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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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WITH GRIP ATTACHMENT

MEETING OF THE  
NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

April 7, 1987

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Trip to Moscow

MINUTES

ATTENDEES:

- |                          |                        |
|--------------------------|------------------------|
| The President            | Mr. Robert Gates       |
| The Vice President       | Mr. Douglas George     |
| Mr. Craig Fuller         | Attorney General Meese |
| Secretary Shultz         | Secretary Baker        |
| Ambassador Ridgeway      | Mr. William Martin     |
| Ambassador Nitze         | Mr. James Miller       |
| Ambassador Rowny         | Dr. William Graham     |
| Ambassador Lehman        | Mr. Kenneth Duberstein |
| Secretary Weinberger     | Senator Howard Baker   |
| Dr. Fred Ikle            | Mr. Carlucci           |
| Admiral Crowe            | Colonel Robert Linhard |
| General Moellering       | Dr. Fritz Ermarth      |
| Director Kenneth Adelman |                        |

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS:

- Tab A - Meeting Attendance List
- Tab B - Meeting Agenda and Meeting Memo
- Tab C - President's Opening Remarks
- Tab D - Mr. Carlucci's Arms Control Talking Points
- Tab E - Decision Memo on Nuclear Testing
- Tab F - Mr. Carlucci's Non-Arms Control Talking Points
- Tab G - Preparatory Materials

The meeting opened at 11:00 a.m. in the Situation Room, with the President reading from his Talking Points (see Tab C).

SHULTZ: The pattern of Soviet behavior is similar to pre-Reykjavik period:

- They are laying back, but filling the air with hints about progress in arms control.

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We need to consider what we want from this meeting. The Soviets have signaled that they are ready to delink the INF negotiations. We need to see if they are serious. We have had a lot of activity on bilateral issues since Reykjavik. The Soviets have fulfilled their Reykjavik commitments in the bilateral area. The commitments were made in the all night session on non-arms control chaired by Roz Ridgeway and includes things like a bilateral commission, which has been functioning

Also, on regional issues, a lot has been done. We believe we should hit both issues heavily. In the regional area, we will hit them hard on Afghanistan. To solve this problem, they need to get out of Afghanistan.

It may be that I can do something on South Africa. I met with Savimbi when I was in Africa. This has never been made public and has not leaked. Now it is likely to be in the paper tomorrow. My intention is to probe on this, especially on Angola.

On human rights, we will have to give credit where credit is due; but the glass in this area is still only seven-eighth full.

The subject of arms control will also play an important part in this meeting. As before, an INF agreement seems near; but our priority should be in the START area. There are a great many arms control issues, but I will leave that for later discussion. We will go to Moscow ready to discuss all subjects in a sober minded manner. I feel under no pressure to come home with any agreements. As with our dealings with the Soviet Union in the past, the atmosphere can turn up or down on a very short-moment's notice because of what they do. At any point, the snapshot of the situation may be bad, but the overall trend is good. We have had events in the past (i.e., KAL 007, etc.), and now we have the Embassy problem. It does make it difficult to talk to them. Carter said after the Afghanistan affair that he was surprised and learned a lot. We were not surprised by the fact they set up such a hostile environment in Moscow. I will make the Embassy situation the first issue we discuss.

[The President intervenes.]

THE PRESIDENT: At Reykjavik and Geneva, I told Gorbachev that we would never take bows for causing them to improve their human rights. George, you ought to remind them of this.

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SHULTZ: When we negotiated about Danilov, Shevardnadze pledged to do a number of other things. About two-thirds of our list has been acted on. I intend to tell Shevardnadze that we are glad to see what has been done, but we still need more.

CARLUCCI: Well, we have a very short amount time; we're going to run over time; let's turn to the arms control area. (Mr. Carlucci read his Talking Points until he got to Nuclear Testing -- see Tab D. At that point, he noted that the President had a decision package on this, but likely had not read it as yet.

[The President then interrupted.]

THE PRESIDENT: I have the read the package; let me read to you my conclusions. (He then read the recommendation highlighted at Tab E.)

CARLUCCI: That is fine; we will incorporate into Shultz's instructions, and continued on the START area. (Read the Talking Points on START -- see Tab D.)

