noott came on the air and said we had to meet up with him on the Darwin Road. On seeing him in the road we moved up to him. The sniper in front with the rest of the Sec behind in extended line as we were apprehensive of the situation at this stage. Major Noott then told us to lay down our arms and ammo, we were then searched, put on the transport and taken to GH.

REPORT BY C/SGT MUIR

About 0200 hrs. 2 April 82 Det HQ, Admin Tp and elements of RN set up defences around Government House. A 50% stand-to was implemented, and at various times thereafter, on reports of enemy movement we had 100% stand-to.

About 0605 rifle fire and explosions were heard to come from the west in the area of Moody Brook, on this a 100% stand to was ordered. (100% then remained for the rest of the confrontation). About 06.15 hrs, GH came under fire from the high ground to the south with rounds hitting both GH and the vehicles outside. Fire was returned but the effect was unknown. About 0620 a number of enemy troops attempted to enter GH from the SE edge, they were engaged and 3 hits recorded. Firing continued spasmodically on GH from the 'S' until about 0845 when it was announced by the OC that a mediator was approaching from the west and that he was not to be fired on. After the arrival of the mediator firing by our own forces was kept to a minimum although the enemy continued. He put fire down on GH.

About 0900 the buildings to the rear of GH were cleared and three prisoners taken. About 0915 the military negotiators arrived and about 0930 hrs the order to cease fire completely was given.

REPORT BY CPL SELLEN
GOVERNMENT HOUSE

1/2 SECTION FROM 4 SEC

- 2000 hrs Deployed from MB to GH with 4 men to guard Governor and GH. Force increased and decreased throughout night by Navy and HQ & Admin elements.
- 0515 Stood to after reports of shipping close in in Port William.
Deployed around GH main arc east.
- 0600 Explosions in MB area then firing closer thought to be at Vice Commodore's House.
- 0605 Redeployed to face west flank.
- 0610 Engaged target at corner fence of garden/wood. SE corner GH withdrew to SW corner of servants' quarters.
- 0620 approx En unit entered GH via intersection of kitchen and servants' quarter.
Using grenades.
Engaged en between 0615 and daylight causing 3 wounded.
- 0830 3 x prisoners flushed out of servants' quarters.

Report by Cpl GILL (Acting Tp Sgt)

During the initial stages of the assault the main problem was defending interior of Govt House. Most of the defence section were pinned down and engaging the enemy outside.

Apart from relaying orders from Ops Room to outside sections and Mne Tighe and Mne Dorey at the east end of Gov House.

During this time there was considerable movement in the shrubbery to the east but because of the fact that our sections were fighting their way back to GH and we could not identify them in the half light we did not engage.

Approx 0730 Cpl Armour and his section arrived at the east entrance after fighting their way back.

Ever since the first assault there had been moans and screams from 3 x Argentinians hit in the engagement.

Several of our men had come under accurate rifle fire from the ridge to the south and I tried to find a window upstairs to attempt to engage the firer with my L42. However there was no suitable vantage point.

Shortly after, the first cease fire was arranged and the Arg. negotiator came in under a white flag. Just before he got to the entrance of GH at the west end two low velocity shots were fired at him by Arg. forces on high ground to the south. They missed.

While cease fire was on Cpl Pares and myself moved out into gardens at east side of house to attempt to find and if poss bring in the Arg. wounded. We saw one approx 30m to south of main building but to get to him we would have had to climb two fences and our faith in cease fire was not that good. While in the garden we saw a section of Arg. on the ridge moving forward to better positions and informed OC. Shortly after firing resumed and the cease fire was called off. I engaged the Sec Cmd on the ridge at 500m's with my L42, and on my third shot he dropped his weapon, jerked upright and slid over the rock he was using as cover falling in full view where he remained unmoving.

I then shot the Rifleman who jerked and slumped behind the rock leaving his rifle

on the top of the rock, no further movement from that position. Cpl Pares then said he could see the radio operator; as he could see him and I couldn't, he engaged him with 10 rds rapid. A body fell into my arc of view and lay writhing.

We were then engaged (or the general area) by a machine gunner. I fired 4 x shots at him and after the last shot he didn't return fire and there was no more MG fire directed at GH from that area for remainder of the action.(Probable).

We then returned to GH and I went with Maj Noott to clear maid's quarters. There were 3 x Arg. up in loft who were persuaded to surrender by firing SMGs into ceiling. They were taken outside and guarded till we were ordered to lay our weapons down 0920 approx.

REPORT BY MNE MILNE & MNE WILCOX
BEACH POSN

After briefing started out to our posn, waiting by Canache Track, to take canoes down. Cpl Duff dropped off canoes, got them to edge of water, discovered one was u/s. Then proceeded to our posn arriving there at 0330 hrs, due to the fact that the lights on one motorcycle was fused, had no radio contact, receive only. Heard stand-to around about 0530 hrs. Mne Wilcox heard rumbling of U/K engine. We then spotted silhouette of assault ship. We expected it to come on our beach, but by-passed us and stopped inside Port William. At this stage Mne Wilcox and I left our posn, taking GPMG with us. We then checked Cpl Duff's posn, finding it empty, so we proceeded towards town where we met Cpl Armour, and were informed that the Argentinians were fighting up by Govt House. We then joined Cpl Carr's Sect and did street fighting trying to get to Govt House, but we were unable as the resistance was too great. Then we were ordered to Post Office and were told there were Amtracks coming. We then boarded the FORREST as we couldn't do much else at that stage, then came the ceasefire. Called Ø and told him where we were. Reply was "stay there until we come for you" which we did.

