


310


Encl
J P W
Mn 4/5

Secretary of State

PS

No. Weston
Further briefing may
be required covering
some of these subjects
J P W
26/4

cc:- PS/PUS
Mr Wright
Mr Giffard
Mr Gillmore
Mr Bullard

MEETING OF OD(SA) AT CHEQUERS ON SUNDAY 25 APRIL

1. I believe that the original intention was that this meeting would concentrate on some of the broader questions involved in future strategic options for the Falklands, particularly military options. There is in any case to be a comprehensive military briefing by the Chiefs of Staff. Judging from the documents listed on the agenda for OD(SA), however, there is a risk that more immediate pre-occupations will supervene; I note for example that the Chiefs of Staff's paper on strategic options is itself not listed.

2. I submit herewith short briefing notes for the Secretary of State's use which cover those documents listed on the agenda having defence implications, including the paper on strategic options. The brief on OD(SA)(82)22 (call-up of reserves) was submitted to you separately yesterday.

Weston

24 April 1982

P J Weston
Defence Department

SECRET

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OD(SA)(82) 15th Meeting

COPY NO 7

CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

SUB-COMMITTEE ON THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND
FALKLAND ISLANDS

MEETING to be held at Chequers on
SUNDAY 25 APRIL 1982 at 10.30 am

AGENDUM

SITUATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

Previous Reference: OD(SA)(82) 14th Meeting

To be raised orally

[The following papers are relevant -

- ✓✓ OD(SA)(82) 22 - already circulated
- ✓ OD(SA)(82) 23 - to be circulated
- ✓ OD(SA)(82) 24 - to be circulated

✓✓ Minute to the Prime Minister from the Defence Secretary
dated 22 April on Maritime Rules of Engagement

Minute to the Prime Minister's Private Secretary from
Sir Robert Armstrong dated 22 April on Falkland Islanders

✓ Minute to the Prime Minister's Private Secretary from
Mr Wade-Gery dated 23 April on Falklands Military Decisions

Minute to the Prime Minister's Private Secretary from
the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's Private Secretary
dated 23 April on the Dependencies]

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG
R L WADE-GERY
R L L FACER

Cabinet Office

23 April 1982

The following are invited to attend

Chief of the Defence Staff
Sir Antony Acland
Sir Michael Palliser

SECRET



MARITIME
RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT

MINUTE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE DEFENCE SECRETARY DATED
22 APRIL ON MARITIME RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Line to Take

1. Agree to what Mr Nott proposes.

Background

2. The risk of authorising Suffix JULIET is tolerable, on the basis of Mr Nott's assurance that 'there is no likelihood of encountering conventional submarines from any other navy in the area'; and on the understanding that the area designated does not include water within 200 miles of the Brazilian coast where Brazilian submarines will be held. With the progress of the British Task Force southwards, the point has become slightly academic since as here described it applies only north of latitude 35° south. South of that line Suffix JULIET is already authorised.



Hd / Defence Dept
✓ PS
PS/PUS
N Wright
N Giffard
N Gillmore
MH 23/4

MO 5/21

PRIME MINISTER

MARITIME RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Our Ambassador in Brazil has taken up with the Brazilian Chief of Naval Staff the question of possible deployment of Brazilian submarines outside Brazilian territorial waters where they might come into contact with units of the Naval Task Force. Admiral Aratanha has now assured our Ambassador that all Brazilian submarines will be held within 200 miles of the Brazilian coast. There is no likelihood of encountering conventional submarines from any other Navy in the area.

2. On Monday we considered (OD(SA) 10th Meeting) Rules of Engagement applicable on the high seas between 10° and 35° South (and West of 20° West.) These Rules authorised attack on any ship, submarine or aircraft demonstrating hostile intent by coming within 25 miles of a British ship or submarine. However, OD(SA) withheld approval of a Rule authorising our forces to presume that any conventional submarine encountered would be Argentinian. In light of the Brazilian undertaking I believe we can now safely promulgate this Rule. May I have your agreement to this.

3. I am copying this minute to the members of OD(SA), and to Sir Robert Armstrong, Sir Michael Palliser and Sir Ian Sinclair.

