



CONFIDENTIAL

42

Fallouts Emergency Unit
Handed to Mr Haig
by the Secretary of State on 23/4
DF 24/4

Mr Fall

ANNOUNCEMENT ON ADDITIONAL MEASURES GOING BEYOND THE MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE

1. I attach the text of a communication we are asking the Swiss Government today to convey urgently to the Argentine Government about additional measures going beyond the establishment of the maritime exclusion zone.
2. In the interests of maintaining confidence, the Secretary of State may wish to find an opportunity this evening to inform Mr Haig of this further action we are taking. He might wish to add that we are informing the Swiss Government that HMG regards the terms of this communication as having immediate effect.
3. We are still considering whether to announce this decision publicly and to deliver it more widely via the diplomatic channel. The Americans should therefore be asked to treat it as confidential for the time being.

D. M. D. Thomas

D M D Thomas

23 April 1982

Copied to:

HM Ambassador
Sir I Sinclair
Mr Bullard
Mr Ure
H of C

*Mr G...
[Signature]
pa*

ALQ 050/16		
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY		
DESK OFFICER	REGISTRY	
INDEX	PA	Action Taken

CONFIDENTIAL

UK CONFIDENTIAL

Text of Communication from HMG to Swiss Government dated
23 April 1982

"In announcing the establishment of a maritime exclusion zone around the Falkland Islands, HMG made it clear that this measure was without prejudice to the right of the UK to take whatever additional measures may be needed in the exercise of its right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In this connexion, HMG now wishes to make clear that any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries, or military aircraft which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British forces in the South Atlantic will encounter the appropriate response. All Argentine aircraft including civil aircraft engaging in surveillance of these British forces will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly."

UK CONFIDENTIAL

33D
FCO 714511
 13413172
 Return by (21/09/2023 09:51:05)
 9562422 (Mr. Christopher Collins)
 Closure status: Open
 S 10/08/2023 09:51:05



-BY HAND

26 APR 1982

11 12
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E
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PA (41)
 Mr. Wright
 You asked about this.
 [Signature]
 23/4

(35)

Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Switzerland and has the honour to acknowledge the Note delivered by hand on 16 April 1982 from the Embassy of Switzerland about an enquiry from the Argentine Foreign Ministry over the Maritime Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands.

The announcement of the Maritime Exclusion Zone by Her Majesty's Government on 7 April was quite clear. It stated that from 0400 GMT on Monday 12 April 1982 any Argentine warships and Argentine naval auxiliaries found within the Zone would be treated as hostile and would be liable to be attacked by British forces.

The British Government statement went on to say that the measure was without prejudice to the right of the United Kingdom to take whatever additional measures may be needed in exercise of its right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs avails himself of this opportunity to express to the Ambassador the assurance of his highest consideration.

ALQ 050/16

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London SW1
23 April 1982





-BY HAND

26 APR 1982

11 12 1
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[Signature]

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London SW1
23 April 1982



RESTRICTED



Mr. Gillmore

(40)

Mr. Giffard
The Secretary of State did not see before his departure, but I see no reason why this should not issue.

Private Secretary *J. H. [unclear]* 2/4

Mr. [unclear]

11 12 1
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
35

MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE

1. We owe the Swiss a reply to their note of 16 April; about which the Swiss Chargé spoke to you earlier the same day (your minute also of 16 April). — (33)

2. As you know, we thought it tactically wise to play this in fairly slow time. But Mr Wright ran across the Swiss Minister yesterday, who enquired about a reply. I think therefore that we should now deliver this. I presume that you would like to transmit the answer yourself. I attach a draft.

No trace
T. Simons
12.6.82.

[Handwritten signature]

D H Gillmore

20 April 1982

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Mr Giffard.

You are our contact with the Swiss
and my wife to call in the charge?



Sir / Sinclair

No objection to its terms. I have advised the chargé possible announcement and made of this is any intention of proceeding to a strike Argentine national vessels.

J. Bums 2/4

I think we might deliver this in writing, rather than call them in; but I should be most grateful for your agreement, if you can give it, that there is no objection to its terms.

