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FALKLAND ISLANDS - MILITARY APPRECIATION

Attached is the first draft, together with supporting briefs, of the Falkland Islands Military Appreciation paper, which you called for at your meeting on 3 April 1982 (1). The draft is for discussion at your meeting at 1400 today, 5 April 1982.

Attachment:

Draft Paper and Supporting Briefs (85 pages).
(No copies to be made without reference to SECCOS).

Note:

1. COS 3rd Meeting/82.

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FALKLAND ISLANDS - MILITARY APPRECIATION

SCOPE OF PAPER

This paper reviews the military options, and their possible consequences, in support of Government policy to restore British Sovereignty to the Falkland Islands and their dependencies.

The principal factors affecting operations - the capability of the Argentine forces, the facilities we can obtain in the area, weather, intelligence, sustainability - are summarised. The military options, short and medium term, are identified and commented on. The paper finally reviews the effects of the operations upon our NATO commitments; and the force levels needed to occupy and defend the Falklands once regained. Further detail on all these points is contained in the Annexes.

FACTORS AFFECTING OPERATIONS

The Argentinian Navy is the most effective in South America, and has 9 ships fitted with modern missiles. However most units are elderly. It would not be a match for a modern Western force, and is particularly vulnerable to SSNs. Their Army is an effective force, high in morale, but weak in artillery, air defence, and logistics. They have a large Air Force, including 35 modern Mirage aircraft, but they will not be very effective at the range of the Falkland Islands, particularly against well defended ships. Nevertheless, if the Argentinian occupation force builds up its strength uninterrupted, it will not be easy to dislodge.

The remoteness of the Falklands from the UK highlights the importance of forward operating and support facilities for air forces. There are indications that Chile might help; a request has been made for assistance with refuelling, and for the basing of Nimrod aircraft, whose reconnaissance would be a powerful

force multiplier for our SSNs and the surface task group. The Chilean response will be a key factor, since other South American countries are either supporting or expected to support the Argentinian action.

The military operations under review can be sustained - with POL, food, water, armaments, stores and medical facilities although the long and difficult LOC will pose many problems. The existing facilities on Ascension Island are meagre but could be made to serve with detailed pre planning. However Ascension Island could not offer an adequate warship maintenance and repair capability. The longer the deployment and the greater the number of ships, the more valuable it would be to have access to the facilities at Simonstown in South Africa.

The weather conditions in the Falkland Islands area from March to May are like those in Europe in late Autumn. Seas will often be rough and winds strong, but overall maritime operations will not be impeded. Ashore there are almost no roads and the terrain is very difficult, so that defensive reaction to a surprise landing is likely to be slow. Operations are, however, expected to be possible by appropriately winter trained and equipped forces year round.

Finally, a cardinal factor affecting operations will be the need to avoid, as far as possible, heavy fighting in the Port Stanley area. Severe loss of life among the small population, and widespread property destruction, would defeat the operation's objective.

MILITARY OPTIONS

The Short Term Options available to the SSNs before the arrival of the Surface Task Force are seen as:

Cutting the Argentine Sea LOC to the Falklands. In an ultimatum, we could declare an Exclusion Zone of - say - 200 miles around the Falklands. In this Zone, Argentine warships and military support vessels would be sunk without warning. Enforcement of the zone could commence with the arrival of the first SSN. This action would demonstrate our political will and could result in the sinking of major Argentinian warships; it would in any event inhibit the further build up of Argentinian forces on the Falklands. This action would be essential to the success of any later landing, but could also be a self contained and effective action on its own.

General Operations against the Argentine Navy. SSNs would be employed to seek out and destroy Argentine warships. Success would depend on Argentinian willingness to keep their warships at sea. These operations would be more effective with the help of maritime air surveillance. The sinking of several major warships would be a dramatic demonstration of our naval capability, and could have a profound effect on public perceptions in Argentina of the Falkland crisis, and so on the domestic position of the Argentinian Government. However, such operations could take time to bear fruit, during which SSNs would not be able to interdict the reinforcement and resupply of the Argentinian garrison on the Falklands.

Blockade of Argentinian Ports. If Argentinian warships had been withdrawn to port, SSNs could be employed to blockade them there. However, action directed at the mainland of Argentina would be perceived as more escalatory than action focussed on the Falklands, and the SSNs could not blockade all the naval ports open to the Argentine Navy.

Unrestricted anti shipping Operations. SSNs could attack without warning any Argentine shipping, warship or merchant, whether connected with Falkland Islands reinforcement or not. This would be a major escalation. It might unwittingly involve neutrals. Propaganda Claims could be made about casualties to women and children. It is probably more suited to a long war of attrition.

Air Operations. Such operations would require the use of Chilean airfields as operating bases. Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft are highly effective surveillance assets which can enhance the operations of SSNs and surface warships. They are also first class submarine killers in their own right. Given Chilean cooperation, they could operate in the vicinity of the Falklands from the airfield of El Tepual. At this range they could remain on task for 4 - 5 hours, and be of the highest value in directing our ships and submarines to their targets. An additional characteristic of Nimrods is that they are publicly perceived as reconnaissance aircraft. A force of 4 Nimrods is envisaged for this option.

Buccaneer strike aircraft, specialised in maritime operations, could be used to attack shipping off the Falklands. They would add significantly to our ability either to cut the

Argentine LOC to the Falklands, or to neutralize the Argentine Navy. These options depend on the use of Chilean airfields. A force of 8 Buccaneers could mount about 84 sorties in a 7 day period. Were it decided to escalate operations to the Argentine mainland, Buccaneer aircraft mounting from Santiago could attack 4 of the major Argentine air forces in the North of the country.

MEDIUM TERM MARITIME OPERATIONS - POST TASK FORCE ARRIVAL

Establishing Sea and Air Control around the Falkland Islands.

This should be a practicable operation for the size of Task Force envisaged, operating in concert with the SSNs. The Task Force possesses the weapon systems with which to protect itself, in this role, against surface, sub surface or air attacks. It should freeze the Argentine position on the Islands. It may destroy further Argentine naval and air units. Whether dramatic successes are obtained in this option depends on the level of Argentine sea/air activity around the Islands - but it is a necessary precursor to any landing by our forces. The option could be extended, given initial success, to a total blockade of the Falklands against all surface and air traffic. It can be seen as a discrete stage, from which the further options following could be mounted.

Blockade of Argentine Ports. The Task force together with the SSNs could attempt to blockade Argentina itself - against naval shipping, or all shipping. In principle this could be an alternative to re-invading the Falklands, hoping that economic pressure would make Argentina come to terms. In

practice the effectiveness, and time taken, would be uncertain. It would also expose our forces to a higher level of risk in proximity to the mainland, as well as having political implications in the possible enlargement of the conflict.

Power Projection against Mainland Shore Targets. This option could be directed against Argentine military infrastructure or civil targets, by Sea Harriers or bombardment. The risks to our own forces are great, the rewards doubtful, and the political consequences fraught.

Offensive Maritime Operations. The objective would be to seek out and destroy the Argentine Navy on the high seas. We have sufficient forces to achieve this. It would be contingent on the Argentine Navy being at sea, and chances of success would be enhanced by air reconnaissance. Depending on the opportunities presented, it could precede, be concurrent with, or follow the Sea and Air Control option. The rewards would be great - destruction of their Fleet would eliminate the threat of further invasion of the Falklands for some years following our re-occupation. It might conceivably be so devastating a blow to the Argentine regime that they withdrew from the Falklands.

Conduct of Landing Operations. This ultimate option depends on sea and air control around the Falklands. It will be affected by the success or otherwise of our earlier operations against the Falkland LOC. It will depend on good intelligence. Subject to all these, the flexibility of the amphibious force

should enable a surprise landing to be conducted in a lightly defended area. The terrain would probably preclude any immediate Argentine response, and a viable bridgehead should be possible. This is unlikely to be in the vicinity of Port Stanley.

Such a landing could lead to our control of part of the Falklands, possibly the West Falklands. In political terms this might constitute a stage, whereby control of the Falklands was now seen to be disputed, giving possibilities for negotiations.

The final stage would be the progressive re-occupation of the Islands - probably feasible if our sea and air control was absolute, but a slow business in the Antarctic winter and in terrain favouring the defender. The potential effect on the civilian population and infrastructure would inhibit operations. The use of helicopters for rapid response and outflanking manoeuvres would be a dominant feature. Neither the scenario or the outcome of this final phase can be predicted with certainty.

OTHER OPTIONS.

Mining. This has been considered, but the wide international implications of using so indiscriminate a weapon weigh against it. Also, our mines are few and of outdated technology. It is possible and potentially effective to declare a minefield when there is none, but again the diplomatic repercussions (Soviet fishing fleet) could be far reaching.

Special Operations from SSNs. The military worth of operations by a Special Boat Section from a submarine are well established. Unfortunately it needs calm weather conditions; also an SSN is ill suited to them, as it takes 7 minutes to dive. The gains of a special operations whether against the Argentine mainland or the Falklands would have to outweigh the very real risk to the SSN.

Evacuation of Civilians. It might be an option to seek early evacuation of the civilian Falklands population by the Red Cross. The final phase of our operations would thus be freed from some serious problems. The Argentine Government might of course refuse, but in that case would have to bear the odium of being seen to hold the population hostage. However, our action in requesting an evacuation could be misrepresented and misunderstood publicly.

Military Occupation. Following a successful re-occupation of the Falklands, we might have to defend them against a bitter and hostile Argentine. Assuming the Argentine Navy had been largely neutralised and their Army and Air Force severely reduced, an initial estimate of our required force level is 2 frigates or destroyers, an RM Commando Group, Rapier anti air defences, 4 - 6 Harrier a/c, 6 - 8 support helos, and supporting elements. The Falkland Islands population would virtually be doubled. The runway at Port Stanley airfield would need to be upgraded. If the Argentine withdrawal had taken place with their sea and air forces largely intact, the force levels required would be much greater.

Effect of Falkland Islands Operations on UK NATO Commitments.

Planned deployments to Operation CORPORATE will severely effect the UK contribution to NATO. There will be about a 50% reduction in our ship Category A1 readiness declarations; 3 RM Cdo Brigade would be at a lower NATO readiness standard; one half of the afloat war reserve stock of ammunition would go out of area in the first 20 days. The greater part of the Air Transport Force would be involved, and the readiness downgrading of 4 Nimrods would be significant with so many of the aircraft already at lower status for conversions. Implementation of NATO reinforcement plans, if called upon during or shortly after CORPORATE, would be protracted. The effect on Army commitments to NATO would be slight, as the principal unit (5 INF BDE) is not declared. Considering NATO exercises, Distant Drum 82, Damsel Fair and Open Gate would all be affected before June.

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
MILITARY APPRECIATION FOR OP CORPORATE

Reference:

A. D Ops Staff 7/10/2 of 3 April 1982.

SCPL input as required by Reference A is attached at Annex A.

4 Apr 82



M M S FINNIS
Colonel
CSO(L)

Seen by DDR/L

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ANNEX A TO
VCDS (PRE) 127/2
DATED 27 APR 82

SUSTAINABILITY

1. Whichever military option is adopted, the basic requirements for sustaining the force are:

POL

Food and Water

Armaments

Stores

Repair and maintenance facilities

Medical facilities.

2. The length of resupply lines from the UK to the Falkland Islands make the establishment of a Forward Operating Base (FOB) highly desirable. There is a need to establish a FOB on Ascension Island as a matter of considerable urgency. Initially the FOB will be a transshipment area. Later, if the deployed force is expanded to include 5 Inf Bde the FOB may have to provide reception and transit facilities for up to 3,500 men.

