

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Meeting
June 29, 1984, 11:00a.m.-12:00 noon, White House Situation Room

SUBJECT: Central America and Proposed Presidential Finding
on Technology Modification

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

The Vice President

The Vice President's Office:
Mr. Donald P. Gregg

State:
Secretary George Shultz
1:00-11:30) Ambassador Langhorne Motley
1:00-11:30) Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman

White House:
Mr. Edwin Meese III
Mr. James Baker III
Mr. Robert McFarlane
Rear Admiral John Poindexter (11:00-11

Defense:
Secretary Caspar Weinberger
Dr. Fred Ikle

OMB:
Dr. Alton Keel

Justice

1:45-12:00) AG William French Smith

CIA:
Deputy Director John McMahon
1:00-11:30) Mr. Duane Clarridge

USUN:
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick

1:30-12:00) [REDACTED]

E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 1.4(c)

NSC:
Lt Col Oliver North (11:00-11:30)
Mr. Kenneth E. deGraffenreid (11:30-12

JCS:
General John Vessey, Jr.
1:00-11:30) Vice Admiral Arthur Moreau, Jr.

Minutes

Mr. McFarlane: Introduced Ambassador Shlaudeman and noted that the purpose of the first portion of the NSPG meeting would be to review the recent discussions between the Nicaraguans and the U.S.

Ambassador Shlaudeman: Noted that the venue was most uncomfortable in that even the Nicaraguans were unprepared for the high temperature

and humidity. This and the Nicaraguan lack of preparedness for discussions in substance limited the total time in meetings over two days to about seven hours.

The Mexicans introduced the conference and then withdrew. At the close, Foreign Minister Sepulveda thanked both parties for attending and the Nicaraguans departed with him for Mexico City.

The Nicaraguan principal negotiator, Tinoco, was obviously on a very short leash and made every effort to abbreviate the meetings. It was apparent that they had no intentions of discussing the substance of our disagreements and preferred to focus on "the shape of the table" and whether or not the meetings should be tape recorded. In their view, recordings of the meetings would be a "confidence building measure." The U.S. side was successful in arguing that, if the Nicaraguans wished, each side could have a stenographic copy made but that no tape recordings would be permitted.

Tinoco's second measure request was for Mexican presence during the discussions. The U.S. side argued that a third party was unnecessary and would not contribute to the confidentiality of the meetings. The Nicaraguans obviously wanted to allow public discussion of the dialogue and the U.S. argued that, if we were to debate this matter in newspapers, there would be no reason for meetings. It was apparent to the U.S. side that the Nicaraguan objective was to "tie us up" in these details and never get to the substance. The Mexicans, in their effort to promote a "friendly atmosphere," proffered an introductory breakfast and a closing dinner--both of which were refused by the Nicaraguans.

In the afternoon session on Monday, the U.S. side commenced reading from the draft Aide Memoire. Tinoco was obviously most uncomfortable with our focus on Contadora and our requirements for verification. Their interventions during the reading of the Aide Memoire were filled with revolutionary rhetoric and aspersions on U.S. motives. It is interesting to note that, with the exception of Tunnerman--who has been nominated as their ambassador to the U.S.--all of them are very young. One of them, Ramos, their Chief of Military Intelligence, is a goon. His contribution was to make faces at me throughout the meeting.

The President: Next time you see them, tell them I don't trust anyone under 70.

Ambassador Shlaudeman: They base their principal argument on the assumption that U.S./Nicaraguan relations are the determining factor in all that happens in Latin American. They focused on "normalizing U.S./Nicaraguan security arrangements." They also stressed that we must recognize Nicaragua's right to self-determination and accept their revolution.

Both sides agreed that we would be able to consult with our respective friends. The principal disagreement became the matter

of the definition of a "successful" outcome. The US side argued that a reinforcement of the Contadora process would meet our objectives. Tinoco wanted to focus on US and Nicaraguan relations. He in fact was so bold as to "dismiss" Contadora as even relevant during the first session. On the next day he was less negative than earlier.

It is apparent that the Nicaraguans are very defensive on the Contadora issue and that their principal negotiator has very little flexibility on the matter. When we closed, the US side suggested another meeting on or about July 15 in Panama. Tinoco countered with a proposal that we meet in Mexico after their July 19 anniversary of the revolution.

Our next step is to consult with our friends: At noon Sunday, July 1, I (Shlaudeman) will meet with President Suazo in Honduras. I will leave a copy of the Aide Memoire and urge that we do what we can to return to the April 25 version of the draft treaty. There is some concern that the Panamanians will try to accelerate this process to the detriment of improving the document. We will not leave copies of the Aide Memoire with the other Contadora countries.

Secretary Shultz. I think we can have real progress here in reinforcing our friends and putting the Nicaraguans on the defensive. I think another side benefit of the meeting is that it has helped to "rearrange" Mexican attitudes toward the US and Nicaragua. They were clearly frustrated by the Nicaraguans' attitude and may be willing to be less difficult with us and perhaps even pressure the Nicaraguans in the right direction in the future.

The President. I want to emphasize that we are working to improve Contadora and that what we are doing cannot be seen as some bilateral negotiation with Nicaragua. How long will the Nicaraguans be willing to keep "stonewalling" on this?

Ambassador Shlaudeman. We are not sure, but this may exacerbate splits within the Nicaraguan leadership.

Secretary Weinberger. Does it appear that they have any fear of US intervention?

Ambassador Shlaudeman. The Nicaraguans said nothing specific about this, but did note that they would have to reconsider the whole idea of the meetings if Congress appropriated aid to the freedom fighters.

Secretary Weinberger. How about the Cuban and Soviet advisors--would they leave Nicaragua?

Ambassador Shlaudeman. The Nicaraguans said they would. As you know we have four principal demands on which we require verification: the withdrawal of the Cuban/Soviet military personnel;

