File E18

# SECRET COVERING SECRET DELICATE SOURCE

D/DIS(CS) 21/52/1/2

DGI

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AD/DI(AG)

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## FAIKLAND ISLANDS INQUIRY


1. I believe you will wish to be brought up to date on the progress Mr James and Group Captain Flanagan have made in assembling the MOD documentary evidence for this inquiry. I attach:

a. A 31 page catalogue of over 140 MOD key documents.

b. A list of secondary sources ie those which have commented on MOD action in relation to the Falklands after the event.


c. A covering minute from Mr James to PUS, CDS and 2nd PUS dated 14 July.

d. A further minute to the same addressees reporting his meeting with the Secretary of the Review Team, dated 19 July.



SECRET COVERING SECRET DELICATE SOURCE

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## RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4)

d. The minute of 14 July, para 10c questions whether more should have been done to stimulate intelligence gathering effort in view of the second priority accorded to Argentina and the Falklands in MOD intelligence priorities. This, too, is a point on which you may wish a defensive brief to be prepared. I understand that at a 1981 review of requirements on Central and South America at the JIC Requirements and Priorities Sub Committee, it was agreed that there should be an increased emphasis placed on requirements for intelligence on Argentine military capability.

3. Only the catalogue will go to the Secretary of the Inquiry: the minutes to PUS and the list of secondary sources will not.

20 July 1982

Head of DIS(CS)

SECRET COVERING SECRET DELICATE SOURCE



## FALKLAND ISLANDS REVIEW: MOD POSITION 14 JUL 82

- 1. Attached is a Catalogue of Documents held by MOD covering the period 1 Jan 79 to 2 Apr 82. Except for a lead-in from the last round of UK/Argentine talks early in 1979, the documents all originate during the life of the present government.
- 2. The documentary sources will be apparent from the Catalogue. They are mainly the Secretary of State's papers (MO 5/21), CDS's (2038/1), the registered files of two DS divisions (5 and 11), and DI4 registered files. All these are in the custody of the MOD Review Team except for a separate folder of all Cabinet and OD minutes and papers on the Faiklands which has now been returned to the Private Office. Such papers as register action by the Chiefs collectively are listed in the Catalogue. But there are not many; over this particular period there appears to have been no formal COS consideration of the Falklands problem in-committee. D/SECCOS believes that there are no Secretary's Standard File entries; and I understand the same is likely to apply to SECCOS' personal record of COS(I)'s.
- 3. The Catalogue is designed to be seen by the Privy Councillors' Review (PCR); and I understand from its Secretary that the FCO has done something similar. Our Catalogue includes numerous papers not originating in MOD. For this reason alone there should be an interdepartmental comparing of notes at any early stage to avoid the embarrassment of any Department disclosing papers of another Department which that Department has failed to register.

- 4. Secondary Documents. Pretty well everything in the Catalogue would be regarded by a historian as a primary source. There are also some useful secondary sources. These are post-invasion accounts/ analyses of events in the few months before the invasion. I attach a list (after the last Catalogue Sheet).
- Delegated work in hand. This is mainly in the Defence Sales area. It was put in hand as a necessary insurance in case the PCR goes into our dealings with the Argentines on defence equipment sales (either made or, and sometimes as significantly, not made). There has been a first run over the course, going back to 1972; the resulting Catalogue of papers a lengthy one is now being filled out so as to be similar to the main Catalogue as a self-explanatory document. AUS(AS) is preparing an account of the Port Stanley runway and airfield facilities.
- 6. <u>General Observations on Catalogue</u>. We have not logged literally every document. The relevant Diptels are repetitious at certain periods and we have been selective (in any case, the main responsibility here lies with FCO). We have been selective too in the heavy correspondence with MOD Ministers that flowed from the announced decision in the summer of 1981 about the final withdrawal of ENDURANCE. Not many of the signals between ENDURANCE and MOD/CINCFLEET have been listed; only those which bear significantly on Argentine actions and intentions.

  Here I am assured by DS5 that CINCFLEET will have nothing beyond what is on DS5 files.
- 7. The Catalogue does not give as clear a picture though I think it gives an adequate picture of action within MOD as we had hoped and intended. There are practical difficulties: for example, to list all those receiving an important Diptel or contributing to DS11 briefs


or S of S would have added disproportionately to the compiling of the Catalogue and made it almost unreadable. This is an area on which the departmental witnesses will have to be prepared to answer questions. (One point that may be raised is the absence of documentary evidence of the involvement of officials and staff above one-star level.)

8. Another area of difficulty is the last 2/3 days before the actual invasion. Much was done at speed and in oral discussion that does not seem to have been recorded. There may be more to be discovered here; but as it was mainly to do with the assembly and despatch of the Task Force, and as the PCR is essentially about why we got into the position of having to send such a Task Force, it is not perhaps all that serious a gap.

RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4)

10. Specific Points. I set about below some of the points that have occurred to me as ones on which MOD witnesses might be pressed by the PCR:

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- b. <u>Serial 10</u>. This and numerous other serials about the prospects of further talks with the Argentines prompts the thought that, despite the fact that the hopes of success were never high (and got steadily worse), no serious attempt was made until much too late to face the consequences of failure at the diplomatic level.
- 1980 pris. c. Serial 14. Whereas national intelligence priorities placed the Argentine in the lowest of four categories, MOD priorities

  1981 (cos) (approved by the Chiefs of Staff) placed her, with Belize, in the second category because of the risk of armed action against British territory. Whether this difference should have led to a greater intelligence gathering effort is a matter for DGI.

82.

- d. Serial 34A. No JTP was ever produced. My impression is that the feeling within the Defence Staffs was that political guidance was necessary before a valid JTP could be drawn up. Moreover, we were waiting from summer 1981 onwards for an FCO OD paper (to which we were ready at any time to contribute a Defence annex) which in the event was never tabled.
- e. Serial 42. If the PCR examine this file they will see forcibly expressed minutes from the Air Staff Secretariat which could be interpreted, according to taste, as defeatism or realism. It would of course be quite unfair for anyone to make much of this, especially from an area not in the main stream of Falklands policy.

- f. <u>Serial 43</u>. This is the kind of letter that out of context (or even within it) would lead to all manner of criticism. The least that can be said is that similar sales were contemplated by Labour administrations.
- g. Serial 47. No evidence has been found that this paper was sent to S of S until Mar 82. Its substance was sent to the FCO much earlier for inclusion in the OD paper that was held up (see d. above). But it could be argued that S of S should have been given the opportunity to circulate it to his OD colleagues in the late summer of 1981.
- h. <u>Serial 46A</u>. This prompts a concern about the adequacy of the processing of this kind of report. Serial 64 an early, possibly the first indication, that one member of the Junta had begun to talk seriously in terms of invasion. is another document which might see the PCR asking who in MOD saw it, outside the Intelligence area.
- j. Scrial 78. This report about possible RN deployments to the S Atlantic was about the latest date that action similar to that taken in 1977 might have had a deterrent effect. (This is hindsight but the contrast can be fairly drawn).
- 11. No doubt there are other areas where MOD action, or lack of it, will be questioned.
- 12. Further Work Remired. This would be better left to a further minute when (as will happen later this week), I have speken again to

Mr Rawsthorne, the PCR Secretary, who is coming to see how the M(D) documentary evidence is being organised. We are in a fairly good position to begin forthwith a similar Catalogue for the period from 1974 to 1979. Most of the relevant documents are still held by the Private Office and the Divisions. Others have been recovered from Archives. The identification of still earlier papers has begun, though I fear some gaps will be disclosed.

13. We have produced two notes on particular subjects: one on the circumstances that led to the establishing of the RM detachment at Port Stanley in 1967 and one on the 1977 episode. Others will be necessary as the PCR gets down to its work.

14. Finally, I need your directions on the further distribution of the attached Catalogue. As a minimum, I suggest Ministers' Offices, CNS, DGT, HDS, DUS(P), SECCOS, and Heads of DS5, 11 and 13. CAS as Acting CDS in late Mar/early Apr 82 should also see the Catalogue.

14 July 1982

T C G JAMES
Hd of MOD Review Team

FILE 21/62/1/4/E17/2

FII/8/82

CDS 2nd PUS

Copy to:

DUS (CM)

HaDIS(cs) DIS(CS) Head of DSIL Head of DS5



## FALKLAND ISLANDS REVIEW

- The meeting with the Secretary of the Privy Council Review 1. mentioned in my minute of 14 Jul 82 took place last Friday; and we now have a clearer picture of what the Review requires of us, as well as of the further work to be put in hand ourselves.
- I showed the Secretary the MOD Catalogue, making it clear that 2. he could not have it at present, and asked how it compared with what the Cabinet Office and FCO are doing. The answer was that similar catalogues have been prepared but without an embodied narrative such as we have included. But he seemed to like what we have done, as giving a useful picture of events as they developed; and he would like a copy as soon as possible and, at the latest, before 22 July (next Thursday; the Review Team meets for the first time on 26 Jul).
- Under Lord Frank's instructions, each Department is required to produce:
  - 8 copies of all the documents listed in its catalogue which originated in the Department.
  - The originals of the files and folders relevant to the

Falklands question for the period from Gen Galtieri becoming President (Dec 81) to the invasion.

