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PS/PUS

cc: Mr Wright  
Mr Gillmore

BRIEF FOR SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG'S MEETING AT 1030 AM  
ON 23 APRIL

1. I submit a short brief on the main item for discussion, which I understand to be 'Rules of Engagement - Enforcement of Falkland Islands' Maritime and Air Exclusion Zone'.
2. I have also included a short note on one or two other subjects which could conceivably crop up.

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DESK OFFICER		REGISTRY
INDEX	PA	Action Taken

*P. J. Weston*

23 April 1982

P J Weston  
Defence Department

- 1 | *Comms in S. Georgia area - move to main carrier battle group.*  
*For her own safety - Rule 5 for submarines*  
*Cp. Dulittle for surface ships - staying south of 35°*
- 2 | *Issue warning. Tell Pym & Parsons what we are doing*
- 3 | *Notification. ICAO etc & Shipping - Prepare*



RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR ENFORCEMENT  
OF FALKLAND ISLANDS' MARITIME AND AIR EXCLUSION  
ZONE (COS S19(3))

A

1. A first draft of this document was discussed in Chiefs of Staff Committee yesterday. Mr Gillmore's record of that discussion is attached. The revised document as it has now emerged for the most part takes account of the points made by Mr Gillmore and is therefore satisfactory. The terms of the UK official notification to establish the Air Exclusion Zone are under consideration by FCO legal advisers who will consult the law officers as necessary.

2. The one problem in the revised text concerns suffix SIERRA on page A3, which provides that attacks may be carried out on 'all aircraft on the ground in the Falkland Islands'. There must be a risk that this sweeping provision might result in attacks on civil aircraft evacuating civilians or casualties from Port Stanley. CDS will no doubt say that the danger could be obviated by negotiations via the Swiss as for hospital ships. But this assumes the Argentines will take an initiative to that end. Their practice so far with regard to hospital ships (which they have not notified internationally) is not encouraging, meanwhile the risk would remain. The rule would be better deleted.

OPERATION CORPORATE - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AGAINST  
SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT (COS S19(6))

B

3. The background to this item, if it should arise, is set out in Mr Gillmore's minute of 22 April, copy attached. The revised draft is satisfactory. The combination of a warning to the Argentines couched in ambiguous terms plus an ROE permitting active harrassment seems best calculated

/to deter



to deter Argentine surveillance flights by 707 aircraft without risking the political costs of shooting such aircraft down. Our own feeling is that the Secretary of State would not need to be consulted personally to authorise this ROE.

[not attached]

USE OF VULCANS AGAINST STANLEY AIRFIELD (COS MISC 153/742/1)

4. The feasibility of this operation, which was also discussed at the Chiefs of Staff yesterday, would depend on very tight timing. It would have to be carried out between 26 and 29 April if other priority air reinforcements are not to be affected. Ministers yesterday put off the decision to deploy the Vulcans to Ascension. We have taken up in Washington the apparent doubts of the US Base Commander about use of Wide Awake Airfield at Ascension by Vulcan aircraft. Mr Bullard raised this with Eagleburger yesterday. The latter confirmed that he was not aware of any possible reason why there should be any problem in the use of Wide Awake by Vulcans; but he would have a word with the appropriate quarters in the Pentagon.

[not attached]


OPERATION CORPORATE - STRATEGIC OPTIONS (COS MISC 150/742/1)

5. This paper is for discussion at Chiefs of Staff today. It follows the line discussed at an informal meeting of FCO/MOD officials on 21 April, as recorded in my minute of 22 April. It identifies as broad strategic options the following:-

- (a) Operation SUTTON;
- (b) enforcing MEZ/AEZ with full carrier Task Force as long as possible, but no landing;
- (c) extended blockade for at least six months, but with reduced force levels;

/(d) general

SECRET



- (d) general offensive operations against the Argentine Navy;
- (e) supplementary option of specific raids against the Argentine garrisons in the Falklands.

These options may well form part of the discussion scheduled for Chequers on Sunday, which is to cover military options in the longer term. The Department will provide a brief for the Secretary of State largely in the form of questions to which military planners must now seek to provide Ministers with realistic answers for planning purposes.

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