3. In the early stages it would be appropriate for the RN to take the lead in establishing the FOB, including small Army and RAF detachments as required. Subsequent expansion to accommodate Army needs should be pre-planned and immediately available.

4. The existing facilities on Ascension Island are meagre but better than may be expected. Camp sites which could accommodate up to 3,000 men are available; the necessary tentage and associated camp stores will have to be provided. There is plenty of potable water available, means of distribution will have to be provided. Some fuel stocks are available but those of aviation fuel will need to be supplemented and additional refuelling vehicles will be required to cater for the needs of the ATF and other RAF aircraft which may be based on the island.

5. It will be possible to establish a basic LOC with an alternative:

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- a. By sea direct from the UK, sailing time about 20 days.
- b. By air to Ascension Island FOB and then onward by sea, sailing time about 10 days.

Although the air/sea route is quicker and gives flexibility it is uneconomical and should only be used if essential. If air operations are mounted from Chile resupply will have to be by air and may take up a considerable proportion of the available ATF effort.

6. POL. The Oil Industry Emergency Council has been approached with a view to making up the take off from war reserves of fuel and matching the consumption in Op CORPORATE. The requirement is therefore to deliver and distribute POL within the theatre of operations. One or more Fleet tankers will be necessary to replenish the Naval Task Force and stocks of ground and aviation fuel on Ascension Island. These tankers will need topping up depending on the size of the task force and the level of activity. Two British River Class tankers are available from trade and feature in plans from the early phases of the operation. The retention of these vessels and the acquisition and conversion of additional ships from trade for freighting purposes will be necessary if a large scale operation is to be sustained.

7. Food and Water. The initial Naval deployment has sufficient food for $3\frac{1}{2}$ months. Any forward operating base or staging facilities established on Ascension Island will also be provided with suitable initial stocks of rations. There are adequate supplies of water for service needs on this island. Forces would best be sustained by the use of Naval stores ships from UK using Ascension Island for redistribution as necessary. The frequency of rotation of the Naval solid support ships will depend on the scale of operations.

8. Armaments. Half the RN Afloat Back Up War Reserve will be deployed in the first wave. Ground and air forces will deploy with appropriate scales. Replenishment will depend on ammunition

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consumption but it is anticipated that Naval requirements could be met from the solid support ships in para 7 above. Ground and air forces may need to be resupplied by the air/sea route until the task can be undertaken by the above solid support ships. Any substantial deployment of RAF Nimrod or Vulcan aircraft will make heavy demands on the available ATF and will almost certainly necessitate the chartering of commercial aircraft.

9. Stores. Resupply of stores would best be by sea from the UK as for armaments. Emergency requirements would be air-freighted to whatever air head is established.

10. Repair and Maintenance. Ascension Island is not suitable for major Naval repair. This requires facilities such as those at Simonstown, South Africa, which are unlikely to be available. The alternatives are therefore the use either of temporary workshops accommodation on Ascension Island, the establishment of a special repair ship capability or, the rotation of ships to the UK for repair. It will be necessary to establish a Fleet Maintenance Unit for the force. Initially it is envisaged that only basic facilities for ground and air maintenance will be available at the FOB.

11. Medical Facilities. Medical evacuation should be by air from the Ascension Islands FOB. There will be a requirement to establish both holding and evacuation facilities on the island. It is unlikely that the RN will be able to establish such a facility and the Army should be tasked to meet this requirement.

12. It is clear that the military options currently under review can be sustained. The LOC is long and difficulty will be experienced in producing any logistic support required quickly. Detailed and accurate pre-planning will be of great importance.

REVIEW OF THE SITUATION

1. After the ^{lack of progress in the} latest talks between the United Kingdom and Argentina about the Falkland Islands, a bellicose press campaign was launched in Argentina apparently designed to pressure HMG into an early settlement. ^{It seems probable that the} ~~The~~ left-wing military junta in Argentina, faced by large-scale demonstrations over galloping inflation and falling living standards, may ^{Saw} ~~have seen~~ the Falklands issue as a convenient distraction from these serious domestic problems. On 19th March an Argentine civilian contractor's demolition team landed illegally in South Georgia, and although ^{the event} ~~this~~ was almost certainly a coincidence, the subsequent dispute over the de facto Argentinian presence was linked by Argentina on 28th March with the wider issue ^{of sovereignty.} By 29th March several naval ships had sailed and over the next three days an amphibious task force assembled at sea and proceeded towards the Falkland Islands. This force invaded the Falkland Islands on 2nd April and South Georgia on 3rd April.

2. In support of its insistence that the Falkland Islands and Dependencies remain British Territory, a task force equipped for conventional operations in the South Atlantic sailed from home waters on 5th April.

FALKLAND ISLANDS - WEATHER/ENVIRONMENTWeather

1. The climate of the Falklands is marked by the low temperature range, high winds, seasonal uniformity and day-to-day variability. Weather conditions in the period March to May are similar to those in Europe in late autumn with variations during the passage of frontal systems. Cloud amounts average about half sky cover with bases less than 1000 ft on up to 20% of occasions. Winds are strong and persistent with speeds in the order of 10-20 knots predominantly from between SW & N. Calms are infrequent and gales occur on 3 to 5 days a month. Visibilities are generally 5-10 miles but on 5% of occasions they are less than 2200 yards. Swells from an easterly direction are almost unknown, most coming from N and S through W. From March to August waves of 4m or more occur on 15% occasions. Radar propagation conditions are usually average or below average.

2. In the Dependencies and Antarctic Territory, except for South Georgia, climatic conditions are severely Antarctic with average temperatures rarely above 5^sc and for most of the year below freezing point. Humidity is exceptionally high. South Georgia has a milder climate, only slightly cooler on the whole than that of the Falklands.

Terrain and Beaches

3. The two main islands of the Falkland group are divided by Falkland Sound and there are many deeply-incised fjord-like smaller sounds and bays. The general level of the hills on the islands is between 400 and 600 m with occasional higher levels, while the southern half of East Island is rolling plain which seldom rises

higher than about 30 m above sea level. There are numerous beaches, generally at the heads of bays or inlets. Most of them are sandy but some are shingle and a few are mud. Most are suitable only for minor landing craft, but a few might take LCT. Approaches are generally restricted and kelp (seaweed) is an obstruction to propeller driven craft almost everywhere. The best landing possibilities are in the areas of Port Stanley and Salvador. A few beaches or jetties (at most small settlements) are connected to an elementary track system and vehicle penetration inland varies from difficult to impossible especially during winter. The hinterland includes large areas of bog and rocky areas, both of which are impassable to vehicles.

4. Landing possibilities in the Dependencies and British Antarctic Territory will be controlled by the prevailing ice and weather conditions. No part of the area is ever completely free from the risk of pack-ice. South and East of the South Shetland Islands, the whole area is quite unsuitable for amphibious landings from conventional landing craft.

Roads

5. On the Falklands there are only 34 km of roads with rolled stone and concrete surface. These are located in and around Stanley where there is a concrete surfaced section along the waterfront. All other roads are unsurfaced cross-country tracks approximately 3m wide. Movement is made difficult by bays, numerous small streams and boulders and for $\frac{1}{4}$ - $\frac{1}{2}$ tonne front wheel drive vehicles is restricted to the summer season (October-March). An all-weather rolled stone road is to be constructed from Stanley to Darwin but it will be at least 5 years before it is completed. The journey of 60 miles over rough terrain currently takes some 10 hours.

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6. There are no roads or motorable tracks in any of the Dependencies.

Airfields

7. The only airfield is five miles east of Stanley. It has limited potential and could not be brought up to major operating base standard in less than 6 months. It has only one runway, low LCN of 16, length 1250 m and a shortage of parking space and manoeuvring area. There is no POL on the airfield and fuel is brought by road tanker from the bulk storage depot at Port Stanley. The road from Stanley to the airport has a waterproof surface but is in poor condition.

8. There are 32 strips on the islands but they are suitable only for very light aircraft or helicopters.

Ports

9 The only port is at Stanley while Port Willian (an anchorage adjoining Stanley Harbour) is suitable for vessels of all draughts. The Harbour is entered from Port William through a channel 128.87 wide and 6.92 deep. The size of vessels entering is also restricted by the lack of an adequate turning circle within the harbour. There are six T-head jetties, the largest being the East Jetty which can accommodate vessels with a mean draught of 5.5m and a length of 152.39m. One of the T-head jetties is reported to be unusable. There is a fuel-vil jetty on the north side of the harbour with a depth alongside of 1.82m. There is a 5 tonne mobile crane at Stanley and a 3 tonne crane. There are two warehouses providing covered storage space of 669 sq m stacking area, and ample open stacking space is available. There are facilities for limited bunkering, water laid on to the jetties, and minor repairs

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10. Three former whaling stations on the northern coast of South Georgia offer good anchorage only; the shore facilities having fallen into disrepair.

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POSSIBLE

ARGENTINA: ECONOMIC TARGETS

OIL

1. Argentina produces over 90% of its crude oil requirements. The two most southerly oilfields are in the TIERRA DEL FUEGO (24,000 barrels per day) and in SANTA CRUZ province at Caleta Zordeba (95,000 b.p.d.) These two also account for nearly 25% of Argentina's crude production. There are three other major producing areas, at NEUQUEN, MENDOZA and on the Bolivian border. ^{Oilfield} ~~Difficult~~ interdiction would have to be on a huge scale to have any appreciable effect.

2. There are 14 major oil refineries, including 8 in the River Plate area. The most southerly plat^{nt} is at COMODORA RIVADAVIA in the SANTU CRUZ oilfields and its size suggests that it supplies only the southern provinces. Again, refinery interdiction would have to be on a large scale including the ^{densely} ~~sparsely~~ populated ^P plate estuary, to have real effect.

3. The tanker loading facility at BAHIA BLANCA offers a worthwhile target. It handles imported crude oil which has been offloaded into small tanks forther south and the crude oil from the SANTA CRUZ and TIERRA DEL FURGO fields which is sent to BAHIA BLANCA by ^{coastal} tanker. The facility consists of a single mooring buoy and the oil is pumped onshore to storage tanks where a pipeline feeds the refineries at BUENOS AIRES. This buoy must be handling more than a third of Argentina's total crude oil requirements. If it were destroyed, crude would have to be send direct^{to} the the River Plate area by tanker, but the two tanker terminals at BUENOS AIRES are for export and import of products, ^{and it} It might take some time to adjust the export pumping equipment to receive crude oil. Although the river Plate refineries would be disrupt^{ed}, they would still be drawing crude from the NEUQUEN, MENDOZA and Bolivian border oilfields.

4. Interdiction of the three SANTU CRUZ terminals would disrupt the crude oil sent upcoast to BAHIA BLANCA and the refined oils distributed locally and to the FALKLAND Islands, from the COMODORA RIVADAVIA refinery. The TIERRA FUEGO terminal is simple, flexible *hose* and is not worth interdiction alone.

GAS

5. The gas pipeline system ^{ends} extends from the gas/oil fields in TIERRA del FUEGO, northwards through the gas/oil fields of the SANTA CRUZ district and onto BUENOS AIRES. A further gas pipeline system extends southwards from Bolivia's extensive gas field complex through Argentina's northernmost oil field in the JUJUY district, and on to BUENOS AIRES also.

