

21 April 1982

J224

J1 AJ27 K K2 P V2 S Z

DR to see on file

FALKLANDS : NOTES OF MEETING HELD ON 20 APRIL 1982

Present: DR J1 AJ27 K K2 P V2 S Z DIA

1. Current Intelligence: the provision of good intelligence on AR naval activity continued, the only matter causing concern was the report of a message that the Argentinians had detected a UK interest in S Georgia through interception, though the source was not known. J1 thought that Northwood would be very interested and K agreed to contact GCO Northwood on the matter.

Action : K

2. DR drew the meeting's attention to the DCDS(I) brief on Argentinian Capabilities including a summary on AR Sigint capabilities. Z said that undoubtedly this section of the report would have been contributed by GCHQ.

3. DR asked whether there was ^{int}Signal evidence that AR were receiving overhead information from the Soviets. K said that the only report he had seen was from a [redacted] source, which merely stated that information was being received from the Soviets. ~~K would investigate and report.~~

~~Action : K~~

4. S pointed to other possible sources of "information" namely the press links from Ascension and the telegraph link from Ascension to St. Helena.

5. J had nothing further to report other than the transit of Bears back to Cuba.

6. V2 made the following points:

(a) on [redacted] Elint, information was being received [redacted]
[redacted]

(b) it looked as if it would be possible to adequately fingerprint 2 AR destroyers - one in each task force;

(c) on the timeliness of intercept, the DTG from [REDACTED] was 2 hours after intercept and an initial report by 'phone was made to Northwood 20 minutes after this. A follow-up signal was sent to MOD 1½ - 2 hours after this.

7. K had organised the 4-man rota for Northwood.

8. DR said that DMSI had requested a GCO at MOD in DIC. K was to arrange the matter with either DMSI's outer office or D/DMSI (Mrs Brocker).

Action : K

9. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Action : MJ27/K

10. K had replied to two signals from SUKLO accepting the offer of SSA but not agreeing to our sending a Spanish linguist to NSA. P outlined the type of equipment he envisaged being installed in support of the SSA operation and will ask P/B to obtain details of dimensions/power size etc and act as a general interface with W/Q.

Action : P

11. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

12. P was asked to enquire about the possibility of a Fax link with Northwood.

Action : P

13. DMSI had mentioned to DR about the delay of 4 hours to an Ops Immediate signal and the bunching of traffic. K has the matter in hand.

14. [REDACTED]

15. [REDACTED]

Action : S

16. [REDACTED]

Action : S

17. S and Z both spoke on the problem of "Intelligence Officers" turning up on Ascension and asking for Sigint service. Z is to supply OIC UKC204 with a brief on the use of Sigint.

Action : Z

18. S reported that the rhombics and dipole aerials had now arrived in Ascension.

19. Coordinator will be seeing DR and Herdon after the JIC(R & P) meeting tomorrow to discuss the affect on Sigint should there be a break in diplomatic relations with the RIO states. Z thought that such a break would not be disastrous but will consult with FCO. He will further inform them that if diplomatic relations are broken FCO should not insist on the closure of the communications links. A brief is to be supplied to DR by Z for 21.4.82 (am).

Action : Z

TOP SECRET

UMBRA

20. DR is also to see Sir Michael Palliser and brief him on the current situation. Sir Michael has been appointed as Special Adviser to the PM on the Falklands crisis.

21. FCO had said that they could deal with the present flow of intelligence. Third-party diplomatic reporting had been increased by using an extra EO on days to reissue/filter etc. The basic fault was that FCO were not equipped to deal with such volumes. DR reminded Z that he had previously asked for a brief on this from Z.

Action : Z

22. K is to view the NEW MOON capability developed by X. Whilst full scale usage was not considered possible K2 thought that it certainly could help in the distribution and issue of end product reports. K is to keep DR informed.

Action : K

23. Cover and collection:

UKC100 had intercepted 2 nets which they now had on cover but the take was not particularly good. [REDACTED]

Action : Z

24. V2 said that ACOS(I) had complained that the Elint feed was unreliable. V2 felt that the position (vis-a-vis the Elint take in the S hemisphere) ought to be explained to senior officers and that we were providing the best service from what was available. DR felt that the situation would take care of itself as the system gets more reliable.

25. DR asked about any Sigint reports regarding mine laying but none had been seen.

26. V2 was concerned about the security of the [REDACTED]. The source could be deduced from the information being provided and an injudicious remark might alert the AR ships which would take appropriate EMSEC action. V2 would warn Fleet about this via GCO Northwood.

TOP SECRET

4 UMBRA

Action : V

TOP SECRET

UMBRA

27. The RN is to continue to pass the task forces' position which is very important from an identity standpoint.

28.

[REDACTED]
The Task Force were now calculating the orbits of the Soviet satellite and hence the safe periods of use by our own ships. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

29. There had been a request for more information on MERSHIPS in the South Atlantic (the area of interest had been enlarged).

30. Reports had been received via HERMES of radar parameters in the Port Stanley area obtained ostensibly by a British nuclear submarine. The information so received agrees with that obtained from other sources and augurs well for the provision by the Task Force of information which will confirm/refine present Elint knowledge.

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