

CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

Memorandum

From: PSO/CDS

To: CDS

Date: 26 Apr 82

JHO
FLAG B

JIC PROPOSED MILITARY SUB COMMITTEE

1. You will remember I rang you this morning to say no need to read the attached. I then spoke with DCDS(I) who said that he had done some leg-work and reached agreement with DGI about what ought to happen.

2. I have been asked by MA/DGI if we would still comment on the JIC proposals and at FLAG B I have now summarised the agreement between DCDS(I) and DGI and put it up as your comment on the JIC paper. Are you happy with FLAG B, which has been cleared with MA/DGI?

AB

PSO *non signed*

I assume you have not signed the final version of FLAG B.

27 Apr

Jhr (A)1

20/4

2038/18
Jhr 28 Apr

AZ
I need more
caution before I accept
this. What
is wrong with what
is happening now?

CDS

JIC PROPOSED MILITARY SUB COMMITTEE

1. The attached paper was tabled by the Coordinator at the JIC and he hopes to clear it with the Secretary of the Cabinet this evening and issue it as a directive. I saw both DCDS(I) and DGI this morning and whilst there is no animosity between them DGI thinks that the proposal is good, it is alleged to have PUS' support and should go ahead; on the other hand DCDS(I) is strongly opposed.
2. DCDS(I) outlined the background. Falklands had put the JIC in some disarray, and they felt the need to get in on the military band-waggon. The JIC was slow at present to react to the need for special assessments eg Argentinian survivability against blockade, and the Military Sub Committee was therefore proposed. This would operate in the DIS under, probably, DDS(Int)(RoW) with FCO and GCHQ representation. Its purpose is at TAB 1 on the attached paper.
3. DCDS(I) made four points:
 - a. The proposal risks degrading the quality of military intelligence to the Chiefs of Staff. At present assessments are military judgements made by military men. A mini JIC will produce military/political compromise and DCDS(I) doubted if this would find favour with the Secretary of State.
 - b. It introduced a new level of assessment in the DIS/JIC set up and this would be a further commitment for an already busy Int staff.
 - c. Falklands had necessitated a painful reorganisation and some "moving on" of staff in the DIS. It would be a bad step to bring about a further reorganisation, ~~and~~ DDS(Int)(RoW) is opposed to the reorganisation but thinks it could be made to work.
 - d. Immediate assessments would be slower because they would have to go through formal meetings.
4. In summary DCDS(I) thinks that if the proposal is implemented it will be contrary to the best interests of the Chiefs of Staff.

CONFIDENTIAL
COVERING SECRET UK EYES A
PERSONAL IN CONFIDENCE


5. DGI described the proposal as a natural progression of events. In war, the JIC would be chaired by the DGI. Therefore it is logical for the Intelligence Coordinator to propose now a Sub Committee on immediate military assessments which includes FCO and GCHQ and this could be a prelude to a fuller MOD take over of the JIC if shooting becomes ^{more} likely.

6. He understands DCDS(I)'s reluctance to agree to something which will allow him to react less rapidly but it would mean that he, DGI, would also be able to contribute to the assessments whereas at present he is taking no part in them. Drafting of papers would go on as it does at present with FCO/GCHQ help as appropriate and these papers would go to DCDS(I) and DGI to vet.

7. On balance DGI thinks the proposal should not be turned down because it could jeopardise MOD's right to take over the JIC in time of war.

8. My own instinct is to back DCDS(I), unless you personally have doubts about the judgements he is arriving at. It seems to me that the Chiefs of Staff need the military judgement which he is providing and in my opinion FCO contribution to his rapid reaction assessment would not be helpful, he can anyway now turn to them for advice should he need it. I realise that by opposing the proposal you are going against the Whitehall tide which includes Sir Robert Armstrong and Sir Frank Cooper, but I think it would be counter-productive to slow down our Intelligence by introducing an extra layer of bureaucracy.

23 Apr 82


PSO/CDS

Att

D R A F T

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENTS: CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR
FALKLANDS CRISIS

1. The existing JIC Crisis Machinery, which includes a Current Intelligence Group on 1 hour standby with Secretariat reinforcements provided by the MOD, can be activated at short notice by decision of the Intelligence Co-ordinator in consultation with the Chairman of the JIC and the Secretary of the Cabinet. This CIG is intended, under the general direction of the Chairman JIC, to produce immediate and regular assessments bringing together all military, political and economic information from overt and covert material, plus longer term assessments, for the Cabinet, Cabinet Committees (such as OD(SA)), Ministers, Departments, and the Chiefs of Staff.

2. As the likelihood of an outbreak of hostilities increases, there will be an additional need in the MOD for immediate assessments to be produced at very short notice. The JIC has agreed that an assessment group, chaired by the DGI or his nominated representative, should be set up in the DIS. It will be known as the Military Sub-Committee of the JIC. The purpose of the Sub-Committee will be to provide for CDS and the Chairman JIC immediate tactical assessments of military-related intelligence, as it becomes available, to help with the conduct of operations. But such assessments

must necessarily take account of related non-military factors. The Sub-Committee should therefore have FCO, Assessments Staff, GCHQ and other participation as relevant, in addition to the appropriate Service representation. Representatives of the Intelligence Allies would not be invited to attend.

3. The Sub-Committee would not replace or alter the need for the normal CIGs and assessments in the Cabinet Office, where the JIC machinery would continue to provide immediate and other assessments for general circulation. In order to avoid duplication of effort, and to ensure proper co-ordination, the assessments from the Sub-Committee will be copied immediately to the Assessments Staff, the FCO Emergency Room, and to JIC members and others who need to see them. (DS Int, in consultation with Secretary JIC, will be responsible for drawing up a distribution list.)

4. Apart from tasks placed upon it by CDS or by agreement between DGI's staff and that of the JIC, the Sub-Committee will generate its own assessments as and when it considers necessary. Work for the Chiefs of Staff Committee which would more appropriately be handled in the normal JIC machinery will be commissioned through the Chairman JIC (who attends meetings of the Chiefs of Staff).

5. The decision to activate this crisis machinery, and formally establish the JIC Military Sub-Committee, will be taken after consultation between the Chairman JIC and DGI.

6. The DIS will now draw up plans to provide accommodation, communications, members and supporting staff (this latter provision in consultation with the Joint Intelligence Secretariat). The FCO, GCHQ and Cabinet Office (Assessments Staff) are requested to make contingency arrangements for nominated representatives to attend meetings of the Military Sub-Committee as and when required and to inform DS Int of these arrangements.