

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
WITH GRIP ATTACHMENT~~

MEETING OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP
February 10, 1987

SUBJECT: Arms Control & SDI

MINUTES

ATTENDEES:

The President	Mr Robert Gates
The Vice President	Mr James Miller
Mr. Craig Fuller	Mr Kenneth Adelman
Secretary Shultz	Mr Donald T. Regan
Ambassador Nitze	Mr Will Ball
Ambassador Rowny	Mr Frank C. Carlucci
Secretary Weinberger	Gen Colin Powell
Admiral Crowe	Col Robert Linhard

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS:

- Tab A -- Meeting Attendance List ~~(S)~~
- Tab B -- Meeting Agenda and Meeting Memorandum ~~(S)~~
- Tab C -- Mr. Carlucci's Prepared Talking Points ~~(S)~~
- Tab D -- Descriptions of Criteria/Options Distributed at NSPG ~~(S)~~
- Tab E -- ACSI Paper Serving as Basis for Discussion ~~(S/GRIP)~~

The meeting opened at 11:00 am in the Situation Room. Mr. CARLUCCI stressed the importance of security following these meetings. He noted that notes were taken by the NSC staff, in this case by Bob Linhard, and that meeting participants could come and review the notes as needed after the meeting. However, he asked that all notes taken by others at the meeting be left in the Situation Room.

Mr. CARLUCCI then began the agenda (Tab B) and framed the first issue for discussion using the talking points attached at Tab C.

After this introduction, the following discussion ensued. (N.B. These notes reflect the thrust of the remarks made. And while the notetaker did try to capture the speakers words as closely as possible, these should not be considered verbatim notes.)

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
WITH GRIP ATTACHMENT~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~HANDLE TAB E IN GRIP CHANNELS.~~

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
NLS M05-016#19277
BY WOT, NARA, DATE 12/21/05

CARLUCCI: George (Shultz), I understand that you support Option C (see Tab D E). Would you like to say something in its favor?

SHULTZ: I think that we should not decide on Option C now. I would prefer we not discuss it in such an open meeting. It will leak, and we will lose it. I suggest that we use this option in some other mode, and that we not pursue it further in such a leaky meeting.

We are in a good position. Max is authorized to listen and probe. If pressed, he can simply repeat our position. I think that we should simply stay in this mode for now.

WEINBERGER: I think that Option C is a bad approach. The paper prepared (Tab E) suggests good criteria.

SHULTZ: [Interrupting] Don't make me respond about Option C. We may need to be creative at some point soon, but not now.

WEINBERGER: It is important that we don't negotiate what is permitted and prohibited under the ABM Treaty. And, we certainly should not suggest we are willing to conduct such negotiations in advance of having an end-game in sight.

SHULTZ: I am not sure that we should discuss Option C now in this forum. Should we do so?

WEINBERGER: Whether now or later, it will have to be discussed.

The Soviets want to kill the SDI program. Option B offers the only option protecting what we want.

CARLUCCI: [Mildly interrupting] George, if you don't want to talk about Option C now, when would it be appropriate?

ADELMAN: [Joining in the interruption] I agree. We should talk about it now.

WEINBERGER: [Continuing on his points] We agreed to reduce forces by 50%. Option B has this as an end by 1991. We would then be free to deploy, not negotiate.

We need to discuss the concept behind Option C because it will be discussed in Geneva.

The current structure of the SDI program is hurting us already. Delta 181 was designed originally to be an intercept. It is now redesigned to miss.

We need to decide on what we are going to do about the legally correct interpretation (LCI) of the ABM Treaty.

I agree that we have to consult with Congress and our Allies. But we don't need to get into haggling with the Soviets over how many watts will be permitted for a laser and the like.

If we can keep them convinced that we will hold on to SDI, we will get them to agree to offensive force reductions.

~~THE~~ PRESIDENT: To ensure that the Soviets understood that we were not interested in a 1st strike capability, I put on the table at Reykjavik the idea of making an agreement in advance that we would share the benefits of SDI. I made the point that it had to be an agreement in advance, so that it was clear to all that they agreed we could go forward with our efforts.

Since then, I've had another thought. Now, the Soviets want an agreement, but are determined to force us to give up SDI. How about looking at going forward with deployment, but of an international SDI, and international defense against any ballistic missile.

~~CARLUCCI~~: Mr. President, we are already staffing that general idea in the Arms Control Support Group (ACSG). [FYI: Actually, the work is being done under a special, compartmented study entitled THRESHER RAIN.]

~~THE~~ PRESIDENT: This approach would take SDI out of the bargain. This done, I can see no reason why we could not move forward with reductions.

~~ADELMAN~~: We should not have this associated with the UN. If placed there, it would be a real loser.