- c. The first remit requires us to copy about sixty of the 141 documents in our Catalogue; and to deliver them by next Thursday (22 Jul). As for the second, we can only be glad that nothing more has been called for. Even so, it will be a big job and indicates that the Departmental views of the important papers is not one that the Review Team is inclined to take as read. We shall of course have to make duplicates of these files/folders; without them, MOD witnesses would be in difficulty.
- 4. I have arranged for DGI's staff to check the MOD Catalogue to ensure that it can remain classified 'SECRET', the point being that the Privy Councillors have adequate security boxes in their homes up to that level but not beyond.
- Further Work. This falls mainly under two heads; what Lord
  Frank wants and what we should do ourselves. On the first, we shall
  have to produce a similar Catalogue to the one you now have, starting
  in the mid-1960's, but not as detailed and comprehensive. If we
  complete this by early next month and I think this will be possible
   we should be in good time to meet the requirements of the Review.
  No doubt there will be the same chore of providing copies of MOD
  originated documents, but probably not of sending them the relevant
  files. There is also a somewhat vague commission from Sir Patrick
  Nairne. This is for a quick study of the impact of successive Defence
  Reviews since 1965 on our Falklands/Out of Area policy. It has been

put in hand but as it is required by the end of next week it will be somewhat superficial; we must wait to see what comes of it.

- 6. Our own work must include a full and well documented account of the decision to withdraw ENDURANCE from the Defence Programme (not just the decision of this Administration but also-perhaps in a separate paper-of the 1974 Labour Government). The MOD Review Team will tackle this. Secondly, a brief history of the South Atlantic Station since the mid-sixties might come in handy; and I hope DS5 might take it on. Then we ought to have a note on Parliamentary interest in the Falklands (including such references as there may have been in Defence Debates); my impression is that Parliament has always been solicitous about the Falklands without ever hoisting in what would be involved in guaranteeing its defence. The Parliamentary section in the Private Office are well-qualified to do this.
- 7. <u>Witnesses</u>. We can expect further notes on various aspects of the Falklands history, to help MOD witnesses. These will not be summoned for some time; the Secretary's guess was late September/early October.
- 8. Staff. We are now in excellent accommodation but in the absence of a PA we are obliged to do too many clerical tasks.

T C G JAMES
Head of Review Team

19 July 82

## LIST OF SECONDARY SOURCES

1. Report on Accuracy of DIS Assessments in Lead-Up to the Falklands Crisis. D/DIS(C)21/52 of 3 May 1982.

Rehearses DT4 view (DT4A/6618 of 10 March 1982) that well into March, while the Argentine Navy was pressing for a military solution, secret reporting indicated that all other elements of the Argentine Government favoured diplomatic action and that the military option was at that time not under active consideration. First concrete sign of military action was judged to be the Sigint report (received on 30 March) of a possible beach reconnaissance mission by an Argentine submarine. Concludes, inter alia, "that the decision to invade the Falklands was indeed taken only late in March". Current Intelligence Group (CIG) did not formally discuss Argentina/Falklands between July 1981 and the end of March; there were limited resources available RETAINED 3(4).

RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) to

to cover the area in question.

Also concludes that, with hindsight, it would have been better to review JIC(81)(N)34 when Galtieri assumed the Presidency.

RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) 3. Appreciation by JIC of Events leading up to the Invasion of the Falkland Islands - JIC(82)(N)29 of 6 April 1982.


Concludes that Argentine Government became increasingly impatient after the New York talks in February; that the South Georgia incident was exploited but not contrived; that the decision to assemble a task force was probably taken by the Navy alone, but that all 3 Services appear to have been involved by about 28 March; and that the decision to invade was almost certainly not taken earlier than 28/29 March.

- 4. Informal Report by the Naval Attache to Argentina of 14 April 1982. This report tends to confirm the intelligence assessment that the decision to invade was taken very late in the day. States specifically that Attache visited all Argentine naval bases in 1982 and saw no material preparations for an invasion up to the end of February. Mentions, in the context of the South Georgia incident (but without dates), the sailing of submarines from Mar del Plata and of the fleet from Puerto Belgrano. Also mentions information from American sources that the plan for invasion was started some 3 weeks before the invasion. Finally concludes that apart from the evidence of ships sailing, there was no overt evidence available of an intention to invade and that Argentine officers met during the period were unaware of any intention to invade.
- 5. Reconstruction of events leading up to invasion of Falklands
  prepared by Director Naval Operations and Trade (DNOT) in May 1982.

  A straight factual account of key events (mainly in 1982) seen
  through Naval Staff eyes, which contains nothing of note which is
  not already included in the Catalogue of relevant documents prepared
  by the Review Team.

- 6. Views of HM Ambassador to Argentina on the events leading up to the invasion recorded in Diptel Number 174 of 6 April '82. An interesting account which opines that the decision to invade developed in 4 phases. Phase 1 was marked by increasingly Argentine impatience at the progress of negotiations in June 1981. Phase 2 concerned the run-up to the New York talks and was also marked by secret reports indicating that the use of force was being considered by the Navy at least. Phase 3 began with the unilateral communique issued by Buenos Aires on the outcome of the New York talks and an increasing press campaign which referred to the use of force. The final phase was marked by the South Georgia affair where the Ambassador voices the belief that "the high tone we adopted in our notification and public announcement of 22 March about measures being adopted to remove the Argentine workmen" provided the final trigger to the decision to invade.
- Report by Mr D R Nicoll on "UK Intelligence and the Argentine Invasion of the Falkland Islands July 1981 2 April 1982" published in May 1982 by the Cabinet Office. This is a comprehensive report seeking to answer questions on when the Argentine force was assembled and when the final decision to invade was taken. It is well worth reading in full and any summary risks being misleading, with that caveat, the main conclusions are:
  - a. the Argentine communique of 2 March on the New York talks was a turning point in the crisis;
  - b. though the South Georgia incident "was the trigger" the available evidence suggests that it was not deliberately contrived at high level by the Navy;

- c. the main part of the invasion force put to sea on 28 March.
  - d. the decision to invade was made by the Junta during1 April;
  - e. the JIC should have been asked to assess the significance of the escalating press campaign and should certainly have reviewed the position after the Argentine statement of 2 March;



14 June 1982

SHEET No. 1

MOD FALKLANDS REVIEW

CATALOGUE	OF	RELEVANT	DOCUMENTS	HELD	BY	MOD	

1 JAN 79 TO	2 APR 82			
SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR	FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE AND PART NO CURRENT HOLDER
1	Minute to PM	13 Mar 79	FCS	MO 5/21 Pt 5
2	Diptel	18 Apr	Minister of State /FCO	DS 11/10/6 Pt Q
NEW CONSERVA	TÎVE ADMINISTRATIO	<u>N</u>		
3'	Minute	11 July	DS 5	DS 5/3/5/71
4,				
5	Minute to PM	20 Sep .	FCS	M05/21 Pt 6

1. ALL FILES/FOLDERS HELL MOD REVIEW TEAM UNLESS SPECIFIED IN CATALOGUE

## BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

Proposes new negotiating round with Argentina: New York in March. Ambassadors likely to be restored (withdrawn 1975/6). Scientific co-operation scheme objected to by Islanders. PM agreed.

Mr Rowlands reports on NY talks; to Islanders as well as HMG. Argentine disappointment over scientific co-operation scheme. Their continued claim for sovereignty rejected. Told best solution to give up this claim and work for development of area resources.

Confirmed the Navy Dept assumption that Endurance would remain in service for the 1980/81 and 1981/82 seasons.

## RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4)

Sets out three broad options: . 'Fortress Falklands' - would not be realistic; 'militarily indefensible except by major diversion of our current military resources; ... Islands would be condemned to economic decline and social decay and we would have to commit ourselves to heavy aid expenditure to keep them going': protracted negotiations with no concessions on sovereignty; some islanders and their UK supporters might favour this but would eventually lead to a complete breakdown, probably sooner rather than later with consequences similar to 'Fortress Falklands': substantive negotiations on sovereignty; "our intentions would be to surrender only the trappings of sovereignty in return for guranteed economic and political security for the Islanders under British rule"-ie lease-back solution. FCS proposed this course, "the risks in.... doing nothing are clear", referring to Annex 1 on Defence. This was on the usual lines: adequate deterrence would need four major RN units and garrison of Commando Group + Blowpipe Troop; recovery would require a force of at least Field Force (Brigade Group) strength, which could not reach FI in under a month. . Refors by air impossible; resupply by air extremely difficult.



### CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS HELD BY MOD

SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR	FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE AND PART NO CURRENT HOLDER
6	Letter	15 Oct 79	PS to PM	MO 5/21 Pt 6
7	JIC(79)(N)74	28 Nov	Cabinet Office	DS 5/3/15/74
		72.80	Salarya (1996)	
	T. (7.29)45			Estate at the same
8	Minute to PM	24 Jan 80	FCS	MO 5/21 Pt 6
9	Brief for SofS/ Defence	25 Jan	DS 11	CDS 2038/1 Pt 7
	street too secret			THE HAMPER R. LEWIS CO.
10	OD Meeting	29 Jan	Cabinet Secretariat	Private Office Folder
. 11	Brief for SofS/ Defence	5 Feb	DS 11	MO 5/21 Pt 6

## BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

Serial 5 commented on by several Ministers, including concern over loss of potentially exploitable resources. Letter from No 10 deferred OD consideration of FCS's proposals (because of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe); the resultant paper - OD(79)31 of 12 Oct 79 - was not considered by OD until 29 Jan 80 (OD(80)3rd Mtg).

