

*file* *LHM*  
HD. D85 M.O.D. *if not already* *194*

CONFIDENTIAL

379 - 1



PP TOKYO  
RR CANBERRA  
GRS 459  
CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 151725Z APR 82

TO PRIORITY TOKYO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 148 OF 15 APRIL

INFO WASHINGTON, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, UKMIS NEW YORK,

UKREP BRUSSELS, BONN, PARIS

SAVING OTHER EC POSTS, WELLINGTON

FALKLAND ISLANDS: JAPANESE POSITION

1. I ASKED JAPANESE AMBASSADOR TO CALL THIS AFTERNOON. LARGELY ON THE FALKLANDS.
2. I SAID THAT WE WERE GRATEFUL FOR THE SUPPORT IN PRINCIPLE OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT ON THIS ISSUE AND FOR THE SYMPATHY WHICH THEY HAD EXPRESSED. HOWEVER IT WAS NECESSARY FOR US ALL TO SUSTAIN AND INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. HAIG HAD SAID THAT THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND SUBSEQUENTLY BY THE EC AND OTHER COUNTRIES HAD BEEN TOTALLY UNEXPECTED FOR ARGENTINA. WE KNEW THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAD CONSIDERED TAKING FURTHER ECONOMIC MEASURES, AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD HAVE A GREAT INFLUENCE. NOBODY WANTED A WAR, AND IF ALL FREE COUNTRIES STOOD TOGETHER IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY: BUT A PEACEFUL OUTCOME WAS NOT BY ANY MEANS ASSURED. THE WAY TO ACHIEVE PEACE WAS TO INCREASE PRESSURE.
3. HIRAHARA REPLIED THAT THE JAPANESE ATTITUDE WAS CLEAR. JAPAN DID NOT KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT THE BACKGROUND OF THE FALKLANDS QUESTION TO BE ABLE TO EXPRESS A VIEW ON THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION (IE THE SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTE), AND MUST THEREFORE REMAIN NEUTRAL ON THAT ISSUE. HOWEVER THEY HAD CLEARLY CONDEMNED THE INVASION BY ARGENTINA AND HAD SAID AS MUCH TO THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR. THE PRESS IN ARGENTINA, PERU AND VENEZUELA HAD ALREADY REPORTED THAT JAPAN HAD DEMANDED WITHDRAWAL BY ARGENTINE TROOPS AND HAD THREATENED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IF THIS WERE NOT DONE.

14.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

379 - 1

4. IN EARLIER CONVERSATION WITH THE AMBASSADOR WHILE AWAITING MY RETURN, ELLIOTT SAID THAT THERE WERE TWO STEPS WHICH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT COULD USEFULLY TAKE. ONE WOULD BE A PUBLIC STATEMENT OF CONDEMNATION OF ARGENTINA COMBINED WITH A STATEMENT OF INTENT NOT TO GIVE CREDITS ON FUTURE BUSINESS WITH ARGENTINA FOR THE TIME BEING: THE JAPANESE POSITION ON THESE ISSUES HAD PERHAPS NOT BEEN MADE SUFFICIENTLY PUBLIC, DESPITE THE APPARENTLY HELPFUL PRESS REPORTS IN SOME LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. THE SECOND ACTION WOULD BE A BAN ON IMPORTS FOLLOWING THE EXAMPLE OF THE EC AND AUSTRALIA/CANADA/NEW ZEALAND. HIRAHARA SAID THAT HE SAW NO OBJECTION TO A STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENT OF CONDEMNATION, AND PERSONALLY FAVOURED A STATEMENT ALSO ON EXPORT CREDITS. ALTHOUGH HE KNEW THAT SOME WORK REMAINED TO BE DONE ON THIS. HE REPEATED THE JAPANESE ARGUMENTS AGAINST AN IMPORT BAN, AND ADDED THAT THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THE EC IMPORT BAN, LIMITED TO ONE MONTH, MIGHT BE QUITE SMALL ALTHOUGH ITS POLITICAL MEANING WAS MUCH GREATER.
5. THE PRESS ARE BEING TOLD MERELY THAT THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR CAME IN AT MY REQUEST AND THAT THE FALKLANDS CRISIS WAS DISCUSSED.

PYM

FCO  
S AM D  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
SIR K COUZENS }  
MR HUMMER } TREASURY  
MR HAWTHORN }  
MR FREEMAN }  
MR [unclear] }

MR FULLER SAFU CABINET OFFICE  
MISS DICKSON (EMP DIVN) D/ENERGY

-2-

CONFIDENTIAL