SW

23 APR 1982

SECRET



FALKLANDS
MILITARY
DECISIONS

MINUTE TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM MR WADE-GERY
DATED 23 APRIL ON FALKLANDS MILITARY DECISIONS

Line to Take

1. The passage on SSN Conqueror is overtaken by events, since Conqueror has now been ordered back toward South Georgia to support Operation Paraquet, given overnight intelligence about Argentine submarine movements. The chance of an encounter between Conqueror and an Argentine submarine are of course now rather different from those stated in Mr Wade-Gery's minute.
2. (Argentine 707s) Confidential warning to Argentines via Swiss delivered at 9.30pm London time last night. Question whether any 707 ignoring warning shots should be shot down as been subject of separate submission to Ministers: on balance military advantages of this (when not in MEZ or on Operation Paraquet) may be outweighed by political costs in terms of likely international reactions. If Argentines complain publicly that their aircraft have been attacked, best line would be to publish terms of our prior warning yesterday to the Argentines, adding that responsibility clearly theirs for failing to take account of warning.
3. The background is set out in the Department's submission of 24 April, copy attached.

SECRET

Ref: B06475

MR COLESFalklands: Military Decisions

Sir Robert Armstrong, who has now left for Paris until tomorrow, has asked me to report two urgent decisions on military matters which were authorised at his meeting this morning with Sir Antony Acland, Sir Frank Cooper, Sir Michael Palliser and (in the Chief of the Defence Staff's temporary absence) the Chief of Naval Staff.

2. SSN Conqueror. This submarine has been deployed off South Georgia in the context of Operation Paraquet. The Ministry of Defence consider that she is no longer required there and that, in order not to waste a valuable asset, she should be immediately redeployed in direct support of the main Carrier Battle Group, which as you know is now south of latitude 35° South and will arrive at the Falklands MEZ on 29th April. But if she is to leave the South Georgia area, where she is covered by the Paraquet Rules of Engagement (ROE), she will need to be given new ROE. Apart from the Paraquet area, our submarines have at present ROE only for the Falklands MEZ. But our surface ships south of latitude 35° South have ROE which allow them to take necessary action to achieve their military task (transit) and to attack any submarine (or ship or aircraft) that demonstrates hostile intent; in these contexts they are allowed to presume that any conventional submarines detected are Argentinian. The equivalent ROE for an SSN reads

"Any submarine detected not classified nuclear may be presumed to be Argentinian and may be attacked".

The Ministry of Defence consider it essential that, if Conqueror is redeployed as they suggest, she be given this ROE (you are aware of the reasons why our submarines cannot afford to wait for a conventional submarine encountered to demonstrate hostile intent). Sir Robert's meeting concluded that this was unexceptional from Ministers' point of view; and therefore authorised both the proposed deployment and the proposed ROE. Sir Antony Acland did not consider that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary need be consulted or informed in Washington. The chances of an encounter between Conqueror and an Argentinian submarine are not in fact very high.

3. Argentine 707s. Boeing transport aircraft, with Argentine military markings, have been overflying the British Task Force. If this reconnaissance activity continues it could involve military danger, not least from submarines. Sir Robert's meeting therefore agreed -

(a) that the Task Force's Harriers should be authorised by the Ministry of Defence to "warn off" any further 707s which attempt such surveillance, using internationally recognised signals;

(b) that the Argentines should be confidentially warned, through the Swiss, that with immediate effect any Argentine aircraft engaging in such surveillance will be regarded as hostile and will be liable to be dealt with accordingly;

(c) that, once (b) had been done, the Ministry of Defence should authorise our Harriers to fire warning shots across the path of any 707 which ignores the signals at (a);

(1) (d) that as soon as further urgent work on the legal position is complete a separate submission should be made to Ministers on whether any 707 which ignores the warning shots at (c) should be shot down.

(11) If the steps at (a) or (c) succeed, (d) will of course not arise. The Defence Secretary is content with (a) and (c); Sir Antony Acland is informing the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in Washington and is confident that he too would not object. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office will prepare a public statement which could be made if, as a result of warning shots as at (c), the Argentines publicly complain that their aircraft have been attacked.

