

PERSONAL
COVERING
SECRET

510/506
MOS/21 [116/82]

41/1

By S41T

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - SOUTH GEORGIA PARTY


1. I have studied the signals sent from MODUK and from HMS ENDURANCE concerning Rules of Engagement for the Royal Marines landed in South Georgia, between the period 23 March - 3 April. The following is a chronological resume of the relevant developments.
2. On Tuesday 23 March HMS ENDURANCE deployed ashore Royal Marine observation posts under the command of the OCRM HM ENDURANCE (Lt Mills), with the task of observing the activities of the Argentinian Scrap Merchant Party at Leith Harbour.
3. These parties were covered by Rules of Engagement which were appropriate to their role at the time. These are at Flag A. You will wish to note that the rules for opening fire at this stage were of necessity restricted.
4. Eight days later, on the afternoon of Wednesday 31 March, MODUK Navy warned CINCFLEET of the possibility of an Argentinian landing on the Falklands, and mentioned the option of moving HMS ENDURANCE at short notice rapidly towards the Falklands, (Flag B). That Wednesday evening (3112015Z) the executive order was given by MODUK Navy to HMS ENDURANCE (Flag C) to proceed with despatch to Port Stanley, landing all Royal Marines at Grytviken.
5. Two hours later specific orders were sent from MODUK (Navy) giving the party their tasks (Flag D). At this stage the Rules of Engagement contained in Flag A were to continue to apply, and the OCRM was ordered to take these Rules of Engagement ashore with him. The signal was originated by Dept of CGRM, and cleared by DNOT and DS5.
6. On the night Thursday/Friday 01/02 April the major decisions were made to launch the Task Force in the light of the intelligence of an immediately impending Argentinian invasion. Amongst the many other orders issued, a MODUK signal (Flag E) was sent to HMS ENDURANCE passing a warning to the Royal Marines ashore in South Georgia of the strong possibility of an Argentinian assault. The Op Tasks in Flag D were cancelled, and the ROE in Flag A were cancelled. The Royal Marines were ordered 'to open fire without warning on any Argentinian landing in South Georgia, providing you are certain they are armed'. This signal was initiated by Dept of CGRM at the wish of the First Sea Lord, in accordance with the guidance of the Cabinet. It was written in consultation with DNOT and DS5. Twenty minutes later a necessary rider was sent (Flag F) telling the South Georgia party not, at that stage, to make any move to arrest the Argentinian working party at Leith Harbour.
7. On the morning of the 2 April the invasion of the Falkland Islands took place, and on South Georgia, Mills prepared his positions at the mouth of King Edward Cove. That evening HMS ENDURANCE signalled FCO London (Flag G), copy to MODUK Navy, (Flag G), copy to MODUK Navy, stating that the Bahia Paraiso was on the point of sending a signal which was likely to demand the surrender of the shore party in South Georgia. In the absence of HEGFI, Captain HMS ENDURANCE asked what instructions were to be passed to the shore party. (This signal was received in the DSC at about midnight local 2/3 April).
8. Up to this point it is considered that there had been no inconsistency in the instructions issued to Lt Mills and his party. However it is considered that the MODUK response (Flag H) to HMS ENDURANCE'S signal was confusing. The phrase 'If Argentinians then invade, RM Detachment is to resist invasion using force in accordance with ROE laid down in YDA/WF4/19F 232001F Mar (Flag A)' is

PERSONAL COVERING SECRET

PERSONAL COVERING SECRET

contradictory as the ROE in Flag A are self defence ROE and are not applicable to repelling an invasion. The signal was initiated by the Defence Secretariat at a time of great pressure, and at the time Dept of CGRM were not consulted. It is understood that subsequently DNOT considered with Dept of CGRM and the Defence Secretariat the possibility of yet a further signal cancelling Flag H, but in the event it was considered that this would add even more to the confusion. I believe from hearsay that the Captain of ENDURANCE may have subsequently sent a signal direct to the detachment, perhaps to clarify the contradiction.