6. From an interdiction aspect the destruction of gas pipelines creates little lasting damage as pipelines can be repaired within a couple of days. However, the destruction of gas pump stations situated along the pipeline system does create considerable problems. The destruction of such ^{stations} routes north and south of BUENOS AIRES would have an immediate effect within the capital.

RAILWAYS

7. Although most of Argentina's freight and passenger traffic is carried by road (80% in 1980) there is a very extensive rail network. However, ^{however,} it is not evenly distributed over the country, a very large proportion being concentrated in Buenos Aires Province (ie the area south and west of the River Plate).

8. Outside Buenos Aires city, the following rail centres would provide worthwhile targets on the most important routes to the south:

- a. General Pico (35.43S, 063.45W)
- b. Las Flores (36.03S, 059.08W)
- c. Coronel Suarez (37.30S, 61.52W)
- d. Bahia Blanca (38.45S, 62.15W)

Of the above, the Bahia Blanca complex is the most significant, as it cannot be bypassed. Within the complex, a number of junctions, marshalling yards, and workshops would provide targets, as would the major river bridge some 20 km west of the city; this bridge cannot be bypassed by rail.

Roads

9. The highway system is densely developed within Buenos Aires Province. South of Bahia Blanca, few roads exist; the main one is the Pan American Highway which follows the coastline as far as the Chilean border south of Rio Gallegos. Diversionary routes inland from this highway involve extremely long and difficult routes through increasingly mountainous country away from the coast. There is no through rail route south of San Antonio Oeste (40.45S, 064.58W) to take diverted traffic.

10. The highway crosses a number of major rivers by large bridges, and worthwhile targets include:-


- a. Colorado River at Pedro Luro (39.30S, 062.38W).
- b. Rio Negro at Carmen de Patagones (40.45S, 063.00W)
- c. Rio Chico at Rawson (43.15S, 065.53W)
- d. Rio Deseado 50km west of Deseado town (47.44S, 065.56W)
- e. Rio Chico 10 km northwest of Rio Chico town (49.50S, 068.35W)
- f. Rio Santa Cruz 20km west of Puerto Santa Cruz (50.03S,
068.35W)

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

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A possible advantage of selecting the bridges at d,e and f is that they are away from centres of population.

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SOUTH AMERICA SOUTHERN PORTION



OIL

OILFIELD

OILFIELD

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
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A

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D



- Rail point
- Road point

OPERATION
CORPORATE

SPECIAL

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
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FACTORS AFFECTING MILITARY OPTIONS


1. The principal factors affecting operations in the Falkland Islands are:

- a. The proximity to the Argentinian main land.
- b. The remoteness from the UK.
- c. The absence of forward operating/support bases under British control.
- d. The degree of external military support for Argentina.
- e. The need to avoid excessive casualties among the Falkland Islanders and substantial damage to the infrastructure.
- f. The risk of reprisals against British passport holders in Argentina.
- g. The weather.

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3.



4. There is no alternative to Chile as a potential location for forward operating or mounting bases. Though nearly 4000 miles distant, the facilities at Simonstown in South Africa would greatly ease the maintenance, repair and replenishment problems associated with a lengthy deployment of the Task Force. Current Government policy prohibits military cooperation with South Africa. A request for the use of Simonstown would, therefore, need OB approval. The reactions of "Black Africa" would be difficult to predict.

5. Uruguay, Brazil, Peru and Ecuador have all declared political support for the Argentinian action; other South American States can be expected to follow suit. Panama ^{was alone in opposing} ~~opposed~~ a Security Council resolution calling for Argentinian withdrawal. There will be problems, therefore, in negotiating transit or overflight clearances on the most direct routes to Chile. However, the difficulties are not insuperable and, at the expense of additional flying ^{via a Pacific route} time and pay and restrictions, the Chile option could be exploited if available.

6. As yet there is no evidence of external military support for Argentina.

7. A cardinal factor in operational planning must be to avoid, as far as possible, heavy fighting in the Port Stanley area. Severe loss of life among the small population and the widespread destruction of property and public utilities would defeat the objective of the operation.

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8. The majority of British passport holders in Argentina have dual nationality status. The PCO may advise those who wished to leave the country in advance of operations against the Argentines. However, evacuation on a large scale is not expected.

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MILITARY APPRECIATION PAPER

Ref. COS(Misc) 81/742/1 of 3Apr 82

1. The ND input to the draft paper called for by the Reference is attached.

4 Apr 82

A J Whetstone
A J WHETSTONE
Rear Admiral
ACNS(O)

COVERING SECRET UK EYES A

REVIEW OF THE MARITIME MILITARY OPTIONS AND THEIR POSSIBLE
CONSEQUENCES IN SUPPORT OF GOVERNMENT POLICY TO RESTORE
BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

INTRODUCTION

1. Naval forces are being assembled or have sailed for operations in the South Atlantic. This paper reviews possible military options as an input to the paper in preparation by ACDS(Ops) for the Chiefs of Staff. The threat is not discussed but the paper starts with a brief outline of the enemy's possible courses of action. These are related to the Falkland Islands rather than the dependancies.

POSSIBLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

Land

2. There are three basic choices:
 - a. Consolidate present force level (estimated 2,000).
 - b. Build up forces, weapons and war stocks in preparation to resist an assault.
 - c. To withdraw under diplomatic pressure.
3. Of these three the second is the most likely but it would involve an extensive lift by sea and air transport.

Maritime

4. There are four basic choices:
 - a. To maintain forces at sea in the vicinity of the Falkland Islands with the aim of local sea control.
 - b. To carry out more distant offensive operations against an approaching force.

- c. To attempt some combination of these two.
- d. To retire to Argentinian bases once the Islands are adequately armed and stocked.

It should be noted that the Argentinians have a mining capability (laid by aircraft and possibly ships, but unlikely by submarines) which could be effective in waters out to 50 metres against surface ships and up to 200 metres against submarines.

5. For military reasons their most attractive course would be to attempt to maintain sea control in the vicinity of the Islands out to a range of about 200 miles with the possibility of some tactical offensive beyond this. They are unlikely to adopt a distant offensive policy since this involves operations remote from land-based support and their afloat support is poor. However, there is some intelligence to suggest that naval losses at sea would be severely damaging to the regime and this coupled with their desire to maintain their fleet in being may drive them to return to their bases before our force arrive in the area. It is difficult to assess whether military or political factors will predominate.

Land-Based Air

6. The Argentinians have three basic courses:
- a. To supplement maritime forces in their sea control task by use of attack and ASW aircraft.
 - b. To attempt to maintain the integrity of the airspace in the vicinity of the Falkland Islands and along the air corridor from mainland bases.
 - c. To reinforce and resupply land forces established in the islands.

7. All three are likely but the degree of success will be limited by the performance of their aircraft (radius of action), weather and daylight.

MARITIME MILITARY OPTIONS

RN Force Levels

8. The following forces have been assigned to Operation CORPORATE:

- a. 3 SSN ETA 12, 15 and 21 April
- b. 1 AEFS ETA Ascension 6 April, then to join ENDURANCE or R/V subsequent Groups.
- c. Group consisting of
 - 2 DLG (County))
 - 3 DDG (T.42))
 - 3 FF (1 x T22, 1 x T21,)
 - 1 x T12))
 - 2 RFA (1 x AO, 1 x AOT)) ETA Falkland
- d. Group consisting of
 - 2 CVS) Islands Area
 - 1 LPD)
 - 2 FF (T.21))
 - 2 RFA (1 x AFS, 1 x AOT)) 29 April
 - 5 LSL)
 - Ships taken up from trade))
 - 3 CDO BRIGADE)
 - SPEARHEAD Battalion)
- e. ENDURANCE in S Atlantic.

Total aircraft embarked
in force:

SEA HARRIER	20	
ASW WESSEX	2	
ASW SEA KING	22	
LYNX	10	
WASP	3	
ASSAULT SEA KING	12	
ASSAULT WESSEX	7	
GAZELLE	9) Brigade Air
SCOUT	5) Squadron

It is the present plan that the groups at c and d above will join before arrival at the Falkland Islands.

Short Term Options

9. Short Term Options are defined as those which could take place before the arrival of the main surface Task Force; in other words action by SSNs and HMS ENDURANCE. The options we examine are as follows:

- a. An Exclusion Zone including operations against Argentine ships within it.
- b. General operations against the Argentinian Navy.
- c. Blockade of mainland Naval ports.
- d. Punitive operations against Argentine shipping.
- e. HMS ENDURANCE.
- f. Submarine aspects of special operations.

It is important to bear in mind that the full effectiveness of the SSN can only be realised outside the 100 metre line and below 50 metres it is severely restricted.

10. Exclusion Zone. This could be declared as part of any ultimatum to the Argentine Government. Its form could vary but typically it might be a zone of 200 miles around the Falkland Islands in which it was declared that Argentinian warships, submarines, fleet tankers and military support vessels including merchant ships, related to the occupation would be liable to be sunk without warning (an SSN is an "all or nothing" weapon). The timing of the declaration would require fine judgement but a period of, say, 48 hours before the arrival of the first SSN might be appropriate; it would also be helpful to let the Argentinians believe we already had an SSN in the area. The implications of the announcement of an

exclusion zone would depend on the political will of the Argentine Government; it might lead to negotiations or (more likely) an increased determination to maintain forces at sea. In this option it would be important to declare a sufficiently large zone with adequate depth of water to enable SSNs to have a reasonable chance of success. It would not be necessary to await the arrival of the second or third SSN before declaring the exclusion zone; one Argentinian ship successfully attacked by the first submarine would be a clear message of HMGs intent. Furthermore the earlier the exclusion zone is declared and seen to be effective, the more difficult the Argentinians will find it to continue the support of their force in the Falklands by sea; and the longer will be the time before the arrival of the main Task Force for diplomatic negotiations to resolve the issue. There are thus positive military and diplomatic advantages in the early implementation of this option. As the second and third SSNs arrive in the area the effectiveness of the exclusion zone will be further improved.

11. Targets for the SSN should be selected from a priority list taking account of those Argentinian units which would pose the greatest threat to the Task Force - such as submarines, the carrier and escorts; fleet, military support ships and merchant ships would have a lower priority. The early loss of an Argentinian warship would have a profound effect on the people and Government of that country. The loss of several of her naval units would severely inhibit Argentina's ability to mount a second

invasion for some considerable time once the Islands are repossessed. It would also weaken her position with relations to Chile and could force her into early negotiations with HMG.

12. A further option within the exclusion zone is the declaration of a minefield in the area of the Falkland Islands. Although we have no mines embarked in the deploying SSNs, the Argentinians are not to know this and a ship sunk or damaged by torpedoes might equally be judged to have been sunk by a mine if it were in the declared area. This would undoubtedly inhibit or even cause them to discontinue seaborne reinforcements and resupply to the Islands. Militarily, in isolation, this is a very attractive supporting element of an exclusion zone but but as the mine is not a discriminating weapon declaration of a minefield would implicate other nations using the area (eg Soviet fishing fleet) the diplomatic repercussions could be far reaching. Moreover since the Argentinians possess a mining capability it could lead to a corresponding real mining campaign which would seriously inhibit the achievement of the aim. Any declaration of a minefield within FI territorial waters although strictly within our right to protect the security of the islands, will be perceived by the Argentine and possibly other countries as illegal. The UK claims 3 miles territorial sea around the Falklands and Argentine 200, thus the international position would be ambiguous and open to doubt. The laying of a minefield outside 3 miles would be a breach of International Maritime Law for this country. Overall ~~the~~ this option is not favoured in view of the possibility of retaliation by the Argentinians.