4. Since the above was written I have, as you know, mentioned these points to the Prime Minister and she has indicated that she is content with both.

5. I am sending copies of this minute to the Private Secretaries of the other members of OD(SA); and to the Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir Antony Acland, Sir Robert Armstrong and Sir Michael Palliser.



Ring Colles
Ful N.Y.

Mr Gillmore

cc: PS/PUS

~~PS/PUS~~ Private Security

FALKLANDS: PUBLICATION OF WARNING TO ARGENTINES ABOUT PROTECTION OF THE FLEET

Problem

1. Whether, and if so how, to publish the confidential warning conveyed yesterday to the Argentine Government via the Swiss about protection of the Fleet (FCO telegram to Berne No 64).

Recommendation

2. I recommend that Sir Anthony Parsons be authorised to convey the terms of our communication to the President of the UN Security Council for circulation, as he himself has proposed in UKMIS New York telegram 554. I further recommend that if before we can do this an incident occurs requiring public comment to pre-empt or rebut Argentine criticism, we should publish the terms of the warning immediately from News Department, adding that it was conveyed formally to the Argentines before the incident in question took place.

3. When the warning was conveyed to the Argentines yesterday in the interests of speed, the question whether we should also publish it was left on one side as a matter for further decision by Ministers. Mr Nott is known to favour early publication. The argument for this is strengthened by the risk that under existing rules of

/engagement

Now approved by PUS and no. 10. Action taken 1/4 Bm

engagement for operation PARAQUET the Force Commander has discretion to shoot down any future surveillance flight by the Argentines over South Georgia waters. We should be putting ourselves in the strongest position diplomatically by conveying the terms of our warning to the Security Council forthwith; if an incident occurs before this can happen we can already rest our public position on the fact that the Argentines were given formal advance warning not to approach British forces with their aircraft, which they chose to ignore.

4. Linked with publication of our warning is the separate question whether Ministers should now add to the rules of engagement of the Main Task Force a rule which permits attack upon Argentine surveillance aircraft if all warnings and other forms of harassment including warning shots fail to deter. While the terms of the warning conveyed yesterday to the Argentines are ambiguous and do not categorically commit us to attack such aircraft, it could be argued that after publication of such a warning we shall lose credibility if we do not in fact actually attack them. The Chiefs of Staff will no doubt argue that Argentine surveillance aircraft over the Main Task Force are as much a threat (by their ability to direct Argentine submarines) there as they are to our forces in operation PARAQUET where the ROE already permit shooting down.

5. As against that, we have yet to see whether yesterday's warning to the Argentines coupled with active harassment by British interceptors will do the trick in deterring

/further

further Argentine surveillance flights. If so, the problem disappears. If in operation PARAQUET an Argentine aircraft is meanwhile actually shot down, this will do much to reinforce the deterrent effect of our warning as it affects the Main Task Force. The political costs in risking the shooting down of an Argentine surveillance 707 (which may or may not carry military markings) over the high seas and not in relation to a specific operation could be significant and do us a lot of damage internationally. The Argentines would undoubtedly claim that the aircraft was in innocent transit to some distant destination and this might be difficult to disprove. On balance therefore I would recommend against authorising the shooting down of Argentine 707s if they are neither in the MEZ nor engaged in active surveillance of operation PARAQUET. If the current ROE prove insufficient to deter, we can reconsider.

P. J. Weston

24 April 1982

P J WESTON
DEFENCE DEPARTMENT


Copied to:

PS
Mr Wright
Mr Giffard
Mr Mallaby, Planning Staff
Mr Fearn, SAmD

SECRET

/ I agree...

1. I agree with Mr Weston's recommendations.
2. This issue was discussed at this morning's meeting of the Chiefs of Staff, when I suggested proceeding on the lines proposed by Mr Weston. The CNS is, naturally, concerned by the threat that Argentine reconnaissance aircraft will provide valuable intelligence to the Argentine fleet and in particular to its submarine force. He thought, however, that it would be reasonable to announce today the fact of our warning yesterday to the Argentines and to ask Ministers to change the ROEs for the Task Force so as to allow them to shoot down the Argentine 707s only if there was another overflight following the warning we have given.
3. I think that the Secretary of State will wish to clear this line with colleagues. I submit a Private Secretary letter to No.10.