Comprehensive assessment of the Argentine Threat to FI, setting out all the options - diplomatic, economic and military - open to Argentina. On the one hand, 'threat of military action in present circumstances is at a low ebb'; on the other - and this has been previously reported by the JIC - "if negotiations break down, or if for some other reason the Argentine government calculates that HMG is not prepared to negotiate seriously on sovereignty, there will be a high risk of it resorting quickly to more forceful measures."

Minute preparatory to deferred OD consideration of FI FCS concerned to begin 'exploratory talks' soon; "to continue to stall would be risky."

For use at OD Mtg. Utters standard warning about problems of FI defence. Hence importance of continuing negotiations. Also helpful for potential defence sales, 'frustrated at present'.

Agreed to resumption of talks, subject to agreement of Islanders and clearance of TOR for talks. Record suggests no great optimism for success on any acceptable basis.

Provided for forthcoming meeting with HEGFI (designat Contains facts about local defence (Endurance, RM detachment and local defence force); the forces neede to deal with 'more forceful Argentine action'; and the difficulties involved in their provision.

## MOD FALKLANDS REVIEW CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS HELD BY MOD

SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR	FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE AND PART NO CURRENT HOLDER
12	Minute to PM	22 Feb 80	FCS	MO 5/21 Pt 6
13	Report on Negotiations	28 Apr	FCO	D/DS 11/10/6 Pt R
14	JIC(80)12	19 May	Cabinet Office	Held separately by MOD Review Team
15	OD(80)46	27 June	FCS	Private Office Folder
16	Brief for SofS/ Defence	1 July	DS 11	D/DS 11/10/6 Pt R
	Light Br			Private Office Folder
17	OD(80)17th Mtg	2 July	Cabinet Secretariat	FITTALE OFFICE FOLGET

## BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

Reports Islanders agreement to new talks (at which the; would be represented) and proposes action for an early meeting. PM agreed 25 Feb.

New York talks had gone reasonably well but Argentines maintained their formal position on sovereignty. All aspects of the Falklands situation discussed. British position on the acceptability of any agreement to the Islanders equally maintained.

Major appreciation of intelligence requirements and priorities for period 1980-82. Placed information or Argentine intentions towards FI in 4th (and lowest) category.

Key paper in which FCS sets out objections to any agreement that does not at once (a) meet the Argentine sovereignty requirement and (b) carry the agreement of the Islanders. Lease-back arrangement the best option but formidable difficulties. Seeks agreement of OD to find out 'whether such a solution is possible.' Has to be explored because otherwise 'dispute could develop into a confrontation which we would find very difficult and very expensive to handle.'

For use at OD Mtg. Similar brief to Serial 9. Recognition of risks of Argentine aggression if talks broke down. If successful, defence aim should be complete withdrawal.

Agreement, not without misgivings, to proposals of FCE Nothing in record about defence implications of failure, though expense of substituting British for Argentine supplies to FI mentioned.



# MOD FALKLANDS REVIEW CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS HELD BY MOD

SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR	FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE AND PART NO CURRENT HOLDER
18	OD(80)66	4 Nov 80	FCS	Private Office Folder
			7	
19	Brief for SofS/ Defence	5 Nov	DS 11	D/DS 11/10/6 Pt R
20	OD(80)23rd Mtg	7 Nov	Cabinet Secretariat	Private Office Folder
21	Diptels	Nov	HEGFI and HMA/BA	D/DS 11/10/6 Pt R

## BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

Key paper arising from negotiations since OD meeting in July: "reasonable possibility" of reaching a settlement on the lease-back concept. Argentines would be taken aback if we pulled out of talks at this stage; and the new Argentine government might be less amenable especially if control of Foreign Ministry passed from Air Force to Navy - "could lead to an expensive and dangerous confrontation." Next step should be for Mr Ridley to visit FI to secure Islanders endorsement for formal negotiations on the possibility of lease-back solution.

No change in 'line to be taken.' Background briefing material makes point (made on earlier occasions) that Marines and Endurance could only be effective against 'small scale, adventurist incursions.' Deployment sufficient to deter 'open Argentine hostility' would require major diversion of resources. To dislodge a force already established 'would be a major undertaking.' Military threat broadly described, including capability of launching an air or seaborne operation at up to Brigade strength. JIC formulation - "a high risk of more forceful Argentine measures should they believe that HMG not prepared to negotiate on sovereignty" - also included. Defence sales benefits of settlement mentioned again.

Mr Ridley's visit to FI agreed. Advantages of settlement recognized but "no agreement could be contemplated which did not have the positive support of a majority of the Islanders."

Reporting progress of Mr Ridley's talks in FI - inconclusive at this stage - and associated Argentine press reports, varying - according to paper - from recognition that force would be an unsatisfactory last resort to a more hawkish line.

# 1

## MOD FALKLANDS REVIEW

#### CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS HELD BY MOD

SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR	FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE AND PART NO CURRENT HOLDER
22	Admiralty Board Submission	Dec 80	DS- 5.	D/DS 11/10/6 Pt R .
23	Diptel	15 Dec	HMA/BA	as above
		•		
24	Brief for SofS/ Defence	28 Jan 81	DS 11	as above
25	OD(81)1st Mtg	29 Jan	Cabinet Secretariat	Private Office Folder
26	Minute to PM	13 March	FCS	MO 5/21 Pt 6

### BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

Proposed that instead of endorsement of ENDURANCE for short period of up to 3 years she should be run-on until limit of her economic life, ie 1992. Based in part on FCO requirement for naval presence in S. Atlantic and Antarctica for at least 10 years and partly on efficient management of refit programme. Submission approved by Board, 19 Feb 81.

Reports Foreign Ministry statement, on anniversary of UN Resolution 1514; "colonies inadmissible anachronisms", "Definitive restitution" of FI an "irrenounceable aspiration." Expectation of new series of negotiations early in 1981.

For OD(81)1st Mtg. Usual brief provided except that in light of Islanders dubious attitude to lease-back solution the scope for manoeuvre in a further round of negotiations is questioned. (The OD paper itself may have been mislaid.)

Progress report on Mr Ridley's talks with Islanders who had not accepted (but not ruled out) lease-back, preferring a 'freeze' on sovereignty issue (which Argentina was 'unlikely to accept'). Nevertheless, further negotiations should be undertaken; Argentine government under strong pressure from public opinion and the armed forces. So keep negotiations going even though, based as they would be on a 'freeze', they would not succeed. Islanders were slowly coming to see that lease-back essential to a negotiated settlement. OD agreed to further negotiations despite concern in Parliament at implications of Mr Ridley's FI visit.

Reporting talks in New York 23/24 Feb. Good features had been exposure of FI representatives to 'full intractability' of Argentine position on sovereignty; and of Argentines to crucial importance to Islanders of continuing under a British administration even at the expense of economic development. Nothing more to be done now until new Argentine government takes offic at the end of March; and little point anyway until Islanders have cleared their own minds. If they decide in favour of status quo, relations with Argentina might deteriorate to the extent of UK supply of essentials and defence "against physical harassment"

#### SHEET NO 6

#### MOD FALKLANDS REVIEW

### CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS HELD BY MOD

SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR	FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE AND PART NO CURRENT HOLDER
27	Letter	24 Mar 81	DS11	D/DS11/10/6 Pt S
	More	F 62 84	412 1	47,647,654,4
		24 549 27	\$10.000 (600 500 (1000)	The property
28	Letter	1 Apr	SA Dept/FCO	as above
	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •			
29	Letter	6 Apr	SA Dept/FCO	as above
30	Minute	15 Apr	DS11	as above

## BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

Defence Plans for FI. MOD response to request for information from South American Dept FCO. No contingency plans as such but letter forwarded copy of COS(Misc)523/742 prepared in 1977 and still valid. Essential features were: limited capability of Marines and ENDURANCE; rapid refors by air 'extremely difficult if not impossible'; by sea would involve passage of 19 days plus preparation time; to protect British shipping in area and convoy troop refors would require balanced naval force of 4/5 warships with supporting RFAs: minimum credible deterrent to serious attempt at invasion would be Cdo Group and Blowpipe AD troop; force of at least Brigade strength needed to repulse fullscale Argentine invasion or to recapture the FI. Concluded that in consequence the pursuit of negotiation has been considered necessary "in the defence interest".

Letter to Treasury giving essence of above but more particularly describing the range of UK civil support required at different stages of harassment by Argentines at heavy (but unspecified cost). All this as a possibility: "we are in no way suggesting that we anticipate an imminent deterioration of the situation".

Letter to MOD rehearsing the uncertainties and possibilities, pointing out that information in Serial 2' out of date in some respects (eg it referred to ARK ROYAL) and asking for plans to be updated. How could the FI population be evacuated; what could be done to counter any military action?" We do need a clear picture of what our naval and military response should be \_\_to prevent or undo an attack/".

MOD Action Arising from Serial 29 Staff alerted to the need to re-appraise COS (Misc)523/742 (see Serial 27): "it does seem that the road to a negotiated solution may be blocked." Meeting planned with MOD and FCO representatives to consider more precise assumptions about scenarios in the light of latest political and military intelligence.

## CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT LOCUMENTS HELD BY HOL

SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR	FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE AND PART NO CURRENT HOLDER
31	Minute	21 Apr 81	DI4	D/DS11/10/6 Pt S
*				
32	Minute	14 May 81	DD Ops (Air Tpt) (RAF)	as above
33	MOD Internal Note	Undated (June ?)	DS11	as above
34	Minutes	10 Jun	DS11	as above

#### BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKER

DI Response to Serial 30 No major change in situation since last JIC assessment (Serial 7). Currently, Argentine/Chile dispute over Beagle Channel of greater public and military interest. But Argentina more convinced now of commercial as distinct from political/prestige advantages of securing FI sovereignty. Also some improvement in military capability from weapons "acquired primarily in relation to their dispute with Chile". A new assessment could await an indication of the new government's attitude to FI and/or progress in settling Beagle Channel dispute.

Under heading of Falklands Islands Contingency Planning this minute set out in detail the severe limitations on air reinforcement. Maximum number of Hercules sorties would be two (which would exhaust the capacity of the bulk fuel installation - controlled by the Argentines - at Port Stanley). Even accepting the considerable risks the payload to the Falklands from Ascension Island would be no more than 30 soldiers in each aircraft.

An internal minute or note of no formal status but indicative of thinking at a relatively low level agains the need to meet FCO request for contingency plans. Impracticable to apply deterrence in a European mode, ie sufficient forces to meet an attack at any level: "MOD in danger of being asked to provide a limited force for deterrent purposes in the knowledge that our bluff could be called.... no way to avoid preparing for every eventuality so long as there is no negotiated solution, and therefore no alternative but to continue to encoura the FCO to seek one".

Action arising from Serial 30 proceeded slowly, though at least one meeting as originally envisaged took place The minute under reference - to the military and civili staff involved and also to the S American Dept/FCO - se in hand the drafting of a politico/military assessment of UK ability to respond militarily to a range of Argentine actions, the implications and chances of success, and the costs. The resultant paper emerged for COS consideration in September.



### CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT DOUMENTS HEID BY HOD

SE	RIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR		FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE CURRENT HOLDER	AND PART	NO
	34A	Minute	11 Jun 81	DN Plans		D/DS 11/10/6 Pt S		
	75		E /452 To	P/G /G - 6G		Company hold by MOD		•
	35	Minutes	5/15? Jun	FCS/SofS Defence		Separately held by MOD Review Team		
						<b>&gt;</b>		
	36	Diptel	24 Jun	FCO		as above		
	37	annou	25 Jun RANCE decision inced in ament)	DS 5	<b>:</b> .	as above	,	
	38	Diptels	26 Jun	HEGFI		as above		

## BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

Naval Staff welcome for preparation of paper at Serial 33 but recommend that in addition a Joint Theatre Plan (JTP) should be drawn up since other Services would be involved in evacuation or reinforcement, or both. A later minute (19 Jun 81, same file) stressed the same point though it conceded that the range of military action open to Argentina and the distance from any UK 'firm base' might make detailed planning difficult.

Exchange about ENDURANCE FCS urged strongly (in a minute about several features of the current Defence Review) that ENDURANCE should not be withdrawn: "unless and until the dispute is settled, it will be important to maintain our normal presence in the area at the current level". Otherwise, there would be misinterpret ation by Argentines as well as Islanders, and strong criticism in the UK. (Note: the terms of Mr Nott's reply are still (7 Jul 82) being traced).

HEGFI and HMA/BA informed of Defence Review decision on ENDURANCE. RM detachment to be maintained and HM ships would continue to visit the area "From time to time".

Reply to FCO letter of 12 June reporting suggestion from HMA/BA that question of joint patrols and naval co-operation with Argentina should be reopened. DS 5 said that RN group deployment in S Atlantic in Autumn 1981 had been planned but reduced fuel allocations in 1981/82 had caused its cancellation. Possibility would be kept in mind for later years. In any case, Argentine response would be problematical: an Argentine Admiral visiting London in Dec 80 had declined an invitation to meet 1st Sea Lord.

Reply to Serial 36: report at some length of Islander reaction to news of ENDURANCE. Concluded that "this development will probably strengthen the resolve .... of the "Fortress Falklands" element. It is generally seen locally as a calculated step in the process of isolating Falklands from UK in the face of increasing Argentine pressure .....important that the forthcoming elections should produce a moderate and constructive new council but correspondingly less likely that they will". Further diptel of same date transmitted atrongly worded resolution from joint meeting of Executive and Legislative Councils deploring the decision and urging its reversal.

FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE AND PART NO

## CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS HELD BY MOD

SERIAL NO	TIPE OF BOO	DATE	ORIGINATOR	CURRENT HOLDER	TARLE NO
39	Minute	2 Jul 81	DS 5	D/DS 11/10/6 Pt S	
				47 fb 6).	
40	JIC(81)(N)34	9 Jul	Cabinet Secretariat	Separately held by MOD Review Team	
			Decitoration	2012011	

ORTGINATION

## BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

Advice to S of S/Defence on line to be taken by PM in answer to questions about ENDURANCE. Broadly, this was to stand by the decision but to stress that this implied no lessening in the Governments commitment towards the people of the FI and that the RM garrison would remain. This line was agreed between MOD and FCO.

Note: - From this time, criticism of the ENDURANCE decision came from many quarters - Parliament (including Mr Callaghan), the FI Office in London and the general public. The resulting letters and replies are numerous and are not recorded here. Mr Nott stood by the decision (Encl. 28 on Private Office Folder MO 5/21 Pt 6 indicates the firmness of his position). Doubts about the accuracy of the assessed savings - \$\frac{24}{24}\text{M}\$ a year - were expressed (by Lord Shackleton for one) but the figure, if anything, was on the low side.

Full JIC Assessment of Argentine Threat to FI and Dependencies. Finalised and accepted at JIC(81)26th Mtg. Any summary of this appreciation runs the risk of misleading inadequacy. With this proviso, the key features were: impatience in Argentina at the absence of progress in negotiations and at the attitude of the Islanders, with some evidence of specific pressures "to teach the Islanders a lesson;" increasing risk that disappointment over Beagle Channel mediation and economic and political difficulty might cause the Argentine government "to seek an early success in the Falkland dispute; " economic and commerical measures "would be most likely in the first instance "but small scale military action against FI or a dependency could not be ruled out. And finally - "If for any reason Argentina concludes that there is no hope of a peaceful transfer of sovereignty, there will be a high risk of its resorting to more forceful measures against British interests, and it might act swiftly and without warning. In such circumstances military action against British shipping of a full-scale invasion of the FI cannot be discounted." (This view, in the context of the report as a whole, can be seen as implying a somewhat higher risk of early and swift action than the last assessment in Nov 79 - Serial 7). No other full JIC assessment of the Argentine threat was made before April 82.

First draft of MOD paper on counters to the military threat to FI. FCO (Defence and S American Depts) and Cabinet Office Assessments Staff received copies. This was a direct response to Serial 40.

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CEDIAT MO

# MOD FALKLANDS REVIEW CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT ECCUMENTS HELD BY HOL

SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE 817	ORIGINATOR	FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE AND PARE	ET NO
42	Minute	30 Jul 80	DS 8	D/DS 11/10/6 Pt S	
			and the second	and all that the Y	
43	Letters	16 Jul/ 5 Aug	Defence Sales/ FCO	as above	
44	Letter	12 Aug	DS 11	as above	
45	PM letter	19 Aug	No 10	as above	
46	Minute to PM	14 Sep	FCS	MO 5/21 Pt 6	

## BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN


Minute from Air Steff Secretariat (relevant to Serial 41) attaching Air Staff advice on the use of Hercules a/c to supply FI and on the deployment of Harriers and Rapier. Conclusions (expressed very forcibly) were that if these were sent it would have to be by sea.

FCO reply to D Sales letter asking for agreement to promotion of sale to Argentina of HERMES or INVINCIBLE-class carrier and Sea Harriers. If submitted to FCO Ministers at present, answer would be 'No'. But FCO letter not a final rebuff; it amounted to saying not that the request was unreasonable, merely ill-timed.

Letter to FCO attaching latest draft of MOD paper on FI defence (see Serial 41) as an indication of the form to be taken by an annex to OD paper under preparation by FCO.

Letter to Lord Buxton about the UK commitment to FI and the decision to withdraw ENDURANCE. Noteworthy only for the formulation - on MOD advice - of the significance of the RM garrison - "a tangible demonstration of our commitment." Another and later letter from the PM used a different formulation (again on MOD advice) implying that the garrison was itself a deterrent. This caused trouble in Parliament and the Press.

Key paper. Reports recent developments; Argentine action with UK and UN deploring slow speed of negotiations - "if progress is not made soon they may have to look to other means of achieving their purpose." FCS still convinced that lease-back "the most likely, and perhaps the only, basis for an agreed solution." But prospects of Islanders agreement have diminished. Elections in October likely to result in Legislative Council opposed to any transfer of sovereignty. Risk of military confrontation. "In short, the present outlook is not good." FCS referred to contingency studies in hand; "it is clear that supplying and defending the Islands would be both difficult and costly."



### CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT ECCURENTS HELD BY HOL

SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR	CURRENT HOLDER
47	COS Paper	15 Sep 81	SECCOS	CDS 2038/1 Pt 7

### BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

Key paper Staff paper, under preparation since July (Serial 41), submitted to Chiefs of Staff who 'took note' and approved its conclusions without formal discussion (COS(Misc)268/742). Form of paper determined by JIC assessment of Argentine military options, ranging from small-scale actions - occupation of one or more of the uninhabited islands (eg S Thule), or arrest of BAS team on S Georgia - to arrest of British shipping and to full-scale invasion of the FI. All were within Argentine military capability. The general constraints on reinforcement were described, with the conclusion that any response to provocation would have to be primarily naval. Refors by sea - the only practicable course could take a month or more "with significant penalties to commitments elsewhere". Appropriate responses to each Argentine option were set out, with their approximate costs. As in previous appreciations (see for example Serial 27), to deter a full-scale invasion would call for a large balanced naval force, including an Invincible-class carrier, and a garrison of brigade strength; but if on arrival (a month after assembly) such a force was faced with an Argentine force in occupation there could be no certainty that it would be adequate to retake the Islands. With the withdrawal of specialist amphibious shipping (planned for 1984) and doubts about the future of LSLs, commercial chartering would be necessary. In short, as the papers' conclusions put it, "to deter or repel even a small scale invasion would require a significant commitment of naval resources, at the expense of commitments elsewhere, for a period of uncertain duration. To deal with a full scale invasion would require naval and land forces with organic air support on a very substantial scale, and the logistic problems of such an operation would be formidable".

#### CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS HELD BY MOD

SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR	FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE AND PART NO CURRENT HOLDER
48	Diptels	22/23 Sep 81	UKMISNY/FCS	D/DS 11/10/6 Pt T
49	Minute to PM	Undated (end-Sep)	Chief Secretary	MO 5/21 Pt 6
->				
50	Letters	22 Sep/ 13 Oct	Ld Buxton/PM	D/DS 11/10/6 Pt T
51	Minutes/	Oct/Nov	MPs/FCO/MOD	MO 5/21 Pt 6
	Letters			
52	Report	20 Oct	HEGFI	D/DS 11/10/6 Pt T
53	Letter	28 Oct	DS 11	as above

## BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

Reporting statement by Argentine Foreign Minister in UN debate: 'decisive impetus' needed in negotiations for Malvinas, S Sandwich and S Georgia sovereignty. Subsequent discussion with FCS who was as unyielding about HMG's commitment to respect the "wishes" of the Islanders as the Foreign Minister about respecting thei "interests" within the context of Argentine sovereignty Agreed that negotiations should start again.

About Treasury's concern:..."it should be made quite clear, at least to the most influential and responsible of the Islanders, that HMG does not have the resources to protect the Islands from the economic consequences of a confrontation with Argentina."


Exchange of letters about ENDURANCE. Noted here because Lord Buxton's letter a most powerful plea, backed by instances of ENDURANCE's practical value in the past. PM replied as advised by MOD.

Meeting at FCO between Mr Richard Luce and Mr Shersby and Mr Ogden who had recently visited the FI. Minutes record a statement of FCO policy which registers the essential dilemma of the UK position. A later meeting (9 Nov) between the MPs and Mr Nott was devoted mainly to the case for and against retaining ENDURANCE.

Results and significance of recent FI elections. These showed that "their paramount wish was not to become Argentine, now or at any time in the future." But likely to agree to at least one more round of talks.

FCO had consulted MOD on line to be taken by Mr Luce in discussions with back-benchers. MOD objected to the formulation "to maintain a substantial force for any length of time would be prohibitively expensive (and would not in any case prevent the Argentines attacking the Islands - any British action would inevitably be after the event)" - and proposed an alternative. MOD conceded that deployment would be extremely expensive but had the relevant military capability ("at a pinch") if Ministers decided to use it.





## CAPALOGUE OF RELEVANT FOCULENTS BELD BY HOD

Pt 6 /10 Pt U /37/81 (not held by	FCS	2 Dec 81	Minute to PM	54
/37/81 (not held by	Da Ovon			
/37/81 (not held by	Pa Ovon			
/37/81 (not held by	De Orion			
/37/81 (not held by	Dr Owen	21 Dec	Letter	55
Team)	ENDURANCE	8 Jan 82	Signal	56
Pt 7	HEGFI	19 Jan	Report	57
re	FCS	22 Jan	Minute to	5.8
			SofS/Defence	,,,,
cely held by Review Team	ENDURANCE	25 Jan 82	Signal	59
	FCS	22 Jan 25 Jan 82		58

## BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

Reports new round of talks (were to have been in Geneva in December but were in the event held in New York in Feb 82, largely because of Argentine difficulties in meeting an earlier date. Gen Galtieri became President in December.) Two Island Councillors in UK delegation. Difficulties of keeping negotiations going rehearsed. Preliminary studies indicated that cost of providing services to FI (based on sea rather than air communications) if Argentines withdrew support would be about £6M a year.

Opposed phasing out of ENDURANCE in Antarctic as well as FI context. Full reply by Mr Nott.

Reported that CO of Argentine Antarctic squadron had deceived him about his itinerary: Argentine ship had gone to S Thule. Suggested that "FCO would be better placed to make overall appraisal." Repeated to HEGFI for transmission to FCO.

Annual Report for 1981 (not certain when received in MOD but probably mid-Feb). Essential reading for an assessment of the Islanders' view of events in the past year. More broadly, "As for a settlement of the main issue, as long as the Argentines continue to insist upon sovereignty first and we continue to maintain that Islanders wishes are paramount, I see no way ahead in future talks."


Despite denials of significance of ENDURANCE withdrawal


decision, "the issue is having a disproportionate impact on the credibility of our policy in the area." Could her reinstatement be considered (as with INTREPID and FEARLESS)? (Mr Callaghan added his weight in a conversation - reported to MOD - shortly afterwards with Lord Privy Seal.) In reply, Mr Nott thought it would be difficult to go back on earlier decision. Reported 'cold' reception by Argentine Navy on visit to Ushaia: in sharp contrast to usual warm hospitality. Seems an order had been issued not to fraternise; sounded warning note in view of forthcoming negotiations. (Note:report by NA/BA after the invasion pointed out that ENDURANCE welcomed elsewhere; that he had been well received during his own visits in February to Argentine naval bases, when he saw no evidence of preparations for attack on FI. This report is held by MOD Review Team and is referred to elsewhere in the catalogue.) ENDURANCE signal received in FCO and MOD.

## CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS HELD BY MOD

SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR	FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE AN CURRENT HOLDER	D PART NO

61 .	Internal Note	28 Jan	Defence Intelligence	as above
62	Report	28 Jan	CINCFLEET	DS5/3/5/71 Pt 15
63	Internal Note	4 Feb	Defence Intelligence	DI4a2/6618






Recorded view of Assessments Staff that JIC(81)(N)34 (Serial 40) still valid.

Report on Staff visit to FI RM detachment: recommended improving communications and provision of 81 mm mortars and Blowpipe.

Note referring to Argentine negotiating position for tal later in month (see Serial 40). Next round clearly crucial. Argentine will not be put off much longer. Update of JIC assessment (Serial 40) after conclusion of talks would be appropriate.



# MOD FALKLANDS REVIEW CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS HELD BY MOD

SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR	CURRENT HOLDER
65	Minute to PM	15 Feb 82	FCS	M05/21 Pt 7

## BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

Reports Tough Argentine Position before New York Talks: asserting sole purpose of negotiations the cession of sovereignty; denying relevance of Islanders' wishes (as opposed to interests); and referring to FI dependence on services provided by Argentina. Difficult session in prospect: "I expect that we shall need a further discussion .... in OD in March." Commenting on this minute, PM said it must be made clear to Argentina that wishes of the Islanders were paramount.

RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4)

69 Diptel 28 Feb UKMIS/NY D/DS11/10 Pt 11

Report on Talks in New York, 26-27 Feb. Atmosphere good but clear that Argentina negotiating brief 'rigidly circumscribed'. Sole purpose of the proposed negotiating commission - in Argentina view - would be to resolve details of a transfer of sovereignty; and all this at speed.

AND PART NO

RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4)

## CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS HELD BY MOD

SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE .	ORIGINATOR	FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE CURRENT HOLDER
71	Diptel	2 Mar	UKMIS/NY	D/DS11/10 Pt 11
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72	Letter	2 Mar	Defence Attache/	as above
73	Diptel	2 Mar	нма/ва	as above
74	Diptel/PM Comment	3 Mar	нма/ва	M05/21 Pt 7

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

RETAINED (INDER SECTION 3(4)

Reporting Mr Luce's Talk with Mr Enders (State Dept): Difficult situation now; political difficulties for UK very real and not easy to see how progress could be made. Talk in Argentine press of military action (Mr Luce doubted if this reflected Argentine govt view); in any case other means of bringing pressure to bear on Islands. Mr Enders under took to ask Argentine govt to keep things cool. Enders commented that Argentines had recently given impression that UK now more ready to consider Islanders' interests rather than wishes. Mr Luce disabused him.