CROWE: The JCS prefer a time period (i.e., seven years) rather than a fixed date for accomplishing the reductions. We prefer seven years versus five years as the time period. And by not having a fixed date, we avoid the Congress targeting that date and using it to cut our programs.

WEINBERGER: We need more resources to safely make reductions we are committed to. We need time to produce and get delivery of the systems that we need. For example, if we require the B-1, we need to reopen the production line. We strongly recommend a longer time to avoid any degradation in military sufficiency.

SHULTZ: We proposed reductions in 1982; this is not a new idea. It has been five since we made the initial proposal for 50% reductions. We proposed five-year reduction period for 50% in Reykjavik; the public sees our offer as five-year 50% offer. Five years puts a burden on the Soviets also; we shouldn't forget that. The United States should be seen as standing for quick reductions. To accommodate the JCS, I have suggested a change. In Reykjavik, we said 50% reduction in five years through 1991. The recommendation that I make is to keep the five-year commitment, but make it five years from the point when the treaty is entered into force. This, in fact, moves us to



seven-year commitment. It's important that we keep perceptions of our position as consistent. Military sufficiency is important, but it important that we keep our perceptions of our position consistent.

WEINBERGER: Military sufficiency is more important than imagery; the Soviets have an easier time of adapting than we do.

PRESIDENT: Are we basing military sufficiency on idea that reductions in nuclear forces will put more of a strain on us than in the conventional area?

WEINBERGER: Yes, we need to adjust our nuclear forces to make sure that we fill in the gaps, and that the asymmetries that remain are properly handled.

CROWE: The main reason that we require this additional time is that there are different targeting requirements (for the US and USSR). We need to make sure that we can cover their target bases with a 50% cut. We should be able to adjust to this, but we need time. For the Soviets, a 50% cut cuts into their reserves, not into their primary targeting assets.

SHULTZ: When you do your military sufficiency calculations, do you factor in China, Japan, and the like as Soviet targets?

CROWE: No, not now -- but we are trying to factor this into our future work. It would certainly enlarge their (the Soviets') targeting requirements.

CARLUCCI: Let's move on to Defense and Space, because the intent is not decide an issue but make sure the considerations are on the President's mind. The main issue was whether we should commit not to withdraw or not to deploy something. Secretary Weinberger, you favor nondeployment through 1994. Would you like to open up?

WEINBERGER: No. I favor deployment as early as we can. But due to the political realities in the situation, given the choices we have, I would favor as short and less restrictive constraints on us as we possibly can get. A commitment not to deploy "operational systems" or systems "not permitted" by the ABM Treaty is okay provided that we have the broad interpretation of the Treaty. A commitment not to withdraw gets us into compliance, and I certainly don't want to give up any of our sovereign rights. Our



objective should not be to preserve the ABM Treaty but to preserve our right to deploy. So we should offer the most limited restrictions that we can, and that would be a nondeployment commitment through 1994.

CARLUCCI: In both cases, either nondeployment or nonwithdraw, we are talking about some type of treaty that would novate the ABM Treaty.

WEINBERGER: That's absolutely essential.

SHULTZ: In conjunction with our five-year proposals, we would favor taking a similar position in the area of defense and space. We have talked in the past about nonwithdrawal. We've talked about nonwithdrawal for five years in the July, 1986, letter, and we talked about nonwithdrawal for 10 years in Reykjavik. A nonwithdrawal commitment does not inhibit our ability to withdraw for certain reasons. For example, for supreme national sovereignty, for supreme national need, or in the face of noncompliance. If we shift from nonwithdrawal to nondeployment, we are signaling that we may wish to withdraw from the Treaty. The JCS has often said that this is not in our interest; it is not in our interest to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. And it's certainly not in our interest to give Congress the impression that that we are prepared to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. In our idea, there would be a 10-year period composed of eight of nonwithdrawal, and two of negotiation of transition. We would commit not to deploy during these two years and use the time for negotiation and discussion of ideas like zero ballistic missiles, sharing, and internationalization of SDI. We could do testing during this period under any interpretation.