24 April 1982

D H Gillmore

Copied to
PS / PUS
Mr Wright
Mr Gifford
Mr Mellaby
Mr Fean

SECRET

LETTER

DRAFT

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:-

Private Secretary

Number 10

From

Private Secretary

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

cc: PS/Mr Nott

PS/Sir R Armstrong

ARGENTINE RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER THE BRITISH TASK FORCE

1. As you know, following two overflights of the main Task Force by Argentine military 707 reconnaissance aircraft, we asked the Swiss to warn the Argentine Government that any approach by its warships, submarines, naval auxiliaries or aircraft which amounted to a threat to interfere with the mission of the British Forces would encounter the appropriate response and that all Argentine aircraft including civil aircraft engaging in surveillance of these British Forces would be regarded as hostile and were liable to be dealt with accordingly. This warning was delivered in Buenos Aires at 1720 (local) yesterday evening.
2. Sir Anthony Parsons has now recommended that we should circulate the text of our warning in the United Nations. He fears that, if we do not do so, the Argentine Government will circulate the text themselves as 'evidence' of our aggressive intentions.
3. The Secretary of State considers that we should proceed as Sir Anthony Parsons proposes and at the same time announce in London the fact of the warning given yesterday. If before we can do this,

an incident occurs (eg over South Georgia where the Force Commander already has discretion to shoot down Argentine reconnaissance aircraft) Mr Pym would be in favour of publishing the terms of the warning immediately, adding that it was conveyed formally to the Argentines before the incident in question took place.

4. On the separate question of whether we should now change the Rules of Engagement for the main Task Force in order to permit the shooting down of Argentine reconnaissance aircraft if warning shots failed to deter, Mr Pym's view is that we should wait to see whether yesterday's warning to the Argentines is sufficient to deter further surveillance flights. If this turns out not to be the case, Mr Pym hopes that Ministers can consider ^{urgently} whether to change the Rules of Engagement accordingly.



ODSA (82)24: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR
TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE

Line to Take

1. The rules of engagement as they have now emerged from detailed examination, including by Legal Advisers, are now largely satisfactory. Need to be sure that Attorney-General is content.

2. Draft text of the official announcement (Annex B). FCO

propose an amended version of the draft annexed to this paper.

This does not change the substance but brings into better balance the provisions of the TEZ as they apply to both ships and aircraft. It also includes a reference to the closure of Port Stanley Airport.

Flag A
(not yet
circulated
to ODSA)

Background

3. The process of exclusion needs to be watertight if the TEZ is to be effective. The rules of engagement achieve this, while providing that merchant ships and commercial aircraft not identified as carrying military supplies or personnel may be attacked only in the last resort and if specific prior warnings are not heeded. The MOD wish to add to Rule FOUR under SSNs the caveat ''applicable to targets within exclusion zone only''. This balances a similar provision governing the rules of engagement for surface ships and aircraft and is designed to ensure that the boundaries of the TEZ are not ignored. If there is to be adequate time for the Task Force to enforce the TEZ from the



moment of arrival on 29 April, these rules of engagement must be authorised by 26 April.

4. Legal Adviser's Comments

In the light of views which have been expressed by the Attorney General, the FCO legal advisers, have the following comments on details of the ROEs:

(a) Merchant Ships and Civil Aircraft, whether Argentine or other

The combined effect of rules 202 and 104 is that such ships or aircraft are in the first place to be warned off, but if they do not respond to the warning may be attacked. The legal justification for attacks on such ships or aircraft must rest on our being able to establish that they could, in the circumstances, reasonably be treated as operating in support of the Argentine military effort. It is therefore highly desirable that the public announcement of the Total Exclusion Zone should make it clear, in relation to aircraft as well as to ships, that the Zone is essentially directed against such supporting operations. The revised draft recommended by FCO officials would achieve this; the draft at Annex B does not do so in relation to aircraft.

