

Secretary of State



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Private Secretary

PS/PUS
The S/S was seen to agree.
18/05
21/05
1/6/82

FALKLAND ISLANDS: SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT

1. The Secretary of State will remember that at Chequers the Rules of Engagement were changed so that the task force steaming South could shoot down an Argentinian 707 engaged in surveillance activities. There was also some inconclusive discussion on whether a further specific warning should be conveyed through the Swiss privately to the Argentinians. Mr Wade-Gery has confirmed that this was left to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's discretion.

* 2. The previous warning conveyed by the Swiss last Friday and reported subsequently to the Security Council is explicit in that it refers to civil aircraft engaged in surveillance activities. Since the attack on the submarine and the retaking of South Georgia I do not think that the Argentine Government can be in any doubt about our resolve to carry out our intentions. A further warning is unnecessary and would look rather feeble. I and those concerned with the Falkland Islands problem are therefore against it.

3. Unless the Secretary of State thinks otherwise, we will take no further action.

Antony Acland

26 April 1982

Antony Acland

cc: Sir I Sinclair
Mr Wright
Mr Gillmore

The COS told me this morning that the Argentinians seemed in any case to be heeding the warning & that there had be no further maritime reconnaissance.

R
20/4

~~D. G. J. J.~~ to ps.

~~ADD.~~

ALQ 050/6
RECEIVED
4 APR 1982
Taken

SECRET

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Mr Weston
Defence Department

FALKLAND ISLANDS: SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT

1. During the Prime Minister's meeting at Chequers yesterday afternoon, DSCS(I) reported that there had been a further surveillance overflight by an Argentine 707 on the morning of 24 April (i.e. about 12 hours after the warning conveyed via the Swiss on the previous evening).
2. In the light of this, it was thought that a private message should be sent to Berne, drawing the attention of the Swiss to this further overflight, and repeating again, in identical terms, the warning which had been conveyed to them on 23 April. The meeting took the view that a further warning on these lines was required in the interests of the security of our own forces.
3. A further decision was taken, in the context of the same incident, that a further rule of engagement should now be promulgated on the following lines:

''On the high seas, any positively identified Argentine military aircraft, or positively identified Argentine civil aircraft apparently engaged in surveillance, coming within 40 miles of British forces and not responding to harrassment, may be shot down.''
4. The second of these decisions will be recorded in summary of the meeting which Mr Wade-Geary will be circulating today. I should be grateful if you would draft a telegram on the lines of the first decision, checking first with Mr Wade-Geary that this accords with his understanding of the decision taken yesterday.

P R H Wright

26 April 1982
cc: Private Secretary
PS/PUS
Sir I Sinclair
Mr Gillmore

SECRET

Falklands:
Operations Centre
OPK

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See left

Mr Wright

Yes. [Signature]
26/4

c.c. Private Secretary
PS/PUS
Sir Ian Sinclair
Mr Gillmore

FALKLANDS : SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT

I have checked with Mr Wade-Gery the point raised in your minute of 26 April. Mr Wade-Gery has said that no decision as such was taken by Ministers that a further private message of warning be conveyed via Berne. The Prime Minister, summing up, left it to the discretion of Mr Pym whether such a further message should be sent.

2. In the light of discussion at the PUS' meeting this morning, I therefore assume that no further action is required.

[Signature]

P J Weston
Defence Department

26 April, 1982

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