

IMMEDIATE

2304/14

A DISTRIBUTION  
FINAL SPECIAL \*\*\*\*\*  
EXCLUSIVE FOR

(SFA)

DR MR JOHNSON

CS MR BENJAMIN

DP [REDACTED]

J MR HERMAN

K (2) [REDACTED]

L [REDACTED]

P [REDACTED]

R [REDACTED]

S [REDACTED]

V [REDACTED]

Z [REDACTED]

BT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

JIC HIGHLIGHTS  
Copy to 2304/14

O 271750Z APR 82 ZYH

FM GCHC LDN

TO GCHC

INFO SLKLD

[REDACTED] /SBOM

ZEM

T O P S E C R E T UMBRA UK EYES ALPHA SECTION ONE OF TWO

EXCLUSIVE FOR DR (JOHNSON): CS (BENJAMIN): DP [REDACTED]:

J (HERMAN): K [REDACTED] - 2 COPIES: L [REDACTED]: P [REDACTED]:

R [REDACTED]: S [REDACTED]: V [REDACTED]: Z [REDACTED]:

D1 [REDACTED]: FROM DIRECTOR. SPECIAL JIC HIGHLIGHTS ON 27 APRIL 1982:

1. [REDACTED] REPRESENTED +C+. DGI ALONE REPRESENTED MOD.
2. IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENTS. THE CHAIRMAN CONGRATULATED THE ASSESSMENT STAFF AND ITS SUPPORTING CIG ON THE EXCELLENCE OF THEIR WORK. IT WAS LEFT TO A SOMEWHAT EMBARRASSED DGI TO CONVEY THE CONTINUING (ALBEIT DIMINISHING) WORRIES OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF, WHOSE MAIN PROBLEM WOULD SEEM TO BE THAT OF BEING EXPOSED TO THE SAME INTELLIGENCE SEVERAL TIMES OVER: HAVING RECEIVED A MOD INTSUM AND AN FCO SITREP FIRST THING, THEY ARE GIVEN A FURTHER BRIEFING

BY DCDS(1) AT THEIR DAILY 1030 MEETING (AND SOMETIMES AT A SECOND MEETING AT 1430 AS WELL). NOT ALTOGETHER SURPRISINGLY, THE COS THEN FIND THAT THE DAILY IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENT, WHICH REACHES THEM MID-AFTERNOON BUT IS OFTEN NOT READ TILL THE FOLLOWING MORNING, HAS A SOMEWHAT HISTORICAL FLAVOUR. THE FACTS REMAIN HOWEVER THAT:

- A. THERE ARE MANY OTHER READERS WHO FIND THE IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENT OF CONSIDERABLE VALUE:
- B. THE IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENT IS THE ONE AND ONLY ALL-SOURCE ASSESSMENT OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS.
3. AFTER MUCH DEBATE THE JIC MOUNTAIN HEAVED AND PRODUCED TWO SHALL WICE:
  - A. THE TITLE WILL BE CHANGED FROM +IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENT+ TO +DAILY ASSESSMENT PRODUCED AT (TIME) ON (DATE)+, THUS MAKING ITS READERS MORE AWARE OF ITS TRUE CHARACTER:
  - B. IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS, RATHER MORE ATTENTION WILL BE PAID

TO TENSES: FOR EXAMPLE, IN JIC(82)(1A)43, +BRITISH FORCES HAVE RECAPTURED SOUTH GEORGIA+ MIGHT HAVE BEEN MORE HAPPILY WORDED +BRITISH FORCES RECAPTURED SOUTH GEORGIA YESTERDAY+.

4. ALL THAT HAVING BEEN SAID, DGI WAS ON FIRMER GROUND WHEN HE INFORMED THE COMMITTEE THAT CDS CONSIDERED THE JIC OUTPUT TO BE +PROGRESSIVELY MORE USEFUL+. (NONE OF THIS WHITEHALL IN-FIGHTING SHOULD, INCIDENTALLY, BE TAKEN AS A REFLECTION ON THE SIGINT OUTPUT, ON WHICH SUBJECT I SHALL BE REPORTING SOME HEART-WARMING WORDS FROM CDS IN PERSON.)

5. SPECIAL MACHINERY FOR ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE IN A PERIOD OF HOSTILITIES. THE PROPOSALS MENTIONED IN PARA 9 OF MY 221550 AND SET OUT IN DETAIL IN JIC>S 221730 HAD APPARENTLY MET WITH A HOSTILE RECEPTION AT COS LEVEL. THE COS PREFERENCE IS THAT THE PRESENT MACHINERY, WHEREBY A DIS +SPECIAL ASSESSMENT STAFF+ (HEADED BY AIR CDRE ASHFORD) PROVIDES INSTANT PAPERS ON A WIDE RANGE OF CRISIS-RELATED TOPICS WITHOUT JIC INTERVENTION, SHOULD CONTINUE: THE CHAIRMAN AND CO-ORDINATOR FELT THAT WE HAD NO OPTION BUT TO AGREE THE COS VIEW. THUS THE PROJECTED MILITARY SUB-COMMITTEE OF JIC WILL NOT, AFTER ALL, BE ESTABLISHED.