(b) Suffix SIERRA

This Suffix authorises attacks on all aircraft on the ground in the Falkland Islands. The Attorney General has said that it is desirable for this instruction to be adjusted so that an aircraft on the ground which is positively identified as not being there in support of the Argentine military effort should not be attacked (an example might be an air taxi, clearly identifiable as such, which had brought press correspondents). It would, in any event, be desirable that the public announcement should make clear (as the revised draft does) the liability to attack of aircraft on the ground in the Islands.



(c) Suffix UNIFORM

This Suffix authorises attacks on all aircraft (i.e. Argentine or other, military or civil) which cannot be positively identified because of cloud or light conditions. In view of the risk of attack on an innocent aircraft (perhaps one that had entered the Zone because it was in distress) the Attorney General thought that the public announcement should make explicit the exposure to attack of any aircraft flying in the Zone in conditions which prevent positive identification. The revised draft does not go so far as to refer expressly to this risk: it does however provide for the possibility of authority being given by the MOD to fly in the Zone (which might meet the case of an aircraft in distress); and it is unambiguously clear about the liability to attack of 'any aircraft whether military or civil which is found within this Zone'.

SECRET

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OD(SA)(82) 24

COPY NO

7

23 April 1982

CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

SUB-COMMITTEE ON THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE

Note by the Secretaries

The attached note by officials identifies decisions which Ministers need to take on Monday 26 April and may therefore wish to discuss at their meeting on Sunday 25 April.

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG
R L WADE-GERY
R L L FACER

Cabinet Office

23 April 1982

SECRET

SECRET

In
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR ENFORCEMENT OF FALKLAND ISLANDS
TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE (TEZ)

Note by Officials

1. OD(SA) has to date approved Rules of Engagement (ROE)
 - a. for our SSNs within the Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) of 200 nautical miles around the Falkland Islands which are as follows:
 - (1) Any vessels positively identified inside the Exclusion Zone as being Argentine warships, submarines and naval auxiliaries may be attacked.
 - (2) After the first successful attack, withdraw from scene of action and report. Having reported or, if unable to clear report after 12 hours, continue patrol.
 - (3) Situation Reports are to be made at your discretion as soon as possible after any subsequent successful attacks and on all Argentine units detected.
 - (4) Additionally, if attacked you are authorised to retaliate as necessary for your self defence both inside and outside the Exclusion Zone.
 - b. (1) For the transit of the Task Force to the area which, for the area NORTH of 35° South has the following aim: to avoid provocation but to respond to aggression with sufficient firmness to ensure safe transit.
And the instruction that: to achieve transit you may attack any positively identified Argentine naval ship, combat aircraft or submarine which demonstrates hostile intent by coming within 25 miles of a British unit. Minimum force is to be used. All units may assist in defence of any unit which is attacked. Merchant ships may not be attacked. Maritime international law is not to be broken unless necessary in order to achieve aim.
 - (2) Once the task force has passed 35° South the aim is to: take sufficient action to ensure transit towards United Kingdom MEZ around Falklands.
And the instruction that to achieve transit you may attack any positively identified Argentine naval ship, combat aircraft or submarine which demonstrates hostile intent by coming within 25 miles of a British unit. All units of an Argentinian force may be attacked if one of them initiates an attack on a British unit. Merchant ships may not be attacked. Maritime international law is not to be broken unless necessary in order to achieve aim.

SECRET

In addition appropriate ROE were authorised in the context of Operation Paraquet.

2. The first surface vessels are due to enter the MEZ on 29 April. Thereafter a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) can be established and enforced. This paper assumes that such a TEZ would have the same geographical limits as the existing MEZ and would exclude aircraft as well as ships, commercial as well as military traffic and (where necessary) non-Argentines as well as Argentines. To allow adequate time for planning its enforcement, appropriate ROE need to be authorised by 26 April. Authorising these would not in itself commit Ministers to implementing the actual operation. But if the TEZ is to be enforced from 29 April, appropriate public announcements will need to be authorised on 26 April. Once these announcements have been made, Ministers will in effect be committed to subsequent implementation, though some very limited flexibility on the decision to implement will remain until 28 April.

