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PRIME MINISTER

ENDURANCE

We are to meet on Wednesday next to discuss endurance. This minute discusses the next steps on building up coal stocks and a number of related issues which have a bearing on the CEGB's endurance.

COAL STOCKS

2. At our meeting in March we agreed to ask the NCB and the electricity supply industry (ESI) to aim at rebuilding coal stocks at power stations to give the equivalent of six months' endurance (23 million tonnes by the end of October 1985). The NCB and CEGB are working on this basis, and are on course to achieve the target: higher coal burn due to unexpectedly high demand this summer has been offset by higher deliveries from the NCB.

3. We must now decide what programme the industries should plan to work to beyond this October. In particular they need guidance on whether to continue with a target of six months' endurance or to aim at the ability to endure for longer.

4. I am sure that we should not aim at a level of stockbuilding which could be achieved only by delaying the closure of uneconomic pits: we must do nothing that might impede the progress of the NCB towards break even by 1987-88. The NCB's existing plans suggest that the maximum which the NCB could deliver would be 34 million tonnes during the last five months of 1985-86 and 43 million tonnes in the first seven months of 1986-87. During the same period the CEGB would expect coal burn to be 75-76 million tonnes. Allowing for non-vested production and imports during the period (say 6½ million tonnes), the total stock build between October 1985 and October 1986 would be of the order of 8 million tonnes, to give total stocks of about 31 million tonnes. This would be very close to the 32 million tonnes which is assessed to be the amount required in October to give a full 12 months' endurance, and for which the CEGB has stocking facilities readily available. So a target of 12 months' endurance by October 1986 is a feasible option.

5. We must also consider carefully the financial implications.



6. The Electricity Council is discussing this month its attitude to the financing of coal stocks but it is certain that the industry will refuse to finance stocks as high as 31 million tonnes. In their view, the industry should not have to accept the financial burden of maintaining coal stocks above the level judged necessary for commercial reasons, say a level of 12 million tonnes in October. They will argue that it is not reasonable that the industry should be required to earn the target rate of return on assets which it does not need for normal business purposes; and they are worried that the additional interest burden on the stocks (which would be in excess of £50 million a year) might force the industry, through pressure on the EFL, to reduce expenditure which it would regard as more desirable.

7. In short, while some in the industry would be willing to accept a stock level giving six months' endurance, as we decided in March, as a reasonable charge on the industry's finances, the industry as a whole will be unwilling to go further. If the ESI is asked to build stocks to a level significantly higher than the equivalent of six months' endurance, it will press for special payment arrangements or some other form of Government financial assistance.

8. The difficulties of direct Government assistance are obvious. Special arrangements might be made for deliveries of coal above a certain level to be on a deferred payment basis. But the NCB face the difficult task of moving to break even in the next two years. I would be reluctant to impose on NCB's demanding financial prospectus additional financial charges associated with deferred payment deliveries to CEGB.

9. There will also be some cost to the PSBR. Even with the rapid run down of the coal industry currently envisaged the coal stocks under discussion will be a charge on the PSBR one way or another. But the alternative to a transfer to the CEGB is the maximum feasible additional exports sales. An additional 3 million tonnes of export sales might be feasible, so revenue of, say, £85 million could be lost to the PSBR if the coal is transferred to the CEGB.

10. It is for decision, therefore, whether we ask the two industries to plan for an endurance target of 12 months at a net cost to the PSBR of say £85 million. Officials would then need to discuss the financial arrangements to cover such a programme of coal stock build.



STRENGTHENING THE SCOTTISH INTERCONNECTOR

11. You were particularly keen that, in the context of improving endurance, there should be an urgent study of the case for strengthening the Scottish Interconnector. This is discussed in the attached note by officials at Annex 1.

12. The only option which could have any impact on the situation in the near future would provide an increase in capacity from 1000 MW to 1250 MW, would not be ready until November 1987, and would involve a period of seven months in 1987 during which one of the two present interconnectors would be out of action. It would provide only nine days extra endurance over a twelve month period at a cost of £60 million. I agree with the CEGB that this would not be justified and that there would be many better ways of spending that amount of money to improve endurance.

