### SECRET AND PERSONAL

From: Date:

Rod Lyne 25 January 1994

cc: Alex Allan

Chris Mayor Philippa Leslie Jones.

PRIME MINISTER

## MINISTERIAL MEETING ON NORTHERN IRELAND, 26 JANUARY

#### Points for discussion

A summary of the papers from NIO and elsewhere is below.

You might open by seeking agreement on the broad strategy set out in the Northern Ireland Secretary's paper "The Way Forward".

You could review the following subjects:

## Selling the Joint Declaration/Keeping the Provisionals on the defensive

- How can we retain the initiative over the next month or so, and ensure that the Provisionals/Sinn Fein are seen as intransigent for failing to accept the Joint Declaration? What more can we do to counter their demands for "clarification"? Should we challenge Sinn Fein to specify which points need clarification? Or is this too risky?
- Is there a case for a Prime Ministerial speech, to build on those of Sir Patrick Mayhew? When? When?
- Pros and cons of giving radio or TV interviews.
- How can we get John Hume on side over clarification?

#### **Talks Process**

- Intensification of the talks process leading <u>either</u> to <u>early resumption</u> of formal talks <u>or</u> to <u>publication</u> by Easter of our own proposals.
- How is Michael Ancram getting on?
- Present attitudes of UUP/DUP/SDLP/Irish Government.
- Do we have a realistic prospect of getting them back into formal talks before Easter?
- If not, and we publish our own proposals, what consequences would this have for the future of the talks process?

## Response to IRA rejection of the Joint Declaration

- We have rightly avoided setting a fixed deadline. In practice, how long do we wait before talking on the assumption that the JD is being rejected?
- Immediate action if there is a definitive rejection?
   What general line would we take in public?
   Would we arrange an early meeting with the Irish Government?
- Our reaction if the Irish propose a North/South referendum on the TD?
- Use rejection to generate increased momentum in the talks process:

  Any possibility of moving rapidly towards an Assembly?
- What other political and PR steps could be taken to maximise the IRA's isolation? Media blitz? Churches? Community relations?

## Risk of a spectacular IRA attack

- JIC assessment of 19 January refers to this possibility.
- Do we treat a mainland "spectacular" (successful or intercepted) as proof that the IRA have rejected the Joint Declaration?

- Immediate reactions? Co-ordination with Irish Government? Public line?

## Preparing for tighter security

- Increase cross border co-operation: note suggestions in paragraph 17 of Sir Patrick Mayhew's minute. (at Flag A)
- Measures within Northern Ireland, including possible changes to the law:

  note NIO paper of 29 December. (\*\* ±145 °C)
- General acceptance that internment would not be the answer?
- would it be worth convening a separate meeting in February/March to review these security proposals (assuming the IRA had not accepted the Joint Declaration)? Could invite the Minister of State (Sir John Wheeler), the Chief Constable, GOC and Director of Intelligence.

## **Contacts with Irish Government**

- Agreement on the Northern Ireland Secretary's approach to the 28 January IGC?
- Timing of next meeting with the Taoiseach? Keep open the possibility of an informal discussion when the Taoiseach comes over for the 19 February rugby match?

RMIL

25 January 1994

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Signed J.D. Cto. Ref. why as? Release PIAA split; Adams led by nort - don't want division. , RA down to relife They've polated, My prospose is peace. NOW. let. Q. e.. Majority, botalt iver of violace. Protol nament. States hape Kall hap been is with a well. had, tope and tope you took the find the four Ass with milt the for from in leigh N. control speak.

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### BACKGROUND

The following papers are attached:

? But K basis.

Sir Patrick Mayhew's minute "The Way Forward" A

Broad strategy paper (you have seen an earlier draft). Focus on

paragraphs 14 to 17. Suggests that if/when the IRA reject the JD we should: Ald do that any way.

press for early resumption of formal 3-stranded talks;

failing that, publish our own proposals by Easter;

- review possible changes in the law to improve medium-term (+ dulate)security;
- press the Irish for better cross-border co-operation.

# NIO letter, 25 January

Reply to our request for specific ideas. Tends to repeat the thrust of the strategy paper. Suggests unrelenting, hard-hitting PR. Against a referendum. Few expectations of the churches. Community relations initiative would require more resources. Does not exclude the summit meeting with the Taoiseach.

- C NIO paper of 29 December on possible security measures

  Describes initiatives already in hand (eg improvements in intelligence)

  and possible changes to the law (all raising difficulties). Against
  internment. Favours a "co-ordinated information strategy" (sounds
  grand, but what does this mean?) Press the Irish further on co-operation
  through the Chilcot/Dalton group.
- D Article and Broadcast by Lord Callaghan

  Be prepared to answer questions from Sinn Fein (though not negotiate),
  perhaps through "the subterranean channels". Launch an immediate
  initiative if the JD is rejected: Legislative Assembly from which an
  Executive Council (elected by proportional representation) might be
  drawn. Through Executive Council, give responsibility for Northern
  Ireland Departments to Hume/Molyneaux etc.
  - E Early January intelligence report of Irish Government planning

    The NIO papers say that the Irish "do not appear to have seriously considered the next steps". This report suggests otherwise. Floats idea of a "Boyne package", referendum North and South of the border and a low key security initiative if the Provisionals reject the JD. (John Hume also suggested a North/South referendum to you. Seen as gimmicky and risky by NIO.)
  - F JIC assessment of 19 January

    Decision by Provisional Army Council that the Joint Declaration is insufficient for an early cessation of violence. Strategy of calling for clarification to try to wrong-foot HMG, and of increasing the level of violence (risk of mainland attacks) to try to secure further concessions.