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COS 33RD MEETING/82 Copy No ..71.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

MINUTES of a Meeting held in Room 5301, Ministry of Defence, Main Building, Whitehall, on WEDNESDAY 28 APRIL 1982 at 10.45 am

PRESENT

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Terence Lewin, Chief of the Defence Staff

Admiral Sir Henry Leach, Chief of the Naval Staff

General Sir Edwin Bramall, Chief of the General Staff

Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Beetham, Chief of the Air Staff

ALSO PRESENT

Air Chief Marshal Sir David Evans, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (Personnel and Logistics)

Lieutenant General Sir James Glover, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence)

Lieutenant General Sir Maurice Johnston, Deputy Chief of the Defene Staff (Operational Requirements)

Commodore R G Heaslip, Representing the Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Policy)

Rear-Admiral D W Brown, Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations)

Colonel D J Milton, Representing the Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Signals)

Rear-Admiral J W T Walters, Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Personnel and Logistics)

Air Commodore A Beill, Director Defence Operational Movements Staff

Sir Frank Cooper, Permanent Under Secretary

Mr I S McDonald, Deputy Chief of Public Relations

Mr J M Stewart, Assistant Under Secretary (Defence Staff)

Mr P R H Wright, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier J A C G Eyre
Captain J E S Raymond RN
Lieutenant Colonel J B R Peecock
Wing Commander A M Wills

COS 33rd Meeting/82
28 April 1982

C O N T E N T S

Note:

1. Recorded as a Confidential Annex.
2. Issued on 28 April 1982.

101. BATTLE CASUALTY REPLACEMENTS RESTRICTED

The Chiefs of Staff have agreed a note (1) prepared by ACDS(P&L) subject to telephone amendment. ACDS(P&L) has been informed.

Note:

1. Attachment to COS(Misc)162/742/1 dated 26 April 1982.

102. SPECIAL PROJECTS GROUP - PAPER NO 4 RESTRICTED

The Chiefs of Staff have not approved a paper (1) prepared by the Special Projects Group. The paper has been withdrawn, and ACDS(Ops) has been informed.

Note:

1. Attachment to COS(Misc) 157/742/1 dated 23 April 1982.

103. SPECIAL PROJECTS GROUP - PAPER NO 5 RESTRICTED

The Chiefs of Staff have not approved a paper (1) prepared by the Special Projects Group. The paper has been withdrawn, and ACDS(Ops) has been informed.

Note:

1. Attachment to COS(Misc) 162/742/1 dated 26 April 1982.

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
TO
COS 33RD MEETING/82 HELD ON
WEDNESDAY 28 APRIL 1982 AT 10.45 am

OPERATION CORPORATE

ITEM 1. INTELLIGENCE

1. SIR TERENCE LEWIN invited the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence) to update them on current intelligence.

2. LIEUTENANT GENERAL GLOVER (Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence)) reviewed the intelligence published in the latest summary (1). In subsequent discussion the following points were made:

a. US Secretary of State Haig had been informed the previous day that we had reliable evidence that the Argentines were not observing the Maritime Exclusion Zone, and he had been invited to warn the Argentines not to jeopardize the delicate negotiations currently in hand. It was not known whether he had passed this warning to the Argentines.

b. The Israeli Ambassador, having been summoned to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the previous day, had said that Israel could not default on existing agreements as she must be seen to be a reliable supplier and her Arms Industry depended on South American custom. However, he added that Israel would neither increase nor accelerate her delivery of arms supplies to Argentina, and that he had been informed that Bell helicopters would not be made available.

ITEM 2. OWN FORCES

3. The situation was set out in the Force Tote Sitrep (2).

4. SIR TERENCE LEWIN informed the Committee of the decisions taken that morning by OD(SA).

Note:

1. INTSUM No 48 280600Z April 1982.
2. Force Tote Sitrep Issue 34.

ITEM 3. PUBLIC RELATIONS

5. MR McDONALD (Deputy Chief of Public Relations) reported on Press coverage. In discussion the following points were made:

a. Because of communications problems, the names of the Prisoners of War captured on South Georgia were not yet known in London. They should be made available to the Defence Public Relations Staff as soon as possible.

b. It was intended to inform Brazil, as the Protecting Power under the Geneva Convention, about the dead Argentine Prisoner of War that day. The news would also be released to the Press.

c. Following the agreement of OD(SA) that morning, news of the announcement of a Total Exclusion Zone would be released at the Press briefing to be held later that day.

d. The Meteorological Office were publishing their normal forecast coverage of the South Atlantic, but not the detailed forecasts which were made available only for Operation CORPORATE.

