

~~TOP SECRET~~

NSC
5/3/82
START

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS M/306 #1

BY Smf, NARA, DATE 11/4/05

~~TOP SECRET~~

5/3/82
0945
START
2nd Mtg.)

Weinberger / Carlucci / Ske
Rostow / ? / Rowny
Hayward / Gorman
Kutepalrick

[State absent when President arrives]

Pres: tells stories ... \$120 tickets - 12,000 pennies

Judge Clark: units of account $\frac{1}{2}$ insert to be discussed today - hold on verification - 90% agreement ... do we limit TW directly or indirectly - Bud McF will review charts

Bud McFarlane: criteria = ① carry out strategy ② deep cuts ③ equality ④ easily understanding ⑤ satisfy allies, ⑥ allow for stability — all agree
① substantial difference from SALT II
② 5000 warheads ③ focus on ICBM ④ treat bombers differently ... ultimately 250 on each side ⑤ limit TW, but how?? — STATE $\frac{1}{2}$ JCS
... 5000 w/H \rightarrow substantial cut in TW (down to 2-3M leg)
— easily understandable, deep reductions — cons w/ WH
= breakout (even w/ only modest TW advantage) ...
pennies ... accuracy or yield advantage — cons w/ TW
= understandability ... verifiability ... Soviets alone called to reduce to 2M (we'd increase) ... Soviets may also wish to limit bomber P/L

Adm Duman: cannot give certainty w/o onsite inspection, but can give high ~~certainty~~ ^{confidence} — (review factors that allow high ~~certainty~~ ^{confidence}) — moderate to high w/ mobile ICBMs, high w/ fixed, for W/Hs ... (review other measures)

high = <10%
moderate = 25-50% } confidence

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Judge Clark: roundtable discussion

Haig: (praise Bud's summary) ... must focus on both military and political aspects ... all agree on ^{3M} 5000 w/Hs (= 1/3 reduction from current levels) — ~~no~~ no more than half could be ICBM w/Hs — require Soviets to do 60% reduction in their best systems) — 3 major problems w/ Tw: ① Tw above current levels ... 1.3 to 2 ... paper equivalence but real disparity ② 65% cut for Soviets in Tw ... not credible ③ hard to verify Tw ... 1M leg uncertainty equivalent to 180 SS-18s — ceiling of 850 missiles is most significant guard against breakout — go beyond satellites for verification, but wait on decision until after fix position

Weinberger: vital disagreement (passes out chart) — if we just limit warheads, we'd play into hands of Kennedy & Hatfield — not the relevant measure, since yield is the real measure, and one gets at yield through Tw — it can be easily understood — not relevant that Soviets wouldn't like proposal ... (analogy to) what Soviets are doing at INF now — verification uncertainties affect every proposal — *speech should be specific

5000 / 2500

850 / 250

Hayward: Should I discuss certification and position?
 (... do both...) — T/W important, but JCS think we should get at it indirectly... combination of
 (2500 ICBM) w/4s & 850 missiles ^{gets} our big cut
 — if you take T/W as principal indicator, you'll end up less... we'll end up w/ imbalance in P/W, no matter what our position is

Rowan: important difference in principle remains — recommend in speeches you talk about # of warheads and their destructive capacity, % going into detail on how we measure that — we essentially agree w/OSD position... (refer to Chart) (slight confusion as people shuffle paper)... most fundamental objection to State/JCS position is that it would be profoundly destabilizing (fewer aimpoints would encourage larger warheads)... press in direction of smaller warheads, which would decrease attractiveness of 1st strike — Committee on the Present Danger's experience was that people had strong views on reaching agreement, but did not understand details... that's not the function of the American people — cites (—?) that Soviets prepared to negotiate on T/W — my former memo was that unless we restore... — START & INF are not the centerpiece of our foreign policy — Soviets will have no motivation to enter into agreement unless we convince them & world that continuance of their current

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course carries substantial risk — we haven't solved the MX problem, established a strong mid presence SDA, etc. — we're all recommending the same goal of equal deterrence

(Jean Kirkpatrick leaves)

Gen Rowny: are the goals understandable & can we negotiate? — my preference is that we set goals and then phase — are goals plausible? ... set goals, then do the "possible" first — will they come down? ... we're giving up SUBMs later on ... they fear D-5 ... we give up something in long run, ask them to give up something in the short run

Judge Clark: evidence is in for your later decision — move to START insert for May 9th

Weinberger: 3 quick points — U.S. cut vs. add to get to parity — Soviets did negotiate in 1975 where only they cut

Judge Clark: insert ... comments?

Rootow: add consultation w/ Cong'l leaders (... to allies)

Weinberger: add onsite verification

Haig: disagree ... not before we agree on what to verify

Rootow: save verification for later speech

Howard: Chiefs don't have issue that ^{inside} ^{more worried select} ^{choice where only onsite} ^{would work} should be in or out of speech ...

Baker: are we checking on prior statements by Pres Reagan re: verification, etc.

Inman: sooner or later you'll have to decide what degree of confidence you want

Haig: you're faced w/ sharply divergent views -
 campaign statement for longterm goal
 excellent (don't pose threat to one another) -
 add to that now that we'll proceed over
 time to that goal - taking 2500 warheads
 away will drive them to smaller missiles
 - put equal T/W forth at a later
 stage - capture essence of both positions
 but in a more realistic way - Soviets
 won't negotiate T/W

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Weinberger: on phased approach, comment that comes to mind is that in long run all will be dead - Soviets will negotiate TW

Judge Clark: (cites Geld article of yesterday ... rendition of 16 Apr mtg. et al.)
compulsion to give argument to press a mystery to me

Rostow: another mtg.?