2/ April 1982



I M H MOORE
Lt Col RM

MB 4312

7391

PERSONAL COVERING SECRET

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

CAF 101 23/2125 082A5131

FOR CAF

IMMEDIATE/IMMEDIATE 232001Z MAR 8

FROM MODUK NAVY
TO CINCELEST
HMS ENDURANCE
INFO THE GOV FALKLAND ISLANDS
FOF B
HMA BUENOS AIRES
NP 8901
FCO LONDON

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

~~SIC JDA/W4A/LDQ/A3A~~

~~FCO LONDON FOR SAID~~

~~SOUTH GEORGIA - RULES FOR USE OF SMALL ARMS~~

~~REF: MODUK NAVY JDA/W4A/LDQ/A3A 232000Z MAR 82~~

~~(CONTINGENCY GUIDANCE)~~

~~1. CARRIAGE AND ISSUE OF ARMS.~~

~~A. PERSONAL ARMS AND AMMUNITION MAY BE TAKEN ASHORE FOR USE IN SELF DEFENCE ONLY.~~

~~B. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE FACT THAT OPEN DISPLAY OF WEAPONS MAY EXACERBATE SITUATION AND BE OPEN TO SUBSEQUENT MISREPRESENTATION BUT MAY ALSO HAVE DETERRENT OR STABILISING EFFECT.~~

~~C. IN GENERAL TERMS HOWEVER SERVICEMEN SHOULD NOT BE PUT IN POSITION OF DANGER IN WHICH THEY CANNOT DEFEND THEMSELVES~~

~~D. WEAPONS ARE NOT TO BE ISSUED WITHOUT AMMUNITION~~

~~E. INDIVIDUALS ISSUED WITH WEAPONS ARE TO BE CAREFULLY BRIEFED ON INSTRUCTIONS FOR OPENING FIRE~~

~~2. USE OF MILITARY ARMS.~~

~~A. MILITARY ARMS MAY BE USED ONLY IN SELF DEFENCE WHEN THEY PROVIDE THE ONLY WAY OF PROTECTING SERVICEMEN FROM DEATH OR SERIOUS INJURY. USE OF ARMS IS TO BE LIMITED TO THE MINIMUM NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THIS, CONSISTENT WITH NEED FOR LOW-KEY APPROACH AND CORDIAL BUT FIRM EXCHANGES.~~

~~B. WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT THE SENIOR PERSON PRESENT SHOULD CONTROL THE USE OF ARMS. IF THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE INDIVIDUALS MAY AND SHOULD TAKE SUCH INDEPENDENT PROTECTIVE ACTION AS CIRCUMSTANCES DICTATE~~

~~3. INSTRUCTIONS FOR OPENING FIRE~~

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

CAF101 23/2125 082A5191

FOR CAF

IMMEDIATE/IMMEDIATE 232001Z MAR 8

FROM MODUK NAVY
TO CINCPACFLT
HMS ENDURANCE
INFO THE GOV FALKLAND ISLANDS
FOF 3
HMA BUENOS AIRES
NP 8901
FCO LONDON

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

~~SIC JDA/W4A/LDQ/A3A
FCO LONDON FOR SAID
SOUTH GEORGIA - RULES FOR USE OF SMALL ARMS
REF: MODUK NAVY-JDA/W4A/LDQ/A3A-232000Z MAR 82
(CONTINGENCY GUIDANCE)~~

~~1. CARRIAGE AND ISSUE OF ARMS.~~

~~A. PERSONAL ARMS AND AMMUNITION MAY BE TAKEN ASHORE FOR USE IN
SELF DEFENCE ONLY.~~

~~B. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE FACT THAT OPEN DISPLAY
OF WEAPONS MAY EXACERBATE SITUATION AND BE OPEN TO SUBSEQUENT
MISREPRESENTATION BUT MAY ALSO HAVE DETERRENT OR STABILISING EFFECT.~~

~~C. IN GENERAL TERMS HOWEVER SERVICEMEN SHOULD NOT BE PUT IN
POSITION OF DANGER IN WHICH THEY CANNOT DEFEND THEMSELVES~~

