



Done
24/4 Mr. Wright

21

SECRET UK EYES B

The view in § 2 should be
for to AcDs (oppr).

Mr Wright

27/4

OPERATION CORPORATE: THREAT FROM ARGENTINE CARRIER

20

1. I have seen a copy of Mr Gillmore's minute to you of 27 April; and I have subsequently seen a more detailed minute to me from Mr Gillmore of 26 April.

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2. The only real justification we could advance for sinking the Argentine carrier on the high seas would be that it was constituting a threat to the Task Force. I think that it would be possible to maintain that such a threat existed as soon as the aircraft carrier was in a position where its aircraft were in range of the Task Force. According to the Note prepared by the MOD, the attack aircraft embarked in the Argentine carrier have a combat radius of 500 nautical miles. This being the case, I would have no difficulty in the concept advanced in the Note prepared by the MOD and attached to Mr Gillmore's minute to you of 27 April that notice should be given to the Argentine authorities through the Swiss that we would regard any movement of their carrier south and east of a designated boundary line as a hostile act which would incur an appropriate response. However, I share Mr Gillmore's view that the line proposed by the MOD will not do. In order to protect the Task Force while operating in the zone, I think one might have to draw an east west parallel to the Argentine mainland from the line proposed by the MOD so as to ensure that the carrier never came far enough south to constitute a threat to the British forces in the MEZ. If we had given a warning of this kind to the Argentines, through the Swiss, we would, in my view, be legally justified in attacking the carrier if it breached the line indicated.

3. I do not know where the carrier is at the moment. However, if we drew the line in the way I have indicated, and the carrier were, as I assume it is at present, to the north of it, we could, at any rate in my view, justifiably regard any breach of that line, whether at sea or whether by diverting into a mainland port south of the line as constituting a threat to the mission of the Task Force. Obviously, much depends on where the carrier is at the moment.

4. What I think would be difficult to justify, not only in political terms but also in legal terms, would be an attack on the carrier without warning when it could not be said to be constituting a direct and immediate threat to the Task Force.

27 April 1982

Ian Sinclair
Legal Adviser

AAQ 062/3

6 MAY 1982

- cc PS/PUS
- Mr Gillmore
- Mr Darwin
- Mr Weston
- Mr Hulse

SECRET UK EYES B

SECRET UK EYES B

Mr Wright

Thank you. See minute.

JH 27/4

paper

cc: Sir Ian Sinclair
Mr Weston
Mr Hulse

OPERATION CORPORATE: THREAT FROM ARGENTINE CARRIER

(18)

1. You will have seen the paper on the subject which is for consideration at the Chiefs of Staff meeting today. I attach a copy for ease of reference. You will note incidentally that a copy of this paper was not set to us by the Chiefs of Staff secretariat; Mr Stewart must have let us have a copy in the night.
2. You will recall that I have asked Sir Ian Sinclair for his views on the justifications that we might adduce for an attack on the carrier.
3. At first glance I do not think that Admiral Brown's paper makes much sense. If I understand correctly the map attached to his minute, the line terminates, at its southern end, at the northern edge of our Exclusion Zone. This seems to me to miss the point. The Exclusion Zone is of 200 miles radius. Given that the range of aircraft embarked on the carrier is 500 miles. Admiral Brown's 'thin red line' will not prevent aircraft from the carrier from attacking British units inside our zone, or indeed the Falkland Islands themselves from a point north and west of the line. The line therefore may be useful as regards naval units in transit. It will do little to help operations inside the MEZ. It is this latter point which matters.

D H Gillmore

D H Gillmore

27 April 1982

ALQ 062/3	
28 APR 1982	

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PUS

Sir I Sinclair


FALKLAND ISLANDS: POSSIBLE ATTACK ON THE ARGENTINE CARRIER

1. At the PUS's meeting this morning, there was some discussion about possible attacks on the Argentine aircraft carrier. I think this took place before you arrived, although I understand that the subject was also discussed at Chequers yesterday.
2. As you know, there is considerable interest on the part of the Chiefs of Staff, an interest which is shared I believe by the Prime Minister, in the possibility of an attack at some stage in eventual hostilities on the Argentine aircraft carrier. Air superiority in the Falkland Island zone is of course likely to be absolutely crucial to the outcome of a blockade. On the assumption that the Argentines can be prevented from making any use of Stanley airport, and given that, operating from the mainland, Argentine aircraft will find themselves pretty close to the limit of their range over the West Falklands, the role of the Argentine aircraft carrier is vital.
3. I understand that at Chequers yesterday there was some discussion of the possibility of issuing a warning to the Argentines that their aircraft carrier should stay well clear of the zone of operations. The Chiefs however object that one consequence of this might be to encourage the Argentines to withdraw the carrier close to the mainland or even to mainland ports, thus preserving the potential threat in the longer term.
4. The PUS therefore asked that we should give some consideration to possible justifications for mounting an attack on the carrier outside the MEZ. I would be grateful to have your advice on this.
5. There seem to me to be one or two important considerations which we might need to take into account. First, there is a situation in which the carrier is operating from a station which is sufficiently close to the MEZ (although outside it) to allow its aircraft to attack targets inside the MEZ. In this case I presume that one could argue that an attack on the carrier would be legitimate since it would be providing a platform from which the MEZ was threatened. But we need to be careful even in this instance. The carrier can carry on it the French-built Super Etendard, which has an operating radius of 450 statute miles and carries the Exocet air-to-surface missile which itself has, in this mode, a range of

/40 miles.

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40 miles. If therefore we are talking about an operating base threatening the MEZ from outside we need to take account of a distance which is greater than the distance between the Falkland Islands and the mainland. You may wish to consider what the implications would be, if we adopted this argument, for possible attacks on mainland bases. Second, there is the case of an attack on the aircraft carrier when it is quite clearly out of its own aircraft's range of the MEZ. Unlike mainland bases, the aircraft carrier is mobile and its very mobility would make it a constant potential threat at pretty short notice to targets inside the MEZ. Third, there is the question of whether we could produce any justification for destroying the aircraft carrier in an Argentine mainland port. Although this might be seen as a substantial measure of escalation, one could presumably argue the case on the grounds of the carrier's mobility. Furthermore, an attack on the ship in harbour might (subject to military advice) be one which involved significant damage to the vessel but very limited casualties. This would of course not be the case if the carrier was sunk on the high seas by torpedo.



D H Gillmore

26 April 1982

cc:

PS/PUS

→ Mr Wright
Mr Weston

SECRET