The TEZ has both diplomatic and military objectives. In diplomatic terms, it would demonstrate our resolve with the use of a minimum force while negotiations offer prospects of a peaceful resolution. Successful enforcement of the TEZ therefore could provide negotiating leverage while retaining a degree of international support for the United Kingdom's position. The TEZ should also provide a longer-term opportunity to weaken the morale and fighting capability of the Argentine garrison on the Falklands by denying them food and supplies. If the Argentines were unable or unwilling to break this blockade, internal pressure on their Government to negotiate a solution could mount.

In order to achieve these objectives, action will need to be taken to neutralise Po Stanley airfield and to prevent all aircraft, as well as all ships, from providing supplies to the Argentine garrison. This would involve authorising the ROE set out at Annex A, which may be summarised as follows:

Enforcement of Total Exclusion Zone

Aim is to establish a blockade to prevent entry or exit of all Argentinian surface ships (except designated hospital ships), submarines and aircraft, (including helicopters); and of other merchant ships or civil aircraft which appear to be constituting a threat by acting in support of the Argentine invading forces in the Falkland Islands or otherwise demonstrating hostile intent. Targets include all positively identified Argentinian naval ships,

military aircraft and submarines, all aircraft (including if necessary non-Argentinian aircraft) positively identified as carrying military supplies or personnel, all aircraft on the Falkland Islands, and all aircraft which cannot be positively identified at night or in poor visibility. In addition, the Port Stanley runway and airfield installations (including airfield defences) can be attacked. Minimum force is to be used. Merchant ships are to be warned off as are commercial aircraft not identified as carrying military supplies or personnel; they may be attacked in the last resort, if the warnings are not heeded. In other respects, the instructions in force for all units South of 35° South will apply, with an extra provision that any Argentinian combat aircraft within 40 miles of a United Kingdom unit is deemed to be demonstrating hostile intent. This is necessary as the force comes within range of Super Etendard aircraft carrying the Exocet missile.

5. The geographical scope of the proposed ROE is wider than the TEZ itself in order to allow attacks on targets within the Zone to be launched from outside it. Attacks against any aircraft which cannot be positively identified at night or in poor visibility are included because of probable inability to identify aircraft in such conditions. The Argentinians would be likely to exploit this shortcoming if they appeared able to do so with relative impunity.
6. It will take some time to establish an effective Exclusion Zone, particularly in the air, where the HARRIERS' first duty will be to protect the Task Force. The objective would be to establish local mastery and then gradually to extend control to a wider area.
7. The Government will need to notify the International Civil Aviation Organisation in advance of the intention to implement a Total Exclusion Zone (including air) and to close Port Stanley airfield. It will also be necessary to expand the earlier announcement of a MEZ, to include Argentine merchant ships and other merchant shipping carrying supplies to the Falkland Islands. Draft announcements are attached at Annex B.
8. Ministers' approval is therefore sought for the ROE at Annex A to enforce a Total Exclusion Zone and for the terms of the Announcement at Annex B. These approvals are required on 26 April if the Task Force is to be in a position to enforce the Zone on its arrival on 29 April.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR ENFORCEMENT OF FALKLAND ISLANDS TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE

1. a. Exclusion Zone Limits.

A circle 200 nm radius centred on position 51° 40' South 59° 30' West and from seabed to unlimited height.

b. ROE Area Limits and Applicability.

Applicable to all United Kingdom forces directly engaged in enforcement of the Exclusion Zone.

2. Time Limits.

When ordered until further notice. (United Kingdom forces south of 35°S and not directly engaged in enforcement of the Exclusion Zone continue to be governed by Operation CORPORATE High Seas Serial 2/82; (Paraquet forces are covered separately).

3. Recommended Policies.

POLITICAL

MEANING

EXPANSION

CHARLIE

Escalate

Enforce the Total Exclusion Zone, establishing a blockade to prevent the entry or exit of Argentinian surface ships, submarines and aircraft.

MILITARY

Surface Ship and Aircraft

104 Commanding Officers and Aircraft Captains may take such action as is necessary to achieve their military task, but are not to exceed it.

123 Carry out attacks against designated targets with conventional weapons.
Caveat: Applicable to targets within Exclusion Zone only.