WEINBERGER: I really don't care what we said before concerning nonwithdrawal; that was rejected by the Soviets. What we need to do now is make the best case of what we need under the current conditions. Given the SDI rate of progress, I would argue nondeployment is more appropriate. In the final analysis, the question is do we want to deploy or not. If we want to deploy, as I believe we do, we should put the minimum number of hurdles in front of us. We need a very clear statement no matter what we do that at the end of the period, both sides are free to deploy. So, therefore, again I'd like a minimum number deployment offer -- the idea of first period of nonwithdrawal and then a period of discussion ties us down too much.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, in Reykjavik, the commitments made were associated with zero ballistic missiles and sharing.



SHULTZ: We have never offered to nondeploy. We've always offered nonwithdrawal, both in the letter and in Reykjavik.

THE PRESIDENT: I remember the JCS saying that if the Soviets are released from the ABM Treaty, it's worse for us. And I know they mean that we free them from the letter of the Treaty, because they are clearly doing things that are not consistent with the Treaty now. Freeing them from the letter of the Treaty could cause us risks.

CROWE: We certainly made that statement, and we certainly believe should keep the Soviets under the Treaty as long as we can, but the Chiefs support deployment of SDI as soon when it's ready. Mr. President, I would also like to tell you that we need a DSP follow-on. It is called the BSTS. It is now part of the SDI program, and it will function within that program, but we need for indications and warning now, even though it's associated with SDI. Therefore, we want the maximum protection we can. The Chiefs would support some type of commitment for nondeployment of operational systems not permitted by the ABM Treaty so that we would have some protection for our BSTS deployment.

SHULTZ: A nonwithdrawal commitment avoids any problem with the language, it would certainly not signal any problem in that area.

WEINBERGER: I'm worried about the imagery too. I don't like trying to explain to the public that we're committing to a nonwithdrawal except for conditions A, B, and C. I think that's bad.

SHULTZ: There are a lot of conditions I can think of for exceptions -- compliance, supreme national issues, and others.

CARLUCCI: We would certainly wish to accommodate Admiral Crowe and the concerns about sensors, no matter what we do.

SHULTZ: We have no disagreement on this point. That's important.

CARLUCCI: We have one other issue and that's the prohibition of space toward testing. (He read his Talking Points -- see Tab D.)



ADELMAN: We need to reassure the Soviets that we are not interested in hitting targets on earth; we could do so by simply committing to reassurances that we would not test things in space against the earth. Such a commitment would be harmless for us and help with public relations. Some argue that we may not want to do this because we may want to do something in this area in the future, but that's true of all arms control. If you keep all your options open, you'll never get any arms control. And, secondly, I'm not proposing anything in a Treaty form; rather unilateral guarantees or mutual guarantees that we could change later.

CROWE: I don't see where we are under any pressure at all to do this. And I'm reluctant for us to make offers in this area unless we absolutely have to. Many of the areas that we are seeing with respect to space are non-SDI related, and they are very promising; many are conventional. Therefore, I don't recommend that we do this. I don't think it's non-harmless.

WEINBERGER: I also don't see such a gain in doing such a thing, and I'm reluctant to put more hurdles in front of the SDI program.

CARLUCCI: Fine, let's end the arms control part of the discussion at this point; are there any comments?

ADELMAN: If we want 50% reductions, then we need to build up other categories of strategic weapons to maintain military sufficiency. We need to make this clear to everyone in this room and everyone who talks about it. Beyond that, if we need to build up our forces to get to the position where we can survive 50% cut, and if Congress cuts our funds/resources, we ought to make sure that everyone understands that we need the military capability provided by modernization; and it's denied, we may have to break out of any commitments made.

SHULTZ: The stuff that you need (addressing the Chiefs) are those modernization programs in the budget.

CROWE: The President's strategic modernization program permits many of the problems to go away. For example, if we could wait for the ATB to come on board, that would solve some of our problems. Our purpose is not to build weapons, but to keep the equitable risk on each side as we drop the number of weapons, through the modernization



of a number of systems. We need to maintain target base coverage. If both we and the Soviets go below 50% reductions, we may be able to share the hurt in some respects. And the seven-year period certainly lets us stretch out the needed modernization to make it more acceptable to Congress and doable.