Clark: yes, on interim measures, after Pres. decides

Pres: if W/Its, do you not automatically achieve ↓ TW? (Haig: almost same)

Weinberger: no — Rostow: no ... Haig: requires they do all, we do nothing — Wein.: INF ... never get them to table)

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on May 3, 19 82
for The President of White House:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

State:
Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Mr. Richard R. Burt

NSC:
Colonel Michael O. Wheeler
Mr. Sven Kraemer
Colonel Robert Linhard

OSD:
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
~~Dep Sec Frank C. Carlucci~~
Under Secretary Fred Ikle

CIA:
Admiral Bobby Inman

OMB:
Mr. William Schneider

USUN:
~~Amb Kenneth Adelman~~
Amb Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

ACDA:
Mr. Eugene V. Rostow
Mr. Robert Grey
Amb Edward Rowny

JCS:
Admiral Thomas B. Hayward
Lt General Paul F. Gorman

White House:
Mr. James A. Baker III
Mr. Michael K. Deaver
Judge William P. Clark
Mr. Richard G. Darman

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Admiral John M. Poindexter

MEETING LOCATION

Building West Wing White House Requested by Carol Cleveland
Room No. Cabient Room Room No. 372 Telephone 3044
Time of Meeting 9:45 a.m. Date of request May 1, 1982

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

THE CABINET ROOM

Grey

Poindexter

Darman

Rowny

Rostow

Adelman

Bart


Haig

President

Weinberger

Carlucci

Schneider



Hayward

Inman

Clark

Baker

Deaver

Gorman

McFarlane

Kraemer

Linhard

Wheeler

DOOR

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. list	of participants for NSC meeting <i>WHGLCAS 3/05/01</i>	5/3/82	P-1
2. memo	M. Wheeler to J. Poindexter, re attendance at NSC meeting (2 pp) <i>WHGL 3/5/01</i>	4/30/82	P-1
3. memo	M. Wheeler to J. Poindexter, re proposed list of attendees " " "	4/27/82	P-1
4. minutes	handwritten for NSC meeting (7 pp) <i>R 11/04/05 M1306 #1</i>	5/3/82	P-1 P-5
5. memo	F. Ikle to Secretary of Defense, re OSD approach (2 pp) <i>R 11/04/05 M1306 #2</i>	5/3/82	P-1 P-5
6. paper	re proposal <i>R " " #3</i>	n.d.	P-1 P-5
7. memo	A. Haig to the President, re START (3 pp) <i>R " " #4</i>	5/1/82	P-1
8. memo	Bob Linhard/Sven Kraemer to W. Clark, re START (2 pp) <i>R " " #5</i>	5/3/82	P-1
9. memo	S. Kraemer/Robert Linhard to W. Clark, re NSC meeting <i>R " " #6</i>	5/1/82	P-1
10. memo	W. Clark to President, re NSC meeting <i>R " " #7</i>	5/2/82	P-1
11. table	re START <i>R " " #8</i>	n.d.	P-1 P-5
12. chart	re START <i>R " " #9</i>	n.d.	P-1 P-5
13. paper	re START (16 pp) <i>PAR 7/19/10 M1306 #10</i>	5/2/82	P-1 P-5
14. paper	re options (3 pp) <i>R 11/04/05 M1306 #11</i>	n.d.	P-1
15. paper	re issues (4 pp) <i>R " " #12</i>	n.d.	P-1
16. paper	re talking points for NSC meeting <i>R " " #13</i>	5/3/82	P-1
COLLECTION: EXEC. SECRETARIAT, NSC (NSC Mtg. Files)			DSD
FILE LOCATION: NSC00049 03 May 82 (1/2) Box 91284			4/14/94

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 3/29/2007

File Folder NSC 00049 03 MAY 82 (1/2)

FOIA

M1306

Box Number 91284

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
4	MINUTES	NSC MEETING START (M1306 #1)	7	5/3/1982
		<i>MVH 3/13/08</i>		
5	MEMO	IKLE TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (M1306 #2)	2	5/3/1982
		<i>MVH 3/13/08</i>		
6	PAPER	PROPOSAL (M1306 #3)	1	ND
		<i>MVH 2/13/08</i>		
7	MEMO	HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT RE START (M1306 #4)	3	5/1/1982
		<i>MVH 3/13/08</i>		
8	MEMO	LINHARD/KRAEMER TO CLARK (M1306 #5)	2	5/3/1982
		<i>MVH 3/13/08</i>		
9	MEMO	KRAEMER/LINHARD TO CLARK (M1306 #6)	1	5/1/1982
		<i>MVH 3/13/08</i>		
10	MEMO	CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT (M1306 #7)	1	5/2/1982
		<i>MVH 2/13/08</i>		
12	CHART	RE START (M1306 #9)	1	ND
		<i>MVH 2/13/08</i>		
14	PAPER	INTERIM RESTRAINTS (M1306 #11)	3	ND
		<i>MVH 3/13/08</i>		
15	PAPER	OTHER START ISSUES (M1306 #12)	4	ND
		<i>MVH 3/13/08</i>		

NSC 00049