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British Embassy  
Washington

20 January 1994

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BY IMMEDIATE FAX

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Dear Graham,

GERRY ADAMS

1. We have today telegraphed a summary of the latest state of play (telno not yet available) and the gist of conversations which I had this morning with State Department and NSC contacts. It may be worth reporting some of Jane Holl's remarks in slightly greater detail.
2. Holl's thesis was that the US response to Adams had to take account of the dynamics of the peace process. In the NSC analysis, there was a danger that the initiative of the two Prime Ministers might lose momentum. If the Administration stuck rigidly to the position that Adams was a member of a terrorist organisation and therefore disqualified from entering the US, it would be doing nothing to increase the chances of Sinn Fein/PIRA accepting the Joint Declaration. It might even encourage its rejection.
3. Meanwhile, it was worrying that London and Dublin appeared to be handling Sinn Fein differently. This would only make it easier for Adams and his colleagues to duck and weave. Dr Holl said that she and others in the NSC had been wondering whether it would help if HMG looked again at its ban on direct broadcasts by Sinn Fein. Bringing UK legislation into line with that of the Irish Republic would both demonstrate unity of purpose and put additional political pressure on Adams to respond positively to the Joint Declaration. Although the Declaration provided a framework for negotiating a political settlement, it contained little on the  
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substance of that settlement. This made it difficult for Adams to sell as an achievement. Lifting the broadcasting ban might provide the incentive he needed - and would keep the British Government on the front foot. The lifting could be termed a suspension. HMG could make clear that the ban would be re-imposed if Sinn Fein continued to decline to endorse the Joint Declaration.

4. I took Dr Holl through the obvious difficulties, reminding her of the need to keep moderate Unionists in play, and Adams' feet to the fire. She understands the arguments - and that her assessment of the character of Adams may be wrong. Her response is simply that there are times when it is right to take a risk.

5. Until recently, as an Army Major on secondment, Jane Holl had accepted our arguments more or less without question. It is partly because of the apparent shift in the thinking of this traditional ally, whose advice is likely to affect the Administration's eventual decision on Adams, that I thought it worth supplementing our telegram with this letter.

*Yours ever,*

*Peter.*

Peter Westmacott

cc: J Margetts Esq, NIO(I)  
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FROM PETER WESTMACOTT

TO R.M.J. Lyne, No 10 Press Office

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SIGNED Inapth

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