

CONFIDENTIAL

6/31/3

4/7 20/10/82

ENCL No. 59

DIRECTOR
15 APR 1982
NAVAL PLANS

LOOSE MINUTE

D/DS4/71/47/1 (209/82)

ACNS(O)

Copy to: ✓
DN Plans ✓
D of DP(B)
AUS(NS)
Head of DS5
Head of DS12

FALKLAND ISLANDS - INFORMING NATO

1. I have just seen my copy of DNOT's minute to you of 15 April on this subject.
2. As DNOT says, I discussed this subject at some length yesterday with DDNOT and DPS(B). To my recollection we concluded that as regards surface units:
 - a. our aim should be to send only one signal to SACLANT and CINCHAN rather than a series reporting on changes of availability as the Task Force steamed further from the NATO area;
 - b. there was no sense in fudging the issue of availability since SACLANT would know the position of the Force by national surveillance means;
 - c. in any case, commonsense would suggest to even the most unobservant ally that a Task Force centered on the Falkland Islands would not be readily available to NATO;
 - d. it would be preferable to be as honest as possible with NATO rather than dissipate our fund of undoubted goodwill by appearing evasive.
3. We therefore concluded that the line proposed by DPS(B) in their minute of 14 April was about right; and discussed a possible text of a message to the MNCs based on these guidelines.
4. Against this background, both DN Plans, DPS(B) and I feel that paragraph 1(a) of the draft signal to CINCFLEET is likely to be met with disbelief by the MNCs and scepticism at Evere. Unless, therefore, there is clear evidence that the majority of the Force will be available at A2 we would prefer to revert to the line discussed yesterday, ie that the surface ships of the Task Force would be mainly at A4 with some perhaps at A2.
5. Head of DS12 concurs.

A J Cragg

15 Apr 82

A J CRAGG
Head of DS4
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