

29 April 1982

10D

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JH/S

H1 J J1 K K2 M21 P S V2 Z GCOL

DR - DP to see on file

FALKLANDS : NOTES OF MEETING ON 29 APRIL 1982

1. DR reported two matters arising from conversations with Director.
 - (a) GCHQ was receiving praise for the service it was providing from all quarters;
 - (b) Mr Douglas Hurd, Minister of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, was to visit GCHQ on 13 May. He would visit those areas connected with the Falklands crisis.
2. K reported on a message which outlined the junta's thinking on future UK action. [REDACTED]

Action: Z

Action: Z (Z1)

4. Two TU-95s had left Cuba in transit to USSR and were being replaced by two further TU-95s keeping the total on station at four. It was, however, expected that two of these would fly to Luanda. J1 mentioned the unusual activity on the Moscow-Luanda printer link for which there was no apparent reason. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Action: V2 ✓

[REDACTED]

Action: J(J3) with K, V2 ✓

6. V2 said that if the [REDACTED] intercept was to continue there would indeed be a shortage of manpower but that V2A wished to review the situation with a view to devising a different scheme of working. The matter was left with V2 to pursue.

Action: V2 ✓

7. H were still waiting for a good sample of [REDACTED] for processing - a further (mistuned) sample had been received and H were seeing if the programme could be revised to process poorer quality intercept. DR hoped that information on the quality etc was being fed back to the [REDACTED] operator.

Action: S (S4)/H1 ✓

[REDACTED]

9. Nothing further had been heard on the Maritime NIMROD flights (including the proposal for the use of air-refuellable NIMRODS). DR suggested that we should ensure that we got some feedback from these flights including "NIL returns" even if we had to send someone from UKC204 to debrief the 51 Sqn people. K was to let S1 know whether the present feedback was satisfactory and if not appropriate action was to be taken.

Action: K with S1 //

10. (i) P outlined some possible objections to the installation of the CADMIA communications equipment on INTREPID. After further discussion on the deployment of the CADMIA equipment and the [REDACTED] it was decided to:

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(a) send the CADMIA communications equipment (No 4) to Ascension for transshipment to HERMES by whatever means the Navy considered possible;


(b) send the two [REDACTED] (packaged separately) to Ascension, one to be put on board INTREPID (for the STYLO team) and one to be held at Ascension for possible exploitation purposes should it be possible to hear the [REDACTED] signal there. The equipments were to be in Ascension by 5 May.

Action: S ✓

(ii) P was to check that there would be sufficient room for the [REDACTED] equipment in the cabin allocated to the STYLO team.

Action: P }


(iii) S had nothing further to report on the new aerals at Ascension. }



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Action: DP |

12. The HECTRA data base was still causing concern which had been partially alleviated by the creation of a third data base for crisis material only. H1 was concerned about the number of messages read first time which in part was due to garbling/faulty intercept (ie beginnings/endings being lost). H1 was to send instructions out via K to those stations at fault.

Action: H1 ✓

No further [redacted] had been seen but H1 reported that [redacted] had again been seen but had not arrived in the THETA data base. This omission was being investigated. In addition, H1 said that whilst the crisis material was getting through we were still having difficulties with the non-crisis data bases.


13. DR expressed continuing concern about the time the material was taking to get to GCHQ, especially the unique broadcast material for UKC102. H1 was to talk to K2 about the matter, and a report should be made to DR on the outcome.

Action: H1/K2 ✓

14. H1 reported the use by the Argentinians of additional fills and K2 added that there were signs of a general tightening-up in their communications procedures.

[K2 had arranged for the preparation of a statement on the additional Comsec measures taken.]

15. A signal had been received from ENDURANCE giving some details from the material captured from the Santa Fe. ✓



17. DR said that he had now received from S1 the details of the deployment of Naval Sigint teams in the Task Force. K2 said that we were not getting very much intercept except printer and [REDACTED]

18. DCDS(I) had raised several points with Director:

(a) information was required on AR MERSHIPS and fishing vessels. K was to brief DR on the matter;

Action: K

(b) the problem of information being available to the Task Force at Northwood was raised. Director had assured DCDS(I) that information available to one should be available to the other; *but this (the Fleet) communication might prevent this being achieved;*

(c) the messages on the deployment and mission of the SAN LUIS had been discussed. Director had confirmed that as far as GCHQ were concerned the messages were genuine and not disinformation.

19. K mentioned an article in the "Daily Mail" which had reported details of the last signals sent from the Santa Fe immediately prior to capture. It referred to the destruction of the "PAKU" equipment, a known AR cover-term for [REDACTED]. DR asked whether we had heard anything about the success/failure of the proposal to recover the cipher machine etc. Nothing had as yet been heard. Z was to contact GCLO to ascertain the position and suggest that from the GCHQ point of view, whatever the outcome, it would be useful if it were to be made known that the dive had failed.

Action: Z

20. Z had spoken to CANSIO about the NDHQ intelligence summary on the Falklands, and CANSIO had promised to follow it up.

21. Z had provided a draft signal on "action-on" etc for Director to send to C-in-C Fleet. ✓


22. The present shift/rota arrangements were to continue over the bank holiday weekend. DR proposed to hold a meeting at 10.00 am on Monday (3/5) but this would be confirmed at tomorrow's (30/4) 1600 hours meeting.

23. Z announced that he would be attending the JIC on Tuesday (4/5) and that K4 would provide the briefing. Director himself would attend the JIC on 10/5 and J/V were asked to provide input to K4 by 1414 on that and every Monday while the crisis lasted.

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25. K advised that NEW MOON would be undertaking its last trials today (29/4). The maximum time for a signal to reach its destination was 6 minutes.

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