

Faxed 22/1/94



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 January 1994

USA/GERRY ADAMS

I spoke to you and to Robin Renwick in Washington this evening about the terms of a reply to the message I had this afternoon from Tony Lake.

I am sending with this fax a draft message to Lake which I would like to dispatch this evening. I would be grateful if you could pass your comments or amendments to the Duty Clerk at No 10 as soon as possible.

I am sending a copy of this fax to Robin Renwick, in case he too wishes to comment.

It would be very helpful to have your reply by 2200 hours or sooner.

RODERIC LYNE

Jonathan Stephens Esq
Northern Ireland Office

**DRAFT MESSAGE TO MR ANTHONY LAKE, NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER, WHITE HOUSE, FROM RODERIC LYNE, 10 DOWNING
STREET**

Dear Tony,

Many thanks for taking the trouble to call this afternoon. It is most helpful for us to keep in close touch over the best way of encouraging Sinn Fein to accept the Joint Declaration.

Since we spoke, I have done some further head scratching. I think that the formula you might use with Adams could be very simple. You could say that the US Government would be prepared to grant him a visa "as soon as Sinn Fein and the Provisional movement declare a permanent end to violence and commit themselves to take the exclusively peaceful and democratic path which the Joint Declaration provides".

As you know, our preference would be to have the Provisionals demonstrate over a three month period that they have unequivocally given up terrorism before normal dealings with them begin. However, I accept your point that this three month period is more of a matter for the British Government than for the United States. I agree that it would be a constructive and encouraging move to tell Adams that he could enter the United States as soon as he and his colleagues had ended violence for good, and without any period of delay.

As I explained, two things would undermine, and possibly destroy the Joint Declaration. The first would be if the United States Government - unlike the British and Irish Governments - used words to imply that the IRA could renegotiate the terms of the Joint Declaration. The second would be if Adams was able to enter the United States while IRA terrorism continued, simply on the basis of some personal statement that he would like all parties to renounce violence, preferred peace etc.

A formula on those lines would be more damaging than no formula at all. It would suggest that the US Government was more sympathetic to Sinn Fein's requests for renegotiation than to the insistence of the British and Irish Governments (supported by people like John Hume and Cardinal Daly) that the Joint Declaration is a fair and balanced document as it stands, and leaves no excuse for further violence.

I hope that my suggestion may help to point the way to the constructive package we are both looking for; but I am at your disposal at any time if you would like a further view from us.

Yours ever

RODERIC

**PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
VIA CABINET OFFICE COMCEN**

**MESSAGE FOR THE IMMEDIATE ATTENTION OF MR ANTHONY
LAKE, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, WHITE HOUSE, FROM
RODERIC LYNE, 10 DOWNING STREET**

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