5 SECTION REPORT

i/c Cpl DUFF Mne HOBBS
2 i/c Cpl GARRARD Mne McCALMAN
Driver: Mne CLAY Mne SUGDEN
Detached to beach on m/c Mne MILNE
 Mne WILCOX

We deployed from Moody Brook at approx 0045 hrs to position a canoe at the Canash for Mnes Milne and Wilcox's withdrawal from the beach.

After dropping off Mnes Milne and Wilcox to position the canoe the remainder proceeded to our position which was around the Islander Manager. We arrived at 0130 and continued to prepare two trenches.

Mnes Milne and Wilcox arrive at approx 0145 to pick up their equipment. This was the last contact we had with them until they arrived as POW with 6 section.

We stood to at approx 0314 on the order of Ø when an aircraft carrier and one other ship had been sighted off York Bay. This was a false alarm and we stood down to 50% shortly afterwards.

We again stood to at approx 0430 when helicopters were reported to be flying for the area of Port William.

At about 0530 an explosion was reported from the area of Moody Brook and shortly afterwards we were told by Ø/ to withdraw to Govt House.

We drove through the centre of town and heard fire from the direction of the Darwin Road.

We de-bussed at the Hospital and then told to go to the area of the Monument to cover towards the Harbour and road from Moody Brook.

We re-embarked in the Landrover and debussed at the gate to Cable and Wireless and Govt House.

At first we deployed around the field between Cable and Wireless and the road and moved the three Marines to the Gorse Bushes on Monument Hill while Cpl Gerrard remained by the front right hand corner of Cable and Wireless and myself by the main gate.

During the 1st cease fire the old Vice Commodore walked down Monument Hill to the gate and up the drive.

During the 3rd cease fire three APC drove up Monument Hill and deployed troops over the main road past the Monument.

These troops then moved back towards Govt House firstly picking up Mnes Hobbs, McCalman, and Sugden, then ordering myself and Cpl Gerrard and the two Sailors by the main gate to move to the road. We were put face down on the road and searched. After this we were moved to Govt House.

1. Contact (1) Made our way to GH. Came under fire at Troop from ground above GH.
2. Moved back to Post Office. All round Def. Stopped C/S 1 and 2. Joined forces.
3. Reported to our location and from 8 move to cattle grid on Super Hill and go covert.
4. Moved up road past Joan Bourds up to playground. Came under fire from 4/5 spot and auto. From point (A). Returned fire pos bits. All returned.
5. Pulled back to arch of Post Office and tried to go around via Sidf hall.
6. Moved under cover passed play park to corner came under fire from point (A) again auto and semi fire. Returned fire. No returns.
7. Started to fire and ran up street came under fire at point (B) 3/4 auto and semi spots. Returned fire pos bits nil returns.
8. Came under fire at point (C) Iron house at point (C) no returns.
9. Ask 8 sitrep own troop in area. Nil and 8 unable to give.
10. Fire and ran up street came under fire at point (D) from semi and auto spots at point (D). Returned fire pos bits.

NO 6 SEC

Cpl CARR
Cpl WILLIAMS

- 0200 - Sect deployed at Murry Heights
Sit Reps STAND TO over Heli noises
- 0600? - Exp & gun shots from area of Moody Brook.
- 0615? - Exp and gun fire from area of GH.
- 0620?- From Ø Move to GH.
- onwards
1. Contact (1) Made our way to GH. Came under fire at Tress from ground above GH.
 2. Moved back to Post Office. All round Def. Stopped C/S 1 and 5A. Joined forces.
 3. Reported to Ø our location and from Ø move to cattle grid on Sapper Hill and go covert.
 4. Moved up road pass Joan Bounds up to playground. Came under fire from 4/5 wpns semi and auto, from point (A). Returned fire pos hits. Nil returned.
 5. Pulled back to area of Post Office and tried to go around via fidf hall.
 6. Moved under cover passed play park to corner came under fire from point (A) again auto and semi fire. Returned fire. No returns.
 7. Started to fire and man up street came under fire at (4) from point (B) 3/4 auto and semi wpns. Returned fire pos hits nil returns.
 8. Came under fire at point (5) from house at point (C) no hits, no returns.
 9. Ask Ø sitrep own troop in area. Nil ans Ø unable to give.
 10. Fire and man up street came under fire at point (6) from semi and auto wpns at point (D). Returned fire pos hits.

11. Seen en movement in woods and high ground above GH. Engaged with 2 x GPMG's pos hits. Nil returns.
12. From Ø my C/S to move back to PO and C/S 1 to move to Pavilion.
13. Again fire and man back down street again getting fired at from points (B) and (A). Returned fire pos hits. No return fire.
14. At point (9) moved into the gardens for cover and head behind the Malvinas to main sea road.
15. Deployed around PO and received a sitrep from police (Lamb) that GH was surrounded and that APC's were entering Stanely. Reported to Ø.
16. Told Ø we were attempting to cross river and go covert via the Gemini on board MV FORREST. From Ø go ahead.
17. Fire and man down jetty to Forrest at this time Jack Souis had put Gemini in water.
18. Could not get Gemini started and Jack would not take us across. Reported this to Ø and was told to stay where we were.
19. From Ø we were to remain where we were as there was a cease fire on an not to fire.
20. From Ø stay where you are until one of our officers meets us.
21. Met by Maj Norman who told us to hand our wpns and equip to en.
22. Marched to GH.

All times approx.

No of rounds fired: GPMG 3000

SLR 450.

No of rounds taken ??? (a lot)

NOT DRAWN TO SCALE

DOTTED ARROWS OUTWARD ROUTE

STRAIGHT LINE ARROWS INWARD ROUTE

R. Williams
CPL RM

1-3