*Watts
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P. Smith*

13. There are two other options for more substantial enhancement of the interconnector, one providing an increase to 1500 MW at a cost of £220 million and the other providing an increase of 2000 - 2500 MW at a cost of £320 million. In either case the necessary work would take until 1992 and might not be completed until 1995. I am not at present persuaded that either investment would be worthwhile for the reasons mentioned in Annex 1.

ENDURANCE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE STRIKE

14. Earlier this year MISC 57 drew up, in the light of experience during the strike, a check list of possible options for further increasing power station endurance. The CEGB have their own review in hand and I expect a report from them shortly. I will bring to your attention any aspect of their report requiring action by us. In the meantime, I attach a note by officials (Annex 2) which discusses the MISC 57 check list. That note has been prepared after full discussion with the CEGB and reflects their current thinking in the light of the strike.

15. It is already clear that the CEGB have taken action, or have it in hand, to ensure, as far as possible that the flexibility they were able to apply during the strike will be available to them in any future dispute. They, rightly, attach considerable importance to maintaining the support of their own workforce and, with this in mind, establishing the normality of the flexible use of the



system that will need to be built-on during an emergency. No immediate decisions are required by us on the short term issues discussed in Annex 2 although we will need to monitor CEGB's commercial discussions with BR and the NCB. As for the longer term, we must return to the future of the cross channel link and to the development of the nuclear programme at the appropriate time but no decisions can be taken now.

16. I am copying this minute to the Chancellor, George Younger, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Friday 19 July 1985

PP

PETER WALKER

(Approved by the Secretary of State and signed in his absence)

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The possible case for expanding the Scottish Interconnector
(bearing in mind the increase in over-capacity in Scotland
when the Torness AGR is operational in 1988)

As requested, officials have reviewed with both the CEGB and the SSEB the practical possibilities for expanding the interconnector with Scotland. The preliminary results of this exercise are set out below. However, this is a complicated question, not least because the CEGB's transmission system behaves fundamentally differently under endurance operation than in normal operation. Thus further detailed engineering and computer simulation studies would need to be undertaken to confirm these tentative results.

There are two physical interconnections between the CEGB and SSEB systems with 275 kV lines running from Stella to Cockenzie on the east side of the country and from Harker to Strathaven on the west side. These are illustrated on the attached diagram. The present capacity of the interconnector enables a firm power flow of some 1000 MW to be transferred to England on a continuous basis. It operated well during the miners' strike with a maximum transfer of 149 GWh during one week.

At present, modifications are being made to connect Torness to the system. The Torness to Dalkeith 400 kV line (shown as a broken line in the diagram) is three-quarters completed and the Torness to Eccles 400 kV line will be completed by the end of 1986. The twin circuit eastern interconnector between Stella and Cockenzie although operating at 275 kV was constructed to allow operation at 400 kV. As a part of the operation to tie-in Torness additional switchgear and transformers will be added to upgrade one circuit to 400 kV. Thus, by the end of 1986, the eastern interconnector will consist of one circuit operating at 275 kV and one at 400 kV.

In addition, the CEGB's present system planning includes a programme of reinforcement to the national grid north of the Midlands to eliminate present system bottlenecks which have the effect of limiting transmission capability from north to south. This work is primarily designed to deal with anticipated future power flows in the system, eg from the AGRs at Heysham and Hartlepool. However, it will also have the additional effect of creating further flexibility to deal with a higher level of imports from Scotland. The work should be completed by 1989.

For some time the CEGB and the SSEB have been considering the possibilities for reinforcing the interconnector further. However, the two Boards have found it difficult to identify an economically justifiable solution. On present thinking, one possibility would be to undertake the following programme:-

- (i) The Stella to Harker 275 kV line, which is old and cannot be uprated, would be rebuilt to allow operation at 400 kV. The present Stella to Norton 275 kV line would also be upgraded/rebuilt to allow 400 kV operation.

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- (ii) The western interconnector cannot be uprated and would be rebuilt to give a twin circuit interconnector with one circuit operating at 275 kV and one at 400 kV.

These changes would cost some £220 million (of which perhaps £120 million would be for the CEGB and £100 million for the SSEB). The lines that would need to be rebuilt would almost inevitably give rise to public inquiries given the environmental sensitivity of the routes. The new lines would be built parallel to the existing ones and then tied-in, with the old lines then being demolished. This would minimise any necessary down-time on the interconnector. The work would be likely to take until 1992 and might not be completed until 1995. This would increase the capacity of the interconnector to some 1400 - 1500 MW on a continuous power flow basis, ie an increase of 40 - 50% on the present capacity.

