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NSC Meeting
START
8/9/82

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NLS M05-016 #19169A

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 2/10/06

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START
1/4/82

1510

• Bud McF - introductory remarks [VP joins ... Baker, Deacon, Danner still out - Poindexter not present] missiles above 850, nondeployed - 4 groups of constraints - ^{Group A} (1) development of capabilities, (2) missiles & equipment at sites, (3) activities to develop reconstitution - recommend adoption, any agency comment?
(nobody comments)

group B, procedural constraints on non-deployed missiles & disassembling/destroying missiles that are taken out of inventory ... comment on caveat for SS-9/Titan for space launch [Pres comments: but warheads could be destroyed] - some spares, but stored at designated sites - (propose adopting measures "1 & 3" of B if no objection)

(nobody comments)

as for "2", there's still a question on ability to verify (i.e., for old missiles intended to serve as space launch vehicles) ... agency remarks

- Shultz - difference of opinion in this state - question for Bud: verify if tested ... test to sustain confidence in system
- Bud - true you must test to sustain confidence ... Gen Vessey?
- Gen Vessey - based on tests, Soviets can have graph of degradation over time
- Pres - what about int'l group responsible for dismantling or destroying - how do you destroy? shoot it off?
- Bud McF - Soviets have dismantled SS-7s, #8s
- Skel^{ux} - can verify if destruction's where we can see it
- McMahon - we've not observed dismantling of a large number of missiles

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• Shultz - the reason I raise the issue is that verification is at the heart of agency disagreement ... and of whether or not you want an agreement

• McFarlane - if you ^{could} even find one instance of cheating, the knowledge that this may happen has some deterrent value

• Weinberger - analogy to laws against bank robbery - we've always offered on-site verification - we should go in with best set of conditions, even if we can't verify on-site or don't get in negotiations

• Shultz - inclined to go along w/ this ... but what disturbs me is that if we get an agreement & find they've cheated after several yrs, we're left w/ a serious imbalance

• Weinberger - high moral ground, and we should keep it

• Shultz - approach on grounds we can't trust them ... assume that if we can't verify, they'll cheat - evaluate the importance to ourselves on these grounds that it will be done ... how essential is it to our purpose?

• President - I rewards ... discussion ensues on what the generic issue involves ... covert

• McMahon - web of verification / network of constraints - Soviets will worry about getting caught

• Shultz - but what will they have done over the 5 years

• Pres - alternative is we'd have to do it also

• Gen. Vessey - we don't want to do certain things ... can't go to Congress because we can't verify

- Weinberger - we should go in w/ what we want to get ^{- like laws -} importance to us a valid issue, but not here
- Pres - [discusses zero option]
- Grey - we should have opportunity to raise in SCC ... basis for challenge
- McF - agreed to adopt #2?
[no comments]
- McF - find pre ... designated locations for storage
... verification against the issue - comments
- Pres - our attitude has to be that of preacher in church who let the only one-armed man pass the basket
- McF - last group of constraints ... question again is verification
- Shultz - same arguments apply - I'm not convinced it's a good thing to go with ... logic troublesome
- Weinberger - reconstitution favors Soviets now ... again, argues for on-site inspection ... hollow & shallow w/o it
- Shultz - makes it hollow & shallow ... means if we don't get this, we don't have much
- Pres - is it easier to verify if we close down production facilities?
- McMahan - put inspectors at checkpoints
- Shultz - why don't we agree to have a reconstitution capability?
(expensive ...)

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- Pres - 30% & 50% worry me ... how do we explain to nuclear protestors?
- Genlessy - (explains function of spare launchers)
- Pres - I see ... w/ warheads
- Weinberger - anything we can do to get onsite inspection
- McF - even w/ spares, below SALT II
- Gray - (makes point of SCC again)
- Neese - isn't key issue whether to have onsite verification (discussion, briefly)
- Nielman - our problem over the years has been calling violations - treaties may have provisions (e.g., re: yellow rain) but we've been poor in calling
- Pres - challenge immediately, and if we find even one, we're back in an arms race and we'll outbuild you
- McF - (summarize ... include in instructions ... ~~the~~ Middle East
- Shultz - Sharon wants to come here Thursday ... we'll leave w/ Halab ?? ... not request from PM
- Pres - yes, discourage

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING:

DATE: SUBJECT:

8/9/82 START
3:10-4:10 p.m.
Cabinet Room

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
The Vice President
State:
Secretary George P. Shultz
Admiral Jonathan Howe
OSD:
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
Under Secretary Fred C. Ikle
CIA:
Mr. John McMahon
USUN:
Ambassador Kenneth Adelman
OMB:
Mr. William Schneider
JCS:
General John W. Vessey, Jr.
Lt General Paul F. Gorman
ACDA:
Mr. Robert T. Grey
White House:
Mr. Edwin Meese, III
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
NSC:
Colonel Michael O. Wheeler
General Richard T. Boverie
Colonel Robert Linhard
Mr. Sven Kraemer

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NSC 00059

BY LDT NARA, DATE 11/7/05