ITEM 4. ACTIONS AND DECISIONS REQUIRED

6. The Committee noted the summary of actions in hand (3) and the forecast of decisions required (4).

ITEM 5. THE ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT CARRIER

7. The Committee had before them a paper (5) considering the military threat posed by the Argentine aircraft carrier.

8. SIR HENRY LEACH said he considered the paper had not addressed the options in full, but rather set out a fall-back position which they might be forced to adopt owing to political and legal objections. This position would be difficult to implement effectively, as monitoring the movement of the carrier within the proposed Safe Zone would lead to a large diversion of effort from the major task of enforcing the Total Exclusion Zone.

Note:

3. Annex A to COS 32nd Meeting/82.
4. D Ops 7/10/2 272100Z April 1982.
5. Attachment to COS(Misc) 168/742/1 dated 27 April 1982.

From their knowledge of the Rules of Engagement ordered for the Argentine submarine SAN LUIS, they should be more positive in their approach. He considered the options which should be addressed, in descending order of military preference, were:

a. To sink the carrier without warning after other Argentine naval units had attacked, under Rule of Engagement 206 (6).

b. To give 48 hours notice that the carrier should return to harbour and remain there, or it would be attacked as showing hostile intent.

c. To warn the Argentines that if they did not keep the carrier within a 12 mile territorial limit, it would be attacked as demonstrating hostile intent.

d. Only in the last resort to operate the 200 mile limit proposed in the paper (5).

9. Concluding, SIR HENRY LEACH said that his military recommendation must be that, of the options above, only a. and b. were feasible.

10. In discussion the following points were made:

a. SIR EDWIN BRAMALL reiterated (7) that he would not wish to be associated with any decision to sink the carrier without warning unless it had committed a hostile act.

b. Because of the range of its aircraft, the carrier posed a special threat to the Task Force. This threat placed the carrier outside the scope of the existing Rules of Engagement, which remained satisfactory for all other Argentine ships and submarines.

c. The inclusion of a specific range at which the carrier could be engaged would be merely an extension of an existing principle and not a requirement for a new concept. However, the presentational aspects of any decision to single out the carrier for special treatment would need careful consideration.

Notes:

5. Attachment to COS(Misc) 168/742/1 dated 27 April 1982.
6. OD(SA)(82) 17th Meeting.
7. COS 32nd Meeting/82, Item 5.

d. The paper (5) should mention the considerable threat posed by the carrier to the Amphibious Force.

11. Summing up, SIR TERENCE LEWIN said they would wish to invite the Navy Department, in conjunction with the Defence Intelligence Staff and the Defence Secretariat, to amend the paper (5) in the light of their discussion, and to circulate that afternoon a revised draft to be tabled for their consideration at their meeting the next day.

ITEM 6. GENEVA CONVENTION

12. The Committee had before them a Note (8) setting out the principal ways in which the Geneva Convention affected Operation CORPORATE. In discussion it was pointed out that it was doubtful whether the proposals for repatriated UK prisoners, set out in paragraph 5 of the Note, would be sustainable in law if put to serious test. There was, however, no reason to believe that such a test would occur.

13. Summing up, SIR TERENCE LEWIN said they would wish to take note of the Note (8) and agree its conclusions. They would also wish to invite the Defence Secretariat to inform the Secretary of State that they intended to integrate the repatriated Royal Marines into the landing force, and invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to inform the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

ITEM 7. THE THREAT TO ASCENSION ISLAND

14. The Committee were informed about a signal (9) reporting a possible threat to Ascension Island.

15. Summing up a short discussion, SIR TERENCE LEWIN said they would wish to instruct the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence) to prepare that day an assessment of the threat; and to instruct the Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations), in the light of that assessment, to prepare a paper, recommending appropriate defensive measures, for their consideration at their meeting on Friday 30 April. They would further wish to instruct the Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Policy) to prepare for their consideration on Monday 3 May recommendations on what help the US might give in the defence of Ascension Island, for him to raise in bilateral discussions after the NATO Meeting on 5 May 1982.