While the Boards have not committed themselves to undertaking such a programme their general view is that this is the most that could ever be justified on an economic basis. However, even this on further examination could prove to be uneconomic. While the western interconnector will at least need to be reconducted at some stage, this could be done at 275 kV yielding a negligible increase in the capacity of the interconnector.

Recognising the lack of economic justification for going any further; we have nevertheless reviewed with the Boards what further enhancement would be technically possible. The two interconnectors could be rebuilt/upgraded with additional switchgear and transformers added to operate both circuits at 400 kV. To maximise the power flow, two static var compensators would also need to be installed, probably at Strathaven and Cockenzie, and the SSEB would need to refurbish and rebuild its east/west interconnection between the Clyde and Forth valleys to operate at 400 kV. The total additional cost would be some £100 million, of which £50 - 80 million would be for the SSEB and some £20 - 30 million for the CEGB. It should be possible to complete the work in the same timescale, ie 1992 to 1995. This would increase the capacity of the interconnector to some 2000 - 2500 MW, ie an increase of 100 - 150% on the present capacity.

However, this would not be the end of the matter. It is first necessary to consider the effect of this increased capability on the CEGB's transmission system in the north of England in the 1990s. On present plans there would not be sufficient transmission capacity for a north/south flow at this level. To overcome this when the grid is being operated normally would require system reinforcement into the heart of the grid. This could require a new 400 kV line probably from Stella down to around York, and this could cost a further £100 million or so. Such a new line would undoubtedly be contentious and with the necessary public inquiry would take between 7 and 10 years to complete. This would be necessary if the enhanced capacity of the interconnector was to be fully available at all times. However, if the enhancement was being considered primarily to yield flexibility

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in any future dispute then, on the assumption for example that the operation of the northern coal-fired stations was being restricted to conserve coal, it is just possible that the full capacity of the interconnector could be utilised in an endurance situation without such further reinforcement of the grid.

It is also necessary to consider the available capacity in Scotland in the 1990s to support such power exports. The economic limit in terms of normal trading would be around 1500 to 1600 MW. However, in an endurance situation, exports could be sustained at up to 2500 MW during the summer given full oil burn at Inverkip and Peterhead and with some coal burn at Scottish stations. The winter would be the difficult period. On the basis of the SSEB's present coal stocking policy exports of some 1500 MW could be sustained in the winter. This level could only be raised to 2500 MW or so by providing additional coal stocks in Scotland of perhaps 3 - 4 mt specifically to sustain higher levels of power export to England and Wales. Clearly the SSEB would not expect their consumers to have to finance these. Also, as consumer demand grows through the 1990s the SSEB export capacity would be diminishing with time and would probably not exceed 2000 MW by the year 2000 unless new plant had been constructed.

Thus, while a major enhancement of the interconnector is technically possible it could not be operational until between 1992 and 1995 and it is questionable whether sufficient spare capacity would exist for long enough in Scotland to justify the significant expenditure involved. It could not be justified on the basis of normal trading and even in an endurance situation would require additional coal stocks in Scotland to utilise the export capability in winter. If such stocks were to be financed they would be better placed directly at the CEGB's stations.


We have also considered with the Boards the technical possibilities of enhancing the capacity of the interconnector in the short-term. The most advantageous option would be to re-conductor the western interconnector utilising the present towers. If this proved to be possible the work could proceed without the need for any further consents or planning permission, but detailed negotiations with landowners for access would be necessary. It is believed that the towers could take new 700 sq mm conductors without modification, but their operation would somewhat be constrained by ground clearances. In addition, faster switchgear and static var compensators would be required at Strathaven and Cockenzie and a further static var compensator at Harker. This would give a firm power capability of some 1250 MW for the interconnector, ie an increase of some 25% on the present capacity.