13. General Operations Against the Argentinian Navy. A further option would be for SSNs to attack Argentinian warships on the high seas. This would be more escalatory than an Exclusion Zone; however, it would benefit the Task Force if the targets selected were high on the priority list. Again, the loss of a warship would have a profound effect on the Argentinian people and Government but, if seen to be less directly related to the Falkland Islands, might have unwelcome political implications for HMG in the international arena.
14. Blockade. SSNs could be used to blockade one or two Argentinian naval ports, such as PUERTO BELGRANO and MAR DEL PLATA. This would only be appropriate if the Argentinian navy had returned to harbour; it is also an escalatory move being directed at the mainland. The seas off the coast of the Argentine are shallow and not well suited to SSN operations and thus the submarines would run the risk of being detected or of being outflanked by ships or smaller submarines leaving harbour. Such a blockade is unlikely to be effective. On the other hand, if successful the implications of the blockade would be that the naval threat to the Task Force would be reduced or even removed; but the political objections in the international arena might be substantial.
15. Punitive Operations. Punitive operations against Argentine merchant shipping not directly concerned with the reinforcement of the Falkland Islands could be carried out by SSNs. However this course of action would be a major escalation

and run the risk of the involvement of neutrals. Furthermore its use would be a waste of weapons as it would reduce those available for purely military targets.

[16. HMS ENDURANCE. The ship is now in the vicinity of South Georgia part of which has been occupied by a small party landed from an Argentinian A69 Corvette which is standing off the island. An attack on this ship by SSN or Wasps from HMS ENDURANCE could isolate the party and demonstrate our political will. In view of her light armament HMS ENDURANCE should not be placed at greater risk and the SSN option, which offers little risk, is preferred. However it would divert effort away from the main Argentinian forces which pose the more direct threat.]

17. Submarine aspects of special operations. SSNs could be used for special operations with the SBS. However they would require calm weather conditions and would need to spend at least 30 minutes surfaced for the SBS deployment operation. Such conditions are rare in this part of the world, and thus the SSN may spend some time out of the mainstream of events waiting for the right weather window. The SSN is highly vulnerable on the surface and if detected by a weapon carrying aircraft will almost certainly be lost, as it takes at least 7 minutes to dive. Shallow waters off the Argentine coast preclude operations against mainland targets. Limited operations against certain offshore platforms are possible but are not recommended. Operations against the Falkland Islands in this phase would put the SSN seriously at risk which would not be acceptable.

Medium Term Operations

18. This period refers to operations after the arrival of the Task Force in the Falkland Islands area. The SSNs would operate in concert with this force. The level of operations required would depend on the success achieved against Argentinian warships by the SSNs in the previous phase. In this section the following options are considered:

- a. Establishing sea and air control in advance of the landing.
- b. Blockade of the Falkland Islands.
- c. Blockade of Argentinian Ports.
- d. Power projection against mainland shore targets.
- e. Offensive maritime operations with the aim of neutralising the Argentinian navy.
- f. Conduct of landing operations including associated maritime support.

These options are not mutually exclusive and a combination will be needed to achieve the aim.

19. Establishing Sea Control. The objective is to establish a level of control over the sea area adjacent to the Falkland Islands and the air above sufficient to ensure the successful mounting of any subsequent landing. This will involve the neutralisation of Argentinian naval and air units in the area.

20. The threat to our own forces may be from submarines, surface ships or aircraft. The most dangerous of these is probably the Type 209 submarine. This vehicle should be a high priority target for SSNs . . .

and ASW ships and helicopters from the Task Force. It would be a difficult target for the SSN in shallow water.

21. The most dangerous Argentinian surface ship is the carrier, the destruction of which by either submarines, aircraft or SSM armed ships would be a high priority. The other enemy surface ships are well equipped with EXOCET and thus need to be dealt with at long range by submarines, SEA HARRIERS, SEA SKUA fitted helicopters or missile armed surface ships. The British force contains sufficient assets to deal with submarine and surface threats.

22. The largest potential source of air attacks comes from the shore-based Argentine Air Force. However their aircraft have a poor tactical navigation system for dealing with maritime targets, will probably require assistance from a surveillance aircraft for location and, because of their reliance on conventional bombs, will require a considerable weapon effort to achieve success. Against such a threat the positioning of our own forces to extend to the maximum the range for shore-based aircraft, together with the air defence capability of the Sea Harrier and the medium and short range AAW system within the force should prove adequate. The carrier borne aircraft are unconstrained by a radius of action from fixed bases and probably have a greater proficiency in the maritime attack role; the defence against them remains the same. They present a greater qualitative threat but can be contained.

23. The implication of failing to achieve sea control is that the landing could not be safely attempted.

24. Blockade. A blockade of the Falkland Islands would be, in part, an extension of establishing sea control in the area; it would involve the prevention of military support shipping, merchant ships and transport aircraft from reaching the Argentinian occupation forces. Sea control in the area would be a pre-requisite. The military ^{and merchant} shipping would not be difficult to deal with (although ammunition expenditure could be high), but the aircraft would require interception by Sea Harriers, Seadart or Seaslug SAM fitted ships. The aim of the blockade would be reduce the effectiveness of the occupation force prior to landing; this would be a lengthy business and could be more demanding for Falkland citizens than for the Argentinian military.

25. Blockade of Argentine Ports. Another option is to attempt a blockade of Argentina itself. This could either be directed against naval and military support shipping, or against all Argentinian shipping. Except in the case of Argentinian warships retiring to their bases (c.f. paragraph 5 above), this would not be a sensible proposition as it would be a diversion of assets away from the primary task in the Falklands. It would also expose our forces to a higher level of potential threat due to their proximity to mainland bases and would have wide political implications. This is not a favoured military option.

25. Power Projection Against Mainland Shore Targets. This could degrade Argentine military capabilities (eg airbases) or the military infrastructure, or could be directed against civil targets. It would require a high degree of intelligence and reconnaissance to ensure selection of worthwhile targets. Such measures could expect to be heavily opposed. Power projection could be by Sea Harrier (using bombs or rockets) or bombardment by ships. The Sea Harrier option would require the CVS and escorting forces to close well within range of the Argentine Air Force and also into more favourable operating areas for their inshore submarines and FPBs. Sea Harriers would be opposed by missile defences, guns and air defence aircraft unless previously reduced by attrition. Bombardment by surface forces would require ships to close within range of the coast, and thus the threat from surface ships (especially FPBs), submarines and aircraft would be even greater. To be successful the power projection option would require sea control of the local area. This option present a considerable degree of risk in the initial stages of any campaign, ~~and~~ is expensive in ordnance and is not recommended. The implications would be that although we might gain a military advantage, such attacks on the mainland would represent a significant escalation and may be politically unacceptable.

27. Offensive Maritime Operations. The objective would be to seek out and neutralise the Argentinian Navy on the high seas. This option would be for consideration if their forces were not established in the area of the Falkland Islands (when

neutralisation would form part of sea control). Destruction of Argentinian Naval units would make more certain sea control in the Falkland Islands and, in the longer term, would reduce or even eliminate the threat of further Argentinian seaborne assaults on the Falkland Islands after a successful reoccupation by British Forces. Such offensive operations are likely to involve greater expenditure of fuel and weapons particularly if RN units need to operate closer to the mainland. The neutralisation or destruction of the bulk of the Argentinian ocean-going fleet should not directly affect the Falkland Islanders but would be devastating for the Argentinian regime. For this reason and because of its long term implications this is militarily a most attractive option and one which could be started early by use of SSNs.

28. Conduct of the Landing Operations. The UK landing force consists of a Commando Brigade of 3 Commandos and one Para battalion with landing craft, helicopter, and combat and logistic support. All the Force is equipped for cold weather operations and the Bde HQ, two Commandos and their combat and logistic support are arctic trained and equipped. It is planned that the force would have sufficient ammunition and combat supplies for 30 days operations (at limited war rates).

29. The landing must not be attempted until we have achieved an acceptable level of sea and air control around and above the Falklands and are confident that this can be maintained over a prolonged period at least during active operations ashore.

30. Accurate intelligence of the strengths, disposition and capabilities of the Argentinian forces is vital to any projected amphibious landing. Every possible means should be harnessed in the coming weeks to build up a good military intelligence picture. The inhospitable and rugged terrain and the size of both Islands coupled with the problems of establishing and maintaining logistic resupply will probably preclude a strong Argentinian defence in all good landing areas. There is also a finite number of Argentinian troops who can be assigned to the Falklands, and an early intelligence assessment of these numbers is required. In the period before the landing an intensification of tactical intelligence gathering will be needed; this could be by both covert and overt means, the latter involving Sea Harriers. [Possibility of RAF reconnaissance to be discussed].

31. Shortly before the landing offensive air attacks and bombardments of military targets would be needed. The Force can execute a simultaneous two Company helicopter assault. Coupled with Landing Craft assets, an initial assault by two Commando Groups against light opposition to secure a bridgehead is possible. The flexibility of the amphibious force will enable a surprise landing to be conducted at a range of some 50 nm at a suitable lightly defended or unoccupied area. The subsequent build up within the bridgehead by the remainder of the landing force could be achieved within 24 hours. The terrain would probably preclude any immediate Argentinian response. The choice of initial landing and bridgehead would largely

depend on enemy dispositions, but would be most unlikely to be Port Stanley (which will probably be defended in strength) and where operations could be constrained by the presence of the Civilian population.

32. The next phase would be to consolidate the position in the Islands by progressively reoccupying them. The military success of this operation would depend on the relative strength of the opposing forces and the ability to sustain operations; the outcome cannot be predicted with certainty at this stage given the lack of detailed intelligence. In any event prolonged operations are likely to have a serious effect on the civilian population and the Islands' infrastructure. The terrain would favour the defenders as much as the landing force which would need to make extensive use of helicopters and landing craft for operations and logistic support. Subsequent operations would rely heavily on helicopters which could be used for out flanking operations and rapid response.

33. The onset of the Antarctic winter will render amphibious operations difficult because of frequent high winds, bad weather and low visibility.

34. Mining. The deployed force will have a limited number of submarine mines embarked in the support ships. The issue of declaring a minefield was addressed in para 12. If a minefield were required only submarines and surface ships (using ad hoc arrangements) could lay them. This would be difficult and dangerous off the Argentine coast and is not considered a feasible option not least because of the wide international implications of such an indiscriminate weapon. Mining off the Falklands is likewise not considered a feasible in the medium term.

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LOOSE MINUTE

D/AF/OPS/TF9

Sec Dops Staff


MILITARY APPRECIATION PAPER FOR CHIEFS OF STAFF

Reference:

D Ops Staff 7/10/2 dated 3 Apr 82.

Attached is the Air Force Department contribution covering air operations. You will note that the "Vulcan v Argentina from Ascension" option has been deleted - it is no longer considered feasible.

4 Apr 82


J F H TETLEY
Air Cdre

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DRAFT

MILITARY OPTIONS - ROYAL AIR FORCE

GENERAL

1. The Royal Air Force could undertake military operations around the South American continent and in the South Atlantic provided suitable mounting bases were available and overflying/staging rights to South America were obtained.

NIMROD MPA

2. Capability. MPA are particularly suitable for surface and sub-surface surveillance and providing targeting information and communications links to friendly submarines, surface ships and attack aircraft. They are also capable of carrying out torpedo attacks against submarines and deep draught unarmed surface vessels. However, one particular advantage of Nimrod is that it can be described internationally as a reconnaissance aircraft.