This interesting letter was received in the Defence Secretariat on 17 March. It leads in from the developing 'hard line' campaign in the BA Press to identify a range of military actions open to the Argentines. Importantly, it makes the point that while 'special arrangements' could enhance the chances of obtaining early warning, "we could not realisticall expect to be able to detect any moves". (This letter was in part based on a recent visit to FI by the DA - made at his own expense because the MOD travel vote was over-extended!) Diptels from BA which report the press campaign are on the relevant MOD files (see Serials 73 and 74).


Reports the over-shadowing of the agreed communique following the NY talks by the Foreign Ministry statement issued in BA which had a menacing undertone and which had attracted BA press comment even more menacing.

Reports further press comment, including 'speculation about a direct seizure of the Islands which would be 'understood by the Americans. It was on this Diptel that (as FCO, Cabinet Office and MOD were informed on 8 March) the Prime Minister minuted "we must make contingency plans".

#### CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS HELD BY MOD

SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR	FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE AND CURRENT HOLDER	The state of the s	BRIEF D
			919		RETA SE	INED UNDER CTION 3(4)
76	Private Office	8 Mar	APS to SofS	MO 5/21 Pt 7		Notes that PM haknow how quickly
	Note MOD	(evening)	A Commence	an Admir		Action set in ha
77	Diptel	8 Mar (1830Z)	FCO	D/DS 11/10/6 Pt U		To HEGFI (copy t from FCS to Arge assurances that pre-determined a could they take 'from either sic break down. HEG agreement to ter
78	Minute	9 Mar	DS 5	MO 5/21 Pt 7		Response to Serieither UK or Car taking part in Nof 20 days.' Not ENDURANCE current No 10 and FCS in
79	Minute	9 Mar	DS 11	D/DS 11/10/6 Pt U		Defence Staffs accumulating" thardening, to Defence of FI. FCO paper for O

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN



To HEGFI (copy to BA): gave text of draft message from FCS to Argentine Foreign Minister seeking assurances that further talks would not be based on pre-determined assumptions about their outcome. Nor could they take place against background of threats 'from either side' of retaliatory action should talks break down. HEGFI asked to obtain FI Councillors' agreement to text.

Response to Serial 76: passage time of frigate from either UK or Caribbean (where frigate and SSN were taking part in NATO exercise) would be 'in the order of 20 days.' Nothing said about time for SSN.

ENDURANCE currently within 3 days of Port Stanley.

No 10 and FCS informed by letter on 12 March.

Defence Staffs required, against background of "evidenc accumulating" that the Argentine position may be hardening, to review earlier paper (Serial 47) on Defence of FI. This done, it would be an annex to FCO paper for OD meeting which "they envisage taking place at the beginning of April." Separately, DS 5 asked to advise minimum time for frigate deployment and DS 8 (Air Staff Secretariat) whether if there was a political imperative flights could be made into Port Stanley (in context of civilian supplies). "Replies by 19 March would be helpful."

## MOD FALKLANDS REVIEW CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS HELD BY MOD

SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR	CURRENT HOLDER	CE AND PART NO
80	Minute	10 Mar 82	DI4	D/DS 11/10 Pt U	
				A COLUMN TO SERVICE	
				e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e	
. 81	Diptel	11 Mar	HMA/Brasilia	as above	

## BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

Widely circulated minute (reflecting Serial 75) concluding that, "we have no reason to believe that the Navy have any prospect either of persuading the President or other Government members to adopt their proposed course of action of of going it alone. We do not consider therefore that the Navy's present attitude poses any immediate or increased threat.... beyond that outlined in JIC(81)(N)34" - see Serial 40. (CX report of 12 March indicated that CIA representative in BA took the same view).

Reported talk with Brazilian Foreign Ministry on recent visit of Dr Costa Mendez. Nothing indicative of action other than diplomatic pressure in "UN and elsewhere" but then CM would not necessarily have said anything if there were. Recent "surprise landing of Argentine Air Force Hercules at Stanley" possibly the kind of additional pressure the Argentines might be tempted to use. (MOD was informed of this incident, which happened on 7 March, on 12 March. Hercules was said to have suffered a fuel pipe fracture. It landed at 1537 hrs and departed after refuelling, at 1820 hrs - genuine or contrived?).



## CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS HELD BY MOD


SEF	RIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR	FILE/FOLDER REFERE	INCE AND PART NO
8	34	Letter	16 Mar	FCO	D/DS11/10/6 Pt U	
8	35	Diptel	17 Mar	HEGFI	as above	
8	37	Minute	18 Mar	DS5	D/DS11/10/6 Pt T	
8	38	Minute/Paper	19 Mar	DS11	M05/21 Pt 7	

## BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

## RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4)

Asked for MOD views on draft annex (to forthcoming OD paper) on contingency planning against a withdrawal of Argentine services to FI - air service, fuel, medical services etc.

Reported Islanders' agreement to terms of message from FCS to Argentine Foreign Minister (see Serial 77).



Contribution from Navy Dept to updated paper on FI defence. No impression of impending emergency. More precise than before on deployment time for 2 frigates plus supporting RFAs: 19 days from UK, 161 if standing by at Gibraltar.


Updated Paper on FI Defence Sent to SofS.
Essentially same as Sep 81 (Serial 47) except for deletion of references to future lack of amphibious shipping (because of decision to keep INTREPID and FEARLESS); for the more precise deployment times; and for passage on possible deployment of SSN - 13 days deployment time and useful whether deployed overt or covert. Mr Nott approved use as annex to FCO OD paper. (By then he was aware of Argentine landing on S Georgia,) Paper cleared out of committee by COS.

## CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS HELD BY MOD

SERIAL NO TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR	FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE AND PART NO CURRENT HOLDER
		en 12.3	
89 Diptel	20 Mar 82 (Sat)	HEGFI	D/DS 11/10 Pt U

## BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

Davidoff Landing in S Georgia. Incident occurred late on 19 March. HEGFI had given firm instructions to Base Commander Grytviken that party should be told to take down Argentine flag and return to their ship (BAHIA BIEN SUCESO). Not the first time that a Davidoff party had landed without prior diplomatic clearance: "I suspect that the Argentine Navy are using Davidoff as a front to establish an Argentine presence on S Georgia." Recommended ENDURANCE should sail from FI with marines embarked to ensure departure of Argentines.





91	Diptel	20 Mar (1801Z)	FCO	D/DS 4/10 Pt U
92	Diptel	20 Mar (2310Z)	FCO	as above
93	Diptel	20 Mar (2048Z)	нма/ва	as above

Reply to Serial 89. HEGFI's instructions to Base Commander agreed; asked him to signal details of Argentine ship's armaments (reported later that it had none); Ministers urgently considering redeployment of ENDURANCE and RM. HMA/BA instructed to make representations: party should leave S Georgia forthwith; otherwise difficult problem in context of negotiations would arise.

HEGFI told that CINCFLEET instructing ENDURANCE to leave for S Georgia, with necessary number of marines, on 21 March. Orders covered avoidance of publicity.

Foreign Ministry professed to be unaware of the journey of BIEN SUCESO. Embassy advised restraint until clear whether landing was a deliberate challenge authorised at high level or 'a piece of low level bravura combined with Davidoff's well-known fecklessness.'

CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS HELD BY MOD

SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR	FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE AND PART NO CURRENT HOLDER
94	Diptel	21 Mar 82	HMA/BA	D/DS11/10/6 Pt U
	Note: Action o involved much co and Mr Wiggin).	n 20/21 March onsultation bet	culminating in END ween FCO and MOD or	URANCE sailing to S Georgia fficials and Ministers (Mr Luce
95	Diptel	22 Mar	FCO	as above
96	Diptels	22 Mar	HEGFI/HMA/BA	as above
				2/31/24/3
97	Minute .	23 Mar	DS5	as above Pt Vee

## BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

Foreign Ministry Response on S Georgia Landing: While not actually apologising, expressed hope that affair would not be exaggerated. Party and ship would be leaving S Georgia forthwith; were in no way official and had no serving Service personnel (Base Cdr Grytviken thought that some were).

Text of FCO Press Statement issued 1230Z on 22 Mar. Key points were that if party was to continue its work it would have to seek the appropriate permission from the British authorities and that the Argentine govt had informed HMG that the ship had left S Georgia the previous day. (This was literally true but some of party had remained ashore at Leith - signal same day 1415Z from ENDURANCE.)

Confirmation of continuing presence on S Georgia led to HEGFI recommending ENDURANCE to proceed there to remove Davidoff's men. Concurrently HMA/BA advising that would be best to allow them to remain, subject to retrospective regularising of their position: "it would be wholly counter-productive to send them back here for a heroes welcome." HEGFI stuck to his recommendation. HMA/BA reported Foreign Ministry urging no forceful action which could irritate public opinion.

Widely circulated minute in MOD summarising the S Georgia events and setting out instructions to ENDURANCE - remove party but with courtesy and in low key.