The actual re-conductoring of over 100 miles of line would take a period of some 7 months. This would be a major exercise, requiring four or five gangs starting at different points and could not be undertaken at the same time as the work to tie-in Torness. Therefore it would have to take place during 1987. The re-conductoring would mean a significant period during which the western interconnector would not be available thus weakening system security as well as causing a loss of export earnings for the SSEB for which they would probably wish to be compensated. The cost of the work alone would be some £60 million made up of £30 million for line work and £30 million for the static var

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compensators and switchgear. The construction and installation of the static var compensators would also be on the critical path. There would be no possibility that they could be available in much less than 27 months, but the Boards feel reasonably confident that they could be installed by November 1987 in time for the 1987 winter. However, given the CEGB's recent experience with the main UK supplier GEC it might be necessary to go abroad to guarantee delivery in the necessary timescale.

The Boards are not attracted by this proposition. They do not see it as a technically optimum solution and are concerned that such a short-term expedient would adversely affect the economic justification for any proposal to rebuild the western interconnector in the longer-term to give greater capacity and make its public presentation much more difficult. It would provide only a minimal gain in endurance terms, amounting to about 9 days extra endurance over a twelve month period. The CEGB feel strongly that £60 million could yield far greater endurance savings if spent in other areas, eg enhancing further the Board's ability to burn oil at coal-fired power stations.





CONSIDERATION OF OPTIONS FOR FURTHER INCREASING POWER STATION ENDURANCE

Short-Term

- (i) Any short-term action to improve flexibility to switch from coal to oil and gas, including the establishment of certain activities as "normal working".

The CEGB's oil burning capability was progressively enhanced during the 1984/85 dispute. Most of this capability was provided by the Board's main oil-fired power stations. These performed very well throughout the strike, in many cases exceeding their design specification in terms of power output, and will remain available to provide a major element of generation flexibility in any future dispute.

Further capability was created by the establishment of oil-burning facilities at selected coal-fired stations that were able to receive enough lighting-up oil to enable a significant power output to be obtained by burning oil. These stations accounted for some 20% of the Board's oil burn during the dispute. This was achieved by means of temporary engineering works undertaken in the course of the strike. The Board's first priority is to secure this capability for the future by establishing the facilities permanently and expanding them wherever possible. The objective is to achieve the ability to produce significant oil-fired output from as many coal-fired stations as possible. The precise generation capability achievable will vary significantly with the circumstances of individual stations eg 100% output on oil could be achieved at Thames-side stations that can be supplied by sea whereas for an inland power station with road borne deliveries 10 - 15% of normal output would be the likely limit.

A major engineering programme will be needed to fit the necessary permanent pipework, tankage and pumps etc to ensure an enhanced flow of oil to the burners. It will take place over the next three years as the work will need to be aligned with the Board's maintenance programme and in particular with major boiler outages which are planned on a three year cycle. Arrangements will also need to be made to ensure the delivery of the necessary quantities of lighting-up oil in any future dispute. For most inland stations this will have to be by rail and road. However, work is in hand to provide for deliveries by barge to Thorpe Marsh, Drax, High Marnham and Ferrybridge, with the oil being trans-shipped from the barge delivery point to the station by pipeline. These facilities are already operational at Ferrybridge and High Marnham and the possibilities of delivery by barge to other stations are under consideration. In order to widen the scope of "normal working" as much as possible the oil-burning capability of coal-fired, main oil-fired and dual-fired stations will be appraised and regularly demonstrated.



This approach, designed to achieve as much oil-fired capability at coal-fired stations as is practicable, is seen as a more appropriate way to proceed than seeking to extend the number of dual-fired stations. The latter would require very expensive modifications to the boilers and major engineering works for oil supply and handling. It would also be quite impracticable for the major inland coal-fired power stations as these could never be adequately supplied with sufficient oil by road to justify the expenditure. Equally, while the supply of gas to the Hams Hall dual-fired coal/gas station will be maintained there is no scope for additional dual-firing using gas. Such conversions would be very expensive, requiring major modifications to render all the electrical equipment flameproof. There is also doubt about the availability of supplies as even Hams Hall can only be supplied on an interruptible basis and supplies to the station were indeed interrupted at times of peak gas demand in the winter period.

During the dispute the CEGB managed to utilise some expensive and inefficient small oil-fired plant that had been officially closed. Even though the decommissioning and demanning process was in hand it proved possible to bring the plant back into operation temporarily. This will not be the case in future as this plant will now be finally closed. However, the loss in capacity, some 363 MW is not significant for endurance and should soon be made good by the measures being taken to enhance oil-burning capability at the coal-fired stations.

