

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Mallaby

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SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON: US ATTITUDES TO
THE FALKLANDS CRISIS

1. There is implicit in the briefs I submitted yesterday an important argument which should perhaps be made explicit. I have attempted to do so in the attached draft Speaking Note which, if you agree, Mr Bullard might feed into the deliberations of the Secretary of State's party.

M H Jay

22 April, 1982

M H Jay
Planning Staff

cc

Mr Bullard
Mr Giffard
Mr Ure
Mr Fearn
Defence Dept
EESD
SAmD
MCAD

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Registry

3.

DRAFT

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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To:-

FROM

Michael Jay
 Telephone No. Ext.

Department
 PLANNING STAFF

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON: FALKLAND
 ISLANDS: US ATTITUDES TO THE CRISIS

POINTS TO MAKE

1. We understand American evenhandedness at present and have no quarrel with it. It is for you to decide your tactics as go-between. We have confidence in you, and are enormously grateful for all you have done. We are prepared to ride public opinion on the subject.
2. But this only applies so long as your present rôle as go-between lasts. We very much hope it will succeed. We think it the best chance we have for a reasonable settlement. But if it fails there can be no question where American responsibilities lie. You must come down firmly and unequivocally on our side, which also means taking economic measures against Argentina. That will be the surest way of making the Argentines give way.
3. We realise that this ^{may} ~~will~~ have its price. Alienating yourselves from much of Latin America may make/nore difficult the implementation of your policies in South and in Central America, and may tempt some countries to flirt with the Soviet Union.
4. But let us not get this out of proportion.

Argentina may be susceptible to Soviet pressure, but other South American states are likely to remain strongly anti-communist. They will not flee from your arms to the Russians!

5. Central America is more unsettled, but we think most countries will think twice before giving up US support, no matter what they may feel obliged to say in the name of Latin American solidarity.

6. And the potential costs of not supporting us strongly are higher, viz:

- (i) you waste the best chance of bringing Argentina to its senses;
- (ii) by failing utterly to condemn Argentine illegal aggression you make more likely aggression by others, such as Venezuela over Guyana and Guatemala over Belize. That would run the risk of just the kind of Soviet meddling in the continent you wish to avoid;
- (iii) the reputation of the west as defender of the rule of law will be weakened, with implications for American and Western influence elsewhere;
- (iv) you risk damaging the Western Alliance at just the time, in the run-up to the two Summits, when solidarity is crucial. British public opinion in particular would not understand, especially in view of the support we have given you, e.g. over observers for the El Salvador elections. Only the Russians would benefit from

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7. So we are sure we can count on your support.