



Mr Wright

cc: Private Secretary  
PS/PUS  
Mr Giffard  
Mr Weston  
Mr Bullard

OFFICER		
PA		
REGISTRY		Action Taken
3 - JUN 1982		

CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETING: 28 MAY

1. The following were the main points of interest arising at today's meeting of the Chiefs of Staff.

Intelligence

2. The CDS announced that there had been no decision at today's OD(SA) meeting on the MOD proposal to remove the 12 mile restriction on attacks on Argentine naval units. He remarked that he thought that a delay in a decision on this point was better than the wrong decision (which I take to mean a decision not to remove the constraint). He said the subject would be raised again at OD(SA) on Sunday or Tuesday.

3. DCDS(I) reported that the Argentine Task Group operating from Ushuaia (which was the Naval target the MOD are apparently most interested in) is returning to Port for repairs and is unlikely to be at sea again for some days. On information available it seemed unlikely that a sortie by the Northern Task Group operating out of Puerto Belgrano was imminent.

4. The DIS reported the results of a study of Argentine radar capability from installations on the Falkland Islands. Two TPS 43 radars were deployed north and south of Port Stanley. It appeared that their coverage of the sea areas around the Falklands was considerable, stretching a long way to the east. The Chiefs of Staff agreed that these radars should be a prime target.

5. DCDS(I), as requested earlier by the CDS, gave an assessment of the range and capabilities of the Super Etendard with Exocet missiles. Only if the Super Etendard were operating without air to air refuelling from the mainland with recovery to the mainland

/bases



bases would our carriers be out of range. On every other assumption (eg air to air refuelling on the outward and or inward leg, or recovery to the Falkland Islands using an arrestor wire on Stanley airport) our carrier Task Force would be well within operational range. To move the carrier group further east would mean that the Sea Harriers could no longer operate Combat Air Patrol (CAP) over the area of operations.

6. We were given the following table of Argentine aircraft sortie rates for the last week:

Date (May)	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
Sortie	42	2	14	17	9	0	6

This analysis showed that for every RN ship destroyed the Argentines had flown an average of 23 missions; for every RN ship hit they had flown 11.

.. 7. I attach an assessment of remaining Argentine aircraft availability.

#### Own Forces

8. There was not much new to report on the progress of our own ground forces since the breakout from the beachhead. It appeared that the landline communication cable had been severed and news of ground forces operations was reaching the MOD only after considerable delay. It was known however that the battle for Darwin and Goose Green was now in progress and that 2 Para had engaged the Argentine forces after having carried out a helicopter lift of artillery. There was no further news of the advance of 3 Para towards Teal inlet or of 4 5 Commando in the direction of Douglas.

28 May 1982

D H Gillmore

TOP SECRET



ESTIMATED ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY

<u>Type</u>	<u>Nos</u> <u>Total</u>	<u>Nos estimated</u> <u>to be serviceable</u>
Canberra	7	6
Mirage	22	9
Puccara	50	20
Mentor	13	5
A-4 (Skyhawk)	34	14
Super Etendard	5	3
Aeromacchi	17	7

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