~~D. WEAPONS ARE NOT TO BE ISSUED WITHOUT AMMUNITION~~

~~E. INDIVIDUALS ISSUED WITH WEAPONS ARE TO BE CAREFULLY BRIEFED
ON INSTRUCTIONS FOR OPENING FIRE~~

~~2. USE OF MILITARY ARMS.~~

~~A. MILITARY ARMS MAY BE USED ONLY IN SELF DEFENCE WHEN THEY
PROVIDE THE ONLY WAY OF PROTECTING SERVICEMEN FROM DEATH OR
SERIOUS INJURY. USE OF ARMS IS TO BE LIMITED TO THE MINIMUM
NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THIS, CONSISTENT WITH NEED FOR LOW KEY
APPROACH AND CORDIAL BUT FIRM EXCHANGES.~~

~~B. WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT THE SENIOR PERSON PRESENT SHOULD
CONTROL THE USE OF ARMS. IF THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE INDIVIDUALS MAY
AND SHOULD TAKE SUCH INDEPENDENT PROTECTIVE ACTION AS CIRCUMSTANCES
DICTATE~~

~~3. INSTRUCTIONS FOR OPENING FIRE~~

A. THESE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY TO COMMANDERS CONTROLLING FIRE OR TO INDIVIDUAL SERVICEMEN ACTING INDEPENDENTLY

B. GENERAL. MINIMUM FORCE IS TO BE USED ONLY TO SAFEGUARD LIFE IF FIRE IS OPENED

1. ONLY AIMED SHOTS ARE TO BE FIRED

2. NO MORE ROUNDS THAN ARE NECESSARY TO SAFEGUARD LIFE ARE TO BE FIRED

3. WHERE POSSIBLE AUTOMATIC WEAPONS ARE TO BE ON SINGLE SHOT. AUTOMATIC FIRE SHOULD ONLY BE USED IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

4. ONLY PERSONS ARMED WITH FIREARMS OR OTHER WEAPONS ARE TO BE FIRED UPON

5. MAGAZINES SHOULD BE LOADED WITH LIVE AMMUNITION AND FITTED TO WEAPONS BUT UNLESS FIRE IS ABOUT TO BE OPENED NO LIVE ROUND IS TO BE IN THE BREACH AND WORKING PARTS ARE TO BE FORWARD

C. WARNING. WARNING IS TO BE GIVEN BEFORE OPENING FIRE.

D. GUIDELINES. YOU MAY FIRE ONLY IF THERE IS NO OTHER WAY TO PROTECT YOURSELF OR THOSE FOR WHOM YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE FROM THE DANGER OF BEING KILLED OR SERIOUSLY INJURED AND THEN ONLY USING THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF SHOTS NECESSARY

BT

DISTRIBUTION JDA

N

CWG 1 DS 5 ACTION (CYR 1 Res Clerk)

C3F 1 ACS(FINNS)FONDON 2

CXU 2 DNOT

CAF 2 DS 16

DISTRIBUTION W4A

N

CAF 2 CGRM ACTION (CWV 1 RCDO(N))

CAS 2 CGRM(OAB)

DISTRIBUTION LDQ

N

CXU 2 DNOT ACTION (CXU 1 DNOT(DO))

CWP 1 ACNS(O)

CAS 1 DNHC

CXR 1 DNW

CWG 1 DS 5

CYK 1 STP(N)

DISTRIBUTION A3A

N


CXK 4 COSSEC ACTION (CXK 1 DSC)

CAB 3 ACDS(POL)

CWJ 1 AUS(D staff)