With suffixes

INDIA All vessels positively identified as ARGENTINIAN warships, submarines and naval auxiliaries (latter as designated separately).

Night and low visibility identification and attacks will be seriously hampered.

JULIETT All submarines detected which are assessed to be conventional may be presumed to be ARGENTINIAN.

LIMA All aircraft positively identified as ARGENTINIAN AIR FORCE or ARGENTINIAN NAVAL aircraft.

PAPA All aircraft which can be positively identified (eg by unloading on the ground or by dropping from the air stores or personnel) as carrying military supplies or military personnel.

Non ARGENTINIAN aircraft may, if assisting the ARGENTINES, be attacked.

SIERRA All aircraft on the ground in the Falkland Islands

TANGO Runways and airport installations including airfield defences in the Falkland Islands

UNIFORM All aircraft that cannot be positively identified because of cloud or light conditions.

202 Authority is delegated to attempt to warn off all Merchant Ships and Commercial aircraft within Exclusion Zone which constitute a threat.

And Caveat: If application of Rule 202 is ineffective resort should be made to Rule 104.

205 Authority is delegated to attack any ship, submarine or aircraft that demonstrates hostile intent. non ARGENTINIAN units are included.

With Suffix:

JULIETT All submarines detected which are assessed to be conventional may be presumed to be ARGENTINIAN. There are unlikely to be non ARGENTINE conventional submarines in the area but only NIMRODS and JEZEBEL fitted SEA KINGS will be able to confirm whether submarine is conventional or nuclear.

And Caveat: Any Argentinian warship or submarine detected within 25 miles and any Argentinian combat aircraft detected within 40 miles of UK warships, RFAs or Supporting Ships is deemed to be demonstrating hostile intent.

206 Authority is delegated to assume that one attack by an enemy unit is the first in a planned multiple attack. All threatening units may be attacked in order to prevent a pre-emptive attack and ensure survivability. (ARGENTINIAN)

207 For the purpose of self-defence, attack on one unit may be considered an attack on all other units in company.

208

Notwithstanding other Rules which may be in force the commander of a unit has the inherent right to use such force in self defence as may be necessary to protect his command and the lives of his men.

403

Maritime International Law is not to be broken unless it is necessary in order to achieve the aim.

SSNs

MEANING

EXPANSION

FOUR

All vessels positively identified as ARGENTINIAN warships, submarines and naval auxiliaries may be attacked.

Night/poor visibility attacks very unlikely.

FIVE

Any submarine detected not classified nuclear may be presumed to be ARGENTINIAN and may be attacked.

TWELVE

After the first successful attack on a vessel continue patrol in accordance with ROE in force.

THIRTEEN

Situation reports are to be made at discretion on all ARGENTINE units.

THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE: OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT

1. The text of the official announcement would be as follows:

"From () GMT on () 1982, a Total Exclusion Zone will be established around the Falkland Islands. The outer limit of this Zone is the same as for the maritime exclusion zone established on Monday 12 April 1982, namely a circle of 200 nautical miles radius from Latitude 51 degrees 40 minutes South, 59 degrees 30 minutes west.

From the time indicated, the Exclusion Zone will apply not only to Argentinian warships and Argentinian naval auxiliaries but also to any other ship, whether naval or merchant vessel, which is operating in support of the illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands by Argentinian forces. An Air Exclusion Zone will also be established; any aircraft wishing to enter this Zone must seek the necessary authority from the Ministry of Defence in London. Any ship, and any aircraft whether military or civil, which is found within this Zone without due authority will be regarded as hostile and liable to be attacked by British Forces. This measure is without prejudice to the right of the United Kingdom to take whatever additional measures may be needed in exercise of its right of self-defence, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter."

2. This announcement might take the form of a Parliamentary Statement to be made, possibly, on Monday 26 April. Notices to Mariners and Airmen are being prepared to accompany the statement. Briefing will also be provided for British Missions abroad and for the press.

But see overleaf.