#### SHEET NO 22

# MOD FALKLANDS REVIEW

#### CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS HELD BY MOD

SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR	FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE AND PART NO CURRENT HOLDER
98	Diptels	23 Mar 82	FCO/HMA/BA	D/DS11/10/6 Pt Vee
			22.70	
			Aller or an orași and	
		- (		
99	Signal	24 Mar (0945Z)	ENDURANCE	as above
100	Minutes FCS/PM FCS/SofS Defence	24 Mar	FCS	MO5/21 Pt 7

# BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

HMA/BA instructed to inform Foreign Ministry of instructions to ENDURANCE to remove S Georgia party. Parallel action with Argentine Embassy London. Situation "not of our seeking. Davidoff's irresponsible action and apparent inability of Argentine govt to take necessary remedial action has brought it about." (At this time Argentine Press also excited about incident at Argentine airline office Port Stanley.) Very strong response from Dr Costa Mendez: he and others trying to deal with the FI in a moderate way would lose control of events; "harsh action will produce a harsh response ... could not predict what this will be .... nor undertake to keep it within bounds." Later message (same day) reported somewhat mollified Costa Mendez but still a difficult situation. (Instructions to Endurance had been approved on SofS's behalf by Mr Wiggin but FCO Diptel 68 of 23 Mar - despatched 1928Z - authorised HMA/BA to inform Foreign Minister that while ENDURANCE would proceed to S Georgia she would there await further instructions.)

Arrived Grytviken, relieving BAS for observation and reporting purposes but "keeping well clear of Leith Harbour."


To SofS Defence. At critical stage in FI dispute: continuation of negotiations unlikely; Argentines may take early action to withdraw services; but immediate demonstration of our support for FI would be to maintain ENDURANCE on station (she was due to return to UK).

To Prime Minister. Seeking agreement to despatch of message to Foreign Minister (as agreed with Islanders to completion of contingency plans for civil support; and informing PM and other members of OD of his request about ENDURANCE. Sofs Defence asked to circulate to OD a note about contingency planning on the military side (see Serial 111).

### CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS HELD BY MOD

SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR	FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE AND PART NO CURRENT HOLDER
				RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4)
102	Réport	24 Mar	DA/BA	DS11/10/6 Pt Vee
103	Diptels	24 Mar	FCO/HMAS/BA & Washington HEGFI/ENDURANCE	
104	CC(82) 12th Conclusions	25 Mar (1000 am)	Cabinet : Secretariat	Private Office Folder
105	Diptel	25 Mar (1500Z)	FCS	DS/11/10/6 Pt Vee

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN



Update by Defence Attache of Military Threat: risk of expedition to rescue Davidoff party if taken off by ENDURANCE and taken to Port Stanley. Also, possible 'tit for tat' directed against BAS team on S Georgia.

At the Diplomatic Level: discussions with State Dept about 'explosive situation' now building up. Argentine Foreign Ministry doubtful whether any action could now be taken on their part, to remove S Georgia party without loss of face.

For S Georgia. Continued Argentine activity including new vessel-BAHIA PARAISO- from their Antarctic Squadron

FCS Reported on 'Serious Situation' in S Georgia. (No Defence Minister or Chiefs of Staff present): "real risk" of interception of ENDURANCE or action against the FI themselves if ENDURANCE removes the S Georgia party. Efforts being made to persuade Argentina to arrange for removal of party. "If she failed to do so, Britain would face a very difficult policy decision." Sanctions against FI a possibility. "If the Argentines thereafter threatened military action, Britain would face an almost impossible task in seeking to defend the Island at such long range."
(No action noted in Cabinet record except that plan to withdraw ENDURANCE from service might have to be

To Washington Only. If Argentines could not devise method of removing S Georgia party, ENDURANCE would have to carry out her instructions. "In the final analysis we cannot acquiesce in this infringement of British sovereignty and we are bound to take action to restore the status quo".

reconsidered.)

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SECTION

# MOD FALKLANDS REVIEW

CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS HELD BY MOD

SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	CRIGINATOR	FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE AND PART NO CURRENT HOLDER
				RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4)
	Breite Tree	Ç Xer	TO NO DE	\$36 X 35/1 PG 7
107	Diptel	25 Mar (1628Z)	HMA/BA	DS 11/10/6 Pt Vee
108	Signal	25 Mar (1.745Z)	PSO/CDS	CDS 2038/1 Pt 7

Note: CDS returned from visit to Pacific

and New Zealand on the 5: April

Reporting his discussion with Dr Costa Mendez (on basis of message from FCS to effect that S Georgia party must leave) and advising, "in the light of the defence implications you mention," a compromise requiring both sides to eat their words: ie party to observe immigration requirements; UK to revoke expulsion order. (Later same day (2101Z) ENDURANCE signalled that BAHIA PARAISO working cargo at Leith but apparently off-

loading more than she was embarking.)

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

To CDS in Honolulu Reporting events of last four days. MOD now agreed that ENDURANCE would remain S GEORGIA for next two weeks in hope that situation could be resolved peacefully and looking at "options for possible enhancement of naval forces and relief of ENDURANCE ... risk is always present that Argentine Navy can more than match any force we sent within a very short time." Mentioned reports that two frigates (Exocet armed) deployed to intercept ENDURANCE and remove any of S Georgia intruders she might be carrying. Military confrontation is therefore to be avoided but HMG had repeatedly assured Parliament that appropriate measures would be taken to ensure integrity of FI and dependencies. (Agreement to keep ENDURANCE in S Atlantic resulted from FCS Minute to PM of 24 March).

# CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS HELD BY MOD

SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR	FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE AND PART NO CURRENT HOLDER
109	Diptel	25 Mar 82 (2030Z)	FCS	D/DS11/10/6 Pt Vee
	. State La	at the cont	E POZPORANIA	15/16/e/19(4.85/2-1985/9572
110	Letter from No 10	25 Mar	PS to PM	CDS 2038/1 Pt 7
111	Letter	26 Mar	PS to SofS/ Defence	M05/21 Pt 7
112	Minute	28 Mar (recording events of	PS to USofS (AF)	D/USofS(AF)/JW25/5/7
869		events of 26 Mar)	See Pro	
		(15005)		
113	Minute	26 Mar	USofS(AF)	as above
114	Minute	26 Mar	DS5.	as above

#### BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

Reply to Serial 107: as "an ultimate effort of goodwill", instructed HMA to tell Dr Costa Mendez that if party leaves Leith, proceeds to Grytviken for documentation and formal permission, it could then return to Leith to complete its work. Ambassador spoke to CM who said he would consult President Galtieri.

Signifies PMs agreement to, inter alia, contingency planning for "sea service / to FI\_7 on an urgent basis."

Previously Agreed (see Serial 88) MOD Note on Defence Implications of Argentine Action against FI sent to PM and other members of OD. Recorded in No 10 letter of 28 March that PM had noted.

Recorded (i) agreement to retention of retiring RM party in FI (thus doubling size of garrison.)

(ii) Use of ENDURANCE helicopters on 27 Mar for reconnaissance around S Georgia (there appears to have been earlier FCO objection).

Minute to FCS affirming ability to keep ENDURANCE on station for up to two months but accumulating difficulties thereafter. Copied to PM who instructed that this and other Falklands questions should be put to OD.

Recorded results of discussions between SofS/Defence and USof S(AF): RFA FORT AUSTIN to sail (ex-Gibraltar) 29 March to replenish ENDURANCE; frigates to be earmarked to be sent to FI "should the need arise": storing of FORT AUSTIN to take this into account.



#### CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS HELD BY MOD

SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR	FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE AND PART NO CURRENT HOLDER
116	Diptel	26 Mar 82	HMA/BA	D/DS11/10/6 Pt Vee
117	Diptels	27 Mar (Sat)	FCO/HMA/BA/ NA	D/USofS(AF)/JW25/5/7
118	Diptel	28 Mar (1500Z)	HMA/BA	as above

# BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

Chilean colleague reported that all submarines in Mar del Plata had recently put to sea: "may not necessarily be sinister as a naval exercise is at present taking place with the Uruguayan Navy, probably in the River Plate area."

Efforts to obtain Argentine reply to latest message from FCS. HMA had "growing impression that Costa Mendez less than honest and Argentines have been playing us along". What was now awaited was text of formal reply to FCS message which junta were considering. Signal from NA, while stating that exercises with Uruguay probably genuine, passed on reports of numerous moves of Argentine warships and support vessels and, in particular, "intense activity in Puerto Belgrano". (Post invasion report by NA described practical difficulty of monitoring Naval activity at PB). In Diptel 271624Z HMA said meaning to be attached to NA's report was that "Argentines can have a dominating presence in the area by early next week". (Context suggests that the "area" in question was S Georgia.)

Gave Text of Argentine Message to FCS: represented British position on removal of S Georgia party as "virtually an ultimatum backed by the threat of military action". Informing US Secretary of State of this later this day (Tel No 588 1932Z) FCS described this as "an uncompromising and negative message" and asked for his help to persuade the Argentines to refuse the situation. In later telegram (1550Z) HMA concluded that Argentines "intend no move to resolve the dispute but rather to let matters ride while they build up their naval strength in the area and we remain in the dilemma of either taking or not taking action ourselves."

