



MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE
PROCUREMENT

27/1
D/MIN/TT/42/3/2

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Secretary of State

THE FALKLANDS

The position is clearly changing but I feel I must support the view I gave last night that if there is to be a military solution it has to be achieved pretty quickly from the time the Fleet arrives. I do not believe that this means that it would be necessary to have a bloody battle in and around Port Stanley. I believe that it is a feasible objective to achieve panic and surrender by the Argentine troops on the Islands quickly and without a bloody battle. I may be so ignorant that I am wasting your time, but I am also of the view that war fighting theory today fails to take account of what happens in war and what affects the morale of forces.

2. You clearly recognise the importance of moving fast if you could in terms of international opinion, in terms of unanimity of opinion at home, in terms of the logistic problems that will become increasingly severe, in terms of morale of Marines and others if they have to endure in cramped conditions long periods in high seas and a bad climate. There is further the question of the position of the inhabitants in relation to food and water should a prolonged blockade take place. All these things, and I believe more, indicate a paramount need once sea and air supremacy have been established, to

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
cause panic and surrender quickly; just as we ordered our Marines to surrender, in fact without casualties, and just as our troops at Benghazi were forced to do the same thing, so the whole Italian Army surrendered en masse and at various stages and finally whole chunks of the German Army. There are already a few encouraging reports that some of the Argentine soldiers on the Falklands are bewildered and unhappy.

3. Once the Fleet has arrived, and after warning, the air corridor has been cut also, the position of the Argentine troops on the Falklands will already be one of very considerable fear. ^{SURROUNDED, CUT OFF, No SUPPLIES.} This fear can be augmented by the Harriers with selective attacks, and with periodic threatening overflight, could be enormously increased by well written leaflets in Spanish dropped and distributed which would include clear warnings that the occupying troops would be held responsible for any deprivation they caused to the British civilian population. ^{The leaflets} ~~They could be~~ ^{COULD INCLUDE} ~~coupled with~~ statements such as "As you have now discovered you are on islands which are occupied and have been occupied always by British people who do not even speak your language. You have been misled" etc. I have spoken to you previously about the part the jamming of communications might play at a point in time, but I believe whether or not this were completely possible the sight of the British Fleet and of the Harriers, augmented by leaflets and selected air attacks, would probably do the job. To ensure that the Argentine troops realise that we are not making idle threats and will invade if necessary I would have thought that a landing and a build-up of a presence in a part of the Island where domestic casualties should not take place could be a further option. It might

/ be ...

be necessary to start a final assault on the main Argentine body of troops but even if it was, I believe morale would collapse virtually instantly.

4. You were worried as to what we would do logistically assuming we had successfully occupied the Falkland Islands and had say 7,000 Argentine prisoners to feed and water etc. I believe that the Argentines, in the interests of their own people, would be forced to collect them if not from the Falklands, from Royal Navy ships mid-way between the Falklands and the Argentine, and that they could not possibly refuse to collect their own prisoners for repatriation. I therefore believe that this problem also is capable of solution. Of course there are risks but the risks of delay will be greater.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'A. Jones' or similar, written in a cursive style.

20th April 1982

MF 8

SECRET - UK EYES A



MO-5/21

AUS(D Staff)

THE FALKLANDS

The Secretary of State thought you might be interested to see on a personal basis the attached copy of a minute he has received from Lord Trenchard. S of S was interested in the idea that leaflets in Spanish should be prepared (paragraph 3 of Lord Trenchard's minute) and he understands that some thought has already been given by Colonel Sneyd and yourself to this. S of S would be grateful to hear from you in due course about what your ideas in this and related fields are.

20th April 1982

(D B OMAND)
PS/S of S

SECRET - UK EYES A

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
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