



SECRET AND PERSONAL

Prime Minister
On dates, I doubt
that mid-September
will work, because
you have to be
abroad from 16-20 Sept.
The following week (24-26
September) would be a
possibility if we postponed
certain
other things.

B.07057

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Meeting of OD(I) at 4.45 p.m. on Monday 15 July

Anglo-Irish Relations: Northern Ireland

INTRODUCTION

The meeting will consider the note by the Secretary of the Cabinet (OD(I)(85)4) of 11 July about the state of play in the exploratory talks between British and Irish officials. The text for an agreement is virtually agreed, with the important exception of the reference to Joint Courts in paragraph 17. We seem to have a good chance of persuading the Irish to drop the concept of "associated measures" in favour of the more realistic idea of rapid implementation of the agreement, although it is likely that they will want more in the way of early British moves under the agreement than is foreseen in paragraph 4 of the Cabinet Secretary's note. The next meeting of the Armstrong/Nally talks will start on the evening of 15 July and continue on 16 July.

CJP
12/7.

2. All members of the Sub-Committee are expected to attend. There is a possibility that the Lord President of the Council will be delayed because of the passage of the Local Government Bill in the House of Lords that afternoon.

HANDLING

3. You may wish to start the meeting by asking the Northern Ireland Secretary and then the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to comment on the position reached in the negotiations. The text for an agreement is very similar to



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the version discussed by OD(I) on 23 May: you may thus be able to keep discussion of it brief. You could then focus the meeting on these issues -

(a) Joint Courts. The two sides' positions remain opposed. There seems to be little or no scope for movement on our side. Does the Attorney General see any way in which we could modify our position?

(b) The concept of rapid implementation (paragraphs 3-6 of the Cabinet Secretary's note) as an alternative to "associated measures". This first arose in your meeting with the Taoiseach in Milan on 29 June. It seems to represent the best, and perhaps the only, prospect of disposing of "associated measures" which would greatly provoke the Unionists and thus endanger the agreement. The Northern Ireland Secretary should comment.

(c) The individual steps which the United Kingdom could take to implement the agreement rapidly (paragraph 4 of the Cabinet Secretary's note). This aspect is still being pursued by officials but preliminary discussion in OD(I) would help to clarify it. We need measures which both stand up on their merits and will help us to sell the concept of rapid implementation to the Irish. When will the proposed Code of Conduct for the Royal Ulster Constabulary be ready and could it be announced shortly after conclusion of an Anglo-Irish agreement? (Northern Ireland Secretary). Could this Code or something similar be applied to the regular army and the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) in Northern Ireland? (Defence Secretary). Could the amount of initial training undergone by part-time members of the UDR be increased? The present initial training of 8 days seems very little for soldiers who have powers of



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arrest (Defence Secretary). Could more non-commissioned officers be seconded from the regular army to the UDR on exchange, a measure which the Irish side have suggested would increase the confidence of the Roman Catholic minority in the UDR? (Defence Secretary). Are the lesser measures in the legal field mentioned at the end of paragraph 4 of the Cabinet Secretary's note likely to help us to persuade the Irish to moderate their position on Joint Courts? Would they be acceptable to the judiciary in Northern Ireland? (The Attorney General). More generally, since the Irish are likely to press us to do more in rapid implementation of an agreement, can colleagues suggest other steps which the United Kingdom could take?

(d) The attitudes of the political parties in Northern Ireland. Does the Northern Ireland Secretary wish to add to the information in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Cabinet Secretary's note?

(e) The timing of signature of an agreement (paragraph 9a of the Cabinet Secretary's note). Assuming that the rest of the marching season passes without major trouble, would there be serious objections to concluding the agreement in mid-September?

(f) The location of an Anglo-Irish Summit (paragraph 9b of the Cabinet Secretary's note). Given the difficulties about signature in either part of Ireland, what location in Great Britain would be suitable? Is there a better idea than the Irish Embassy in London or Leeds Castle?

(g) Should the agreement be ratified? (paragraph 9c of the Cabinet Secretary's note). The idea of rapid implementation requires a first meeting of the Standing



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Intergovernmental Committee very soon after signature of the agreement. That would mean that the agreement should not provide for ratification, in line with previous Anglo-Irish agreements. Would it be satisfactory for Parliament to debate the agreement after it had entered into force and the Standing Intergovernmental Committee had begun to meet during the Recess? The Lord Privy Seal and the Chief Whip should comment.

(h) Presentation of an agreement. Is the Sub-Committee content with the preliminary ideas in paragraph 9d of the Cabinet Secretary's note? Is a meeting between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and his Irish and United States colleagues in Helsinki at the end of July desirable? One possible move, not mentioned in the Cabinet Secretary's note, might be a message from you to President Reagan, perhaps at the beginning of September, describing the proposed agreement and paving the way for a visit to Washington by a special emissary of the Government. Should we pursue the idea of a Fund privately with the Americans, shunning publicity on this as on all other aspects of the negotiations? The Northern Ireland Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should comment.

[Bound to leak] ✓

CONCLUSION

4. Subject to the discussion, you could lead the Sub-Committee to agree that:

- the Cabinet Secretary should pursue the talks with the Irish in line with his note and under the direction of yourself and the Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland and for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs;



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- a list of measures which we could take in rapid implementation of the agreement should be finalised as soon as possible, building on paragraph 4 of the Cabinet Secretary's note;
- mid-September should be kept in mind for conclusion of the agreement but no commitment should be made until much nearer the time;
- we should seek to persuade the Irish that the Summit to sign the agreement should take place in Great Britain, perhaps in the Irish Embassy in London;
- plans for presentation of the agreement should be pursued in line with the Cabinet Secretary's note;
- you should report on the negotiations to Cabinet on 25 July on the basis of a paper to be circulated beforehand.

C L G Mallaby

12 July 1985