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SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR	FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE AND PART NO CURRENT HOLDER
119	Minute to SofS/Defence	29 Mar 82 (Monday)	DS5	MO 5/21 Pt 7 (misplaced as if dated 20 March)
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120	Signal	29 Mar	SofS/Defence	as above

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#### BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

Attached note by Naval Staff on "possible options for Naval reinforcements of the Falklands and also assessing the scope for conducting Naval exercises in the South Atlantic": requested by S of S/Defence during weekend. Covered following:

- (i) Sailing of FORT AUSTIN as already agreed but also embarking of company of RMs at Ascension, to which they would be flown.
- (ii) 2 Frigates plus a RFA tanker, currently at Gibraltar for national exercise (SPRINGTRAIN), but would not match Argentine forces believed to be in the area.
- (iii) Up to 9 DD/FF plus RFA support could be diverted from SPRINGTRAIN at "minimal notice". Option not favoured: provocative without necessarily being superior to force Argentines might muster.
- (iv) "SSN could be made available but, given the demand on SSN time, there would be both short and long term penalties."
- (v) A balanced task force capable of effective action would include a carrier, SSN and sufficient missile ships, escorts and RFA support. Could convoy either RM Company Group (180) or Commando Group (800). Force would take at least 7 days to assemble.

To PM in Brussels who had asked for urgent assessment of options for naval deployment, and as result of morning meeting in MOD attended by 1st Sea Lord:


- (i) FORT AUSTIN sailing this day.
- (ii) SPARTAN (SSN) instructed to move covertly to S. Atlantic: will leave Gibraltar on 31 March and near Falklands by 13 April. Nothing quicker possible. Planning on basis of earmarking second SSN.
- (iii) Further possibilities are to divert 7 DD/FF from SPRINGTRAIN; if necessary these could embark RMs at Ascension. 2/3 weeks to reach FI. This option could be kept secret until about 5 April.

CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS HELD BY MOD

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SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR	FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE AND CURRENT HOLDER	PART N
121	Diptels	29 Mar 82	FCO/HMA/BA	D/USofS(AF)/JW 25/5/7	
123	Minute	30 Mar 82	ACDS(Ops)	MO 5/21 Pt 7	
124	Internal Note	30 Mar 82	Naval Staff	DS5 999/Pt C	
125	Minute to PM	30 Mar 82	FCS/M of State (AF)	MO 5/21 Pt 7	
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					a/*
126	Minutes of Meeting	30 Mar 82	Defence Operations Executive	D/DS11/10/6 Part W	

### BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

Several this day, including drafts of next message to Costa Mendez; of Parliamentary statement for 30 Már; and of further message to Mr Haig. PM and FCS in Brussels. HMA doubtful whether US could persuade Argentinian Govt to climb down.



Air reinforcement of FI: reply to question from SofS/ Defence. Previous appreciation of difficulties repeated.

Noted message from SofS/Defence: expected PM/FCS to ask for second SSN to be deployed.

Joint Minute (1st Sea Lord among those consulted) detailing action already taken, including confirmation of despatch of second SSN (SPLENDID, expected to arrive FI area 18 April); doubts about sending a DD/FF Force (ex SPRINGTRAIN); more credible force should include carrier as well as Cdo Group but would 'prove highly provocative and hence escalatory, unless the Argentines were preparing to invade the Falklands. There is at present no sign of this'.

First of FI 'crisis' meetings Intelligence background included presence of substantial Argentine task force including carrier and LST, 800/900 miles N of FI. Unusual at this time of year. Limited amphibious capability. No change noted in Argentine Air Force readiness. FCO reported that Argentines planned to occupy at least one of the islands during April. SSN response still one most favoured but DOE put in hand draft submission on various options to be ready am 31 March.

# MOD FALKLANDS REVIEW CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS HELD BY MOD

SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR	FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE AND PART NO CURRENT HOLDER
127	JIC(82)(1A)6	31 Mar 82	Cabinet Secretariat	Separately held by MOD Review Team
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			Carried and a	
128	Minute	31 Mar	PS to SofS/ Defence	M05/21 Pt 7
129	Minute	31 Mar	A/CDS	D/US of S(AF)/JW 25/5/7
130	Message from PM	31 Mar	No 10	M05/21 Pt 7
131	Minutes of Meeting	31 Mar	Defence Ops Executive	DS11/10/6 Pt W

# BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

First JIC Assessment Since Jul 81: Factual report on Argentine naval movements and dispositions. Considered that landing on S Georgia not contrived by Argentine govt which still primarily concerned to negotiate transfer of sovereignty; "this will tend to constrain it from adopting extreme options". But high risk of use of force if S Georgia party arrested or removed: "such action... highly provocative and / Argentinian govt/ might use it as a pretext for an invasion of the FI".

Request by SofS (away from London) for possibility of RAPIER Deployment in FI to be Examined.

Submission to SofS/Defence, flowing from DOE Mtg
Previous Evening (Serial 126) for use at OD Mtg to
be held on 1 April: Set out action already in hand.
On SSNs said, "if you were to declare their presence...
would be powerful deterrent to ... a seaborne
invasion of FI". Deployment of third SSN not at
present recommended - for reasons set out in
submission. But to counter all possible Argentinian
options "a full naval task group / would need / to
be in the area before the Argentinians take action".

PM's Message to President Reagan. (President's reply received 6.20 pm London on 1 Apr.)

2nd Meeting of DOE: No major intelligence change but Argentine merchant ship reported steaming to FI "carrying certain command personnel but nothing known of any embarked force". Nothing could be done to prevent Argentinian occupation "of one of the outlying islands". ENDURANCE to remain 50 miles off S Georgia. Signal to be sent to HEGFI giving guidance on Rules of Engagement. SofS's Rapier request (Serial 128) to be examined.

### CATALOGUE OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS HELD BY MOD

SERIAL NO	TYPE OF DOC	DATE	ORIGINATOR	FILE/FOLDER REFERENCE AND PART NO CURRENT HOLDER
132	Signal	31 Mar 82 (1600Z)	NA/BA	D/DS11/10/6 Pt W
133	Diptel	31 Mar (2215Z)	FCO	as above
134	JIC(82)(1A)7	1 Apr	Cabinet Secretariat	Separately held by MOD Review Team
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				•
135	Brief	1 Apr	DS5	CDS 2038/1 Pt 7
68.1			Static	
136	OD(82) 6th Mtg	1 Apr (1145 am)	Cabinet Secretariat	Private Offices Folder
		Note: OD M	tg followed Cabine	t Meeting (CC(82)13th) was briefly discussed
137	Minute	1 Apr	A/CDS	M05/21 Pt 7

# BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

Reporting Information from USN Officer serving with Argentine Navy: Whole fleet now at sea; "premature" since no fleet exercises had been planned until after Easter. Argentine Air Force Hercules not at their normal base; "whereabouts unknown".

HEGFI warned of concern that Argentines assembling a seaborne force that could be used to invade FI.

Substantial details about capabilities and actions of Naval Force reported previous day: "Commander has reported that his force will reach its destination in the early hours of 2 April". No intelligence that decision taken to invade FI but situation "disturbing". Force has the capability and logistic support and "will be in a position from which it could launch an assault by about the middle of the day on Friday 2 April".

Full Brief for SofS Defence for OD Mtg 1 April: but while describing action in train, stressed importance of working for political solution; "we need to be clear about the difficulties of reinforcing FI and our disadvantage vis a vis the Argentines."

Numerous Papers on FI before OD, including MOD minute of 26 Mar on FI defence (Serial 111) but not joint minute FCS/M of State (AF) (Serial 125); SofS Defence, A/CDS and 1st Sea Lord present. As recorded OD did not consider either the latest intelligence assessments or the actions taken, or options for further action, to deploy British forces to S Atlantic Seems certain, (see Serials 137 and 138), that unrecorded discussion took place.

To SofS Defence describing action in Hand, "following the general decisions taken this morning at OD" to airlift personnel and equipment to Ascension Island to link up with RFA Fort Austin. These included BLOWPIPE detachment; 2 LYNX helicopters; and communications equipment.

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138	Minute	1 Apr	A/CDS	M05/21 Pt 7
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139	Diptel	1 Apr (1955Z)	HEGFI	D/USofS(AF)/JW 25/5/7
140	Diptel	1 Apr (2015Z)	FCO	as above
141	Internal Note	1 Apr ("2330")	Not Clear	D/DS11/10/6 Pt W

Note: 2 April saw preparations for despatch of Task Force further advanced.

Two Cabinet meetings were held (9.45 am and 7.30 pm). At the second,
the Cabinet formally "invited the Secretary of State for Defence
to arrange for the naval task force to sail from the United Kingdom
as soon as it was ready to do so."

# BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ACTION TAKEN

A/CDS to SofS Defence reporting examination (afternoon 1 Apr) by DOE of options to be contemplated following invasion of FI. (OD Mtg (am) reported to have agreed that at present no surface force should be sent): escalating range of responses set out, culminating in Joint Service Task Force employing RM Cdo Brigade and 5 Infantry Brigade. Would take some time to prepare and require commercial as well as RN ships. "This landing force would be capable of dealing with an Argentine Brigade". HM ships needed - carrier, LPH, LPD and about 10 DD/FF.

HEGFI reports his proposed actions in the event of invasion.

To Washington, UKMIS NY, etc reporting information from secret sources' that Argentine task force will be assembling off P Stanley "tomorrow morning". Emergency mtg of Security Council being sought.

States (for information of UKMILREP Brussels) that after meeting between PM, FCS and SofS Defence at 2330 on 1 Apr it was decided that 3 Cdo Brigade RM were to be placed on immediate notice to move to S Atlantic with a Naval Task Force under the command of R Adm Woodward.