3. Vulnerability. The Mk2 Nimrod with its Searchwater radar would be able to remain outside the missile engagement zone of enemy warships, but it has no offensive capability against shipborne or land-based fighter aircraft.

4. Possible Deployment Bases.

a. Ascension. MPA could be in position at Ascension 2 days after departing UK, having staged through Lajes (for which USA/Portuguese approval would be required.) A Nimrod could remain on task with a surface group for 3 hours at a range of ~~1900~~

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miles from Ascension with a corresponding increase over shorter distances. Anti-submarine attacks could be undertaken up to a maximum range of about 1500 nm.

b. Punta Arenas(Chile). This is the closest Chilean airfield to the Falkland Islands, and a Nimrod operating from there would achieve a typical on task time in the Falklands area of 4½-5 hours.

c. El Tepual (Chile). Depending on routing^e, Nimrod aircraft mounting from El Tepual could remain on task for 4½ hours in the vicinity of the Falkland Islands. Routing^e and staging in Punta Arenas would allow 5 hours on task.

5. Deployment to Chile. Assuming that staging was not possible in Peru or Panama, routing^e would have to be via the USA and the Pacific islands of Hawaii(USA), Tahiti(France) and Easter Island (Chile). Deployment would take 6 days. ATF aircraft would also fly this route.

6. Force Requirement. A minimum viable detachment either at Ascension or in Chile would be two Nimrods Mk 2 in Chile and ^{two Nimrod} Mk1 at Ascension. These detachments would be able to provide at least one sortie per day and could deploy initially unsupported. Four Hercules equivalent loads would be required to provide adequate spares^{and} sensors for a 7 day period; thereafter re-supply would be necessary at the rate of 1 Hercules every 2 days.

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7. Preferred Nimrod Option. Because of the vulnerability of Punta Arenas, El Tepual is the preferred mounting base for Nimrod sorties. It is accepted that some sorties would have to stage via Punta Arenas to refuel.

... and the Falkland Islands from airfields in Chile. Naval support would be valuable against these targets. Offensive counter air operations could also be mounted against Argentinian airfields if necessary.

9. Concept of Operations. In the overland role the Buccaneer would carry 4 x 1000lb bombs, and in the maritime 2 Martel missiles/ 2 x 1000lb laser guided bombs. Two Chilean airfields would be particularly suitable for these operations.

a. Punta Arenas. The Buccaneer in the maritime role with its lo-lo radius of action of 400 nm could provide anti-shiping cover out to the Falkland Islands from Punta Arenas.

b. Santiago. Buccaneer aircraft mounting from Santiago could attack 4 of the major Argentine attack air defense bases in the north of the country.

10. Deployment to Chile. Assuming staging at Panama was not possible, aircraft would deploy via the Pacific islands route at para 5. This would entail operating 3 sectors without diversions. Deployment would take 6 days, and a large number of tanker aircraft would be required in support.

11. Force Requirements. A force of 6 Buccaneers would be capable of mounting about 30 sorties in a 7 day period. Transport support for such an operation would require about 14 Hercules sorties.

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OFFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS (BUCCANEERS)

8. Capabilities. Buccaneers could mount anti-shipping operations in the sea area between Argentina and the Falkland Islands from airfields in Chile; Nimrod support would be valuable against these targets. ^{Valparaiso} Offensive counter air operations could also be mounted against Argentinian airfields if necessary.
9. Concept of Operations. In the overland role the Buccaneer would carry 4 x 1000lb bombs, and in the maritime 2 Martel missiles/ 2 x 1000lb laser guided bombs. Two Chilean airfields would be particularly suitable for these operations.
- a. Punta Arenas. The Buccaneer in the maritime role with its Lo-Lo radius of action of 400 nm could provide anti-shipping cover out to the Falkland Islands from Punta Arenas.
- b. Santiago. Buccaneer aircraft mounting from Santiago could attack 4 of the major Argentine attack/air defence bases in the north of the country.
10. Deployment to Chile. Assuming staging at Panama was not possible, aircraft would deploy via the Pacific islands route at para 5. This would entail operating 3 sectors without diversions. Deployment would take 6 days, and a large number of tanker aircraft would be required in support.
11. Force Requirements. A force of 8 Buccaneers would be capable of mounting about 84 sorties in a 7 day period. Transport support for such an operation would require about 31 Hercules sorties.

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AIR DEFENCE

12. Argentine air assets include Mirage III and V, Canberra, A4 Skyhawk, F86 and Super Etendard aircraft. These aircraft could be employed in the attack and air defence roles and could be deployed to threaten our aircraft.

Punta Arenas in the south is very close to the Argentinian border and is thus particularly vulnerable to attack.

Should it be decided, therefore, to deploy aircraft to Punta Arenas, point defence of the airfield would be extremely valuable. This could be provided by a RAF Regiment Rapier SAM squadron.

13. Deployment to Chile. A Rapier squadron, capable of operating for 7 days, would require up to 15 Hercules sorties. Deployment, via the Pacific islands route, could be completed in 6 days.

RE-OCCUPATION FORCE LEVELS

1. The restoration of British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands could involve the forcible ejection of the Argentinian invasion force or its withdrawal in response to international pressure. The former would involve a major defeat of the Argentinian Armed Forces. The latter would leave the Argentinian invasion capability intact. The initial size and composition of the Garrison would depend, therefore, on the circumstances of Argentinian withdrawal.
2. The destruction of the major part of the Argentinian fleet may prove to be an essential pre-requisite for a successful intervention, although the Argentinians may be reluctant to put key elements - the CVS, the Type 42's and submarines - at risk. The Argentinian land forces deployed could expect heavy casualties and loss of equipment, but this would not necessarily reduce their amphibious capability if the marines used in the initial assault had been replaced by regular troops. Argentinian air force losses would probably be confined to their air transport forces.
3. Depending on the extent of Argentinian naval losses there would remain:
 - a. A slight risk of re-invasion.
 - b. A greater threat of low level harassment operations
 - c. A threat of ~~low and high level~~ air attack from low and high level.

These risks would increase progressively with time as Argentinian losses were made good.

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4. With the Argentinian CVS and the major part of the submarine force out of action the minimum garrison to hold the main islands pending the arrival of reinforcements by air would be:

- a. Force H2.
- b. 1 x T42 plus 1 x T21 w DLG, with supporting RFA.
- c. RM Commando Group (800+ men) or Infantry Battalion Group. (with one company group detached to S Georgia)
- d. Rapier Battery.
- e. EW and SCI radar.
- f. Air Defence aircraft (4-6 Harrier)
- g. Support helicopters (6-8 Sea King / Puma)
- h. Army Aviation (4 Gazelle)
- j. Supporting elements including: TCW, TSW, Engineer and intelligence detachments.

5. The force level above would virtually double the Falkland Islands' population. With the onset of winter the provision of accommodation would be an urgent need. The requirement could be substantially increased if Port Stanley was severely damaged. There could also be a need to restore public utilities.

Unopposed Withdrawal

6. With the Argentinian forces largely intact following withdrawal the force level required would be greater. Initially it would be necessary to retain the Task Group at its original strength. Subsequently it might be possible to withdraw the CVS and the LPH, reduce the number of escorts and SSNs. The retention of one SSN would be essential. Increases in other elements of the garrison would depend on what steps were taken to cater for rapid reinforcement.

Reinforcement

7. A garrison of the size proposed would be

unacceptably hostage to Argentinian action unless it could be reinforced rapidly. This would imply the upgrading of Port Stanley airfield to cater for strategic transport aircraft (VC10, C5, 747 etc). Essential improvements would be:

- a. 9000 ft runway with taxiways and hardstands for 6 or more strategic transport aircraft. Load bearing capacity to LCN 50 required.
 - b. Bulk storage of aviation fuel (5000 m³) with hydramt pressure dispensing system.
 - c. Instrument landing and navigation aids plus approach and airfield lighting.
 - d. Air Traffic Control, radar, communications and meteorological services.
8. To sustain an intensive air reinforcement operation additional facilities would be required.
- a. Hangarage and technical accommodation with main services.
 - b. Pre-positioned mechanical handling equipment.
 - c. Base operations and movement facilities.
 - d. Accommodation for aircrews and support personnel.

Logistics

9. Following ejection or withdrawal of the invasion force, it must be assumed that air and sea supply of the Falkland Island civilian population through Argentina would cease. Nor would it be certain that a logistic chain could be established via Chile. ^{On grounds of economy} Resupply of the civilian population and the Garrison would have to be by sea from the UK, supplemented possibly by airlift to Ascension Island. Runway improvements would allow for direct air supply of priority items, and

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replacement of Garrison personnel.

10. Hangarage and technical support would need to be provided for the Harrier/support helicopters and AAC detachments.
11. It will be necessary to re-establish naval fuel storage at Port Stanley.
12. The upgrading of airfield facilities at Port Stanley would cater for the deployment of MPA and air defence/tactical aircraft. The latter could not be deployed using in-flight refuelling.
13. Estimates of the logistics task, excluding the possibility of MPA and Phantom/Jaguar/Buccaneer deployment and assuming initial repair and accommodation requirements had been completed, would be in the order of:
 - a. For the civilian population, the minimum Garrison and the Guardships: 50-100 tons/day equivalent to 1-2 LSL's/month plus 1 fleet tanker every 2½ months.
 - b. For a. above with a Task Group deployed: 50-100 Tons/day equivalent to 1-2 LSL's/month plus 1 fleet tanker every month.

(There might be advantage in making the maximum use of merchantmen flying flags of convenience for resupply and logistic support as this would obviate the need for escorting RFA's/LSL's) ~~which might be a~~

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Classified: SSDC/US DSC
CGRM

EFFECTS OF FAULKLAND ISLANDS OPERATIONS ON THE UK'S

NATO COMMITMENTS

General

1. Planned deployments to Operation CORPORATE will result in a significant reduction in the UK's maritime and air assets currently committed to NATO at A1 Status ^(with a 40% reduction). The Army contribution will not significantly affect our land forces declarations. ~~The use of the 1st Airborne Division will create severe shortfalls in naval fuel and ammunition stocks in the NATO area.~~ ~~The UK's contribution to a number of NATO exercises will be affected and our ability to perform certain naval and air tasks in peace, tension and war will be ~~seriously~~ restricted. If protracted and sustained operations are required in the S. Atlantic region then the UK's long term NATO declarations are likely to require review. However in spite of the ~~reduced level~~ ^{reduced level} of unit availability to NATO the state of preparedness for war will be considerably higher than in normal peacetime ^{circumstances} ~~situations~~, unless losses or damage ~~are sustained~~.~~

Royal Navy and Royal Marines

2. Principal fleet units, presently declared to NATO at A1 Status, earmarked for Op CORPORATE include 3 SSNs, 2 CVSS, 6 DDs, 4 FFs,

SECRET

1 LPD, 5 LSLs, upto 8 RFAs. Additionally all NATO declared ^{Sea} Harriers and a large proportion (1/3) of our maritime helicopters ~~including about 10 ~~Harriers~~~~ ~~declared to ~~RAF~~~~ will be embarked in the Task Force. This Force will create a 48% shortfall in our ship A1 declaration; these ~~five~~ units will ^{have to be placed} likely be at A4 Status ^{whilst in the S Atlantic} ~~if ~~present~~ dictated~~ ~~their redeployment to the NATO area~~. 3 RFA Cdo. Bde. would not be available to NATO at better than A4 once ashore on the Falkland Islands. Naval war reserve fuel stocks will be reduced by one third in the first 20 days after which levels in NATO will be made up and remain stable. One half of the afloat war reserve back of stock of ammunition will go OOA in the first 20 days and a further quarter will be carried onboard RFA REGENT later. Expenditure of ^{certain} ~~of~~ ^{categories} of ammunition stocks would create permanent shortfalls.

