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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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National Security Council Meeting
October 3, 1986, 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon, Cabinet Room

SUBJECT: South Asia and the Weinberger Visit

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

The Vice President

The Vice President's Office
Donald Gregg

State:
Deputy Secretary John Whitehead
Michael Armacost

Treasury:
Secretary James Baker

DEFENSE:
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
William H. Taft, IV

Justice:
Attorney General Edwin Meese

CIA:
Director William Casey

OMB:
Director James Miller

USUN:
Amb. Vernon Walters

JCS:
Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.
Lt. General John H. Moellering

USIA:
Marvin Stone

ACDA:
Director Ken Adelman

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

White House:
Donald Regan
John M. Poindexter
David Chew

NSC:
Rodney B. McDaniel
Shirin Tahir-Kheli
James Kelly

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M06-043 *2990

BY KML NARA DATE 10/13/10

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Minutes

Admiral Poindexter began the meeting by pointing out the importance of the Weinberger trip to South Asia. He added that the focus this NSC meeting was on where we are in terms of our relations with India and Pakistan and the U.S. effort to promote peace in South Asia. Success of the policy would help change the strategic balance in the region and required careful nurturing by the U.S. The Admiral pointed out the importance of the nuclear issue to the relationships. He added that the U.S. was uniquely placed to play a role. India needed us for technology and to place limits on the U.S. security assistance for Pakistan. Junejo needed us for both military and economic assistance. (S)

In recent months there had been a slowdown in improved Indo-Pak relations for several reasons. The U.S. now needed to push the agenda for peace which requires: (a) U.S.' help in convincing Gandhi to stay the course; (b) letting Gandhi know the U.S. is not shifting the onus of Pakistan's nuclear program to India; (c) convincing Junejo that peace with India is in Pakistan's interest, even if the progress is slow. In the next 12 months, the Admiral added that the U.S. must be extremely careful not to go for AWACS to Pakistan or the M-1 tanks, or aerial tankers because all of these were dual-use items. In closing the Admiral said that the Weinberger visit can enhance the U.S. relationship with South Asia and that the Secretary can offer some ideas on confidence-building measures to Gandhi. (S)

Director Casey was then asked to give his assessment on Afghanistan and the Pakistan nuclear program. Casey said that the war in Afghanistan was going well. Fighting had been heavy in cities and countryside. The Mujahadin were attacking the Soviets within the Soviet parameter. The air war had escalated and the Stingers had given the Resistance a capability against Soviet aircraft. The Chinese had also played a key role in Afghanistan by supplying arms and pack animals. Mr. Casey briefly reviewed the down-turn in Indo-Pak relations and said that both countries were on the nuclear weapons threshold. Pakistan has a workable nuclear weapon design and is more than 10 years away from providing a delivery system but did have U.S.-supplied F-16s.

However, Gandhi was very concerned with Pakistan's progress in its nuclear weapons program. (TS)

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Deputy Secretary Whitehead then talked of ways in which the Weinberger trip could contribute to our foreign policy goal of reduction of Soviet expansion in South Asia. He pointed out the recent down-turn in Indo-Pak relations and stated that it was in the U.S. interest to help resolve mutual suspicion and resulting tension. (S)

Secretary Weinberger said he looked forward to his trip to China and South Asia. There were a number of issues to discuss in each capital. In China he hoped that his visit would help strengthen defense relations. In India, the first ever by a U.S. Secretary of Defense, he would try to wean the GOI away from reliance on Soviet military equipment. Mr. Weinberger noted that the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister will be in Delhi just prior to his visit, and that the GOI could use the U.S. to get more from the Soviets. However, the visit offered a major opportunity to signal U.S. cooperation and willingness to help provide adequate safeguards. In Pakistan the AWACS issue would surface but one way to deal with the problem would be to offer the lesser E2C. Secretary Weinberger said that he will keep India's worries and sensitivities in mind when he goes to Pakistan. (S)

Attorney General Meese stated that the U.S. was working toward developing regional anti-narcotics program based in Thailand which could help train Indian and Pakistani officials who deal with this problem. (S)

ACDA Director Adelman stated that the USG had made 25 demarches to Zia, since President Reagan came to office, on Pakistan's nuclear program. The need for annual Presidential certification on Pakistan gets more and more difficult and Congress will not put up with this trend forever. By and large, the Administration's nuclear non-proliferation policy was successful; one exception was Pakistan. We now needed to go beyond letters to Zia, who had lied to us, and look at the possibility of holding back on the delivery of pending military systems in the pipeline to Pakistan. (S)

Admiral Poindexter responded that Junejo had told the President in July that he was not yet familiar with the Pakistan nuclear program, but would look into the same upon his return. He added that Secretary Weinberger could help by following up on the nuclear issue with Zia and Junejo. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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February 18, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: SHIRIN TAHIR-KHELI *STK*

SUBJECT: Minutes of the NSC Meeting held on
October 3, 1986, 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon
Cabinet Room
South Asia and the Weinberger Trip

Attached for your approval at TAB A are the minutes of the NSC Meeting held on October 3, 1986 in the Cabinet Room.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review and approve the attached October 3, 1986 NSC Meeting minutes for record purposes.

Approve *SK*

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

TAB A NSC Meeting Minutes of October 3, 1986

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
(With TOP SECRET attachment)

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *CS* NARA, Date *1/21/05*

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