

TOP SECRET**UK EYES A****(31)**

Reference D/3147DQ/DTF54

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

7 April 1982

DP P7 H74 J J27 K K42 ASO S1)
 V V2 W Z RNSO ~~X~~ I) copy to each

The following decisions were taken at a meeting chaired by DP yesterday.

SIGINT SUPPORT TO THE TASK FORCE**SIGINT Equipment/Personnel Embarked**

1. There are 5 CHANDOS fits available, ie 10 HF and 10 VHF receivers. There are also 3 printer equipments. There are 14-16 operators, including 4 Spanish linguists. It is not yet known on which ships the fits will be installed. The deployment of the fits and personnel will take place at ASCENSION. CT ratings are currently on ASCENSION waiting to be picked up by HMS ANTRIM.

Communications in GCHQ

2. a. Two additional CCOs will depart for ASCENSION on Thursday. Requirements at ASCENSION for General Service traffic are already increasing.
- b. A BT scrutiny of the GCHQ telephone exchange is to be carried out.
- c. There may be a requirement for extra manning of the GCHQ telephone exchange over Easter.
- d. The level of manning over Easter in W is adequate; requirements are being kept under review.
- e. There is a requirement for additional typist support out of usual hours in K to ease the OCR load, especially during the early evening when the end-product output is at its heaviest. There is also a need for additional typist support out of hours in C Pool to deal with S and Z requirements.

Action: DP to speak to G/G2, thereafter for Divisions to sort out.

- f. There is a requirement for access out of hours between W and the processing group in C Annex. K are arranging for clerical/messenger support.

Identification of Crisis-related Traffic

3. Pending the declaration of a SIGINT alert, it was suggested that a codeword could be used to identify crisis-related SIGINT traffic to speed up handling. The codeword BREITON had been cleared with R, for such a purpose.

Action: S1

Secure Voice Communications with MOD, Northwood etc

4. The present situation was causing problems. The possibility of using BRAHMS was raised.

Action: AW to investigate.

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External Communications

5. a. At present the communications with ships of the Fleet engaged in SIGINT consist of a 50 baud circuit from the vessel to Whitehall, which is a General Service link with SIGINT traffic interleaved with operations traffic. From Whitehall the traffic goes on a 75 baud circuit to the switching centre at Fort Southwick and from there to GCHQ. If the traffic goes by satellite rather than HF, an extra leg is involved. The result is that SIGINT traffic is liable to delay caused by queuing with General Service traffic.
- b. W is in the process of strengthening the service with the task force by taking a machine usually used as a spare on the link with [REDACTED]. M37 needs printers for service to covert sites; equipment usually used on the [REDACTED] link is to be used.
- c. There is already a backlog of routine traffic from GCHQ to MOD. It is hoped to open a second circuit today.
- d. There is a possibility of establishing a dedicated end-to-end protected channel from the ship direct to GCHQ within the RN multiplexing system. This would be a 75 baud offline-enciphered dedicated link. GCHQ are talking to Northwood about this.

Action: to be co-ordinated via S1.

- e. AWP3 is discussing communications requirements with elements within GCHQ.

Maintenance

6. a. A site power maintenance exercise has been postponed from last week. The exercise would result in both W and X using standby power, with no further reserve supply. It was felt that it may be advisable to carry out the exercise in the near future to get it out of the way.

Action: W, X, P6 to discuss.

- b. H has asked X to carry out routine maintenance on the main computers in the near future.

Service of SIGINT to the Task Force

7. a. End-product. This is already addressed to MOD and Northwood. The task force could be added directly as an addressee, or material could be forwarded from Northwood. The main requirement would be for K reports based on ARN. There may also be a requirement for a service of sanitised reports to the Fleet.
- b. Northwood are receiving kleilight-derived information on a daily basis, giving the position of Soviet merchant shipping in the South Atlantic. NSA are prepared to provide a service giving positions of naval ships as well, in areas to be specified by Northwood.
8. The quantity of end-product being received by Northwood at present is small, but may well increase.

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ELINT

9. a. V2 have provided a D1A Order of Battle to EWOSE and to TACINT Air.
- b. Real-time ELINT depends on a system that is geared to the northern hemisphere, and will be of little help.
- c. Valuable ELINT support could be obtained from [REDACTED] if a receiver could be made available for ELINT search. This would provide RF/PRF information but not geopositioning. It would suggest which ships are at sea, and would give EW tactical support. To gain full advantage from RUNWAY, the ideal would be to have several steers over the next 10 days or so. There may be an Argentine naval exercise as the UK task force approaches, which could provide useful information. The COMINT intercept from recent RUNWAY steers had not proved fruitful.
- [REDACTED]

Action: J to discuss with Chief,
A Group.

DF

10. a. The only DF will be what is available on the task force (ie tactical DF).
- b. K has had some positional information from ARN and callsign analysis is currently under way to obtain continuity.

SIGINT Collection by the Task Force

11. Task force collection is limited by the available communications. There is the problem of getting intercept back to GCHQ: how much of this is necessary will partly depend on what comes out of TRYST operations.

GCHQ/NORTHWOOD

12. It will be necessary for GCHQ representatives to discuss with Northwood:-
- SIGINT service to the task force;
 - ELINT;
 - sanitisation, delegation of Action-on;
 - advice to the task force on SIGINT collection;
 - communications - this will have to be treated as a separate issue.

It was proposed that a GCHQ delegation should visit Northwood to discuss the above issues. The delegation would consist of representatives from Z, V, S, W and be coordinated by P7B. Northwood should be consulted as to whether a permanent GCHQ

representative (probably from J27) was desirable. Secretary's note: the meeting will take place on THURSDAY: the GCHQ delegation will include P7B, S1, V2A, W6O, Z1O and possibly K28.

GCHQ Central Organisation

13. A focal point within GCHQ for interface with Northwood/Task Force is necessary. This should be located in the same spur as the X/H processing group. This will provide a point for a BRAHMS equipment and will receive enquiries from external authorities. A rota of senior staff to man the post/be on call will be coordinated by ASO and Z. A GCHQ naval liaison officer will be on call on a 24-hour basis.

Cover at ASCENSION

14. K are producing an assessment of cover, which should be available later today (6th).

Exploitable Ship-Ship Ciphony

15. There is no point in intercepting the exploitable ship-ship ciphony because of communications limitations.

NIMROD Flights

16. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

AD1