

*Falklands - 4/12/82*

Secretary Haig's Telephone Call to Foreign Minister Costa Mendez of Argentina -- 2:25 pm, Monday, April 12, 1982 -- from London (Secretary Haig's end of the conversation)

I called you because when I got on the plane, I looked carefully at the paper you gave me. I now have seen a NEW YORK TIMES report a few moments before from Buenos Aires which reiterated rather specifically the conditions of that paper. It worried me because it allegedly came from your Foreign Office sources.

Well, the thing I wanted to really check with you -- we are getting down to really serious business here at No. 10 Downing. You know the arrangement concluded around the table after dinner the other night -- that is the basis of the discussions we are conducting. If I thought I was not operating in good faith, it could be a terrible setback.

Yes, but you said some of them are contradictory, and it is a menu of things. Now, are you telling me...

Well, I think what we have been talking about here is very close to what we left there with -- not your paper -- but the paragraphs that we worked together jointly.

Well, they certainly don't concede sovereignty, and they cannot! That is the purpose...

Yes... You know I don't have any agreement here. I don't want to mislead you.

Yes, I think quite frankly there are two key paragraphs. The rest are relatively easy. Yes, on paragraph 6 -- the detailed discussions before dinner with the President where we talked about a trilateral arrangement. That is what I am using here as a basis of discussion, and I hope I am on sound ground.

- Right; yes, I do, as long as you understand that I am only using that as a basis.

Yes, all right; the reason I got quite concerned when I saw that newspaper article which was back to the same position I heard late in the afternoon when I decided I should go back home, you see.

Oh, no, I have it.

Well, you know either one of those points on the two areas -- the situation on the Island -- paragraph 5 -- and the ultimate negotiations. A total outcome on either of those I consider to be totally impossible in either capital. There is no way that could be done. And what we have been trying to do is to finesse that and have a date certain for completion of negotiations on

4/12/1982 Telephone Conversation with Foreign Minister Costa Mendez (cont'd)

the one hand and create circumstances on the Island -- the flag would be there, the personalities would be there -- but with a trilateral management.

You can't do that other than this way that will be acceptable. There is no way anybody who could live with that -- at your end or at our end.

Right, in other words, I will get that to you right away because I definitely had the impression before dinner with the President that that was certainly in the ballpark.

Absolutely; absolutely. Yes, but I think that has to be done; it should not be an obstacle in this thing other than the paragraph we are using that you gave us.

If you remember, you gave us a paragraph on normalization, and that is what we are using. And the paragraph 7 we are using is the one we got at the table from you.

I am here at No. 10 Downing, and the best way to get me is through our Embassy. The extension is 2999. We have a line over here to No. 10 where I am meeting with the Prime Minister right now.

The problem, again -- I want to make clear again -- the five points you gave me are not clearly provided for in the text we worked out at the table with the President and were worked on in the afternoon, and so I am very concerned now.

I think it is very comfortable. It has symmetry in the interim arrangements, and it has a date certain and very specific obligations for normalization.

Right, fine; I can't overemphasize...

...to withhold it? I am not sure I understand what you are asking.

A suspended what?

Oh, yes. I was hoping we could do that so we could move this thing very quickly if it is possible here, and I would leave.

No, of course not.

Right, what I anticipate, Mr. Minister, is unless I hear that you are insisting on achievement of any more of those crucial points -- sovereignty or total governing -- I will have to go home. That is not doable here. I am working personally with the Prime Minister on this. I have to know I am on some stable ground.

4/12/1982 Telephone Conversation with Foreign Minister Costa Mendez (Cont'd)

While I was meeting alone with the President and you, Mr. Enders and the Generals were at the table and agreed on a text -- that is what we are using. It is comfortable, but it doesn't concede either of the key points covered in 5 and 7.

You remember the discussion at the table. There would be three in effect -- three authorities. If you designate your Governor, fine; an American; and a UK representative who would administrate for them. That would be the basic authority working over the two Councils which would now expand to include an Argentine representative on board.

I must tell you I took my lead from what the President said and that we redid.

All right, I will get this right to you.

All right, I made this call because both reading those 5 points and seeing that newspaper article represented a major reversal from what we talked about.

All right, thank you.

No, I think I would go right back there if we confirm that we are working on a common basis. I would come right back assuming I can succeed here which is a very, very difficult problem. Very difficult! I know. Such is life!

Right, Mr. Minister, thank you.

Right; I will be in touch. 'Bye.