RESTRICTED

[Handwritten signature]
2/4

(39)

PS/Secretary of State

Copy to:
 PSO/CDS
 PS/PUS
 Sec/CNS
 - AUS D Staff

5/21

ALQ 050/16		
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY		
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FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. We have consulted the FCO Legal Adviser about whether some further Notice to Mariners or Public Announcement is necessary before British Forces engage Argentine Forces either in one of the zones announced (but not formally promulgated) by the Argentine Government or on the High-Seas.
2. S of S will recall that the final sentence of the Notice which announced the establishment of a Maritime Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands reserved HMG's right to take further action in exercising its right of self defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Sir Ian Sinclair has advised us that our rights under the Charter, and the notice we have given of our intention to exercise those rights, provide sufficient legal cover for the contingencies which S of S was concerned about. The Argentines have already committed aggression against British Territory and British people. The aim of the Naval Task Group is to counter that aggression which our inherent right of self defence enshrined under Article 51 entitles us to do. Argentine Forces encountered en route could be presumed to be operating in support of the illegal invasion of the Falklands, and in opposition to our efforts to combat that invasion. Our Force would, therefore, be entitled to deal with them as the situation required. This would/the case on the High Seas, in one of the Argentine zones, or, of course, within our own MEZ around the Falklands.
3. It is a separate question whether any further announcement of our intentions would be desirable either in an attempt to dissuade the Argentine Navy from approaching our Forces, or to put ourselves in a better position politically to defend post hoc any action we may take if they did so. So far as I know CDS has not taken a view about the possible deterrent value of an announcement, but it seemed to AUS D Staff and I that the argument cut both ways. On the one hand an announcement might deter, on the other it might be perceived as a challenge which national pride, required should be taken up. The Naval Staff have made the point that some form of announcement would help to underline HMG's resolve, and would be a fillip to the morale of those serving with the Task Group. All other things being equal the Naval Staff would prefer an announcement to be made, and to be made some time in advance of when British and Argentine Forces are likely to meet.


4. As to the possibility that an announcement would put us in a better position politically in the aftermath of any engagement between British and Argentine Forces, S of S will have his own views. On balance, we believe that it would. We have, therefore, prepared the attached draft of an announcement which we have cleared with Sir Ian Sinclair.

5. As to the timing of such an announcement the FCO have argued strongly that it should not be made while the Haig negotiations are in a delicate and decisive phase. FCO officials are content with the terms of the announcement, but have suggested that it should be held on the stocks while the Haig negotiations unfold over the next day or so, and until Ministers take decisions on rules of engagement for our Forces entering the South Atlantic, which would give them discretion to engage Argentine Forces in the way the draft announcement anticipates.

6. If S of S is content with the terms of the attached announcement, and that it should not be released pro tem, he may nevertheless wish to circulate it to his colleagues in the next day or so for their comments.

7. I should be very ready to prepare the draft of a minute with which he might do so.

17 Apr 82



R T JACKLING
Head of DS11
MB 9326 3287 MB

ANNOUNCEMENT

In announcing the establishment of a Maritime Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands, HMG made it clear that this measure was without prejudice to the right of the UK to take whatever additional measures may be needed in the exercise of its right of self defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In this connection, HMG now wishes to make clear that any attempt on the part of the Argentine war ships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft to interfere with the mission of British Forces in the South Atlantic will encounter the appropriate response.

A-1

SECRET



ANNEX B TO
 COS(Misc) 135/742/1
 DATED 18 APRIL 1982

DECISIONS REQUIRED

TIME OF ISSUE

182000Z

DATE	PARAQUET GROUP	CARRIER BATTLE GROUP (MAIN)	ADVANCE GROUP	AMPHIBIOUS GROUP	DECISIONS BY :		
					COS	CD(SA)	
19 APR MON	a. Authority to cross 200 mile limit b. ROE for Surface Ships c. ROE for SSN	a. Decide Mission b. Authorise ROE c. Issue Directive d. Order ROE for High Seas South of 10°S	as for CBG			am am am am am am	pm pm pm pm pm pm
20 APR TUES	[Cross 200 mile limit] Order to implement Landing Plan					am	pm
21 APR WED	[Earliest landing of advanced Elements]		[Arrive in Holding Position 40°S 35°W]				
22 APR THUR	a. Option to Abort Main Landing - If exercised, decide new ROE [Earliest Main Landing]		Review decision to "Hold"			- if req am	if req - if req
23 APR FRI				Authorise Group to sail South [Sail Ascension] Approve ROE for High Seas South of 10°S		am	pm
24 APR SAT				[Cross 10°S latitude]			
25 APR SUN		a. Authority to cross 200 mile limit b. ROE change for Surface Ships and aircraft [Carrier Battle Group joins up with Advance Group]				am am	pm pm
26 APR MON		Approve insertion of advanced elements into Falkland Islands				am	pm
27 APR TUES		[Cross 200 mile limit from FI]					

ANNEX B TO
CDS
DATED
(Concluded)

302 Harrassment is to be carried out to a similar extent, and in a similar degree to any which is received by units within the force.

403 Maritime International Law is not to be broken unless it is necessary in order to achieve the aim.

506 Surveillance and shadowing may be overt, or covert. The requirement to remain undetected need not have priority over other operational objectives, eg detection by potential hostile forces may be invited in order to gain tactical intelligence.