CAB 1 CAS

CVR 1 CDS



SECRET

DUTY COMMANDER
31 MAR 1982
B/C

D
5
3

CXU154 31/1654 090B3046

FOR CXU

IMMEDIATE/IMMEDIATE 311625Z MAR 8

FROM MODUK NAVY
TO CINCFLEET
INFO MODUK

SECRET

SIC LDQ

1. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT CURRENT INTELLIGENCE INDICATES POSSIBILITY THAT ARGENTINIAN UNITS MIGHT BE IN A POSITION TO LAND TROOPS NEAR PORT STANLEY ON OR AFTER 2 APRIL.
2. MINISTERS ARE CONSIDERING WHETHER HMS ENDURANCE SHOULD REDEPLOY TO FALKLAND ISLANDS. PENDING DECISION HMS ENDURANCE IS TO REMAIN AT-SEA TO THE NW OF LEITHWHER SHE CAN CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SURVEILLANCE OF SHORE PARTY BUT CAN PROCEED TOWARDS PORT STANLEY WITHOUT DELAY IF THIS SHOULD BE REQUIRED.

DISTRIBUTION LDQ

CXU	2	DNOT ACTION (CXU	1	DNOT(DO))
CWP	1	ACNS(O)		
CA	1	DNOC		
CXK	1	DNW		
CWG	1	DS 5		
CYK	1	STP(N)		
C				
CWQ	1	DSC(NATO) ACTION (CXK	1	DSC)
CXU	2	DNOC		

B/K
D
3
5

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CXU126 31/2047-09084635

FOR CXU

IMMEDIATE/PRIORITY 312015Z MAR 62

Later repeated by CINCFLEET

FROM: R0DUK NAVY
TO: CINCFLEET
INFO: R0DUK
RE: GOV FALKLAND ISLES
NR 8901

C O N F I D E N T I A L
SIC LOC

FROM US NAVY LDC 311625Z MAR 62 (NOTAE).

- 1. ENDURANCE IS TO PROCEED WITH ALL DESPATCH TO PORT STANLEY.
- 2. BEFORE DEPARTURE ENDURANCE IS TO LAND AT CRIVILLER ALL AMMO WITH COMPLETE SCALES OF WEAPONS AMMO AND RADIOS PLUS ADDITIONAL TONES AS REQUIRED.
- 3. FURTHER SIGNAL ON RM EMPLOYMENT FOLLOWS

DISTRIBUTION: MEDC

- CXU 2- DNOT ACTION (CXU 1- DNOT(DO).)
- CMP 1- ACNS(O).
- EAS 1- DNSC
- EXR 1- DNW
- CWG 1- DS 5
- CYK 1- STP(N)

- CWQ 1- DSC(NATO) ACTION (CXK 1- DSC.)
- CXU 2- DNOT

SECRET

FLASH

ZPAO 31/2140 090E4796 SPECIAL HANDLING

FOR ZPA

SECRET

87F

FLASH/FLASH 312223Z MAR 82

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

317072 3

FROM - MODUK NAVY
TO - CINCFLEET
INFO - MODUK
HE GOV FALKLAND ISLAND
HMS ENDURANCE
NP 8901

UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR REVISION

UK EYES B

Not
Dist

ACNS(1)

DS5

SECRET UK EYES BRAVO
SIC AAA/LDQ

EMPLOYMENT OF RM DETACHMENT ON SOUTH GEORGIA.

A. MODUK NAVY LDQ-312015Z MAR 82

B. MODUK NAVY JDA/W4A/LDQ/A3A-232001Z MAR 82 -39

1. PENDING RECEIPT OF FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTRARY, MISSION OF RM DETACHMENT REMAINING SOUTH GEORGIA IN PRIORITY ORDER IS TO

A. MAINTAIN UK PRESENCE ON SOUTH GEORGIA

B. PROTECT BAS PERSONNEL AT GRYTUIKEN

C. MAINTAIN SURVEILLANCE OF ARGENTINES AT LEITH HARBOUR

2. APPRECIATE TASK AT PARA 1C MAY BE DIFFICULT AND COULD PRESENT DANGERS FOR ISOLATED PARTY. SURVEILLANCE MAY BE REDUCED TO 1-OP IF NECESSARY ENSURING POSSIBILITY OF CLOSE CONTACT WITH ANY ARGENTINES IS KEPT TO MINIMUM BY KEEPING OP AT DISTANCE.