(ii)

The need to monitor the likely availability of additional supplies of fuel oil in the light of movements in the international oil market.

The CEGB and the Department already monitor the fuel oil market continuously and will continue to do so. All the present indications are that the market will remain soft for some time. Prices have fallen significantly below the level reached during the miners' strike. Indeed with the changes in the exchange rate and the fall in the price of oil, fuel oil prices are now at a level not far above the point at which some increased oil burn would become economic.

During the strike the spot purchase of the bulk of the CEGB's main generation oil requirements proved highly efficient and their experience showed that there was truly a world market for the supply of heavy fuel oil. However, the position will need to be monitored carefully: in particular, refinery closures and the up-grading of simple refineries could reduce the availability of fuel oil in the future. Consideration is being given to increasing the oil unloading capacity, transfer facilities and storage for heavy fuel oil at Thames-side stations to ensure that oil-burn is not hazarded in a future dispute when conditions may not be as favourable as last time.



However, the CEGB see no case for a major increase in storage capacity. It would not be practicable to build enough tanks to carry a stock suitable to provide a significant period of endurance. The need is rather for sufficient tankage to provide a buffer store to enable the smooth transfer of oil from tankers through to the burners at the station. The Board are reviewing their position and may wish to hire some limited further capacity on a long-term basis.

- (iii) Any further action to expand stocking capacity at power stations, particularly in areas where deliveries are least likely to be possible during a strike.

Final decisions in this area will obviously depend on decisions on the long-term level of coal stocks at power stations.

The Board's present stocking capacity is sufficient for a stock of up to 32 mt, which would provide some twelve months' endurance without any coal deliveries. The present restocking target is some 23 mt by the end of October 1985. The Board's present intention is broadly to build up stocks at individual stations to give the same degree of endurance across the country. However, the position is kept under constant review and the system is flexible enough to allow a differential build up in areas considered to be more vulnerable if this was judged to be necessary.

If a decision is taken to move to higher stock targets after October a judgement will need to be taken on the likelihood of disruption in different areas and therefore on the pattern of stocks. For example, the Aire Valley stations might carry proportionately higher stocks than those in the Midlands. However, it would be wrong to over-compensate and thus leave other potentially vulnerable stations short of stocks if the dispute did not take the form initially expected. The main lesson to be learnt from the last dispute was that each situation needs to be dealt with in the light of the circumstances at the time: the key is to ensure a suitable general level of stocks and to take rapid action to conserve coal stocks at stations which are not receiving any supplies.

- (iv) The case for establishing the normality of carrying coal and lighting-up oil by road in certain circumstances, particularly in connection with the forthcoming quinquennial review of the BR-CEGB contract.

The CEGB have a 15-year agreement with BR running from 1 January 1976 covering the transport of coal to power stations. Under this the CEGB, except for emergencies and with limited exclusions, undertook to "forgo the use of road transport for coal supplies from rail-connected sources to rail-connected power stations".

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Under the terms of the agreement its operation is due to be reviewed in January 1986. As the CEGB were severely disadvantaged by BR's inability to move coal (and oil) during the miners' strike they will wish to obtain greater flexibility in the future.

The Board believes that it is essential that some road borne deliveries should be maintained in the future in order to establish them as "normal working". To this end they have been reviewing the legal position with regard to the statutory consents and planning permission for their stations and, in particular, any understandings reached with local authorities during the planning process. In the light of this, they will seek British Rail's agreement to change the present exclusive arrangement wherever possible. Their concern is that British Rail, while being prepared to lower their rates to a more commercial level, will not wish to move away from the exclusive transport of coal by rail. Legally, the agreement cannot be amended without the agreement of both parties.

The agreement is, of course, a commercial arrangement freely entered into by both parties. While it must be right to leave the two Boards to see if an acceptable revised agreement can be negotiated, it may be necessary for the Government to consider putting pressure on BR to accept the CEGB's proposals if this does not turn out to be the case, given the importance that the Board attaches to this point in terms of power station endurance.

The situation is less complex when considering the delivery of lighting-up oil to coal-fired power stations. In the past, deliveries, mainly from the major oil companies, were made by rail. However, during the strike industrial action by British Rail employees meant that no lighting-up oil was delivered by rail. The Board intend to give a part of the business in future to the smaller independent companies, which supplied significant quantities by road in a very flexible manner during the strike. They will deliver by road or by barge to the four stations where this is practicable. This should establish road and barge deliveries as a "normal working practice". The remainder will continue to be supplied by the major companies by rail. Thus, wherever practicable, each coal fired station will in future receive oil regularly from one large and one small oil supplier and by more than one mode of transport.