Notes:

5. Attachment to COS(Misc) 168/742/1 dated 27 April 1982.
8. Attachment to COS(Misc) 167/742/1 dated 27 April 1982.
9. BDS Washington AAA/AUJ 272100Z April 1982.

ITEM 8. FORCE LEVELS

16. The attention of the Committee was drawn to a signal (10) in which the Task Force Commander had requested the allocation of a further 3 battalions for follow-up operations.

17. SIR EDWIN BRAMALL said he did not believe they could discuss the need for further forces until they knew what concept of operations after the initial landing was envisaged by the Task Force Commander. To augment the landing force by 3 battalions would be a major step which could cause serious political and public doubts about the whole operation, and would raise the scale of the operation well beyond the level which they and Ministers had so far envisaged. He also questioned the timing of such reinforcements, since the scenario was wholly dependent upon imponderables such as Argentine morale, the success of any softening-up operations and of the initial landing, and political and diplomatic manoeuvring. The logistic bill would be large, particularly in respect of shipping for heavy equipment. Finally, he considered that they did not yet have sufficient evidence on which to base such a decision.

18. In discussion the following points were agreed:

a. They required further details of the concept of operations before discussing the matter further.

b. If they wished to proceed, they would have to seek Ministerial authority.

19. Summing up, SIR TERENCE LEWIN said they would wish to agree that he should invite the Task Force Commander, supported by his Naval, Military and Air Staffs at his discretion, to discuss with them as soon as possible his concept of future operations.

Note by the Secretary

That meeting has now been arranged for 2.00 pm on Wednesday 28 April 1982.

Note:

10. CTF 317 AAA/A2Z/I9F 271516Z April 1982.

20. In conclusion, SIR TERENCE LEWIN said they would wish to instruct their Secretary to review the status of work which they had commissioned but which had not yet been completed.

ITEM 9. LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS

21. AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR DAVID EVANS (Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (Personnel and Logistics)) informed the Committee that he intended to consolidate in one paper the longer term studies into a possible garrison for the Falkland Islands (11), our capability to repair Port Stanley airfield (12), and Logistic Requirements (13) He would then present this paper for their consideration, highlighting the major problem areas and decisions which were needed.

Annex:

A. Operation CORPORATE - Actions in Hand (2 pages).

Notes:

11. VCDS(P&L) 127/3/3 dated 19 April 1982.
12. DGO/80/2 dated 27 April 1982.
13. VCDS(P&L) 127/3/2 dated 24 April 1982.

OPERATION CORPORATE - ACTIONS IN HAND

ITEM	ARISING FROM COS MEETING	DECISION OR ACTION REQUIRED	SPONSOR	ACTION/ DECISION BY	CONTINUED	CURRENT STATE
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
0023	6/82 Item 1	Op CORPORATE - Military Appreciation			7/82 Item 4 12/82 Item 6	
0065	-	Maintenance of a British Garrison in the Falkland Islands	VCDS(P&L)	ACDS(P&L)	VCDS(P&L)127/3/3 dated 19 Apr 82	To be included in 0076
0066	-	Long Term Measures to Sustain Op CORPORATE	CDS	DCDS(OR)	CDS 2038/1/1 dated 22 Apr 82 D/DCRS/58/1 dated 23 Apr 82	
0067	-	Op SUTTON - Prisoners	CDS	ACDS(P&L)	CDS 2038/1 dated 25 Apr 82	For COS 30 Apr
0071	31/82 Item 6	US Assistance	CDS	ACDS(Pol)		For COS 3 May
0072	32/82 Item 4	Argentine Fishing Vessels	ACDS(Ops)	ND/FCO		ROE to be drafted
0073	32/82 Item 5	Threat from Argentine Carrier	ACDS(Ops)	ND	33/82 Item 5	Draft OD(SA) paper to COS 29 Apr

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
0074	32/82 Item 6	Op SUTTON - Follow Up Forces	CDS	ACDS(Pol)	33/82 Item 8 34/82 Item 1	For COS 29 Apr
0075	33/82 Item 7	Defence of Ascension Island	ACDS(Ops)	ACDS(Ops)		a. Threat assessment by DCDS(I) by 29 Apr to ACDS(Ops). b. ACDS(Ops) paper to COS 30 Apr. c. ACDS(Pol) Note to COS 3 May.
0076	33/82 Item 9	Long Term Logistic Requirements	VCDS(P&L)	VCDS(P&L)		