6. IT WAS HOWEVER AGREED THAT:

- A. TO ENSURE MAXIMUM FLOW OF INFORMATION AND TO AFFORD OPPORTUNITIES FOR CROSS-FERTILISATION, PAPERS GENERATED BY THE DIS SPECIAL STAFF SHOULD BE COPIED TO ALL JIC MEMBERS (AND TO ASSESSMENT STAFF):
- B. TO ENSURE THAT THE CHAIRMAN AND DGI WERE IN A POSITION TO

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STEER (RESPECTIVELY) FCO AND MOD IN THE LIGHT OF THE MOST UP-TO-DATE JIC/CIG VIEWS. HEAD OF ASSESSMENT STAFF WOULD SHOW THEM THE DAILY ASSESSMENT (QUONDAM IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENT) AS SOON AS THE DRAFT HAD BEEN FINALISED BY THE CIG: THE INTENTION HOWEVER WAS THUS TO INFORM THE CHAIRMAN AND DGI RATHER THAN TO INVITE THEIR COMMENTS.

7. GIVEN THAT WE NOW HAVE OUR OWN REPRESENTATIVE IN MOD, I BELIEVE THAT WE CAN LIVE WITH THESE REVISED ARRANGEMENTS.

8. REVIEW OF JIC MEETING ARRANGEMENTS. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE JIC SHOULD MEET TWICE A WEEK FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, NORMALLY AT 1530 ON MONDAY (UKEA SESSION FOR FALKLANDS CRISIS ITEMS) AND 1120 ON THURSDAY (NORMAL ATTENDANCE AND

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T O P S E C R E T UMBRA UK EYES ALPHA FINAL SECTION OF TWO

FROM DIRECTOR.

SPECIAL JIC HIGHLIGHTS ON 27 APRIL 1982 (CONTD):

RANGE OF BUSINESS INCLUDING FALKLANDS- RELATED ITEMS AS APPROPRIATE).

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I MADE THE POINT THAT IT WOULD NOT ALWAYS BE POSSIBLE FOR ME OR, IN MY ABSENCE, DR (OR DP) TO ATTEND, AND HENCE THAT GCHC WOULD ON OCCASIONS BE REPRESENTED AT DIVISION HEAD RATHER THAN DIRECTORATE LEVEL. THIS WAS READILY ACCEPTED, AND I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS ASPECT SUBSEQUENTLY WITH DR.

9. UNDER AOB, THE CHAIRMAN GAVE THE COMMITTEE AN ACCOUNT OF HOW MATTERS STOOD GENERALLY IN RELATION TO THE CRISIS. THE PROPOSALS WHICH MR HAIG IS NOW PUTTING TO THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES ARE +NOT IDEAL+ FROM THE UK POINT OF VIEW: ALTHOUGH THEY WERE

RECOMMENDED BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, TO THE CABINET  
MINISTERS HAVE NOT YET COLLECTIVELY ACCEPTED THEM. THIS  
WILL NOT GREATLY MATTER IF (AS THE FCO EXPECTS, THOUGH HAIG TAKES  
THE OPPOSITE VIEW) THE PROPOSALS IN QUESTION ARE REJECTED BY  
ARGENTINA. IF HOWEVER ARGENTINA ACCEPTS THE PROPOSALS, MINISTERS  
WILL BE +IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION,+ SINCE HMG WILL THEN  
COME UNDER STRONG U.S. PRESSURE TO ACCEPT PROPOSALS WHICH (AS  
PREVIOUSLY NOTED) ARE REGARDED AS +NOT IDEAL+.

10. IN THE LIGHT OF AND IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, MINISTERS WILL  
TO-MORROW BE FACED WITH THE FOLLOWING EQUALLY DIFFICULT DECISIONS:

A. SHOULD THE UK DECLARE A TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE (TEZ), WHICH WOULD  
APPLY TO AIRCRAFT AND TO MERCHANT VESSELS AND WOULD NECESSARILY  
TAKE SOME TIME (24-48 HOURS) TO BECOME EFFECTIVE:

B. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT THE ARGENTINE SUBMARINE SAN LUIS,  
CURRENTLY DUE TO CROSS THE MEZ TO-MORROW MORNING AND TO REACH

HER PATROL STATION THE NEXT DAY (HERE WRIGHT REFERRED BRIEFLY  
TO THE AGREED ACTION-ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR INVITING HAIG TO WARN  
THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES, IN SUITABLY NON-REVEALING TERMS,  
OF THE RISKS THEY WOULD RUN IN ALLOWING ONE OF THEIR VESSELS TO  
ENTER THE MEZ):

C. WHAT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT SHOULD BE FOLLOWED WITH REGARD TO  
THE ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT CARRIER, NOTING THAT TO ALLOW IT TO OPERATE  
AT WILL OUTSIDE THE MEZ (OR TEZ) WOULD VIRTUALLY NULLIFY THE  
LATTER'S EFFECTIVENESS:

D. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO COPE WITH THE SURVEILLANCE THREAT POSED  
BY THE ARGENTINE FISHING FLEET:

E. SHOULD THE AIRFIELD AT PORT STANLEY BE PUT OUT OF ACTION.

11. THE COMMITTEE TOOK NOTE, SILENTLY BREATHING A SIGH OF RELIEF  
THAT THE DECISIONS REQUIRED OF IT WERE OF A LESS DEMANDING  
CHARACTER.

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