We can't forget that nuclear weapons are needed to deter war in Central Europe. We will not be able to roll that back [change the conditions so this is not the case] in our lifetime. We should not associate this idea with the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

~~THE~~ PRESIDENT: [Delivered a series of remarks on why MAD was an unacceptable basis for the future.]

A major part of the way we deter requires rethinking and the associated arms control environments, renegotiation. The Soviets don't want an all out arms race with both the US and NATO.

~~ADELMAN~~: However, Europeans still need nuclear weapons.

~~CARLUCCI~~: George (Shultz), what do you think about the idea of a broad international defense?

28

SHULTZ: The idea needs to be made more concrete before it can be fully evaluated. It must have sufficient detail to be as realistic as cuts in START and INF. This will need some definition.

I do think that the "non-deployment" period is the key; but delinked from the "0 ballistic missile" idea.

I don't think that this is the moment to spring a new concept on the Soviets, but we need to be ready to deal.

WEINBERGER: If we did need to trade some defense for offensive reductions, we should remember that we offered them 10 years of non-deployment, plus sharing, and were scorned.

We don't have to make such a trade! We should show them that it is in their interest, too, to seek offensive force reductions. If we bargain about how much SDI we will give up, we simply set ourselves up for a fall.

Once we signal that our approach involves such a trade, we have a real problem.

SHULTZ: You already offered 7 years of non-deployment [referring to the 25 July 1986 letter to Mr. Gorbachev].

WEINBERGER: That offer entailed no real cost to the SDI program.

THE PRESIDENT: I want to return to the idea that I just suggested.

From the very first, we made it clear that we were prepared for and argued that we should share the benefits of the SDI program for the benefit of all. Our public diplomacy themes have stressed that:

- we want to deploy SDI and render ballistic missiles obsolete, effectively eliminating them;
- we don't intend to simply deploy more defense over our offensive capability; and
- we have offered to share the benefits.

The idea I have fits perfectly with these themes. We can make it clear that we intend to go forward, with no restraints, based upon an agreement in advance that we will seek a system that is designed to hit any missile. An international group can be established to monitor what we are doing.

With such an agreement on defense, then we can press forward with offensive reductions.

WEINBERGER: This would certainly put us in a high moral position. And, if the USSR does not agree, we could still go ahead. We would not wait to obtain Soviet agreement, would we?

THE PRESIDENT: Hell no! We would press forward.

WEINBERGER: I agree with Ken (Adelman). I think that the Europeans would not be happy about this.

NITZE: The Soviets would clearly try to gain control of the international group by loading it with those whom they can influence.

THE PRESIDENT: But it would take the SDI program out of the picture [i.e., remove it from controversy and delink it from offensive force reductions].

ADELMAN: We would still have the threat of suitcase bombs.

CARLUCCI: We will have this staffed thoroughly. As we do, we will add options as appropriate.

WEINBERGER: If someone still feels we need an option now, Option B is available. Don't offer anything beyond 1991. In fact, I'd rather not offer anything so we can avoid giving any false impression that we are ready to trade.

CARLUCCI: We also need to consider some other actions. We need to:

1. start consultations immediately with Congress and Allies;
2. continue our legal research, which could take an additional 3 months;

VICE PRESIDENT: [Interrupting] On SDI?

CARLUCCI: Yes, on the legal aspects of ratification [whether the testimony to Congress in 1972 gave Congress the impression that they were ratifying the more restrictive interpretation of the treaty and whether this binds current action] and on case law [the issue of subsequent practice].

SHULTZ: [Interrupting] Yes, we need to do the consultations and the work; but you [Mr. President] need to be in a position of saying that you haven't made any decision. If you are not in that mode, that it really isn't consultation.

We need time to go through the appropriate records. Its hard to determine how much time we will need to do this right. We can go through the legal homework in 3 months, but I have no idea how long it will take to lay the necessary foundation with Congress.

Nunn is already personally going through the negotiating record.

WEINBERGER: Nunn is already acting like a Presidential candidate.

If we delay for 3, 6 or 12 months, we will be blocking experiments that we need and increasing the hopes of those who want to block us permanently.

We need to be in the posture of taking steps to support the LCI, not arguing about its validity. Let's not take actions that aid others to tie our own hands.

CARLUCCI: Cap (Weinberger), could DoD submit to the President a report on how, specifically, the SDI program would be restructured if authorized; including what changes to testing and why?

WEINBERGER: We would be glad to.

CARLUCCI: Mr. President, once again, we have a number of actions that we should agree to pursue. These include:

1. completing the legal research;
2. completing the DoD report on restructuring the SDI program;
3. beginning consultations with Congress and Allies; and
4. continuing our work on modifying our arms control positions.

Can we all agree on these are tasks to be accomplished.

[There appeared to be no objection.]

SHULTZ: Cap (Weinberger), you need to be sure that any money you plan to use in a restructured SDI program which goes beyond the restrictive interpretation is permitted by law. [FYI: Secretary Shultz is referring to concerns that the language of the Defense Appropriations Acts for existing funds do place such restrictions.]

