

Explain X
depths.

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OD(SA) PRESENTATION 0900 22 APR.

SSN OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THE MEZ

ROE. need same as antennas for MEZ. 3 subs

1. Prime Minister, Gentlemen. My name is Commander CARR and before joining the Naval Staff one year ago, I was in Command of the 'S' Class Submarine HMS SCEPTRE

2. Twenty four hours ago CINCFLEET was instructed by MODUK to detach one of the two 'S' Class SSNs from patrol in the MEZ off the Falkland Islands to intercept the Argentinian Carrier Group which was then at sea some 90 nm off Punta Delgada and approximately 480 nm from the Falkland Islands.

Patrol area Int.

3. HMS SPLENDID has been ordered to proceed to intercept the Argentine Carrier Group, to conduct surveillance operations against that Group and at the same time to be fully prepared for offensive operations. At a speed of advance of about 15 kts SPLENDID could be in the vicinity of the Argentinian force at the earliest in about 12 hours time from now. The transit speed of 15 kts will allow SPLENDID to achieve good sonar performance against Argentinian submarines (which she is also authorised to sink if she should encounter one) and allow her to manoeuvre safely in areas of shallow water ie less than 100 fms (600 feet).

4. Good intelligence reports on the position of this Argentinian group are necessary for successful early interception, and as SPLENDID nears her goal she will home in using her own passive sensors.

5. Once in position SPLENDID can maintain a surveillance and shadowing position, or be instructed to conduct offensive operations as or when directed, SPLENDID is armed with ~~12~~ Anti Surface ship torpedoes as well as Anti Submarine Torpedoes.

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RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4)

7. That concludes this short brief - I will be happy to answer any questions.

(latest intelligence 0800 22 April)

DCDS(I) 26

ODSA BRIEFING - THU 22 APRIL 1982

THE ARGENTINE CAPABILITY TO WITHSTAND A BLOCKADE

Introduction

1. My start point is that an effective sea and air blockade is imposed by 1 May. This assumes that:

- merchant ships will be turned back or sunk
- Stanley Airport is unusable

Size of the Garrison

2. A quick word on the size of the Garrison - which of course bears directly on the landing options. A large brigade group of say 3 or 4 battalions will hold Stanley. If they decide to attempt to deny us a foothold elsewhere further battalions are needed - say 2 to 4 depending on their intent. This produces a probable force level of 7,000 and a worst case of 10,000.

The Build Up

3. We are not privy to Argentine plans. But we believe they are attempting to build up the materiel they need to withstand a siege of at least two months, during which they may have to fight for 30 days.

4. Based on what a British force would need under similar circumstances and taking account of what they have probably been able to lift in by sea and air, the bill is shown on the vufoil. My deduction is that by 1 May a Garrison of 7,000, ~~or in the worse case 10,000,~~ could be in place with the supplies it needs to endure a siege of upto 2 months and possibly longer.

Counters to the Blockade

5. Now to examine the Argentines' ability to counter the blockade.

6. First - by sea. The Argentine Navy could attempt to break the blockade by attacking the Task Force. But they would be unlikely to risk their surface fleet in a match which they must reckon they would lose. Their two modern submarines are a different matter and they pose a threat. [They may use merchant ships to break the blockade, perhaps using flags of convenience. And a determined ship's captain can only of course be stopped by ^{gun}fire.]

No
Navy
report.

7. Secondly - by air. We must assume that the Argentines will attempt to strike the Task Force (vufoil). But (as you know) they only have an outside chance of inflicting severe damage. Air resupply is ruled out provided Stanley airport is neutralised.

8. Lastly - by exploiting, on humanitarian grounds, the plight of the civil population. But they would be subjected more to hardship than to starvation. The majority of the people of Stanley have moved out - of a population of 1000 only 150 now remain. This reduces one of the major constraints on the assault (and other operations).

