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h.c.a.
Faxed to
Sir Robin Lovick
23.1.94

From the Private Secretary

23 January 1994

USA\GERRY ADAMS

I should record the exchanges with Tony Lake at the White House over the weekend which I have discussed with you.

Lake telephoned late on Saturday 22 January. He wanted to consult us on the terms for a conditional offer of a visa to Adams. The Americans would tell Adams that he could have a visa strictly limited to the period of the New York Conference (at the end of January) if Adams would state publicly that:

- he personally renounced violence and urged all parties to the conflict to do so;
- Sinn Fein and the IRA were prepared to participate in serious negotiations to end the conflict in Northern Ireland;
- the Joint Declaration represented a basis for these negotiations.

I replied that we supported Lake's idea of trying to make constructive use of Adams' visa application to apply pressure. However, the terms suggested by Lake would have a very damaging effect, and might well blow the Joint Declaration out of the water. They were pretty close to terms which Adams himself might have drafted. He would have no difficulty in putting his hand on his heart and declaring that he was a man of peace who hoped that all parties would give up violence. He would be delighted to have it said that the Joint Declaration was no more than "a basis for negotiations". Worst of all from our point of view would be the invitation to Sinn Fein and the IRA to participate - before an end to violence - in "negotiations to end the conflict in Northern Ireland". I said that it would be better to have no formula at all than a formula

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on these lines. Lake's formula would be interpreted - wrongly of course - as evidence that the US Government did not consider the Joint Declaration of itself to be a sufficient basis for an end to violence.

Lake said the Administration were under heavy domestic pressure. I said that we were aware of the lobbying by Senator Kennedy and others, though Foley's different position was significant. Lake went on to say that he felt we were not winning the PR battle. If the initiative failed because we had not been prepared to sit down to discuss it with the IRA, he did not think we would attract support in the USA. I pointed out that we had offered to talk to the IRA, but would not do so while they were continuing their terrorist campaign. Finally, Lake said that he did not think the Americans needed to match our three month decontamination period before allowing Adams in. I said that we were prepared to concede this. We would not object to Adams entering the United States very soon after violence had ended.

After consulting you and Sir Robin Renwick, I sent Lake the attached message on Saturday night, offering him an alternative formula.

Lake telephoned again on the afternoon of Sunday 23 January. He received our language and would try to "factor it in". He had already changed "a basis" to "the basis" in his reference to the Joint Declaration. We had to appreciate that there were different views at his end. He would now work further on the problem. He promised to keep us informed, and to allow us a further opportunity to put our views before a final decision was taken. I thanked him for this, and said it was extremely important to continue this consultation.

Further action

I think that we need to have a fall-back formula, as close as we can make it to the Americans' position, up our sleeves for the next exchange with Lake. At best, I think that we shall only have one more shot at this.

My suggestion, which we discussed briefly on the telephone, is that the Americans could offer Adams a limited-duration visa if he will:

- declare, publicly and unequivocally, that in the light of the Joint Declaration there is no further justification [need] for the IRA's violence, and that Sinn Fein and the Provisional movement must [should] now end violence for good and in future use exclusively [only] democratic and peaceful methods.

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I should be grateful for comments or amendments by 1300 on Monday 24 January.

I think it would be helpful if we could show Lake the assessment on IRA attitudes which the JIC made last week - either in full or in edited form. I would be grateful if **Tony Galsworthy** could consider this.

I am sending copies of this letter to R J Sawers (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Sir Robin Renwick (Washington, by fax) and Tony Galsworthy and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

RODERIC LYNE

Jonathan Stephens Esq
Northern Ireland Office

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**PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
VIA CABINET OFFICE COMCEN**

**MESSAGE FOR THE IMMEDIATE ATTENTION OF MR ANTHONY
LAKE, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, WHITE HOUSE, FROM
RODERIC LYNE, 10 DOWNING STREET**

Dear Tony,

Many thanks for taking the trouble to call this afternoon. It is most helpful for us to keep in close touch over the best way of encouraging Sinn Fein to accept the Joint Declaration.

Since we spoke, I have done some further head scratching. I think that the formula you might use with Adams could be very simple. You could say that the US Government would be prepared to grant him a visa "as soon as Sinn Fein and the Provisional movement end violence for good and commit themselves to take the exclusively peaceful and democratic path which the Joint Declaration provides".

As you know, our preference would be to have the Provisionals demonstrate over a three month period that they have unequivocally given up terrorism before normal dealings with them begin. However, I accept your point that this three month period is more of a matter for the British Government than for the United States. I agree that it would be a constructive and encouraging move to tell Adams that he could enter the United States as soon as he and his colleagues had ended violence for good, and without any period of delay.

As I explained, two things would undermine, and possibly destroy the Joint Declaration. The first would be if the United States Government - unlike the British and Irish Governments - used words to imply that the IRA could renegotiate the terms of the Joint Declaration. The second would be if Adams was able to enter the United States while IRA terrorism continued, simply on

the basis of some personal statement that he would like all parties to renounce violence, preferred peace etc.

A formula on those lines would be more damaging than no formula at all. It would suggest that the US Government was more sympathetic to Sinn Fein's requests for renegotiation than to the insistence of the British and Irish Governments (supported by people like John Hume and Cardinal Daly) that the Joint Declaration is a fair and balanced document as it stands, and leaves no excuse for further violence.

I hope that my suggestion may help to point the way to the constructive package we are both looking for; but I am at your disposal at any time if you would like a further view from us.

Yours ever

RODERIC

22 January 1994