~~RAF~~ Army

3. The principal army unit (5 Inf Bde) ^{to be deployed OOA} is not declared to NATO. However one Arty Bty, an AD (BLOWPIPE) Tp, AAC Squ and a Tpt Tp have NATO roles. They total 245 men ^{and} 70 tons of ammunition. One ~~of~~ RAPIER Bty from 12 Regt consisting of 12 launchers and 165 men is earmarked for NATO or A3.

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4. Royal Air Force

4. In the early part of Operation ~~COOPERATE~~^{COOPERATE} the greater part of the Air Transport Force^(ATF) will be involved; it is not possible to predict the effort which might subsequently be required. In the event of a NATO crisis the implementation of plans for the air reinforcement of NATO, including the deployment of the UKMF, would be considerably frustrated while COOPERATE aircraft were recovered. The force might temporarily be re-categorised from A1 to A3 (5-15 days availability).

5. In view of its planned demise by 30 June, the reduced availability of part of the Vulcan force (which is declared to NATO only in the nuclear role) is unlikely to be of major concern. However, the downgrading of four Nimrods from A1 to A3 or A4 would be seen as significant. With up to 10 of the 31 aircraft already at reduced readiness because of the MK2 conversion programme, the withdrawal of a further four would diminish NATO's peacetime and TTW surveillance capability in the Eastern Atlantic.

6. The use of 8 Buccaneers and 4 Phantoms is under consideration. The Buccaneer fleet of 46 aircraft is A1 assigned with the exception of eight training aircraft at C3. A reassignment of the latter to C4 or C5 would probably suffice. All 100 RAF Phantoms are declared at A1: 60 under NATO Command (SACEUR); 30 assigned to SACNAMT and

• Ten training aircraft to CINCPACAIR. Recategorizing
some aircraft to A4 or A5 would not be significant.
The Victor tankers which would be required to shepherd
the Buccaneers and Phantoms to the South Atlantic
are under national command but their temporary
non-availability could impact upon operations of the
UK Interceptor Alert Force.

7. With regard to consumables, UK holdings match
almost exactly the NATO 30-day requirement in
Bombs, Rockets ASM and cannon ammunition but
Phantom air-to-air missile holdings represent only
some 2/3 of the requirement. So it is clear that any
expenditure of munitions would deplete the UK's
declared war maintenance reserve. Fuel stocks would
go into deficit initially against the NATO minimum
but could quickly be restored.

SECRET

NATO Tasks and Exercises

8. The principal peacetime NATO task likely to be affected by Op CORPORATE is the surveillance of Soviet/WP maritime forces.

9. The UK has committed forces to Exercise DISTANT DRUM 82 in the E. Mediterranean 3-15 May.

Op CORPORATE will require the withdrawal of 1 CVS (INVINCIBLE), 1 RFA (TIDESPRING) and 1 Coy 40 Cdo. RM, leaving 3 RM frigates to participate.

The Fleet CDT must be withdrawn from Exercise DAMSEL FAIR off Sicily at the same time.

HMS BRILLIANT must be withdrawn from Exercise OPEN GATE 20-27 May. No further major NATO

exercises will be affected before June. Upto

six minor NATO exercises scheduled before June could be affected by the withdrawal of UK forces.

Use of the ATF and LSLs in Op CORPORATE could have a downstream effect on deployments to other NATO exercises.

SECRET

THE CAPABILITY OF THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES

INTRODUCTION

- * 1. The Prime Minister has stated that HMG's ~~main~~ aim is to restore the Falkland Islands to British Sovereignty, and a Royal Navy Task Force has set sail for the South Atlantic. The Chiefs of Staff are considering the military options available and have directed that the Defence Intelligence Staff assess the capability of the Argentine Armed Forces to counter any United Kingdom military action in the South Atlantic designed to regain possession of the Falkland Islands.

AIM

2. The aim of this paper is to determine the capability of the Argentine Armed Forces to defence the South Atlantic and Falkland Islands against the United Kingdom Task Force.

^SASSUMPTIONS

- * 3. We assume that any UK action to recapture South Georgia will take place after HMG's sovereignty has been restored to the Falkland Islands and we do not consider this matter further. We also assume that HMG will not order any action, other than special operations, against the mainland of Argentina.

SHIPPING

SPECIAL MILITARY

OPERATION CORPORATE (ie Sutton)

SECRET UK EYES B

SCOPE

4. We consider first the relevant political and economic background before giving our assessment of the overall capability of the Argentine Armed Forces. We then look in some detail at the Argentine capability to defend the South Atlantic Ocean and the Falkland Islands before discussion^{NGT} the Argentine strengths and vulnerabilities before drawing our conclusions.

THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

The Political Scene

5. The initial reactions of neighbouring South American countries, other than Chile, has supported Argentina's case on the principal of sovereignty whilst generally condemning the use of force. However, only Brazil has express unreserved political support for Argentina but this is unlikely to lead to the rendering of material assistance and none can be expected from any other Latin American Country. The UK is only likely to receive support from Chile; she has already offered Britain the use of its ports for a civilian manned Royal Fleet Auxiliary. We doubt whether this offer would be extended to cover warships or military aircraft although political pressure may change this.

6. The USSR have supported the Argentinian cause although the absentation on the UN Security Council resolution shows that

they are being cautious. Russian support is to be expected given that they regard the Falklands dispute as a colonial issue and that they need considerable amounts of grain from Argentina.

The Economic Background

7. The economy is in a very poor state, and the countries wealth is very unequally distributed with widespread poverty. In 1981 the inflation rate at 130% was the world's highest, the gross domestic product fell and the currency collapsed against the US dollar. Foreign debt rose, servicing was a serious drain and the budget deficit increased considerably. The one bright spot has been recent large grain exports with the USSR taking three quarters of total sales. The present leadership have introduced an austerity programme but this has provoked large scale unrest. There is little hope of any substantial economic improvement in the short term.

8. The United States are Argentina's biggest trade partner, taking a tenth of her exports and supplying a fifth of her imports. At least a third of Argentina's current \$30 billion debt is owed to US creditors and any action by American banks to call in debts or suspend new loans would cause serious financial damage, whereas the UK can exercise negligible economic leverage.

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SPECIAL MILITARY

OPERATION CORPORATE (ie Sutton)

SECRET UK EYES B

9. In the short term the economic situation would not effect the Argentine ability to wage war, however, if the war dragged on, entailing diversion of more resources to defence, Argentina's economic crisis could only deepen and increase the general disaffection with the Junta's rule.

surveillance may be linked, if not directly, to the two RP/DP sites. Long range surface surveillance is conducted by the CVA embarked on the aircraft carrier by shore based aircraft. It may also be conducted by or larger surface vessels with ASW capability.

2. Their best ASW assets are the Type 23 frigates if pre-positioned for target areas. The Type 23 has a dual ASW/ASUV role which is well suited to the task.

3. HMS EXOCT is widely regarded as the best ASW frigate and, possibly, in the world. It is a Type 23 frigate and EXOCT on original build. The system is well suited from the operators point of view and a high level of performance should be expected. With the limited number of Type 23s and the difficulties of "over the horizon" ASW, the Type 23 would provide the surest means of target detection. The Type 23 is not known to have ever detected a submarine. The Type 23 may well experience difficulty in ASW operations due to its size and gunnery. A total of 16 Type 23s are in service and the entire stock.

4. The SEADANT system fitted on the Type 23 has a horizon limited to a range of about 150 miles. It is a surface ASW system fired by the Argentinians in the surface ASW role.

COS TS15(1)

SECRET UK EYES B

COS TS15(1)

ASSESSMENT OF ARGENTINIAN NAVY AND NAVAL AIR FORCE

ANTI SURFACE WARFARE

- SQUARE
1. The Argentine Navy regularly practices surface surveillance using their P-2E NEPTUNE aircraft and a search rate of 22,000 sqare miles per hour (30% of a NIMROD capability. Their surveillance may be linked, if not initially triggered, by a two HF/DF sites. Long range surface surveillance could also be conducted by the CVA embarked S-2E TRACKER aircraft or visually by shore bases aircraft. ESM may also be used by their frigates or larger surface vessels and by their submarines.
 2. Their best ASUW system is the two TYPE 209/1 diesel submarines if pre-positioned for force intercept; however the requirement for a dual ASW/ASUW role would limit weapon loadout.
 3. MM38 EXOCET is widely fitted in 4 ex-US destroyers, 3 Type A 69 frigates and, possibly, in the 2 Type 42 destroyers (neither ship had EXOCET on original build). This system is rugged and simple from the operators point of view and a better than 50% availability should be expected. With the limited missile range (23n miles) and the difficulties of "over the horizon targetting", active radar would provide the surest means of targetting. The Argentinians are not known to have ever dired EXOCET, have no reloads available and may well experience difficulty in co-ordnating missile firings and gunnery. A total of 36 (max) missiles is considered their entire stock.
 4. The SEADART system fitted to the 2 Type 42 destroyers is horizon limited to a range of about 18n ~~miles~~ and has never been fired by the Argentinians in the surface mode. The system on the

SHIPPING

SPECIAL MILITARY

OPERATION CORPORATE (ie Sutton)

SECRET UK EYES B

SANTISIMA TRINIDAD is probably ineffective due to a MK 19 gyro instability. The maximum number of SEADART missiles between both ships would be 44 but there are no further stocks available ashore and it is believed that neither ship has a full outfit.

IRON

5. The use of attack aircraft in new bomb attacks is probable although unlikely at night. It is not known if the air launched AM 39 EXOCET has been purchased; they are not believed to have ARMs. The Air Force could provide a limited ASUW capability with its A-4B/C and CANBERRA aircraft but effective co-ordination of air operations is lacking. Close range ASM operations using 5 naval ALOUETTE helicopters with AS-11/12 missiles could be conducted from the CVA or Type 42s but is unlikely. The state of training and co-ordination of these operations is likely to be of low quality.

Individual group's Commanders in Chief and there has been no apparent co-operation or co-ordination.

A1 - 2
SECRET UK EYES B

COS S15(1)

SHIPPING

SPECIAL MILITARY

OPERATION CORPORATE (ie Sutton)

SECRET UK EYES B

ATTACHMENT 2 TO ANNEX A TO

← COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. With the exception of the two Type 42s, the Argentinians have a varied collection of old communications equipment. The CVA and two type 42s are configured to link data by an updated Ferranti CAAIS but they are not believed to have the operational proficiency to make effective use of this capability.
2. They are not believed to have a secure voice capability; they use the US MK 10 1FF system, probably with their own codes. Integrated Air Force and Naval Air Force operations are now known to have ever taken place. Each of the armed forces is autonomous and little if any experience of joint operations is available to them. Control of exercises is vested in the individual arm's Commanders in Chief and there has been no apparent co-operation or co-ordination.

control radars on the old 42 ships... and are reported to be suffering from... detection ranges on the... miles but this will reduce to... Harrier is low.

3. Point defence of all ships... on the Cruiser (which is reportedly... suspect); its capability is... and, on the CVA, restricted to... of had held... daylight operations only.