3. ROE ARE IAW REF B. OCRM TO TAKE COPY OF REF B ASHORE AND ANY AMENDMENTS WILL BE ISSUED IN CLEAR.

4. RECOMMEND COMMAND OF RM DETACHMENT RETAINED BY CO HMS ENDURANCE. REAR LINK COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE VIA INSECURE MEANS THROUGH BAS GRYTUIKEN. IF TIME PERMITS AND DEPARTURE OF HMS ENDURANCE IS NOT DELAYED, ARRANGEMENTS TO ESTABLISH LOCAL CODE EG SLIDER SHOULD BE MADE.

Flap A

ORIG: BRUCE BRANCH: OPS CGRM EXT: 2270-6105

BT

NOT - 21522

CGRM

RUSH DSC } 21522
RC }

DSC (NAO) - 21522

CSSEC

MINISTER OF STATE (AF)

UK EYES B
SECRET

SECRET

RESTRICTED

CAE009 02/0208 093A0302

FOR CAF

FLASH/FLASH 021455Z APR 82

CORRUPT DTG: THIS SHOULD READ 020155Z

FROM: NODUK/NAVY
TO: HNS ENDURANCE
INFO: CINCFLEET
HEGFI

RESTRICTED

SIC LDR/W4A/19F

SUSPECT ASSAULT ON SOUTH GEORGIA. PASS TO RM DET.

1. STRONG POSSIBILITY OF ASSLT ON GRVTVIKEN BY 40 ARGONNISE FROM DESTROYER/PARAISSO. POSSIBLE TIME 021300 LOCAL.
2. CONCENTRATE ALL FORCES GRVTVIKEN IMMEDIATELY. CANCEL ALL OP TASKS. ENLIST SP FROM BAS PERSONNEL BY AGREEMENT WITH BASE COND.
3. CANCEL ROE IN NODUK NAVY JDA/W4A 232001Z MAR. YOU ARE TO OPEN FIRE WITHOUT WARNING ON ANY ARG PARTY LANDING ON SOUTH GEORGIA PROVIDED YOU ARE CERTAIN THEY ARE ARMED.
4. IN CONSULTATION WITH BASE COND AS REP HEGFI TAKE ALL NEC STEPS TO RESIST ARG ARMED INCURSION FROM SEWARD

BT

DISTRIBUTION LDR

N

CXU	2	DNOT ACTION	(CXU	1	DNOT(DO))
CWP	1	ACMS(O)			
CAS	1	DNSC			
CXR	1	DNW			
CMG	1	DS-5			
CYK	1	STP(N)			

DISTRIBUTION W4A

N

CAF	2	CGRM ACTION	(CWV	1	RCDO(N))
CAS	2	CGRM(CAE)			

DISTRIBUTION 19F

N

CXK	1	DSC(ROW) ACTION	(CXK	1	DSC)
CYH	1	ACDS(S)			
CXQ	1	ASD-2			
CMJ	1	AUS(D Staff)			
CAF	2	CGRM			
CYT	1	CHSO			

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CXS305 02/1220 092AD343

FOR CAF

FLASH/FLASH 021215Z APR 82

FROM MODUK NAVY
TO RNS ENDURANCE
HEQFI
INFO CINCFLEET

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SIG LDQ/W4A/19F

SUSPECT ASSAULT ON SOUTH GEORGE PASS TO RM DET.