PREFERRED

FCO

VERSION

SECRET

[not yet circulated
to ODSPA]

Revised Text
recommended
by FCO officials

THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE: PUBLIC STATEMENT

"From [] GMT on [] 1982, a Total Exclusion Zone will be established around the Falkland Islands. The outer limit of this Zone is the same as for the maritime exclusion zone established on Monday 12 April 1982, namely a circle of 200 nautical miles radius from latitude 51 degrees 40 minutes South, 59 degrees 30 minutes West. From the time indicated, the Exclusion Zone will apply not only to Argentine warships and Argentine naval auxiliaries but also to any other ship, whether naval or merchant vessel, which is operating in support of the illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands by Argentine forces. The Exclusion Zone will also apply to any aircraft, whether military or civil, which is operating in support of the illegal occupation. Any ship and any aircraft whether military or civil which is found within this Zone without due authority from the MOD in London ^{will be regarded as operating in support and} will therefore be regarded as hostile ^{will be} and liable to be attacked by British Forces.

Also from the time indicated, Port Stanley airport will be closed; and any aircraft on the ground in the Falkland Islands will be regarded as present in support of the illegal occupation and accordingly as liable to attack.

These measures are without prejudice to the right of the UK to take whatever additional measures may be needed in exercise of its right of self-defence, under Article 51 of the UN Charter."

SECRET

OPERATION
CORPORATE
STRATEGIC
OPTIONS

TOP SECRET UK EYES A



OPERATION CORPORATE - STRATEGIC OPTIONS -
COS (MISC) 150/742/1

Line to Take

1. This paper is largely discursive in form, and it will be inappropriate at this stage to offer a precise line to take. It does, however, give rise to a number of important questions, some of which the Secretary of State may care to raise as an aid to clear ministerial minds:-

- (a) would quick and decisive British military action on significant scale be likely to bring about a political decision by the Argentine Government to withdraw its forces and settle the dispute on terms acceptable to us?
- (b) or is it more likely that, even if badly mauled by British action, Argentina will limp on seeking to avenge military humiliation by exacting maximum retribution on British interests and British passport holders on the mainland?
- (c) what type of British military action would be most likely to consolidate support for Argentina from Latin American parties to the Rio Treaty?
- (d) is there a deadline by which military action and the threat of its escalation will cease to be effective as a form of pressure on the Argentine Government

TOP SECRET UK EYES A

/ because



- because it can no longer be sustained politically?
- (e) what form of military action offers the greatest flexibility to Ministers if they are engaged in negotiations, whether through Haig or through some other channel?
 - (f) is there a limit, in terms of resource allocation and opportunity cost in other defence commitments, to the scale and duration of military action in support of our Falklands objectives?

Background

2. The strategic options paper reflects an increasing sense on the part of military planners in the MOD that Operation Sutton, as so far conceived, is by itself an inadequate basis for military operations in the Falklands. A succession of planning papers produced for the Chiefs of Staff Committee over the past fortnight have been equivocal and ambiguous about the chances of carrying out large-scale military operations when inevitably subject to such very large uncertainties. The discussion paper attempts to widen the choices confronting Ministers. It concentrates on:

- (i) land in the Falkland Islands as presently planned, but with the aim changed from 're-possession of the Falklands' to 'establish a British presence' (modified Operation Sutton);



- (ii) enforce TEZ for as long as possible with full carrier Task Force but not attempt landing;
- (iii) achieve sea/air superiority, then sustain blockade over longer period with reduced force level, concentrating on Port Stanley;
- (iv) general offensive operations against the Argentine Navy;
- (v) supplementary option of periodic raids and lightening thrusts to weaken and wear down Argentine resistance.

Of these options, (i), (ii) and (iv) look the least attractive from the political point of view. Options (i) and (ii) in particular are open to very large problems of sustainability. Option (iv) is high profile internationally, difficult to square with Article 51, and may well fail if the Argentine fleet stays in port unless attacks on the mainland are authorised. Options (iii) and (v) offer the best combination of maximum flexibility, sustainability and military feasibility.

3. There is also the broader political question in the long run: how to reconcile significant continuing military obligations in the Falklands with other defense policy commitments, particularly to NATO. So far the drawdown of NATO committed forces has been accepted uncomplainingly by our allies. But we cannot expect them to acquiesce indefinitely to the diversion of the Royal Navy.



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