4. Therefore, unless the... defence is limited to...

A2 - 1
SECRET UK EYES B

COS S15(1)

ANTI AIR WARFARE

1. The primary Argentine naval AAW weapon system would be the SUPER ETENDARDE which, however, are probably not yet qualified for embarkation in the CVA. SKYHAWKS could provide a limited AAW capability with primitive AIM-g AAMs but would require excellent fighter direction which is probably, limited due to air search radar maintenance problems. The SEADART system on the Type 42s has never been fired since arrival in Argentina and on the SANTISIMA TRINIDAD is believed to have been ineffective since building due to MK 19 gyro instability; the two ships with this system have a magazine capacity of 22 missiles each - no reloads are available from ashore. *unlikely to be accurate.*
2. Air search radars, with the exception of Type 965 and Type 992 in the Type 42's, are old and are reportedly ineffectve. Fire control radars on the old ex-US ships do not have an ECCM capability and are reported to be suffering from maintenance problems. Detection ranges on the Sea Harrier are assessed at a maximum of 80 miles but this will reduce to horizon range (9 - 12 miles) when the Harrier is ^{at low altitude} ~~low~~.
3. Point defence on all ships would mainly be gunfire and Seacat on the Cruiser (which is reportedly in harbour and whose system is suspect); this capability is limited due to obsolescent systems and, on the CVA, restricted to hand powered 40mm guns. Deployment of hand held BLOWPIPE SAMs is possible but would be limited to daylight operations only.
4. Therefore, unless the SEADART systems are serviceable. AA defence is limited to guns.

SHIPPING

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OPERATION CORPORATE (ie Sutton)

SECRET UK EYES B

ATTACHMENT 4 TO
ANNEX A TO

NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

- 1. The single 6" gun cruiser is not believed to be serviceable and remains in port as at 4 April; it must be assumed that they could get her to sea by the end of April and th^At she has a full outfit of ammunition.
- 2. The Argentinians do have at least 33 guns of 100mm or greater with a NGS capability; the ex-US destroyers are most likely to be used in this role due to their large magazine capacity and system reliability.
- 3. Effectiveness in NGS would be limited due to probable lack of training and exercise. The condition of fire control systems and turret alignment is unknown but is unlikely to be accurate.

*

*

A4 - 1
SECRET UK EYES B

COS S15(1)

ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE

1. The Argentinians do not often get the opportunity, if ever, to exercise with high performance SSNs. They apparently consider their best ASW platforms to be the 2 x Type 209/1 submarines which have a limited broad band passive search capability with their sonar. Surface ship sonars are limited to the surface duct and the medium frequency Type 184M in the 2 x Type 42s is the most capable but requires constant and careful attention to achieve this capability. The ex-US sonars are obsolescent and would be of very limited use. The DUBA sonar on the Type A-69 frigates would be capable of close range operations only.
2. The TRACKER and SEAKING aircraft are capable of JEZEBEL operations; this equipment is similar to that used by the UK but the aircraft on board processing equipment (which is unknown) determines the effectiveness - this equipment is unlikely to be as sophisticated as that used by the UK or US.
3. ASW torpedoes known to be in the Argentine inventory include the US MK 44 Mod 081, MK 37 and the West German SST 4; the MK 46 Mod 0 may be in their inventory but is unlikely. A West German SUT wire guided torpedo is also reported to be in their inventory. Frigates and larger ^{SHIPS} also have 375mm mortar (2200m range), Hedgehog (274m range) and depth charges. Aircraft would probably drop the UK MK 43 torpedo. The general assessment of their ASW capability against the UK threat is low.

A5 - 1
SECRET UK EYES B

COS S15(1)

OPERATION
CORPORATE
(ie Sutton)

SHIPPING

SPECIAL MILITARY

ATTACHMENT 6 TO
ANNEX A TO

MINE WARFARE

1. Argentinian mine stocks are unknown but may consist of US air dropped Type 52/55 mines. The Type 209 submarines do not have the modifications to lay mines but the ex US submarines do. The Argentinians conduct an apparently vigorous MCM programme with their six ex-British Ton class coastal minesweepers, demonstrating their awareness of the mining threat.

2. Both the P-2 and TRACKERs are assessed as being capable of dropping mines.

The Argentine merchant marine consists of about 700 general cargo, tanker, and passenger vessels, of over 1,000 tonnes, most under national control, available for national transport purposes. The Argentine Navy does not have a centralized logistic control system which apparently multiplies individual ship supply problems. Fuel stocks are unknown, but are probably sufficient for short term operations. Operational availability is running at about 80%.

2. The sophisticated modern equipment in the Type 209 will present major maintainability problems. The 100mm gun is known to suffer from a HEI9 gyro defect from ballistics which will probably render both the gun and missile systems inoperative. Given the known maintenance problems of these missiles and the inability of the Argentinians to obtain spares, it is unlikely if more than one fire control channel is available between the ships.

3. The old ex US cruiser is unlikely to be capable of any surface action but may be capable of ASW. The ship is known to have machinery problems and has, so far, remained in harbour.

A6 - 1
SECRET UK EYES B

COS S15(1)

COS S15(1)

SUSTAINABILITY OF OPERATIONS

1. The Argentine Navy is known to suffer from electronics maintenance difficulties. Also, after short periods at sea, they require alongside maintenance with often difficult to obtain spares requirements. The major surface units are believed to be RAS capable from their single large tanker (which is currently limited to 13 kts) although they normally refuel in port and at anchor. The CVA is limited in operations as it can only carry 290 tonnes of A gas and 333 tonnes of jet fuel. Stocks of fuel supplies are unknown, but are probably sufficient for short term operations. The Argentine merchant marine consists of about 200 general cargo, tanker, and passenger vessels, of over 1,000 tonnes, most under national control, available for national resupply purposes. The Argentine Navy does not have a centralised logistic control system which apparently multiplies individual ship supply problems. A-4 operational availability is running at about 40%.
2. The sophisticated modern equipment in the two Type 42s will present major sustainability problems; the SANTISIMA TRINIDAD is known to suffer from a MK19 gyro defect from building which will probably render both the gun and missile systems ineffective. Given the known maintenance problems of these systems and the inability of the Argentinians to obtain spars^e, it is unlikely if more than one fire control channel is available between the two ships.
3. The old ex US cruiser is unlikely to be capable of serious surface action but may be capable of NGS. She is known to have machinery problems and has, so far, remained in harbour. Since her

A7 - 1
SECRET UK EYES B

COS S15(1)

SHIPPING

SPECIAL MILITARY

OPERATION CORPORATE (Lt Sutton)

ANNEX B TO

most obvious application would have been during the initial invasion, it is unlikely that she is capable of putting to sea.

4. The Argentinian Naval Force, given the low capacity of their only underway replenishment tanker, is unlikely to be able to sustain operations continuously at sea for longer than 3 - 4 days.

2 Interceptor Sqdns	Mirage III	11
	Mirage V	24
Fighter/Bomber Sqdns	A-4 Skyhawk	55
	P-50F Sabre	15
2 Attack Sqdns	T-34B Mentor	17
	OH-1A Iroquois	3
	IA-58 Pucara	10
2 Helicopter and Search Sqdns	Bell 212	2
	Sikorsky S-58T	2
	Sikorsky S-61A	1
	Sikorsky S-61R	1
	Piper PA 31 Navajo	1
	C-47 Douglas Skytrain	1
	HU-16B Albatross	3
	Aero Commander 500B	5
	Hughes Model 500	11
	Swearingen Merlin IV	2
	SA 315 B Lame	3
4 Transport Sqdns	Lockheed Hercules	7
	Boeing 707	1
	Fokker F-27	10
	Fokker F-28 Fellowship	5
	IA 50 Guarani II	2
	C-47 Douglas Skytrain	1
	DHC-6 Twin Otter	6
1 Photographic Sqdn	IA 50 Guarani II	3
	Lear Jet 35	2
4 Training Sqdns	HS 740 Taurus	37
	T-34B Mentor	31
3 Support Sqdns	T-34 B Mentor	1
	Cessna 182	1
	C-47 Douglas Skytrain	2
	Hughes Model 500	2
	Aero Commander 500 U	2
	IA 50 Guarani II	2
	A-4 KQ130	2

A7 - 2
SECRET UK EYES B

COS S15(1)

SECRET UK EYES B

OPERATION
CORPORATE
(i.e. Sutton)

SHIPPING

SPECIAL MILITARY

ANNEX F TO

ANNEX E TO

ARGENTINE AIR FORCE

SUMMARY OF UNITS

<u>Units</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Total</u>
1 Bomber Sqdn	Canberra B-6	9
2 Interceptor Sqdns	Mirage III	11
	Mirage V	24
Fighter/Bomber Sqdns	A-4 Skyhawk	56
	F-86F Sabre	15
2 Attack Sqdns	T-34B Mentor	17
	UH-1H Iroquois	5
	IA-58 Pucara	40
2 Helicopter and Search Sqdns	Bell 212	2
	Sikorsky S-58T	2
	Sikorsky S-61N	1
	Sikorsky S-61R	1
	Piper PA 31 Navajo	1
	C-47 Douglas Skytrain	1
	HU-16B Albatross	3
	Aero Commander 500U	5
	Hughes Model 500	11
	Swearingen Merlin IV	2
	SA 315 B Lama	5
4 Transport Sqdns	Lockheed Hercules	7
	Boeing 707	1
	Fokker F-27	10
	Fokker F-28 Fellowship	6
	IA 50 Guarani II	12
	C-47 Douglas Skytrain	1
	DHC-6 Twin Otter	6
1 Photographic Sqdn	IA 50 Guarani II	3
	Lear Jet 35	2
4 Training Sqdns	MS 760 Paris	37
	T-34B Mentor	31
5 Support Sqdns	T-34 B Mentor	1
	Cessna 182	2
	C-47 Douglas Skytrain	5
	Hughes Model 500	3
	Aero Commander 500 U	2
	IA 50 Guarani II	2
A-4 KC130		

SHIPPING

SPECIAL MILITARY

OPERATION CORPORATE (14 Section)

ANNEX F TO

AIRFIELDS

Units	Type	Total
Additional Air Force Utility Aircraft	T-39 Sabreliner	1
	Cessna 182	11
	IA-50 Guarani II	2
	C-47	8
	Aero Commander 500	6
	DHC-2 Beaver	3
	DHC-3 Otter	1
	Bell 212	5
EL PLANERILLO	32 29 558 63 27 03W Concrete	2310
VILLA REYNOLDS	33 43 488 65 23 08W Asphalt	1591
MORON	34 40 388 58 38 35W Asphalt	98
EL PALOMAR	34 36 378 58 36 42W Concrete	58
RECONQUISTA	29 11 308 59 41 30W Concrete	157
GEN ENRIQUE MOSCONI	45 47 148 67 27 46W Concrete	150
PUESTO DESARDO	47 44 098 65 54 07W Asphalt	266
PUESTO DESARDO MAR	47 43 128 65 55 31W Asphalt	271
RIO GALLEGOS	51 36 218 69 19 28W Concrete	66
SANTA CRUZ	50 01 128 68 35 00W Asphalt	371
RIO GRANDE	53 46 458 67 45 00W Concrete	43
PUESTO MADRYN(CIV) Capable of landing C47	42 45 248 65 05 47W Graded Earth	246
PUESTO MADRYN(MAV) Capable of landing C47	42 47 38 65 01 04 Graded Earth	230

SHIPPING

SPECIAL MILITARY

OPERATION CORPORATE (ie Sutton)