(v) Any further action to improve road access to power stations.

In general all the essential work was undertaken in the course of the strike, but further work to improve the security of access by road, eg by providing two different road access points if possible, is being undertaken during this summer. The one problem area is at Aberthaw in South Wales where road access to the station passes round a bend in a cutting under a railway bridge, thus forming a natural place for an ambush. The CEGB is considering the possibilities for improving access to road borne deliveries of coal to Aberthaw in future. It is the Board's intention to build a coal blending plant, manned by CEGB staff, on a site adjacent to the station. The access arrangements to this plant are



now being reconsidered to ensure that both road and rail borne supplies can be safely received in future. The coal would then be trans-shipped into the station by conveyor. However, it would take about three years before such a plant could be operational.

- (vi) The impact of current commercial arrangements between the NCB and the CEGB on the prospects for increased coal imports.

The present Joint Understanding between the NCB and the CEGB, which runs until November 1987, commits the CEGB to take 95% of its coal needs from the NCB. This sets a limit on the CEGB's freedom to import, although there are no restrictions on the CEGB's present restocking programme, which includes significant imports from the Rotterdam stockpile during the course of this financial year. However, once the restocking programme is complete the CEGB's annual coal needs will drop back to some 75 - 80 mt or so. Under the Joint Understanding some 71 - 7.6 mt would be provided by the NCB, leaving only 4 mt to cover purchases from non-vested sources and imports. On the assumption that the CEGB will wish to maintain a reasonable flow of non-vested supplies of between 2 and 3 mt this implies that the maximum scope for imports lies between 1 and 2 mt a year. The CEGB are under no formal Ministerial restriction on their freedom to import, but before the strike they had informed the Department that their intention was to limit imports to 1 mt a year +10% in line with the Joint Understand/. The CEGB will wish to review their commercial position with respect to NCB supplies and imports when the restocking programme is completed and the future structure of the coal industry and the likely longer-term cost differential between indigenous and imported coal is clearer.

Longer Term

- (i) The possible case for expanding the capacity of the Cross Channel Link with France currently under construction.

The first 1000 MW stage of the link is due to be commissioned by the end of October 1985, with the second stage following a year later. The link will have cost over £600 million, with the CEGB meeting about half of this, and have taken some 8 years to complete. We have reviewed with the CEGB the possible case for a further link, but the Board believe that it would be prudent to wait until some years' experience has been gained in the operation of the present link before consideration is given to planning a further link. There are also innovations in the design of the link that need to be proved in practice. This is also the strong view of EdF who have made it clear that they would not wish to consider the possibility of a further link until 1988 or 1989 at the earliest. This would imply that any new link would be unlikely to be commissioned until about 1996.

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Any second link is likely to be more expensive than the first as the most advantageous route for the crossing has already been used. The grid between the Kent coast and the Thames Estuary would also need to be reinforced at a cost to the CEGB of an additional £100 to 150 million. It is likely that some reinforcement of the French system would also be necessary adding to EdF's costs. It is unclear whether or not EdF would be prepared to consider a further link on the basis of two-way trading as their interest would be rather in the continuous export of power to the UK. Nevertheless, even if a crash programme was to be mounted and EdF could be persuaded to meet its share of the costs of a future link

it would still be 1993 at the earliest before this could be commissioned. In the circumstances we do not feel that this is an option to consider for the moment, although the situation should be reviewed in 2 or 3 years time.

- (ii) A longer-term review of the scope for further diversification in the means for generating electricity, by provision of additional nuclear capacity and in other ways.

The Department and the CEGB keep under constant review the strategic options for the generation system for the future. As well as considering existing technologies this also covers the possible role of alternative sources, eg wind power and tidal barrages etc, although these are not expected to be able to make a major contribution to the Board's ability to diversify away from coal. It is clear that the most sensible and economic way to lessen the present dependence on coal lies in a substantial nuclear programme. However, no decisions can be taken on the longer term until after a decision has been reached on the report of the Sizewell Inquiry and the position will need to be reviewed at this time.