WEINBERGER: We do know that many of the things are in budget, but we ought to remember that we don't often get everything that we ask for in the budget.

SHULTZ: Let's stop discussing this area before we decide that no arms control is possible.

MILLER: Many on the Hill think that reductions lead immediately to a dividend, a cut in defense spending. We need to make it clear that this idea is not true.

SHULTZ: I have been arguing often and loudly lately that a non-nuclear defense is more expensive. We must make it clear we are going to need more defense funds to go to less nuclear weapons.

THE PRESIDENT: I agree. If my veto challenge doesn't help us get more funds for DOD, I've got another idea -- let's pay the Congress in rubles.

CARLUCCI: Let's move on to the non-arms control area. (He used Fritz's Talking Points -- see Tab F.)

#### NON-ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

SHULTZ: I will hit the Soviets hard on Afghanistan, even though I see some positive signs on Angola. However, I am not sure about Nicaragua and Cambodia. The message on Nicaragua would be "keep your cotton picking hand off Central America." On human rights, we plan to go beyond our usual lines -- divided spouses, political prisoners, emigration, and fulfillment of Helsinki -- to press on religious prisoners, freedom of mails, international telecommunications, jamming, and other media issues. The Soviets have proposed a human rights conference in Moscow (agreed by all to be an oxymoron); we have been in consultation with our Allies on how to treat this and believe that stating some firm conditions, such as freedom for non-governmental groups to participate openly, would give us leverage.



I am struggling with the right way to phrase a strong protest regarding the Soviet invasion of our Embassy. I have considered a message to the Soviets that states: "You are creating an environment so hostile and difficult that perhaps we shall decide to limit our representation to an ambassador and few other people, limits that would also apply to the Soviets in the US." However, I found this unappealing, but, at the time, was angry and felt that something needed to be done.

THE PRESIDENT: This is an illustration of my argument that military competition springs from mistrust, not the other way around, and here we have a Soviet action calculated to generate mistrust.

SECRETARY BAKER: Is this not the perfect time to cancel the Soviets' claim on their new chancery building on Mount Alto?

WEINBERGER: Our stress must be on complete reciprocity in these matters. There is no security for official Americans in Moscow, and none can be provided by vans and trailers introduced in a hurry.

THE PRESIDENT: Can't advanced technologies nullify Soviet penetrations?

WEINBERGER: This is being explored.

SHULTZ: Efforts are being made to provide secure voice, messaging, and conferencing for my trip to Moscow. I have been told that I can be confident in the security being provided. In fact, if needed, a small plane will be available to fly messages to Helsinki for transmission. At any rate, not going to Moscow would be a political defeat.

WEINBERGER: I was merely calling for consideration of alternative sites, e.g., Geneva or Helsinki.

THE PRESIDENT: Again, I'm asking that we look to advanced technology to outfox the Soviets in this business.

SHULTZ: I agree, Mr. President. And in closing, I would like to note that, despite intermittent flaps over espionage and such matters, the President's agenda has dominated the US-Soviet relationship, and steady progress has been made since 1984 in pushing this agenda.



CARLUCCI: This is a good closing point, George. I agree. Mr. President, do you have any more comments?

THE PRESIDENT: No. I thank all of you for coming, and good luck in Moscow.



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ACTION

April 9, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR GRANT S. GREEN, JR.

FROM: BOB LINHARD/FRITZ ERMAERTH

SUBJECT: Minutes of NSPG -- April 7, 1987

Attached (Tab I) are the minutes of the NSPG held on April 7, 1987. In addition to the basic minutes, we have attached the relevant associated documents to make a complete package for the record on this meeting.

We do not think that Mr. Carlucci needs to review these prior to their being placed in the record.

RECOMMENDATION

That you accept these minutes for the record.

Approve     *6*     Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I April 7, 1987 NSPG Meeting
- A Meeting Attendance List
- B Meeting Agenda and Meeting Memo
- C President's Opening Remarks
- D Mr. Carlucci's Arms Control Talking Points
- E Decision Memo on Nuclear Testing
- F Mr. Carlucci's Non-Arms Control Talking Points
- G Preparatory Materials

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By     *ds*     NARA, Date     *6/5/04*    

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