AIRFIELDS

NAME	COORDS	R/W (ft)	ELEV (ft)
GEN URQUIZA	31 47 44S 60 28 48W	688 x 147 Asphalt	243
DR MARAINO MORENO	34 33 42S 58 47 20W	7874 x 131 Asphalt	105
TANDIL	37 14 08S 59 13 44W	8366 x 157 Concrete	574
EL PLUMERILLO	32 49 55S 68 47 05W	9885 x 177 Concrete	2310
VILLA REYNOLDS	33 43 48S 65 23 08W	7545 x 164 Asphalt	1591
MORON	34 40 38S 58 38 36W	10334 x 131 Asphalt	98
EL PALOMAR	34 36 37S 58 36 42W	6910 x 164 Concrete	58
RECONQUISTA	29 11 30S 59 41 30W	6447 x 164 Concrete	157
GEN ENRIQUE MOSCONI	45 47 14S 67 27 46W	7710 x 164 Concrete	190
X PUERTO DESEADO	47 44 09S 65 54 07W	4921 x 98 Asphalt	266
X PUERTO DESEADO NAB	47 43 12S 65 55 31W	4800 x 110 Asphalt	271
/ RIO GALLEGOS	51 36 27S 69 19 28W	11647 x 136 Concrete	66
/ SANTA CRUZ	50 01 12S 68 35 00W	6562 x 98 Asphalt	371
/ RIO GRANDE	53 46 45S 67 45 00W	6561 x 130 Concrete	43
RADED PUERTO MADRYN(CIV) Capable of landing C47	42 45 24S 65 05 47W	7283 x 262 Graded Earth	446
PUERTO MADRYN(NAV) Capable of landing C47	42 47 3S 65 01 04	4921 x 164 Graded Earth	230

SHIPPING

SPECIAL MILITARY

OPERATION CORPORATE (ie Sutton)

SECRET UK EYES B

ANNEX H TO

ANNEX H TO

ARGENTINE AIR FORCE

Argentine Air Force Aircraft relevant to the resupply of the Falkland Islands and for operations against a UK Intervention Force are as follows:

<u>Units</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Principal Bases</u>
1 Bomber Sqn	Canberra B-6	9	Parana
2 Intceptor Sqns	Mirage III	11	Dr Mariano Moreno
	Mirage V	24	Tandil
? Fighter/Bomber Sqns	A4C Skyhawk	21	El Plumerillo (Mendoza)
	A4B Skyhawk	35	Villa Reynolds
1 Fighter Sqn (nominally fighter/bomber)	F86F Sabre	15	El Plumerilla (Mendoza)
1 Attack Sqn	Pucara	40	Reconquista
? Transport Sqns	C130 Hercules	7	El Palomar
	F28 Fellowship	6	Gen Enrique Moscono
	F27 Fellowship	10	Not known
	C47	13	Various

COS S15(1)

H - 1
SECRET UK EYES B

SHIPPING

SPECIAL MILITARY

OPERATION CORPORATE (ie Sutton)

ASSESSMENT OF ARGENTINIAN AIR FORCE

ANNEX J TO

← AIRCRAFT CAPABILITIES

1. A-4 Skylark. The 57 A-4B and C Skylarker are the mainstay of the ground attack force. The aircraft first flew in the mid 1950's and has been in the Argentinian Air Force inventory since the 1960's, and the avionics fit reflects 1950's technology - a simple navigation and weapon aiming system. Despite the simplicity of the aircraft, the Argentinians have been unable to maintain an adequate spares back-up with the result that half of the aircraft remain unserviceable; however, some of these could be pressed into service in a wartime situation. The aircraft has 5 load carrying suspension points and is fitted with two integral 20MM canons. The quoted maximum load is 10,000 lbs however a more realistic load would be 2 x 1136 litre fuel tanks and 3 - 5,000 lbs of stores (bombs, rockets or Bullpup ASM).

SKYHAWK The Sklylark can carry 3 Bullpup missiles which have a range of 6NM. The radius of action will be dictated by the aircraft configuration but, until better evidence is available, we are estimating the distance to be in the order of 300 - 500*NM based on a ferry range of 1700NM with full internal and external fuel.

SKYHAWK 2. The Skylark has an in-flight refuelling capability and can also act as a tanker itself. However the Air Force has 2 x KC - 130 tanker aircraft and in-flight refuelling is regularly practiced SKYHAWKS between this aircraft and the Skylarks. It has been reported that SKYHAWKS some Skylarks are armed with the Israeli "SHAFRIR" (short range, IR homing) dogfight air-to-air missile and it is possible that a number are equipped with Sidewinder. Thus, although the aircraft

is used predominantly for ground attck and bearing in mind that the missiles are essentially short range, possibly fitted for self defence, the Argentinians might nevertheless see the aircraft being used in a visual air defence role.

3. Canberra B6. The status of this fleet of 10 aircraft is uncertain; they were delivered to Argentina in 1970. The estimated radius of action is 800NM and the aircraft could carry AS-12, AS-15 and MARTIN PESCADOR ASMIS or an internal bomb load. The AS-12 has a command to line of sight guidance~~x~~ system and is suitable for use against tanks, ships or justifications. The AS-15 is a light weight all weather missile with a range of at least 8NM for attacking surface targets at sea. The radar associated with this missile can be used to designate over-the-horizon targets for long range anti-ship missiles in the EXOCET class. The third ASM which can be carried is the Argentinian built MARTIN PESCADOR which is a short range (4NM) supersonic missile with an 88lb warhead. The missile is radio command guided along the line of sight.

4. MIRAGE III. This is probably the 'E' variant which first flew in 1961 and with the Mirage 5 are the most modern aircraft in the Air Force. The primary navigation aids are Doppler and Tacan and the CYRANO fire control radar may also be used in a secondary role for ground mapping from high altitude. The radar can also be used for ranging in the air-to-ground mode. The aircraft was designed to operate from small airstrips and at maximum take-off weight is quoted as having a 5250 ft take-off run. Two 30MM canons are fitted in the wing roots and in

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SHIPPING
SPECIAL MILITARY

ANNEX J TO

addition 2 x 1,000lb bombs or rocket pods can be carried on the two underwing weapon stations. The radius of action is quoted to be 650NM.

5. MIRAGE 5. This aircraft is similar to the Mirage III but has an increased radius of action (700NM with 2,000 lbs bombs) and an improved weapon carrying capability. The aircraft was designed to operate from semi prepared strips. Seven attachment points are available for weapons and fuel tanks and two integral 30MM canons are fitted in the fuselage. On the inboard wepon stations 110 gallon fuel tanks can be carried with either bombs or rocket pods attached. The total wepon load is 8820 lbs of bombs with an external fuel load of 220 gallons. In the air defence role the Mirage 5 and III could carry Sidewinder missiles.

6. Sabre. The status of the F-86 Sabre is unknown. The aircraft is essentially a sub-sonic air defence aircraft fitted with 4 x 0.5 inch machine guns, although it can be employed in a limited ground attack role. The Sabre is a very manoeuverable aircraft when engaged in close air combat and could be more than a match for the Harrier; however it relies on good ground control for an air intercept and the weight of shot on target of its machine guns might be inadequate.

7. Peuara. The Argentinian aircraft industry has produced its own turboprop COIN aircraft manned Pucara. It is a simple aircraft capable of operating from short, semi prepared strips in order of 1,000 feet and in addition to its 2 integral 20MM canons it can carry 3,300 lbs of weapons or fuel on its 3 underwing suspension points.

THE ARGENTINE ARMY

1. The Army has a total strength of some 85,000; this is made up of a regular cadre of officers and SNCOs with junior ranks being found from 1-year conscripts. Mobilisation plans exist and the Army's strength could grow to 115,000 after 15 days.
2. The tactical organisation of the Army is built round twelve brigades. Tactics and organisation follow the United States model but with local variations. There is an airborne brigade which is held at Cordoba as a strategic reserve. A more detailed account of the Army's capability and organisation, with reference, where appropriate, to the Marines, is at Annex .
3. Training is generally effective, but the large proportion of 1-year conscripts, with the resultant turnover, limits the scope of training to company and platoon level; formation exercises are infrequent. There is little evidence of joint training of any sort. Although the armywide standard of all arms training must therefore be assessed as at the best weak, elite units (eg Airborne/Bde and Marines) probably maintain a higher standard. The Army's morale and national pride are good, but its effectiveness, particularly under testing conditions and after one or two reverses, must be open to question.
4. The Army is equipped with a heterogeneous collection of weapons and vehicles, much of which has been acquired since 1977 from the United States, Western Europe whilst some is ^{of} local manufacture. The diversity of equipment poses maintenance and serviceability problems and logistics are a particular area of weakness. The armoured force, whilst having much new equipment, is light in protection and air defence is another area of weakness. As the Army has only had to draw on a comparatively small and elite proportion of its forces to undertake the Falklands Operation the general weaknesses identified in the Army as a whole are unlikely to be so pronounced in this particular force.

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The Argentinian Air Force

General (Archibald)

B.

1. The Argentinian Air Force consists of 20,000 men, half of whom are conscripted for 12 months, and ~~a front line of some 300 aircraft~~ some 300 aircraft but only 175 ~~are~~ ^{have a} combat ^{capability} ~~aircraft~~.

~~Also~~ The majority are fairly elderly, ~~and~~ all suffer from a shortage of spares and a lack of high quality maintenance. We have ~~some~~ evidence that a Skyhawk Brigade of ~~some~~ 20 aircraft can normally only ~~per day~~ get about half of their aircraft serviceable ~~at~~ ^{any one time}: the ~~is~~ remainder being casualties to previous spares. In the course of hostilities, when flight safety would be less of a consideration, the Argentinians may be able to increase their ~~serviceability~~ ^{to} this in the short term but we doubt whether it would exceed some 60 per cent of the number of bases.

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2. We have little reliable data on Argentinian flying rates or operational effectiveness. We suspect that in common with most other Latin American air forces that standards are not high and that there are unaccustomed to intensive operations.

We believe that weapon stocks are low but this would only be a limitation in a prolonged conflict. ~~We have considered each operational etc.~~
 Our detailed assessment of the

Argentinian Air Force is at Annex —

Air Defense

6. The Argentinians have 35 divisions in air defense...
 always been...
 always been...
 because of the...
 always been...

Offensive Support

3. The Argentines have about 100 ^{dedicated} offensive support aircraft which could be supplemented by a further 35 air defense aircraft which have a ground attack capability. The longest range aircraft are the 9, now obsolete Canberra who have a radius of action of about 800 nms, the others vary in general between 500 to 350 nms. The principal weapon is the 500 and 1,000 lb bomb ^{a variety of} but ~~AS-12 and AS-15~~ command guided missiles are also in the inventory and all aircraft are fitted with canisters.

4. All the aircraft ~~suffer from~~ lack modern navigation/attack systems although the 56 Skyhawks have apparently been fitted with Omega, an area navigation aid. Thus at night or in poor weather they would have little capability of finding or attacking distant targets.

Air Defense

6. The Argentines have 35 dedicated air defense ~~aircraft~~ ^{aircraft} ~~with~~ ^{with} a limited all-weather capability. These aircraft could be supplemented by a substantial number of the offensive support aircraft who have

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Some air defence capability. However, none of the aircraft have sufficient range to remain on station over the Falkland Islands for ~~more than~~ a significant period. ~~Given this limitation~~ The Argentinians could use their 2 KC 130s to refuel the Skyhawks ^{and} this would not add measurably to their capability. ^{Furthermore} ~~However~~ the Argentinians ~~do not~~ ^{do not} have a mobile air defence radar to install on the Falkland Islands. The Navy's ability to rectify these deficiencies is limited and we therefore rule out, ^{the} provision of effective fighter air defence. ~~as~~

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