CROWE: We need to be sure that we understand the terms of any consultation. We can do some additional staffing involved with programmatic detail to buy some additional time. At the same time, the quicker we are free to move the program freely the better.

WEINBERGER: We can treat the restructuring the SDI as the basic proposal for consultation. The idea of sharing has always scared the pants off some.

SHULTZ: We need to remember to stress that we are offering to share the benefits of SDI, not the technology. The whole idea of going to "0 ballistic missiles" was that this was a clear way for all the world to share the benefits achieved by the SDI program.

ADELMAN: Frank (Carlucci), on your 4th point, the present situation is the best for now.

Option C would have been a good option in 1981. Now it is a swamp. It is unverifiable. On top of all else, it is not clear the Soviets themselves would be interested in this.

SHULTZ: Mr. President, I would strongly advise you not to go into Option C in a public meeting.

ADELMAN: The President asked my views on the options, and I am providing them.

Option B sets the date for the end of the non-deployment commitment period at 1991. This walks us back from Reykjavik.

I am not opposed in principle to negotiating what is permitted and prohibited during some non-deployment period, as long as there is a clear green light to deploy at the end of the period.

WEINBERGER: With respect to Option B, I see no inconsistency or problem with the Reykjavik proposal. The Soviets didn't accept it when offered, so we can withdraw it. The situation has changed. We have had much more technical progress since then.

With respect to Option C, I think that we need to discuss this now!

SHULTZ: We can't discuss Option C now. The technical work needed to do so is not done. I don't think that we should task this work to be done either since the work will leak. Therefore, I don't want to talk about this now.

ROWNY: The most important aspect of the consultations is the way they are done. We need not give the impression that our options and thinking is open-ended. We need to assert that the LCI is correct.

BALL: We can't let Nunn manage us. We have maintained support for SDI, but we are working on some very thin margins. Reykjavik let us resolve 5 major issues associated with last year's budget in a favorable way. We will not have that type of device available this year.

We will need allies on the bill. SDI funding will be a fight no matter what we do, but we also must consider that we will also need help on other key issues. We must consider the overall impact of the SDI funding fight.

THE PRESIDENT: If we were to approach the SDI program along the lines that I have suggested in this meeting [FYI: his view of an advance agreement on international sharing], then I would love to see Congress try to cut the funds for SDI.

SHULTZ: Yes, we need to build support to SDI into the very core of an arms control agreement that people want. It must become the insurance policy we need, and in turn, the agreement itself will insure SDI.

THE PRESIDENT: [The President then discussed some recent reading about Chernobyl].

CROWE: Mr. President, your idea about international sharing would require a new order of negotiation and a whole new set of specifics.

ROWNY: Mr. President, you must take steps to ensure that such a proposal is not viewed as being too far afield from the current negotiations, a diversion.

CARLUCCI: Mr. President, our time is up. I believe that we have reached agreement on the following points:

1. We should complete the legal research as quickly as possible.
2. DoD will provide a detailed report on the specific steps we would take if the President were to authorize the restructuring of the SDI program.
3. We will begin consultations with Congress and Allies as soon as possible, and as soon as terms of those consultations can be developed and approved by the President.
4. We will staff out the President's new concept for a "compartmented" or closely-held priority study.
5. All will provide the President their views on the Options discussed today.

George (Shultz), you need to find an appropriate way to discuss your views on Option C so that the President can reach a view or decision on that option as well as the others.

[The meeting ended at 12:04 pm.]

~~TOP SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90153

25

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
WITH GRIP ATTACHMENT~~

ACTION

February 18, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR GRANT S. GREEN

FROM: BOB LINHART *BL*

SUBJECT: Minutes of NSPG: February 10, 1987

Attached (next under) are the minutes of the NSPG held on February 10, 1987. In addition to the basic minutes, I have tried to attach the relevant associated documents to make a complete package for the record on this meeting.

Given the sensitivity of the product, I have taken the liberty of putting the minutes on numbered paper. I would hold copies of this set of minutes to an absolute minimum and ensure that the GRIP material at Tab E is provided appropriate protection.

I don't think that FCC needs to review these prior to their being placed in the record.

With attachments removed, this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED.

Recommendation

That you accept these minutes for the record.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments:

- 2/10/87 NSPG Minutes
- Tab A -- Attendance List (C)
- Tab B -- Meeting Agenda & Meeting Memorandum (S)
- Tab C -- Mr. Carlucci's Prepared Talking Points (S)
- Tab D -- Materials Distributed at the NSPG (S)
- Tab E -- ACSG Paper Which Served as Basis of Discussion (S/GRIP)

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
WITH GRIP ATTACHMENT~~
Declassify on: OADR

HANDLE TAB E IN GRIP CHANNELS.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987
By CAJ NARA Date 9/16/02