


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PS/PUS

THE SCOPE FOR DELAYING LANDING OPERATIONS ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

Following my minute earlier today on the scope for delaying landing operations on the Falkland Islands I now enclose a copy of a draft submission which the Chief of the Defence Staff proposes to put to the Defence Secretary, and which sets out in convenient form the main conclusions of the paper discussed by the Chiefs of Staff this morning.

2. In case the wording of my earlier minute was ambiguous, I should make clear that my reference to "the Task Force" should of course be taken to refer only to the Amphibious Group.



(P.R.H. Wright)
19 April, 1982.

cc PS
Mr. Giffard
Mr. Gillmore
Mr. Weston

~~TOP SECRET~~ UK EYES A

COS(misc) 138/742/1

Copy No ⁵³... of 64 copiesOPERATION CORPORATE - LANDING OPERATIONS

1. In accordance with the instructions (1) of the Chiefs of Staff, ACDS(Pol) has prepared the attached submission to the Secretary of State.
2. Unless the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, hears to the contrary by telephone (Ext 6347) by 1600 this afternoon, 19 April 1982, it will be assumed that your Principals have agreed the draft submission.

Attachment:

Draft Submission - Operation CORPORATE - Landing Operations (2 pages).

Note:

1. COS 24th Meeting/82, Item 7.

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DS 11	51
FCO(Def Dept)	52 - 53
Cabinet Office	54
COSSEC	55 - 64

19 April 1982

DRAFT

SECRETARY OF STATE

OPERATION CORPORATE - LANDING OPERATIONS

1. The Chiefs of Staff have been studying the timing of landing operations on the Falklands, and the scope for delaying them.

Our preliminary views are that:

a. The Carrier Force can start a sea/air blockade from 29 April. It may be possible to sustain it until August; but attrition, due to enemy action and intensity of operations, serviceability problems, and fatigue are likely to cause a progressive deterioration in effectiveness from the beginning of June.

b. The earliest the Amphibious force would be in a position to land is 7 May. The "landing window" extends until end May, with an optimum date of 16 May (when 2 Para Bn will be integrated with the force). From the end of May a landing would be subject to increasing operational risk, the exact extent of which could be better assessed as the date nears. Given a 14 day passage time this produces a latest prudent decision date to launch the force from Ascension of mid May.

c. If nonetheless negotiating positions force us to postpone a landing to the end of May or perhaps June, we would need to hold many of the troops on Ascension in tents. Early arrangements for tentage and water supplies would be needed.

2. I suggest we consider the full implications tomorrow, after we have had a chance to examine CinC Fleet's outline landing plan (expected today).

19 April 1982

CDS