Argentine Vulnerabilities

9. But the Argentines have their flaws:

- a. The airfield - its installations and its land link with the town - is highly vulnerable to attack from the air and on the ground.
- b. Their parked helicopters, on which all movement (reserves, casualties and resupply) depends, are also highly vulnerable.
- c. Their deployment will stretch them out and the harsh weather will drive them into buildings. At night, given the inexperience of their soldiers, their outposts make inviting targets.
- d. The supply dumps - at Stanley, in the Marines Camp and elsewhere are soft targets. As too is the single water pumping station.
- e. Communications with the mainland. We know exactly where the Cable and Wireless Station is - we know the Force Headquarters is in the Governor's House. Both are ideal targets for special forces raids.
- f. Finally, if deprived of their commanders, the Argentines probably lack the battle resilience of other more seasoned armies.

10. This leads me to the crux - morale. ⁷ Most of the Garrison will have been on the Islands for a month when the blockade is imposed. The environment is inhospitable, the weather harsh, the people unfriendly, living conditions primitive and food barely adequate. We now reckon 80% are young - very young - conscripts ill prepared for the rigorous life they face. If reverses elsewhere are rammed home and if, above all, the Garrison is subjected to a vigorous campaign of harrassment - from the ground (by special forces) and from the air - its will to fight will be sapped. It will feel isolated and perhaps even abandoned.

Conclusion

11. In sum, the effects of the blockade will only bite deep if they are accompanied by aggressive attrition - directed at the Garrison itself, its heirarchy, its communications with the mainland, its critical stocks and above all the airfield.

12. The Garrison's morale is the crucial, and most vulnerable, element in the Argentine defence. A carefully orchestrated attack upon it, embracing all methods both physical and psychological, has promise of success. From mid-May onwards the Garrison's will to resist may then start to crumble. Thereafter morale will continue increasingly to deteriorate to the point when, in about late July the Garrison might not offer effective resistance to direct assault.

PRESENTATION TO OD AT 0900 HRS 22 APRIL 1982

~~Williams?~~ Master Copy

LANDING OPTIONS IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

Vufoil ON.

1. Prime Minister, I would now like to outline our landing options in the Falkland Islands, but before doing so I ~~think it might be useful~~ ^{will} ~~for me to~~ run through some of the main considerations that were taken into account in formulating the outline plan. We have made two assumptions which are that South Georgia has been re-taken by the time we land ~~in the Falkland Islands~~ and more importantly, that an effective sea/air Exclusion Zone has been established round the Falkland Islands.

2. It is essential that we obtain up to date and accurate intelligence of the Argentine Land Forces, ~~on the Falkland Islands~~. Hence the vital importance of the ~~Advance~~ ^{Special} Forces Operations, particularly in an intelligence gathering role, ~~which have already been outlined.~~ ^{As you have just heard} We

~~believe~~ ^{the} Argentine Land Force could be ~~between~~ ^{well in excess of} 7000 ~~and 8000~~ ^{men} in

~~strength~~ by the time we land and we expect that their largest concentration will be in the area of Port Stanley although it is likely they will have Battalions based round the settlements of Darwin, Fox Bay and

North Arm from where they will attempt to watch and cover our possible landing areas. Our Landing Force will number some 5,500 and we expect

to achieve an amphibious landing with minimum casualties mounted outside areas of the main concentrations of Argentine defences. The mobility provided by our helicopters should give us ^a tactical advantage. Assuming

an air and sea blockade of the Falkland Islands has been ^{effective} ~~successful~~,

Argentine morale and ability to resist will have deteriorated and their ^{cap} ability to react will be reduced provided we have succeeded in knocking

out their air and helicopter assets. We retain some flexibility as to our exact landing points.

