
SECRETE OF EYES A



OD(SA) MEETING AT 0930 WEDNESDAY 21 APRIL 1982

RELEVANT PAPERS

1.	I	enclose	the	following:
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Revised Agenda for 13th OD(SA) Meeting	FLAG A
OD(SA) Debrief 20 Apr 82 (2nd Meeting)	FLAG B
OD(SA)(82) 20 - UK Counter Proposals to draft Agreement	FLAG C
19 April Draft Agreement from BA	FLAG D
OD(SA)(82) 18 Comparison of Draft Agreements of 13 and 19 April	FLAG E
Decisions Flow Chart	FLAG F
Op CORPORATE ROE	FLAG G
Maritime ROE state at 210600A	FLAG H
Attendance of MOD Officials at Thursday's Ministerial Brief	FLAG J
Haig's general Comments on BA text of 191620Z Apr	FLAG L
Draft Text (same as FLAG D) but CDS' Working Copy	FLAG M
Haig's detailed Comments on BA text	FLAG N
HMA Washington DIPTEL of 191746Z Apr	FLAG O
CINCFLEET Outline Plan Op SUTTON	FLAG P
FCO note on Evacuating Falkland Islanders	FLAG Q
CINCFLEET Oporder 2/82 - PARAQUET	FLAG R
AUS(DS)' note on the BA Draft	FLAG S
FCO internal note on the Haig proposals (compare FLAG E)	FLAG T
The Draft as of 13 Apr	FLAG U

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ATTENDANCE

- 2. SofS will not be present at today's meeting as he is attending his Mother's funeral. You and SECCOS will be the only MOD representatives.
- 3. I have consulted AUS(DS) on the points to make.

READING GUIDE

4. Discussion will centre almost entirely round FLAGS C, the first part of OD(SA)(82)20 and to a lesser extent FLAG E (which is the final version of FLAG T). You have gone through the BA draft text (FLAG D) and your working draft is at FLAG M.

POINTS TO MAKE

- 5. MOD interest centres on Paragraphs 2.2.1. and 2.2.2. Rather than getting into drafting you should concentrate on two key points which relate to:
 - a. the timing of withdrawal
 - b. the question of distances
- 6. Timing of Withdrawal. There can be no question of accepting different terms for our forces from that proposed for forces of Argentina. If it is decided that they should have 15 days to carry out their withdrawal then we should have the same. Similarly, if 7 days is allowed for them, then the same for us. You should not concede on this.
- 7. Distances of withdrawal. Our opening position should be that the UK task force should stand off, outside the 150 nm zones from the three co-ordinate points quoted earlier in the document (we should not accept 200 nm as the FCO propose since 150 nm is the figure agreed with Mr Haig last week and enshrined in the present proposals). If pressed, we could agree to all UK forces being withdrawn to points some 400 nm from the same co-ordinate points. These would, in effect, be the same distance from those points as Port Stanley is from the closest mainland Argentinian base.
- 8. These are the two key points of principle but there are also questions on:

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- a. Oversight of Argentinians who from Haig's own experience are not to be trusted (FLAG N).
- b. Interpretation of "UK Naval task force". Would this include SSNs, occupying forces on South Georgia etc? We might exclude SSNs from our meaning of Task Force but that could be a difficult point to put across to the world. The fact is that if we get an agreement along the lines of 6 and 7 above we could withdraw all forces accordingly.
- 9. Most of the rest of the document, and the commentary on it, concerns political questions and administrative questions on which the FCO must naturally take the lead. But there is one absolutely fundamental point in paragraph 7 which relates to transportation, movement of persons, residence and ownership of property. If this is not controlled by HMG there is no doubt that it would be open to the Argentine Government to flood the Island with their own people, in very short order settling questions of self determination sovereignty and all the rest. The FCO proposals on this point (paragraph 7(a)) mean that there would be a veto on the part of HMG which should be sufficient safeguard. It was indeed on these lines that the matter was dealt with in the consideration of the proposals put by Mr Haig the weekend before last (13 April).

LINE TO TAKE

- 10. You should demand parity of treatment (at the very least) for our force withdrawals with the Argentinians in terms of:
 - a. time for withdrawal
 - b. distance of withdrawal.
- 11. You should point out how untrustworthy the Argentines have been in both ours and the US' experience.
- 12. You should support the FCO proposals for 7a a point PUS believes to be critical.

Drafted by: SCDS (Capt P C Abbott)
Dated: 2/ Apr 82