

ENCL No.
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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FOR CWG

IMMEDIATE 131555Z APR 82

FROM COMMCEN FCO LONDON
TO MODUK
CINCFLEET

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SIC A3A/A2N/19F

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BONN 131555Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 320 OF 13 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON PARIS UKDEL NATO

UKREP BRUSSELS MODUK

INFO SAVING DUBLIN ROME LUXEMBOURG COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE BRUSSELS

ATHENS

YOUR TELNO 135 (NOT TO ALL): FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. WHEN I CALLED ON HERR GENSCHER THIS MORNING, HE SAID HE HAD ASKED TO SEE ME IN ORDER TO OBTAIN AN UP-TO-DATE REPORT ON THE SITUATION, AND TO COMPARE NOTES BEFORE SEEING THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR THIS AFTERNOON.
2. IN REPLY, I HANDED OVER YOUR MESSAGE IN FCO TEL NO 81 TO BRUSSELS, EMPHASISING HOW MUCH WE HAD APPRECIATED THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S IMPRESSIVELY STRONG SUPPORT, AND THE PART WHICH THE COMMUNITY DECLARATION WAS PLAYING IN PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINES. I REGRETTED THAT, IN THE PRESENT SENSITIVE SITUATION, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO SAY MUCH ABOUT HOW THINGS WERE LIKELY TO DEVELOP

ON MR HAIG'S VISIT, I READ TO GENSCHER THE STATEMENT IN FCO TELNO 699 TO WASHINGTON. AS THE BEST AVAILABLE EVIDENCE OF OUR CURRENT THINKING, I HANDED OVER THE TEXTS OF YOUR TWO INTERVIEWS (PARA 5 OF SECOND TUR) EMPHASISING THAT WE WERE MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION BUT INSISTED ON SCR 502 BEING IMPLEMENTED. THE PRIME MINISTER'S, YOUR OWN AND MR NOTT'S LONG HOURS OF TALKS DEMONSTRATED THE GREAT EFFORT WE WERE MAKING. IF WE COULD NOT GET A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WE WERE READY TO USE MILITARY FORCE. WE WERE FULLY AWARE OF THE RISKS WHICH SUCH ACTION COULD INVOLVE AND THEREFORE DETERMINED TO TRY TO ACHIEVE A SOLUTION BY OTHER MEANS. I OUTLINED THE HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE, POINTING OUT THAT WE HAD BEEN TRYING FOR 15 YEARS TO NEGOTIATE A SOLUTION, AND HAD PERSISTED IN OUR EFFORTS EVEN AFTER THE RETURN OF ARGENTINA TO UNPLEASANT MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS HAD MADE IT HARDER TO PERSUADE THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS THAT THEIR FUTURE LAY IN CLOSE CONNEXIONS WITH SUCH PEOPLE. I ADDED THAT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I DOUBTED WHETHER FURTHER ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT THIS TIME WOULD BE HELPFUL: WE HAD SCR 502 AND SHOULD INSIST ON IT.

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3. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THE CRISIS HAD BEEN CLEARLY SET OUT IN THE CABINET'S DECLARATION OF 7 APRIL. HE REPEATEDLY EMPHASISED THAT GERMAN SUPPORT FOR US WAS A GESTURE OF COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY, POINTING OUT THAT THE GERMANS HAD SUPPORTED THE IMPORT EMBARGO EVEN THOUGH AS THEIR PUBLIC OPINION WELL KNEW, THEY WERE THE COUNTRY LIKELY TO SUFFER MOST IN ECONOMIC TERMS FROM SUCH A STEP. WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT AN IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE FALKLANDS CRISIS AND IRAN, AFGHANISTAN, ETC, WAS THAT WE HAD THE UNEQUIVOCAL BACKING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, GENSCHER SAID THAT THE SCR MATTERED IN TERMS OF EXTERNAL PRESENTATION TO THE THIRD WORLD, ETC OF THE FRG'S ATTITUDE, BUT WAS NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT INTERNALLY. HE SAID STAUNCHLY THAT THE FRG HAD TAKEN ITS DECISION QUITE SIMPLY BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE WHICH IT ATTACHED TO ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS, AND TO SOLIDARITY WITH ITS COMMUNITY PARTNERS AND ALLIES. HE AGREED HOWEVER WHEN STATE SECRETARY VON STADEN, WHO WAS PRESENT, ADDED THAT THE SIGNIF

CANCE OF THE SCR LAY IN DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WHICH HAD BEEN COMMITTED.

4. GENSCHER SAID HE QUITE UNDERSTOOD WHY WE HAD RESPONDED SO STRONGLY TO THE INVASION, AND AGREED THAT IF WE HAD TAKEN ANY OTHER LINE IT WOULD HAVE ENCOURAGED OTHER SIMILAR AGGRESSION IN LATIN AMERICA AND ELSEWHERE. THE GERMANS WERE HOWEVER VERY ANXIOUS FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, AND CONCERNED THAT ALL 3 PARTS OF SCR 502 SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED. THEY WERE VERY CONCERNED THAT HAIG'S MISSION SHOULD SUCCEED. THEY WERE PARTICULARLY WORRIED ABOUT THE ACTIVITY OF THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH WAS NOW ACTIVELY ENCOURAGING ARGENTINE BELLIGERENCE. THE RUSSIANS HAD YESTERDAY TWICE ATTACKED HIM PERSONALLY FOR HIS SUPPORT OF THE UK OVER THE FALKLANDS AND HIS CRITICISM OF SOVIET STATEMENTS.

5. GENSCHER THEN SAID THAT, SINCE I WAS VISITING HIM, HE WISHED TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE ASPECTS OF TRANSATLANTIC CONSULTATION AND THE MANDATE NEGOTIATIONS. SEE MY 2 IFTS.

6. I HAD EXPECTED GENSCHER TO PRESS ME HARDER ABOUT POSSIBLE DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS TO THE CRISIS: BUT MY EXPLANATION APPEARED TO CONVINCE HIM THAT THERE WAS LITTLE PROFIT IN PURSUING THIS LINE WHILE HAIG'S EFFORTS WERE STILL UNDER WAY. THE EMPHASIS HE PLACED ON ANGLO-GERMAN AND COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY WAS STRIKING. THOUGH HE DID NOT SAY SO, THE GERMANS CLEARLY HOPE THAT THIS PROMPT AND SUBSTANTIAL POLITICAL ACTION BY THE COMMUNITY WILL HAVE A BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE COMMUNITY IN BRITAIN.

7. GENSCHER WELCOMED MY OFFER TO SEE HIM AGAIN AS SOON AS THERE WAS ANY FURTHER INFORMATION THAT I COULD PASS ON ABOUT OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SOLUTION.
FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

TAYLOR
BT

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