3. The Winter is bleak in the Falkland Islands and the weather can be likened to Dartmoor on a bad day. The weather will have a bearing on the land battle as it will pose morale and survival problems for troops in

the open. The bulk of our force is trained and equipped for arctic^{mountain} warfare operations ^{and} but the Argentine forces are likely to be concentrated in the area of settlements where accommodation exists for troops not deployed in the field. The weather will undoubtedly make amphibious operations more difficult, particularly on exposed coasts, and ~~severely~~ ^{previously} ~~inhibit parachute operations on many occasions.~~

4. The Amphibious Force can normally loiter over the horizon ready to land when required. However, this capability will be particularly difficult to ~~achieve~~ ^{sustain} in the South Atlantic during winter and therefore we should not wish to keep troops embarked for more than a month at a time. South Georgia, ^{which is 3 days passage from} ~~eight days closer to the Falkland Islands than~~ Ascension, could provide a suitable loiter area for a limited period.

5. We are aware of a number of possible landing areas and the most likely ones that might be used for this operation are shown on this ~~overlay~~ ^{overlay}. They will all require detailed reconnaissance and this would ^{by the SAS and by our air assets.} be carried out by the SBS embarked with the Force. One of the particular difficulties that we are likely to encounter around the Falkland Islands is the presence of ^{seaweed,} KELP which could prove an obstacle and prevent landings in certain areas. ^{Helicopter} Landing sites, because of the very open nature of the ground, would be easy to find throughout the whole area but we must take into account exits from the landing areas for vehicles. The going throughout the whole of the Falkland Islands is extremely difficult, the ground is very boggy and we expect tactical mobility to depend mainly on foot, helicopters and coastal movement in large or small craft. We will be deploying with approximately 70 oversnow vehicles and these should give us some mobility cross-country but wheeled vehicles are likely to be restricted to the Port Stanley area or on a very few specific tracks. The Argentinians could find their mobility restricted.

6. You have already seen an outline of the key dates. The current

preferred
 of ~~the~~ date for landing is 16 May. *This date has been chosen because* ~~this~~ ^{it} allows the force to be supplemented by HMS INTREPID *which arrives on 16 May and* which provides greater flexibility for the initial landing; by the addition of ^{Battalion} PARA *arriving on 14 May* Group in NORLAND as an immediate reinforcement unit; the completion of the intelligence gathering tasks *which could take up to 15 days* and the consolidation of the sea/air exclusion zone including the "softening up process" on Port Stanley airfield. Any changes to ^{any one} these parameters *would affect the selection of* ~~must be taken into account when~~ selecting the final landing date.

7. This leads on to the outline concept of land operations. We believe that a strong and sustained British presence ashore will be ^{best} achieved by landing 3 Cdo Bde augmented by two Parachute Bn Gps (~~about 5,500 men~~) on or about 16 May. The force will establish a bridgehead close enough to exert direct military and psychological pressure against the main Argentine forces in the Port Stanley area. *following special operations and the sea and air blockade.* This may be enough to convince the Argentines that their own position is militarily untenable and that they could honourably agree to withdraw but the possibility that the enemy may advance for a decisive battle must be allowed for in selecting the position for the Bridgehead. The destruction of Stanley airfield together with the Argentine air assets will be crucial in ensuing land operations as we must have ^{superiority in the} ~~full~~ air ~~superiority~~ and ⁱⁿ tactical mobility over the Argentinians. It would be wrong for me to speculate ^{and when} on where the landing will actually take place. This will be very much a matter for the commanders on the spot, but I believe it is likely to be in North East Falkland ~~Islands~~, as close to Stanley as possible while remaining out of range of ^{the} artillery and surface to air weapons ~~selected there~~. Subsequent operations ^w should take advantage of our mobility, firepower and our ability to outflank. We believe a major battle is unlikely but do foresee a series of damaging and demoralising attacks ^{by us} ~~on~~ ^{their} ~~his~~ outlying forces, Headquarters and logistic installations separated from the civilian population. It is significant that the Argentinian forces will have been denied any form of resupply for more than two weeks ^{before the} during this phase. *preferred date*