A. MODUK NAVY LDQ/W4A/19F 021215Z APR 82 FURTHER TO REF A, MAKE NO ATTEMPT TO ARREST ARG WORKING PARTY AT LEITH HARBOUR
BT

DISTRIBUTION LDQ

N
CXU 2 DNOT ACTION (CXU 1 DNOT(DO))
CWP 1 ACNS(O)
CAS 1 DNSC
CXR 1 DNW
CWG 1 DS 5
CYK 1 STP(N)

Log

DISTRIBUTION W4A

N
CAF 2 CGRM ACTION (CWV 1 RCDO(N))
CAS 2 CGRM(OAB)

DISTRIBUTION 19F

N
CXX 1 DSC(ROW) ACTION (CXX 1 DSC)
CYH 1 ACDS(S)
CXQ 1 ASD-2
CWJ 1 AUS(D Staff)
CAF 2 CGRM
CYT 1 CNSO
CXX 2 COSSEC
CYD 1 DD Ops(AT)(RAF)
CYG 1 DIS
CXV 1 DNW
CXU 2 DNOT
OAB 1 DONS
CWJ 1 DS 11

CGRM	
RM	
-2 APR 1982	
ACTION	RM
Controlled Release	
Serial No.	

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Sir
Miss
Mrs

022260Z

FROM HMS ENCOURAGE
TO FOC LONDON
INFO CINCFLEET
MODUK NAVY

SECRET

1. BASE COMMANDER GRIVIKEN CALLED BY AA BAHIA PARAISO AND TOLD THAT AN IMPORTANT MESSAGE WOULD BE PASSED AFTER 031000Z.
2. IT IS ASSUMED THAT THIS MESSAGE WILL ASK GRIVIKEN TO SURRENDER THE BASE AS QUOTE SOUTH GEORGIA IS IN ARGENTINE HANDS UNQUOTE IN THE ABSENCE OF HEGFI WHAT INSTRUCTIONS DO YOU WISH PASSED TO BASE COMMANDER QUES.
3. I WILL BE IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT MY ROYAL MARINES AT GRIVIKEN AT APPROX 031500Z

DISTRIBUTION - 137

- 1 DSO (ROW) ACTION (1 DSO)
- 1 AOPS(S)
- 1 AOPS(S)
- 1 AOP(2) (REF)
- 4 OSEB
- 1 CMS
- 1 CIBO
- 2 OSEB
- 1 DD-CMS(AT)(RAF)
- 1 DIC
- 1 DIRM
- 1 CWF
- 1 DORS
- 1 DE 14

ENCL No.
4

S E C R E T

CW0000 0370000 093A0991

FOR COM

FLASH/FLASH 037015Z APR 62

THE ASSESSMENT OF COMCEN IS THAT THIS DTG IS CORRUPT AND SHOULD BE 030815Z APR 62.

FROM ROLU NAVY
TO RMC ENDURANCE
INFO CTRFLEET
CCO LONDON

S E C R E T

SIC 19F/LDQ/EAL

OPERATION CORPORATE

REFERENCE ENDURANCE 19F/LDQ/EAL 022000Z APR 62

1. IF STATEMENT FROM BAHIA PARAISSO AT 031000Z ASKS FOR CASE TO BE SURRENDERED BASE COMMANDER SHOULD NOT COMPLY. HE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT ANY ATTEMPTED LANDING WILL BE RESISTED. IF ARGENTINIANS THEN INVADE RM DETACHMENT IS TO RESIST INVASION USING FORCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ROE LAID DOWN IN JDA/W4A/19F 232001Z MAR, BUT THEY SHOULD NOT RESIST BEYOND THE POINT WHERE LIVES MIGHT BE LOST TO NO AVAIL AT

DISTRIBUTION 19F

CNR	1	DSC(ROW)	ACTION	(CXI)	1	DSC
CYH	1	ACDS(S)				
CWF	1	ACNS(O)				
CXQ	1	ABD 2				
CXJ	1	AUS(D staff)				
CAF	4	CSRH				
CMS	1	CMS				
CYT	1	CNSO				
CXF	2	COSSEC				
CYB	1	DD Ops(AT)(RAF)				
CY	1	DDO				
CXV	1	DFAW				
CNR	1	DIR				
CNS	1	DCRS				
CXJ	1	DC 11				
CNR	1	DCI				
CNR	1	DCO Co-ord				
CAT	1	DST(FNV)				
CNR	1	DC 2				
CAL	1	RUST				
CAF	1	VCDS(P&L)				
CNR	1	DSC(NAVY OPS)				